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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the opinions of, and advice tendered 
by, members of the Northern Department of the British 
Foreign Office during the years 1939-1942.  Previous 
works on this era have focussed predominantly on the role 
of Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden.  However, an in 
depth and exhaustive analysis of the views of the various 
members of the Northern Department provides a new and 
original perspective on the relations between London and 
Moscow in the critical period from the outbreak of war in 
September 1939 to the signature of the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty in May 1942. 
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 6 
Introduction. 
 
At the heart of the following analysis will be Great Britain’s relations with the USSR 
from the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on 23 August 1939 to the conclusion of the 
Anglo-Soviet alliance of May 1942.  Through an examination of the activities of the 
members of the Northern Department, the Foreign Office unit which dealt with the 
Soviet Union, it is possible to offer a new and original perspective on the 
development of relations between London and Moscow during this critical period of 
the Second World War.  
As Raymond Smith notes, there is a growing acceptance by historians of the 
validity of examining more closely not merely the process of policy formulation but 
the need to ‘highlight the role of permanent officials of the Foreign Office and 
Foreign Service in that process’.1  Indeed, as the late Sir Herbert Butterfield wrote in 
1949: 
  The importance of the higher permanent officials of the Foreign 
  Office is now accepted as a matter of common knowledge; and  
  it has often been noted to what degree a Foreign Secretary is in  
  their hands… These sub-governmental, sub-ministerial actors in  
  the drama are bound to be the real objective of a genuine enquiry 
  into British foreign policy; and the real secrets and the real  
  problems are situated in the very nature of things at this level.
2
 
This is in marked contrast to the hypothesis of A.J.P. Taylor who once described what 
has traditionally passed as diplomatic history as the story of ‘“what one clerk said to 
another clerk” during a period when great events were happening a long way from 
Whitehall’.3  However, it is through a close examination of the men of the Northern 
Department that one can gain a great deal of insight into the reactions and responses 
                                                 
1
 Raymond Smith, ‘Introduction’, in British Officials and British Foreign Policy 1945-50, edited by 
John Zametica (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990), 1-7 (p. 1). 
2
 Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), p. 203. 
3
 Ibid., p. 3.   
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of these men to the ever-changing and fluid nature of the war.  It is my contention that 
the belief that the Northern Department was a ‘relative backwater in the Office’4 is 
incorrect. As William Strang noted, although the men working within the various 
political departments did not finally determine British foreign policy, they would 
collate the ‘pertinent information upon which the policy may be intelligently 
established’.5  Indeed, ‘a man stationed at one of these geographical desks for a 
number of years is a veritable goldmine of information on both the region’s problems 
and the precedents which have been used in past British relations with the area’.6  It 
was the business of the men of the Foreign Office to make themselves expert in the 
conduct of international relations, and the officials within the Northern Department 
were no different to other Foreign Office departments.
7
 
 A second criticism of the men of the Northern Department will be addressed 
in this analysis of British foreign policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second 
World War.  The charge that these men were ‘neither the best nor the brightest’ is 
both insulting and erroneous.  Interestingly, the main criticisms of the Northern 
Department that will be dispelled in this study came from Laurence Collier, the Head 
of the Department between 1934 and 1941.  Similar sentiments were expressed by 
Erik Goldstein in 2006.  Goldstein remarked that the Northern Department was a 
‘marginal’ entity within the Foreign Office.8  Collier, as will be shown, had a 
penchant for hyperbole and was guilty of self-deprecation and self-pity during his 
time at the Soviet desk in the Foreign Office.  To diminish the intellectual acuity of 
                                                 
4
 National Archives [hereafter NA], FO371/ 21103/ N2109/ 272/ 38, Collier to Osborne, 29 July 1937. 
5
 Donald G. Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1961), p. 236. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 William Strang, The Diplomatic Career (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1962), p. 117.  Head of the 
Central Department 1937-39; Special mission to Moscow 1939. 
8
 Erik Goldstein, ‘Sir Laurence Collier (1890-1976)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(October, 2006).  Online edition, www.oxforddnb.com/article/64924, accessed 22 February 2009. 
 8 
these men, and the influence that they did on occasion exert is misleading.  The case 
of Fitzroy Maclean, who was Second Secretary at the Embassy in Moscow during the 
Stalinist purges prior to his tenure at the Northern Department, dispels both 
misconceptions.  Maclean was highly intelligent with excellent and influential 
contacts, and in fact requested a transfer to the Moscow Embassy in the mid-1930s.
9
  
Although the Central Department was regarded by contemporaries and historians 
alike as a more prestigious department, one ought not marginalise the work of Collier 
and his colleagues during this tumultuous period. As will be shown through an 
analysis of the activities of the Northern Department, influence could be exerted by 
men of rather junior rank, not merely by the Permanent Under-Secretary and Foreign 
Secretary, a process facilitated by changes to the structure of the Foreign Office at the 
turn of the twentieth century. 
In 1962 Strang wrote that ‘the foreign policy of a state may be defined in a 
rough and ready way as embodying the purposes, intentions or objectives pursued by 
its government in the conduct of relations with the governments of other states, and 
the methods adopted by it in order to achieve those purposes’.10  For D.C. Watt, 
Britain is essentially an oligarchic society in which power is exercised by a minority 
of its citizens.
11
  At the heart of the formulation of foreign policy lies the Foreign 
Office, which has been regarded as the ‘headquarters for the administration of foreign 
relations’12 and was the place where policy was framed.13  It is the job of the Foreign 
Office to make available to the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister all of the 
relevant information and recommendations from which future policy may be decided.  
                                                 
9
 Fitzroy Maclean will be discussed in greater detail in the latter part of this chapter. 
10
 Strang, The Diplomatic Career, p. 114. 
11
 D.C. Watt, Personalities and Policies.  Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Longmans, 1965), p. 1. 
12
 Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations, p. 229. 
13
 Strang, Diplomatic Career, p. 14. 
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Although the Foreign Office was ‘not so much a maker of policy as an instrument for 
its execution’, Strang clearly illustrated the significance of this government 
department: 
  It does not … seek to impose its own ideas in disregard 
  of the democratic principle of ministerial and  
  parliamentary control over a nation’s action; but it does   
  supply, in marshalled and digested form, the bulk of  
  those facts on which alone sound policy can be based, 
  and gives its own opinions on the courses of action 
  which the facts make necessary or indicate as desirable.
14
 
The Foreign Office is responsible for the conduct of Britain’s international affairs.  
Working alongside the Diplomatic Service,
15
 the permanent officials within the 
Foreign Office ‘help to fit together the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle’.16  Although an 
examination of the Foreign Office is at the heart of this study, one must not neglect 
exploration into the Diplomatic Service which provided the men in Whitehall with the 
intelligence upon which their recommendations were based.
17
  If the Foreign Office 
ought to be regarded as the headquarters of diplomatic activity, then the embassies 
abroad were the ‘front lines’ through which the Foreign Office operated.  As Strang 
noted, the Foreign Service may ‘reasonably be regarded as the most reliable of all the 
possible channels of supply’ for it was a ‘highly-trained body accustomed to 
scrutinise and assess the trends of the outside world and enjoying the advantages of 
direct official access to the leaders of the world’.18  If there was an issue of particular 
importance, the information would be passed on to the Cabinet who would discuss the 
matter in detail. 
                                                 
14
 William Strang, The Foreign Office (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1955), p. 20. 
15
 The Diplomatic Service oversaw the staff of Britain’s overseas embassies, and received memoranda, 
despatches and minutes from the varying ambassadors. 
16
 Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations, p. 242. 
17
 Michael Hughes, ‘Diplomacy or Drudgery?  British Consuls in Russia during the Early Twentieth 
Century’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 6, 1 (1995), 176-195 (p. 177). 
18
 Strang, The Foreign Office, p. 18. 
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 Then as now, within the Foreign Office there were political departments that 
oversaw Britain’s foreign relations.  The work was split geographically, with the 
Northern Department focussing on Britain’s relations with Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the Soviet 
Union.  The Southern Department dealt with Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy 
whilst the Central Department dealt with France, Germany, Holland, Luxemburg, 
Poland and Belgium.  Although the Northern Department dealt primarily with matters 
concerning the Soviet Union, due to the complex and interconnected issues of the 
interwar and war years, often the work of the Northern and Central Departments 
would overlap.  
 The origins of the Foreign Office are unclear.  In 1253 there is mention of a 
Secretary to the Sovereign whose position was comparable to the present Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs.  By the mid-sixteenth century two secretaries of equal 
standing were appointed and were tasked with overseeing the two political 
departments, the Northern and Southern Departments.
19
   However, it was not until 
1782 that the name ‘Foreign Office’ as a separate department of state was first 
coined.
20
  The staff making up the Foreign Office in the late eighteenth century staff 
consisted of the Secretary of State, a Parliamentary and Permanent Under-Secretary, 
two Senior Clerks and nine Junior Clerks.  At this juncture it was the Foreign 
Secretary and his Under-Secretaries that did the majority of the work.  The Foreign 
Secretary stood at the head of the Foreign Office and was typically an aristocrat who 
had close ties with the Sovereign.  As with all other Departments of State, the Foreign 
                                                 
19
 Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations, p. 229.  These political departments were 
created in 1640. 
20
 John Tilley and Stephen Gaselee, The Foreign Office (London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons Ltd, 1933), p. 2.  
Tilley was the Chief Clerk at the Foreign Office between 1913 and 1918 whilst Gaselee was the 
Librarian and Keeper of the Papers at the Foreign Office. 
 11 
Secretary was not a civil servant but a member of the Government, and was ‘by 
custom personally responsible … for the acts of the government as a whole’.21   
  The Foreign Secretary is a member of the government, 
  working with colleagues in the Cabinet under the  
  general direction of the Prime Minister.  He must conform 
  his action to general government policy and see that, on 
  matters of major importance, he carries with him his  
  Cabinet colleagues, each of whom may have his own view 
  to express, fortified maybe by the advice of his officials.
22
   
 
Although the Office was regarded as autonomous department of state, it was 
not until the nineteenth century that the advisory function of the Foreign Office was 
established.
23
  Previously the Office was regarded merely as the Secretary of State’s 
‘clerical organisation’ whose remit consisted merely of copying, ciphering and 
filing.
24
  In the late nineteenth century, Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, sought 
little advice about policy even with leading officials.
25
  The structure of the ‘Old 
Foreign Office’26 – a termed used by Collier in an article in Blackwood’s Magazine – 
was pyramidal, with the Foreign Secretary standing at the apex of the Office 
hierarchy.  The Foreign Secretary’s chief advisor, the Permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, had been the ranking member of the Foreign Office since 
the days of Lord Hammond.
27
  The Permanent Under-Secretary oversaw the running 
of the Foreign Office and the embassies abroad, supplied the Foreign Secretary with 
all the relative facts that would help him in the formulation of policy, whilst putting 
                                                 
21
 Strang, Diplomatic Career, p. 117. 
22
 Ibid., p. 127. 
23
 Strang, The Foreign Office, p. 17. 
24
 Ibid., p. 146. 
25
 D.C. Watt, ‘The British Foreign Office Between the Wars’, in Shadow and Substance in British 
Foreign Policy, 1895-1939, edited by B.J.C McKercher and D.F. Moss (Alberta: University of Alberta 
Press, 1984), 181-202 (p. 181). 
26
 The ‘Old Foreign Office’ spanned the years 1898-1906. 
27
 Zara Steiner, ‘The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office, 1898-1905’, The Historical Journal, 6, 1 
(1963), 59-90 (p. 62). 
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forward his own recommendations as to what should be done.
28
  In the period under 
examination, the Permanent Under-Secretary was Alexander Cadogan, who came 
from a family well-versed in the intrigues of diplomacy as his father held Under-
Secretaryships in the Ministry between 1874-80.
29
  Cadogan was often praised by his 
colleagues for his level-headed approach to diplomacy.  As Lord Temperley recalled, 
Cadogan ‘knew everything, was never in a hurry, never ruffled no matter how 
irritated the caller might be, and he possessed a canny judgement of the right course 
to adopt in a given situation’.30  Beneath the Permanent Under-Secretary sat the 
Under-Secretaries who supervised a group of political departments.  Under-
Secretaries had the authority to comment on the despatches of departments other than 
their own; for example, the Under-Secretary supervising the Northern Department 
could minute a Southern Department memorandum.  During the period under 
examination Sir Orme Sargent, a Deputy Under-Secretary, played the key role within 
the Northern Department hierarchy, and was described by Sir Robert Vansittart, 
Cadogan’s predecessor, as a ‘brilliant and rather passionate character’.31   
The heads of department – or Chief Clerk – were the ‘real experts in the 
Foreign Office’ as they were highly experienced and knowledgeable in the affairs of 
their geographic region and often remained in post for eight to twelve years.
32
  The 
head of department minuted the papers that were supplied to him by the juniors and 
his minutes often merely provided routine directions.  However, he was, on occasion, 
able to produce more superior drafts.  As Tilley noted: ‘… the Senior Clerk was 
                                                 
28
 Churchill Archives [hereafter CA], Cadogan Papers, ACAD 4/5, Cadogan to Gilbert, 14 March 
1962. 
29
 David Dilks, The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945 (London: Cassell, 1971), p. 1. 
30
 Arthur C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe (London: Collins, 1938), p. 108. 
31
 Robert Vansittart, The Mist Procession: the Autobiography of Lord Vansittart (London: Hutchinson, 
1958), p. 399. 
32
 Steiner, ‘The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office’, p. 71.  Heads of Department were also referred 
to as ‘Chief Clerks’. 
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supposed to have, and did have, a thorough knowledge of what was going on in his 
sphere, and was expected to be ready to supply information at the shortest possible 
notice’.33  Sources of information ranged from minutes, memoranda and telegrams 
from the diplomatic missions abroad.  Minutes were particularly useful as they were 
often written in a great hurry, thus revealing the immediate reactions of the author to 
events.  Memoranda, however, were more considered and contained views or 
proposals that possessed significance in and of themselves.  Telegrams from 
ambassadors possessed a wide variety of intelligence from ‘the man on the spot’ and 
would often contain reports on the political situation in the countries where they were 
posted. 
 Although concrete figures are impossible to calculate, it has been estimated 
that the total number of despatches and memoranda that flowed through, and were 
handled by, the Foreign Office is as follows: in 1821 the number totalled 6,193; in 
1849 the number was 30,725 and by the turn of the nineteenth century the number had 
increased to 44,041 – quite some margin in the space of some eighty years.34  With 
the approach of the twentieth century it was clear that change was necessary in order 
to relieve the burden of work from the Foreign Secretary and Permanent Under-
Secretary.  As Thomas Keene noted, ‘if the Foreign Office was too proud to let 
someone else interfere, it was not too stupid to see that changes to bring more 
efficiency were required’,35 as the strain on the Secretary of State was simply too 
great.  So, in 1889, copying clerks were introduced, though on a very limited basis.
36
  
It was at this time that the staff of the Foreign Office were divided into first and 
second division clerks.  First division clerks did all the important and political work 
                                                 
33
 Tilley and Gaselee, The Foreign Office, p. 130. 
34
 Bishop, Administration of British Foreign Relations, p.231. 
35
 Thomas Keene, ‘The Foreign Office and the Making of British Foreign Policy, 1929-35’, 
unpublished PhD thesis (Ann Arbor, 1975), p. 5. 
36
 Ibid. 
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whilst the second were employed in the non-political departments.
37
  This was 
deemed insufficient for the task of devolution of work from the Foreign Secretary.  It 
was thus decided that the calibre of recruits into the Office ought to be encouraged 
through the introduction of stiffer examinations. 
Entrance into the Foreign Office was first made subject to examination in 
1856, with a clear distinction between intellectual and clerical work.  In order to sit 
the examination it was necessary to be nominated by the Secretary of State.  One of 
the chief complaints of the Foreign Office prior to the 1906 reforms was the narrow 
social stratum from which its members were recruited.  In order for the Foreign 
Secretary to nominate a candidate for examination, they had to be known to either 
him or one of his close advisors.  Strang defended the narrowness of the social base of 
candidates, believing that there were compelling practical reasons for choosing 
candidates for the diplomatic career from a restricted social stratum.  In any case, the 
Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service ‘must and will recruit from the best’ that 
society had to offer.
38
  D.C. Watt argued that the Foreign Office and Diplomatic 
Service had to reflect the nature of the society in which it served.  ‘By its nature it 
must be drawn from the elite groups of Britain, since its job was both to represent the 
elites abroad, and to represent to them the nature of foreign interests’.39   
 If the candidate wished to enter the Diplomatic Service he had to prove that he 
had a private income of at least £400 per year. This ‘property qualification’ was 
necessary as diplomats spent their first two years as unpaid attachés, and were then 
paid £150 on their appointment as Third Secretary.
40
   The property qualification 
compounded cries of elitism, whilst the fact that candidates had to be proficient in 
                                                 
37
 Steiner, ‘The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office’, p. 60. 
38
 Strang, Foreign Office, p. 72. 
39
 Watt, Personalities and Policies, p. 188. 
40
 Christina Larner, ‘The Amalgamation of the Diplomatic Service with the Foreign Office’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, 7, 1 (January 1972), 107-126 (p. 107. 
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both French and German generally necessitated that any potential candidate study 
abroad prior to sitting the examination.  Fitzroy Maclean would have met the criteria 
for entrance into the Diplomatic Service under the ‘Old Foreign Office’ era.  Born in 
1911 to a vast inheritance, Maclean was conceived in Inverness, born in Egypt and 
had lived in both Florence and Paris by the age of 8.
41
   
Once a candidate had completed a year or two of study abroad in preparation 
for the Foreign Office or Diplomatic Service examination, he would spend a final 
year at the infamous Scoones cramming school on Garrick Street, run by a certain Mr 
Scoones.  John Tilley spoke very warmly of Scoones, who ‘knew the tricks of the 
trade’ and ensured that would-be entrants were guided by first-class teachers for both 
foreign languages and history.
42
  Tilley recalled fondly: 
 When I went up for examination, I believe that in  
 twenty years there had not been more than one  
successful candidate for the Foreign Office who had 
not been to that famous crammer.  Of the dozen or 
so candidates who went up with me, there was one  
from another crammer, and he got no marks at all. 
The teaching was certainly very good, and I believe 
the Private Secretaries had considerable confidence 
in Scoone’s personal opinion of the candidates.43 
 
Owen St Claire O’Malley was one such candidate who attended Scoones, 
although he ultimately abandoned the school and instead worked with private tutors.
44
  
O’Malley failed his entrance examination on his first attempt, yet secured his place on 
his second attempt. Fitzroy Maclean, in comparison, successfully passed his Foreign 
Office examination on his first attempt.  Indeed, in the written examination Maclean 
swept the board and in his French and German papers he scored 97%, the highest 
                                                 
41
 Frank McLynn, Fitzroy Maclean (London: Frank Murrary, 1992), p. 4. 
42
Tilley and Gaselee, The Foreign Office, p. 89.  
43
 Ibid., p. 88. 
44
 Owen O’Malley, The Phantom Caravan (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 33.  O’Malley spent five 
years in the Northern Department from 1919. 
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marks ever recorded for a would-be entrant.
45
  For Archibald Clark Kerr, who 
succeeded Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, his experience at 
Scoones was far more enjoyable than that of O’Malley, and he used the establishment 
to brush up on his skills prior to sitting the examinations.
46
 
Candidates had to speak two languages and were tested on handwriting, 
orthography, précis writing and translation from French.
47
  In 1871 Latin and German 
were made compulsory, with optional examinations in Greek, Italian and Spanish, as 
well as history and ‘general intelligence’.  By the time that Clark Kerr took his 
examination for entrance into the Diplomatic Service, it was essential to be proficient 
in four foreign languages.
48
  The Foreign Secretary implemented further changes in 
1904.  The minimum age of recruits increased from nineteen to twenty-two; a 
measure that was praised by Tilley as he felt that ‘nineteen was too young to begin a 
career which was to be made altogether or mainly in foreign countries’.49  A key 
factor that motivated Lord Landsdowne to raise the age limit was to increase the 
number of university graduates and to broaden the educational backgrounds of the 
candidates.  Landsdowne believed that a special emphasis on foreign languages in the 
general civil service examinations was paramount following consultation with several 
heads of Oxford and Cambridge colleges.
50
 
Not only were reforms needed to relieve the burden of work from the Foreign 
Secretary, but there was a pressing need for an ‘administrative revolution’ in order to 
bring the Foreign Office ‘in line with other great departments of state’.51  Complaints 
                                                 
45
 McLynn, Fitzroy Maclean, p. 10. 
46
 Donald Gillies, Radical Diplomat.  The Life of Archibald Clark Kerr, Lord Inverchapel, 1882-1951 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 8. 
47
Tilley and Gaselee, The Foreign Office, pp. 73-74. 
48
 Gillies, Radical Diplomat, p. 8. 
49
 Ibid., p. 82.   
50
 Steiner, ‘The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office’, p. 85. 
51
 Ibid., p. 59.   
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from Cabinet members necessitated the need for reform.  Important despatches were 
not being disseminated and it was believed that the system of archiving past 
correspondence was inadequate.  Too much time was wasted looking for lost papers, 
much to the frustration of all involved.  Reorganisation of the Foreign Office along 
the lines of the Colonial System was first recommended by Mr Arthur Otway, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary between 1868 and 1869.  Otway was scathing of the 
fact that clerks had little or no opportunity of giving their opinions and were 
essentially reduced to mere copyists.  He firmly believed that by adopting a similar 
approach to that of the Colonial Office, clerks could make their observations on the 
despatches as they arrived and send them to their department head.
52
   
In response to the criticisms of Cabinet members, the so-called ‘Crowe 
Reforms’ were introduced in 1906.  Although these reforms dealt specifically with the 
Registry of the Office, the Crowe reforms ‘effectively revolutionised the Foreign 
Office’.53  Whilst the reforms of 1906 were the culmination of a series of steps taken 
by Lord Landsdowne to improve his diplomatic establishment, it was Crowe who 
oversaw the implementation of the reforms.
54
   
 The impact of Eyre Crowe upon Laurence Collier is evident.  In ‘Impressions 
of Eyre Crowe’, found in Collier’s private papers in the archives at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, Collier wrote in glowing terms of Crowe 
who he described as a ‘legend’ who kept a ‘sharp eye on the juniors’, of whom Collier 
himself was one.  It is unsurprising that Sir Eyre Crowe was so deeply involved in the 
reforms at the turn of the century.  Aside from Crowe’s reputation for keeping a sharp 
                                                 
52
 Tilley and Gaselee, The Foreign Office, p. 92.  This change involved a redistribution of work that 
would relieve the first division of virtually all its clerical duties. 
53
 Keene, ‘The Foreign Office and the Making of British Foreign Policy’, p. 6. 
54
 Steiner, ‘The Last Years of the Old Foreign Office’, p. 88. 
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eye on the juniors, Crowe’s obsession with detail was well known throughout the 
Office.  Collier wrote: 
  The average Foreign Office clerk might have been 
  excused for supposing Crowe to be a single-minded 
  fanatic when all he had to judge was the copious  
  flood of minutes, notes and memoranda which 
  descended on us from his room, always in a neat and  
  clear handwriting … No detail escaped his corrective 
  notice, whether it was an accuracy in English 
  grammar or an unsuitable piece of red tape.
55
 
The reforms themselves were as exhaustive as Eyre Crowe’s eye for detail.  
Tilley, who entered the Foreign Office in 1893, was particularly critical of the fact 
that a body of men who were recruited by highly competitive examinations were 
employed for the first fifteen to twenty years of their career on work that was of the 
‘simplest possible character’.  Indeed, it was a case of revolution from below, stating 
that there was ‘a feeling that the questions with which the Foreign Office had to deal 
had grown so much in number and intricacy that there was work of a better kind 
waiting to be done if we could be allowed to do it’.56  The introduction of stiffer 
examinations certainly succeeded in improving the calibre of Foreign Office recruits.  
However, such highly intelligent men were not content to spend the first fifteen years 
of their careers as ciphers.  It was no longer believed that clerical work was good 
training for diplomacy, and work of a more engaging and challenging nature was 
necessary for the men of the third room.
57
   
 Each political department within Whitehall was organised in a three-room 
system.  The head of department was situated in the first room, his principal assistant 
was based in the second, and the lowest men in the hierarchy, the Second and Third 
Secretaries, occupied the third room.  Members of the ‘third room’ spent leisurely 
                                                 
55
 London School of Economic and Political Science [hereafter LSE], Collier Misc 0466 Files, 
‘Impressions of Sir Eyre Crowe’, p. 2. 
56
 Tilley and Gaslee, The Foreign Office, p. 153.   
57
 Keene, ‘The Foreign Office and the Making of British Foreign Policy’, p. 5. 
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afternoons.  As Collier himself remarked, the Foreign Office could be likened to the 
fountains in Trafalgar Square because they played from ten until four.
58
  J.D. Gregory 
aptly conveyed the boredom facing the juniors in the third room: ‘… members of the 
Foreign Office lived a pleasant routine existence which stultified their education, 
dulled their wits and deprived them of any kind of initiative’.59  The ‘multifarious but 
simple’ tasks of the juniors included docketing newly arrived letters, ciphering and 
deciphering telegrams and copying papers as deemed necessary by the department 
head.  Tilley recollected just one instance whereby he contributed to an annual 
departmental memorandum; yet this was certainly a one-off occurrence.
60
  
The Foreign Secretary agreed with the general consensus that reform was 
necessary.  Thus, Landsdowne set up a committee to examine the organisation of the 
Foreign Office – the process of evolution had begun.  The principal aim of the 
reforms was to ‘relieve the Diplomatic Establishment of the Office by devolving a 
portion of the work now performed by it on Clerks of the Second Division’.  In that 
way it might ‘be free to devote itself to more important work’.61  The proposed 
changes would ensure that memoranda were kept constantly prepared and up to date 
and that all second division clerks should deal with the minor details.  This aim was 
achieved with the creation of a general registry that was made up of a growing 
number of second division clerks.
62
 
 Under the new system the Foreign Office operated essentially in a collegiate 
system, with the document starting with the most junior official and slowly escalating 
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further up the Foreign Office hierarchy to the Foreign Secretary.
63
   Any incoming 
despatch was registered to the general registry and covered with a jacket for 
circulation.  Papers were placed in the jacket, with ‘wide and cleanly space [sic] of 
which allowed full scope for minutes’.64  The copying clerks would then summarise 
its contents, collect all related material and send it to the political departments.  There, 
beginning with the most junior officials, the material was read, and suggestions as to 
the best course of action were minuted on the jacket.
65
  The junior would perhaps 
suggest a draft reply which would either be amended or accepted by their superior.  
Alexander Cadogan appreciated the contributions of officials, even if their 
suggestions were not taken any further.  Officials were not expected to formulate 
policy, and ‘if he fails to convince, I think he has no real grievance … he has at least 
done his duty’.66  Under the new system, an ambassador’s despatch customarily did 
not reach the Foreign Secretary until it had been thoroughly fleshed out and debated 
and the jacket covered in minutes.   As Keene noted, it was not uncommon for an 
‘overburdened minister’ to simply approve the action suggested. 
The role of the juniors was particularly significant in light of the fact that the 
information that flowed into the Office – usually in the form of telegrams and 
despatches sent by the ambassadors and diplomatic missions abroad – was not sifted 
by specialist intelligence officers.  Thus, the varying departments within the Foreign 
Office were alone responsible for sifting through telegrams and despatches, and 
relayed what they believed to be the pertinent points to the head of department, who 
would escalate it further up the Foreign Office hierarchy should it be deemed 
necessary.  It was only papers that related to pertinent matters of policy that reached 
                                                 
63
 Watt, Personalities and Policies, p. 4. 
64
 Harold Nicolson, Lord Carnock: A Study in Old Diplomacy (London: Constable, 1930), p. 326. 
65
 Keene, ‘The Foreign Office and the Making of British Foreign Policy’, p. 6.   
66
 CA, Cadogan Papers, ACAD 4/5, Cadogan to Gilbert, 14 March 1962. 
 21 
the Secretary of State.  Indeed, approximately only 20% of despatches made it past 
department heads.   
 As Steiner writes, following the reforms of 1906, men who had previously 
been mere copying clerks began acting as ‘true advisors’.67  As a consequence of the 
Crowe Reforms, the Office evolved from a ‘cozy, if sometimes rather tedious family 
party to that of a great and efficient department of state’.68 
 Even as a training ground for the junior clerks, the Crowe Reforms were 
deemed a success. 
69
  One of Crowe’s aims was for the juniors to impress their 
superiors through their contributions to papers in order to gain promotion.  The 
possibility of promotion following an impressive piece of work was true for both the 
men in the Foreign Office and in the Diplomatic Service.  Gladwyn Jebb recalled that 
three memoranda he composed between the summers of 1933 and 1934 caught the 
eye of R.A. Butler, then a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.  Butler was 
impressed with Jebb’s observations and marked the beginning of an illustrious and 
life-long friendship.
70
   
Under the new system, each diplomatic mission abroad had to produce an 
annual report.  The quality of the report was to serve as a guide for the suitability of 
the writer for transfer or promotion.  It must be remembered that within the 
Diplomatic Service there were certain postings that were far more desirable than 
others.  Ivone Kirkpatrick related it to the ‘inner circle’ joke whereby the Foreign 
Service was likened to the London underground.  It was said that once a man was part 
of the ‘inner circle’ it was impossible to leave the track.  The embassies in London, 
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Paris, Berlin and Rome made up this ‘inner circle’.71  Thus, by writing a superior 
paper or suggestion for action, a junior could become an attractive candidate for 
transfer; with the much desired ‘inner circle’ the prize.  The Crowe Reforms 
incentivised a previously unmotivated and bored set of men, and not merely 
restructured the Office but rejuvenated it.   
 At every level in a political department, the opportunity to impress existed 
after 1906.  For the junior clerks there was a sense of purpose in their analysis and 
suggestions, whilst the head of department was able to prove his worth and engender 
a ‘sense of self-reliant responsibility’.72  On his second day as Permanent Under-
Secretary in February 1906, Sir Charles Hardinge informed the Office that he would 
not personally supervise any of the political departments.  This would now be the 
responsibility of the first division clerks.  Hardinge was clearly an advocate of 
delegation and believed that the heads of department ought to work without the direct 
supervision of the Under-Secretaries.
73
  Prior to the Crowe Reforms, the Foreign 
Office had what Tilley referred to as a ‘partial identity’.  In the aftermath of the 
reforms, however, when people spoke of the Foreign Office they were referring ‘not 
to the Foreign Secretary but to the permanent staff in Whitehall’.74 
 Following the 1906 reforms one sees an attempt to increase the number of 
members of the professional and middle classes that gained entry into the Office.  
Previously, ‘the Foreign Office was the place where political importance and social 
distinction were most obviously and closely linked, it was this combination which 
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gave it its legendary prestige’.75  Indeed, between 1898-1907 over half of the 
successful candidates came from aristocratic backgrounds.
76
  Ivone Kirkpatrick’s 
mother was a friend of Queen Victoria, who was also the godmother of his sister,
77
 
whilst Alexander Cadogan came from an extremely wealthy family and fitted the 
typical Foreign Office mould by attending Eton and Oxford’s Balliol College.  Robert 
Vansittart, Cadogan’s predecessor, also graduated from Eton.  Archibald Clark Kerr, 
the British Ambassador to the USSR at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet 
alliance, came from a family of considerable wealth and was educated in France and 
Germany prior to sitting his examination for entrance into the Diplomatic Service.
78
  
As O’Malley remarked, upon his entry into the Western Department in 1911, four out 
of six men in his department were the offspring of noble families.
79
 
 Thus, criticism that the ‘Old Foreign Office’ had recruited from too narrow a 
social base was not without foundation.  In order to address calls of elitism within the 
Foreign Office, a Board of Selection was created in 1907.  The Board consisted of the 
Permanent Under-Secretary, the Foreign Secretary’s principal private secretary, one 
or more members of the Diplomatic Service and one of the heads of the political 
departments of the Foreign Office.  It was hoped that the Board would broaden the 
social base of candidates, and to a degree it did.  In the final years of peace before the 
outbreak of the First World War, there had been a slight widening of the selection 
pool.  However, as Steiner illustrates, nine out of sixteen successful candidates came 
from Eton and fifteen attended either Oxford or Cambridge.
80
  In 1919 twenty-two out 
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of forty-four office clerks were old Etonians.  Clearly, the entrance of men like 
Collier into the Office was part of a slowly evolving trend. 
Laurence Collier, the Head of the Northern Department in the period under 
examination, did not have the same upper-class credentials as his colleagues. Collier 
was born in 1890 into a family of considerable artistic and intellectual distinction.  
His father, John Collier, was a renowned portrait painter.  Collier studied history at 
Balliol College, Oxford, where he was awarded a First-Class Honours degree in 
1912.
81
  After passing a competitive examination he entered the Foreign Office in 
1913 as an apprentice in the ciphering room.
82
 It is interesting to note that between the 
years 1908 and 1913 the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service admitted thirty-
seven recruits into its ranks, and Collier was the only candidate whose father’s 
occupation was listed as ‘artist’.  He was not the ‘typical’ recruit amongst those who 
had been educated at Eton and whose family were of upper-class rank.  Thus, whilst 
his family’s credentials must have impressed the selection board, his appointment can 
be seen as a ‘part of a slow trend on the part of the Foreign Office towards a broader 
social base’.83  In an article for Blackwood’s Magazine in 1972, Collier pointed out 
that he entered the Foreign Office because he ‘had neither the money nor the social 
graces then thought necessary’ for the Diplomatic Service.84  In May 1919 Collier 
was appointed as Second Secretary to the Embassy in Tokyo, returning to the Foreign 
Office on 5 January 1921.
85
  Initially assigned to the treaty department where he was 
promoted to First Secretary in September 1923, he was then posted to the Far Eastern 
Department.  Erik Goldstein wrote that ‘it was for his connection with the northern 
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department remit that his career was especially notable’ as he was promoted to 
counsellor in November 1932 and was appointed C.M.G. in June 1934, finally 
becoming head of department from 1933 until 1941.
86
  Whilst he had not studied the 
Russian language and had never visited the country, it is evident that ‘his general 
training and his long experience with Soviet affairs gave him a strong formal claim, 
by the later thirties, to speak with some authority on the subject of communism’.87  
Doerr noted that if Whitehall had continued to draw even more recruits from varying 
social backgrounds it was conceivable that the Office would have had  ‘a wider range 
of more imaginative policies to pursue’ by providing great opportunities for men such 
as Collier, who was often providing analysis that ran contrary to the prevailing 
Foreign Office consensus.
88
 
Far less is known about Warner in comparison to Collier, possibly due to his 
more relaxed approach to the problem of Anglo-Soviet relations.  Educated at 
Winchester and Magdelan College, Oxford, Warner entered the Foreign Office on 19 
November 1920.  His first overseas post came in April 1923 when he was transferred 
to Constantinople.  He returned to the Foreign Office in May 1928.  By 1940 Warner 
had been promoted to Acting Counsellor in the Foreign Office.  Following Collier’s 
appointment as Ambassador to Norway in May 1941 Warner began his tenure as 
Head of the Northern Department where he would remain until 1946.
89
 
The Crowe Reforms were successful in ushering in a  ‘revolution from below’ 
and were moderately successful in bringing men like Collier into Whitehall.  For the 
Permanent Under-Secretary, however, the Crowe Reforms merely resulted in an 
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increase in paperwork.  The new system of minuting was highly beneficial for junior 
clerks and resulted in a more thorough analysis of papers.  Yet, as the Permanent 
Under-Secretary oversaw the running of the Foreign Office, the vast burden of the 
increased work fell on him.  Between 1906 and 1912 the number of despatches 
increased by a staggering 38%.
90
  As a consequence of this increase in paperwork, a 
bottleneck developed that threatened to overwhelm the new Registry system.
91
 
The Royal Commission on the Civil Service, created in April 1914, sought to 
examine and rectify outstanding issues that were either created by or omitted from the 
reforms of 1906.  The Commission was to study the Foreign Office as well as the 
Diplomatic and Consular Services.  However, this evaluation of Britain’s diplomatic 
machinery did not stem merely as a result of the strained Registry system.  Critics of 
the Foreign Office were vehement in their insistence that the foreign policy-making 
process ought to be subjected to democratic oversight and control.
92
  Upon the 
outbreak of the First World War, calls for reform gained momentum and intensity.  
The lack of transparency in British diplomacy was heavily criticised and more 
democratic methods of selection and promotion were regarded as essential.
93
  As 
James Joll and Gordon Martel highlighted, many diplomats defended the Foreign 
Office from both the Liberal and radical critics.  The men of Whitehall believed that 
no outsider was qualified to understand the intricacies of their profession and that 
members of the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service ‘must come from a particular 
class or caste’.94  As one senior official of Whitehall put in 1914: 
 I think your Board of Selection will generally take 
 what one may call perhaps one type of man, because 
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 he is the type of man who is fit for this international 
 career called diplomacy.  All … speaking metaphorically, 
 speak the same language; they have the same habits of 
 thought, and more or less the same point of view, and 
 if anybody with a different language came in, I think 
 he would be treated by the whole diplomatic service 
 more or less with suspicion.
95
   
 
Members of the British Diplomatic Service shared a reputation for being part 
of an exclusive club, one that was exceedingly difficult to gain membership, 
especially if one did not come from the correct social background.  
In spite of the attempts of Crowe et al to address and reduce the social 
snobbery associated with the British diplomatic institutions, the reforms of 1906 were 
evidently regarded as insufficient for critics.  As Steiner remarked: ‘All the clichés of 
the Foreign Office staff were true; it was indeed the stronghold of the aristocracy and 
everything was done to preserve its class character and clannish structure’.96  The 
Royal Commission, also known as the MacDonnell Commission, of 1914 sought to 
remove this property requirement, whilst reforming the Board of Selection of 1907.  
Members from outside the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service were to be 
members of the Board, which was to meet after rather than before a candidate sat the 
examination. 
A third recommendation of the MacDonnell Commissioners is particularly 
relevant to this study.  It was recommended that the staffs of the Foreign Office and 
Diplomatic Service be amalgamated into one department as it was believed that both 
services would benefit; particularly the Diplomatic Service.  As a consequence of 
amalgamation it would be possible for officials to be posted at the Moscow Embassy 
and then be transferred to the Northern Department in London.  Both Fitzroy Maclean 
and Armine Dew had benefitted from the interchangeability between the two services, 
                                                 
95
 Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 189. 
96
 Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p 16. 
 28 
whilst Laurence Collier had been posted to the Tokyo Embassy prior to his transfer to 
the Northern Department.
97
  Maclean had been posted to Moscow during the show 
trials of 1937-38 whilst Dew succeeded him following Maclean’s transfer to the 
Soviet desk at the Foreign Office.  It is interesting to note that both Maclean and Dew 
had previously served at the Paris Embassy, one of the ‘inner circle’ posts, and had 
been praised for their intellectual acuity and dedication.  It is worthy to note that 
Maclean had made the unusual request to be transferred to Moscow.  In his 1951 book 
Eastern Approaches, he described the reactions of his colleagues to his decision to be 
transferred to the Moscow Embassy: 
  Everyone whom I consulted about my projects told me that  
  I was deeply mistaken.  They assured me that the Moscow  
  Embassy was a dead end.  Life there would be even more 
  sedentary and a great deal duller than life in London and  
  Paris.  I should see no Russian and gain no insight into the  
  intricacies of Soviet policy.
98
  
  However, Maclean was not alone in his request to be transferred to the 
USSR.  As will be shown, Sir Stafford Cripps had asked to visit Moscow in order to 
build bridges with the Soviets – although originally in an unofficial capacity – whilst 
Archibald Clark Kerr had accepted a posting to the Mexican Legation in 1937 on the 
proviso that if he did well there, he might be offered a position in Moscow.  Although 
Clark Kerr was offered the more prestigious position of Ambassador to Iraq instead, 
he had relished the possibility of working at the Moscow Embassy, which he believed 
to be ‘one of the few worthwhile posts’.  He himself predicted that it would ‘soon be 
by far the most important embassy in the world’.99  The opportunity to work at the 
Moscow Embassy was relished by Maclean, in spite of the notorious unpopularity of 
any posting to the USSR.  Hence, as a consequence of amalgamation, men who had 
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first-hand experience of communism and the Soviet state could draw upon that 
experience whilst working in the Northern Department, thus becoming ‘experts’ in 
the true sense of the word. 
The outbreak of the war in 1914 not only delayed the application of the 
recommendations but also dramatically increased the workload of the Foreign Office, 
placing even greater strain on the already overburdened registry.
100
  Following a 
report from the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service in April 1918, the two services 
were finally amalgamated in 1919.  For the purposes of promotions and transfers the 
two services worked from one common seniority list.  Although amalgamation was 
approved by Parliament, under the leadership of Curzon and Hardinge outstanding 
issues of recruitment, promotion and training were ignored.  Thus, the changes 
recommended by the Commissioners proved to be less decisive than was hoped.
101
  A 
key reason for the lacklustre application of the Commission’s recommendations was 
simply a lack of public interest in foreign policy following the Paris Peace 
Conference; the issues raised by the Commission were no longer at the fore of the 
public consciousness. 
Due to the lack of enforcement of the reforms, charges of elitism were once 
again raised, with the Diplomatic Service returning to its old ways.  Although the 
property qualification had been abolished, it was still very much believed that having 
private means was almost essential if one wished to pursue a diplomatic career.
102
  
Interchangeability between the two services certainly increased; almost all lower-level 
diplomats appointed after 1919 had at least one posting abroad,
103
 yet the educational 
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and social background of candidates were not as diverse as reformers would have 
hoped.  To be sure, there were recruits who did not come from aristocratic 
backgrounds.  William Strang was one such example.  Strang was the son of an Essex 
farmer and gained admission to the Office on the grounds of his academic ability and 
his impressive war record.
104
  The Tomlin Commission of 1929-31 illustrated that the 
trend towards a broader social base was declining once again, as it was still the major 
public schools which were putting forward most of the successful candidates, with 
Oxford and Cambridge the normal routes for entry.
105
  
Whilst the role of the Foreign Office is to supply the Foreign Secretary with 
various courses of action available to him, the role of the diplomatic missions abroad 
was to supply the Foreign Office with that information whilst conducting the relations 
between His Majesty’s Government and international bodies.  Unfortunately for 
British diplomats stationed in the USSR, there was a veil of secrecy surrounding the 
Kremlin and information blackouts were common.  This was very much a common 
complaint of all British ambassadors to Moscow in this period. 
Diplomatic missions abroad were usually headed by ambassadors, yet under 
exceptional circumstances it was possible for the embassy to be headed by the chargé 
d’affaires, as was the case when Sir Stafford Cripps was in London at the time of the 
German invasion of the USSR.  Strang proudly boasted that the British diplomat had 
‘at all times prided himself, and not without justification, on scrupulously suppressing 
his own individual viewpoint and loyalty representing the national attitude as 
embodied in that of the Government of the day’.106   
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During the period under examination, the ambassadors posted to the USSR 
were Sir Stafford Cripps and Archibald Clark Kerr.  Belonging to the radical left of 
the Labour Party, Sir Stafford Cripps had long argued in favour of an improvement in 
Anglo-Soviet relations and steadfastly believed that an Anglo-Soviet understanding 
was key in erecting a barrier to German aggression and expansion.  However, Cripps’ 
proclamations that the Labour Party ought to unite with all political parties 
irrespective of class ‘in order to more effectively fight galloping Fascism’ were 
heavily criticised by members of his own Party.
107
  Consequently, in June 1939 he 
was expelled from the Labour Party due to his advocacy of Popular Front policies.   
Following the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Cripps wrote an article in 
The Tribune, and, rather than altering his opinions on the Soviet Government, as 
Collier had done, he instead praised the ‘realism’ of Molotov and Stalin which had 
spared the Soviet people the horrors of war.
108
  Cripps’ pro-Soviet attitudes often 
exasperated his Foreign Office colleagues, as evidenced, for example, by Sargent’s 
damning criticism of the ambassador in April 1941 following Cripps’ refusal to 
deliver Churchill’s warning to Stalin about concentrations of German troops on the 
German-Soviet border.
109
  In his scathing analysis of Sir Stafford Cripps, Sargent 
stated that the ambassador had the ‘political judgement of a flea’.110  This sentiment 
was generally accepted within the Foreign Office.  Cripps’ behaviour and vacillations 
were a source of much frustration to senior officials such as Collier and Sargent.   
Archibald Clark Kerr, Cripps’ successor as ambassador, was a far more 
composed individual, much like Christopher Warner.  Prior to his appointment to 
                                                 
107
 Eric Estorick, Stafford Cripps: A Biography (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1949), p. 169. 
108
 H. Hanak, ‘Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador in Moscow May 1940 to June 1941’, The English 
Historical Review, 94, 370 (January, 1979), 48-70 (p. 52). 
109
 NA, FO371/ 29479/ N1573/ 78/ 38, minute by Sargent, 13 April 1941. 
110
 Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931-1945 (London: Muller, 1957), p. 41. 
 32 
Moscow, Clark Kerr had been British Ambassador in both Iraq and China.
111
  As 
Donald Gillies writes, prior to his removal as ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps ‘had 
lost Churchill’s confidence and, having no influence with Stalin, nor backing from the 
Foreign Office, was … something of a lame duck in Moscow’.112  Although Sir 
Stafford Cripps ‘had not enjoyed the best of fortune in the Soviet capital’,113 it was 
hoped that Archibald Clark Kerr would be more successful.  On 27 April 1942, in a 
letter to the Foreign Secretary, Clark Kerr confessed that he had ‘said goodbye to 
those engaging, and often feckless and exasperating, Chinese with some sadness’.  
The new ambassador predicted that it would prove to be difficult to gain any real 
insight into the workings and opinions of the Soviet Government, ‘other than those 
which the official people wish to create’.  In spite of such obstacles, Clark Kerr 
promised Eden that he could ‘count upon me to put everything I have into this 
harassing job which you have entrusted me with and which, believe me, I am proud to 
have a shot at’.114   Upon his arrival in Kuibyshev, Clark Kerr received a 
communication from Cripps, who had himself spoken in glowing terms of the newly 
appointed ambassador.  Cripps expressed his belief that Clark Kerr, with his vast 
experience and expertise, was a wise appointment.  Cripps had welcomed Clark Kerr 
as his successor for he was ‘convinced that it was essential to have an absolutely first-
class man with the right sympathies to deal with what I know is an extremely difficult 
situation’.115  Cripps was indeed correct.  Clark Kerr was a fine successor and was a 
welcome contrast to many within His Majesty’s Government who had lamented 
Cripps’ many perceived faults.  On 12 June 1942, only weeks after the conclusion of 
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the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Clark Kerr wrote to Warner: ‘I am so strong a believer in the 
closest cooperation between these peoples [sic] and ourselves, both during the war 
and after it, and so anxious to make some useful contribution towards it’.116   
The First Secretary was the second-in-command in the diplomatic mission and 
exerted a good deal of influence as all minutes, memoranda and reports had to be read 
and analysed by him prior to being sent to the Foreign Office.
117
  Below the First 
Secretary sat the Second and Third Secretaries.  Although not regarded as ‘specialists’ 
due to their junior rank, their experience would lead them to acquire specialist 
knowledge of the region in which they were posted. Fitzroy Maclean, who was the 
Second Secretary at the Embassy in Moscow prior to his transfer to the Northern 
Department in 1939, had taken the opportunity to travel throughout the USSR during 
his time there.  Thus, in addition to his experiences at the Moscow Embassy this 
furnished him with a strong impression of the political machinery of the Soviet state, 
both locally and nationally.  Maclean’s background and experience certainly 
impressed his head of department.  Indeed, it has been suggested that Maclean exerted 
a good deal of influence on Collier, who respected the tenacity in which Maclean 
tackled his time in the USSR.
118
 
Upon Hitler’s accession to power in 1933, Maclean believed that war was 
inevitable, as the rise of two opposing political ideologies – Nazism and Communism 
– could only lead to catastrophic results.119  Maclean informed his biographer, Frank 
McLynn, of his reasons for requesting a transfer to the Moscow Embassy: 
 ‘… Communists and Communism were very much in 
 the forefront of everyone’s minds.  This made me want 
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 to see them for myself.  I guessed, too, that Russia  
 might feature in a future war …’120 
Throughout the interwar years the notion of ideological antipathies was a 
preoccupation of Collier’s and was one which was sharpened due to his belief that 
Nazi Germany represented a more immediate threat to British interests than the Soviet 
Union.
121
  
Thus, the Crowe Reforms of 1906 and the reforms stemming from the 
MacDonnell Commission of 1914 gave members of the Foreign Office a formal 
channel through which to exert influence.
122
  As Rothwell writes, clerks in the 
Foreign Office were in a ‘different world of information and influence from clerical 
staff in the normal sense of the term’ as they had input into the various debates of the 
day.
123
   However, the men of Whitehall were also able to exert informal influence 
through the contacts made both within the Foreign Office and with colleagues from 
embassies and missions abroad.  Working within the Foreign Office structure gave 
officials ample opportunity to develop contacts with their political masters. The 
informal atmosphere within the Foreign Office aided the cultivation of relations 
between juniors and their superiors.
124
  Indeed, superiors were rarely addressed as 
‘sir’ and it was not uncommon for issues to be discussed in the halls of the Foreign 
Office.  The homogeneity of the men of the Foreign Office allowed for contacts to be 
established and nurtured; those who attended the same colleges and universities 
developed long-lasting friendships and confidences, whilst official functions gave 
men the opportunity to carry out business in a more informal manner.  Sir Frank 
Lascelles, the British Ambassador in Berlin at the time of Clark Kerr’s posting to the 
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Embassy there, had viewed it as ‘extremely valuable for his young staff to disport 
themselves creditably at as many social gatherings as possible’.  Clark Kerr was 
particularly impressive in social settings and was able to move easily at the numerous 
functions he was expected to attend.  Consequently, he ‘gained the ear of many 
influential personage, picking up important snippets of political and social gossip for 
the Embassy files’.125  
As previously mentioned, a key problem facing the ambassador and visiting 
diplomatic missions in Moscow was the dearth of information emanating from the 
Kremlin.  It was particularly difficult for the men at the Moscow Embassy to provide 
accurate and reliable information as a result.  Fortunately, Clark Kerr had experienced 
such difficulties during his time at the Embassy in Persia.  It was during his time in 
Persia that he gained invaluable experience in an environment ‘where democratic 
niceties were not the guiding principles of political activity’.126  Hence, it was 
necessary for these men to establish contacts that could provide useful information for 
their colleagues in Whitehall.  Maclean recalled: ‘In Paris much of our information on 
the political situation had come to us from our social contacts’, yet this was more 
difficult to do in Moscow.
127
  Thus, upon his arrival in Moscow, Maclean diligently 
studied the annual reports whilst improving his knowledge of the Russian language.  
Once satisfied with his knowledge of what had come before him, Maclean nurtured 
his relationship with Hans ‘Johnny’ Herwath von Bittenfeld, his opposite number at 
the German Embassy.  As his confidence in Maclean grew, von Herwath slowly 
began leaking snippets of top-secret information from his own sources.
128
  Von 
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Herwath informed Maclean that if there were going to be a war, the only hope for 
Germany would be an agreement with the Soviets.  Then, at least, ‘we should not 
have a war on two fronts’.129 
During his time as Second Secretary at the Embassy in Moscow, Maclean 
continued to impress his colleagues in London.  Oliver Harvey, Private Secretary to 
Anthony Eden shortly after he became Foreign Secretary, would often discuss matters 
relating to the Soviet Union with Maclean.  In July 1938 he asked Maclean’s opinion 
of the Soviet leader in the wake of the purges in order to ascertain the efficiency of 
the Red Army.
130
  After witnessing the trial of Bukharin in February 1938, not only 
was Maclean keen to be transferred from Moscow, but his anti-communism became 
more pronounced.  Fortunately for Maclean, he had so impressed his political masters 
that he was granted transfer to the Soviet desk at the Foreign Office, where he was 
regarded as a ‘safe pair of hands’.  Once stationed in Whitehall, Maclean continued to 
strengthen his relationship with Winston Churchill, who he had met at an exclusive 
luncheon club whilst stationed at the Paris Embassy.
131
  In June 1939, Churchill’s 
niece Clarissa invited Maclean to dine with Churchill who wished to speak to 
someone with first-hand experience of the Soviet Union.
132
  This is a clear example 
whereby members of the Foreign Office could seek to influence the opinions of 
politicians through more informal channels, as opposed to exerting formal influence 
through their position within the Foreign Office hierarchy. 
Collier, much like Maclean, was able to establish relationships with men of 
influence within the Foreign Office, in spite of his somewhat controversial views that 
often ran contrary to the prevailing Foreign Office consensus.  Robert Bruce Lockhart 
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shared Collier’s belief throughout the 1930s that Great Britain should seek 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union in order to provide a bulwark to German 
aggression.   Bruce Lockhart was regarded as a true expert in matters concerning 
Russia, due in large part to his time served in Moscow as Vice-Consul prior to the 
Revolution.  Indeed, following the Bolshevik coup d’etat in October 1917, Lockhart 
was instructed to return to Moscow in order to establish unofficial relations with 
Russia.
133
  By January 1939 Collier had gained the support of another highly 
influential man in the Office, Gladwyn Jebb, who was at the time Private Secretary to 
Alexander Cadogan.  This is significant in itself.  As Cadogan’s Private Secretary, all 
papers of any significance passed through Jebb’s hands on their way to his chief’s 
desk.
134
  Indeed, Cadogan expressly instructed Jebb to act as a filter of incoming 
papers and to ‘sort out the ones that don’t matter at all’.135  Incidentally, Jebb’s about-
turn with regard to the desirability of rapprochement with the Soviet Union coincided 
with Cadogan’s own change of heart, as he too came to support the notion of a Soviet 
alliance following the German advance into Prague in March 1939.
136
   Previously 
Jebb had supported the policy of appeasement, yet by the beginning of 1939 he was 
no longer ascribing to the school that believed that Britain should let Germany move 
eastwards.
137
  Collier and Jebb’s views continued to coincide throughout the war, 
most notably during the Soviet-Finnish conflict.  Gaining the support of influential 
men in the Office gave Collier more credibility in his assertions.  Furthermore, one 
appreciates that when Maclean transferred to the Soviet desk in the Foreign Office, 
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Collier’s second-in-command exerted a good deal of influence on the head of 
department due to his close and impressive experience with the Soviets.  
This would not have been possible if not for the reforms of 1906 and 1919.  It 
was through these formal and informal channels that the men of the Foreign Office 
could exert influence and help contribute to the debate surrounding British foreign 
policy.  Therefore, claims that the Northern Department was a ‘relative backwater’ 
and a ‘marginal department’ do not ring true, as it did not work in a vacuum.  To be 
sure, one cannot assert that the recommendations and advice tendered would 
necessarily form the basis of British foreign policy during the war, yet the Northern 
Department contributed to the discussion and ensured that its political masters had 
considered all aspects of the debate, thus allowing the Foreign Secretary to make a 
more informed decision when discussing matters pertinent to British foreign relations 
with the Cabinet.  
 Although the coverage of this thesis begins in 1939, the Northern Department 
sought to exert influence over the direction of British foreign policy in the mid-1930s 
but was consistently unsuccessful.  As far as European affaires were concerned, the 
views of the Central Department under the tutelage of Ralph Wigram and later 
William Strang generally compelled attention in view of the threat posed by Nazi 
Germany.  Indeed, there was a certain gravitas associated with Central Department 
men as their opinions tended broadly to reflect the wishes of the ruling political elite.  
In December 1935 a debate arising from a telegram received in the Foreign Office 
from Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador to Berlin, clearly illustrated the 
existence of inter-departmental disagreement over the thorny issue of Britain’s 
relations with Germany and the Soviet Union.  Sargent questioned whether it would 
be prudent, in order to prevent a Nazi-Soviet rapprochement that ‘could bring the 
 39 
downfall of the British Empire and of civilisation as we know it’,138 for His Majesty’s 
Government to make a ‘supreme effort to come to terms with Germany’ whilst there 
was still time.
139
  Collier recommended a different course.  He pencilled tersely in the 
margin: ‘France and Russia ask nothing but to be left alone, Germany asks for the 
moon.  Why not come to terms with the former?’140  Unfortunately for the Head of the 
Northern Department, his views were unpopular with not merely his colleagues but 
also to his political masters.   
As Michael Roi and Brian McKercher note in their analysis of British foreign 
policy in the interwar years, the assumption of the Premiership by Neville 
Chamberlain in May 1937 marked a watershed in the making of British foreign policy 
in the 1930s.  As Eden would soon discover to his chagrin, the new Premier sought to 
and generally succeeded in directing policy from Downing Street.
141
  The 
controversial and irksome views expressed by Collier flatly contradicted the attitudes 
of the new Prime Minister who was decidedly antipathetic to Soviet Communism and 
refused to consider an understanding with Moscow.  As Chamberlain himself 
expressed in March 1939: ‘I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia … I 
distrust her motives, which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of 
liberty’.142  Thus, throughout the interwar years, especially in the final years of peace, 
it is difficult to discern influence in the activities of the Northern Department.  
However, as the war progressed and relations with the USSR increased in 
significance, views that had hitherto been regarded as unacceptable gained a measure 
of credence and acceptability. 
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The Russian Revolution of November 1917 marked the introduction of 
international Communism into the arena of inter-state relations.  The emergence of 
Soviet Communism was met with confusion and apprehension within Great Britain.  
One Foreign Office official noted as early as 12 November 1917 that ‘Bolshevism is 
essentially a Russian disease’ and for decades thereafter it was generally treated with 
great suspicion within the higher echelons of the Foreign Office.
143
  Moreover, as 
Louise Grace Shaw has forcibly argued, British Cabinet ministers ‘refused for too 
long to overlook their distrust of and hostility towards the Soviet Union’ in the 
interwar period.
144
   
One must remember that the Russian Revolution took place against the 
backdrop of the First World War.  As a result of the revolution the Russian Empire 
withdrew from the fray, its new masters refusing to take any further part in what they 
saw as an imperialistic battle in which the Russian people were perceived merely as 
cannon fodder in an essentially bourgeois conflict.  Subsequently the British 
Government came to the aid of the enemies of the fledgling Bolshevik state partly in 
an attempt to overthrow the new regime.  By the time the Great War and the Russian 
Civil War had ended, the British Government had to face its own problems, including 
mass unemployment, labour unrest and political turmoil in the Empire.  These not 
only created a great sense of uncertainty for the future, but made the British 
authorities even more suspicious of alien political doctrines such as Bolshevism.
145
   
The political landscape of Britain in the 1920s played an important role in the 
course of Anglo-Soviet relations.  When Lloyd George was defeated in the 1922 
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election a new and ferociously anti-communist Conservative Government took office.  
Without the restraining influence of Lloyd George, the new Foreign Secretary, 
Curzon, himself deeply anti-communist, was able to pursue a more confrontational 
stance towards the Soviet Union, leading finally to the ‘Curzon ultimatum’ of 8 May 
1923 which called upon Moscow to cease its revolutionary activities or risk the 
termination of the recently concluded Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement.
146
  
Fortunately, for Anglo-Soviet relations at least, the Conservative Government was 
replaced in January 1924 by a Labour administration, which generated some hope that 
there would perhaps be an improvement in the atmosphere between London and 
Moscow. 
Unfortunately that was not the case.  The ‘Zinoviev Letter’ crisis of  
September 1924 once again led to a further rupture in Anglo-Soviet relations.  The 
publication of a letter by Grigory Zinoviev, the head of the Comintern, to the 
Communist Party of Great Britain, only intensified the distrust felt for Soviet Russia 
by the British political elite.  The document instructed British Communists to put 
pressure on their sympathisers in the Labour Party, lobby the Government to proceed 
with the ratification of the trade treaty with the U.S.S.R., and to intensify ‘agitation-
propaganda work in the armed forces’.  Whilst the letter was later confirmed to be a 
forgery, the crisis it provoked has been regarded as ‘the greatest Red Scare in British 
political history’.147 
As the decade progressed relations between the two countries continued to 
deteriorate. Christopher Andrew has asserted that the legacy of the Zinoviev Letter 
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caused a further breach with the Soviet Union in the form of the Arcos raid in 1927.
148
  
As these examples illustrate, one can justifiably describe the 1920s as a period of 
intense British hostility towards and suspicion of the Soviet Union, a situation which 
itself was not helped not helped by fluctuations in the internal politics of Great 
Britain. 
As for Anglo-Soviet relations during the interwar years, Keith Neilson 
asserted that any analysis of those relations would largely be a ‘study in silence’.149  It 
seems strange for that to be the case.  One might imagine that the magnitude of the 
threat posed to both the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain by the revisionist states, most 
notably Nazi Germany, was such as to make Anglo-Soviet unity a clear imperative for 
the policy makers in both London and Moscow.  Yet throughout the 1930s the British 
government distanced itself from Communist Russia.  Indeed, far from seeking to 
contain Hitler in association with the U.S.S.R., the British consistently sought an 
improvement in their relations with Germany, despite the fact that Hitler’s unilateral 
violations of international treaties and the increasingly aggressive nature of Nazi 
foreign policy appeared to make any such prospect ever more elusive and improbable 
as the decade progressed.  
 From 1934 onwards the Soviet Government professed to have reversed its 
foreign policy position.  Instead of preaching the doctrine of the desirability of a 
world-wide communist revolution, the Soviet Union claimed thereafter to have placed 
its faith in  the ‘indivisibility of peace’, thus firmly positioning the U.S.S.R. alongside 
Great Britain and France as a status quo Power.  In discussing these and other issues 
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one inevitably becomes drawn into the topic of ‘appeasement’ as an Anglo-French-
Soviet alliance would clearly have constituted an alternative to an understanding with 
Germany during the 1930s.   
When assessing the course of international relations in the last years of peace, 
the questions of the appeasement of Nazi Germany and the neglect of Soviet Russia 
run alongside one another simultaneously.  One cannot consider one without the 
other.  Yet in comparison to the historiography of Anglo-German relations the 
historiography of Anglo-Soviet relations is surprisingly thin.  As Carley has 
identified, the subject of Anglo-Soviet relations has not received a great deal of 
attention.  Previous work in that area, predominantly undertaken by British and 
Canadian historians, has viewed appeasement, at least in its somewhat underplayed 
ideological dimension, as an expression of a pro-Fascist and anti-Communist policy, 
with an emphasis on the British Government’s ‘culpability for failing to secure an 
alliance with the U.S.S.R. against Nazi Germany’.150   
This argument has attracted a wide range of support.  For example, writing in 
1965 Margaret George noted that the obsession with Communism had prevented 
British leaders from correctly perceiving the Nazi danger.
151
  More recently, Louise 
Grace Shaw has forcibly argued that Cabinet ministers and members of the Foreign 
Policy Committee ‘refused for too long to overlook their distrust of and hostility 
towards the Soviet Union’.  Consequently, ‘this unwillingness, by most, to overlook 
completely their anti-Soviet prejudices throughout Chamberlain’s premiership meant 
that all ministers ultimately bore some responsibility for Britain’s failure to secure a 
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Soviet ally’.152  Those who place far less emphasis on ideological considerations 
include Donald Lammers and Robert Manne.  Whilst writing decades apart, both 
Lammers and Manne are in agreement that the failure of Anglo-Soviet rapprochement 
was not the result of anti-communism.
153
   
Thus, the idea that His Majesty’s Government was truly desirous of reaching 
an Anglo-Soviet understanding in the opening stages of the war appears, at first sight, 
improbable.  However, it will be contended in this analysis of early Anglo-Soviet 
wartime relations that the British Government – more specifically, the British Foreign 
Office – consistently sought to bring about closer relations with the authorities in 
Moscow.  This desire ebbed and flowed depending largely on the political context of 
the war.  However, it will be illustrated that a central preoccupation of the men of the 
Northern Department and from 1939 their political masters was an attempt to lay the 
foundations upon which an improved Anglo-Soviet relationship could be built and 
strengthened.  Discussions centring upon economics undoubtedly had political 
undercurrents as it was hoped that through a spirit of collaboration a political 
understanding between London and Moscow would be attained.  This was a 
consistently pursued policy throughout the period under examination, and one that 
was initiated immediately upon the outbreak of the war with the British request for an 
economic agreement with the Soviets.   
As Martin Folly notes, ‘to plan on the basis of friendly relations, let alone 
close collaboration, was a radical departure for British policy’.154  This was 
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undoubtedly true, particularly when one considers the poor state of Anglo-Soviet 
relations in the 1920s and 1930s and the prevalent antipathy to the Soviet regime.  
However, in his series of memoirs exploring British foreign policy during the Second 
World War, Winston Churchill argued that British policy towards the USSR was not 
encumbered by ideological prejudice.  Rather, British policy was pragmatic and 
sought to establish improved relations with Moscow during the war.
155
  In the 1940s 
and 1950s memoirs and histories had depicted Stalin’s deviousness as a primary cause 
of the breakdown of Anglo-Soviet relations during the Second World War.  
Churchill’s ‘orthodox’ account set the agenda for any discussion of the war for a 
generation.  Thus, an effective critique of Churchill’s argument was largely 
impossible.  In the opinion of John Hubbard, writing in 1950, Churchill’s The Second 
World War would unquestionably ‘become a classic in English literature’ as would 
the author’s ‘superior foresight and judgement in contrast to the manifold 
misconceptions and errors of his rivals and contemporaries’.156  Walter P. Hall, also 
writing in 1950, fully ascribed to the belief that Churchill ‘did everything within his 
power to aid the Soviets’ and that it was only a lack of Soviet cooperation that 
disrupted the success of the alliance.
157
   
Following the release of the American official documents, the 1960s was 
dominated by American ‘revisionist’ historians who depicted Britain and America as 
having been constantly ready to betray one another, while seeking to find a common 
cause in their hostility to the Soviet Union.
158
   The fundamental problem with the 
hypothesis of American revisionist historians such as Gabriel Kolko and Bruce 
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Kuklick is the fact that they viewed British policy as unambiguously anti-Soviet and 
anti-Communist and were thus unwilling to acknowledge that Great Britain viewed an 
understanding with the Soviet Union as absolutely imperative if Hitlerism was to be 
defeated.  Indeed, a common trend within American revisionism throughout the 1960s 
was the belief that the breakdown of relations between Great Britain, the United 
States and the Soviet Union was primarily due to the nature of American foreign 
policy.  The revisionist school, although rather incoherent and diverse, generally 
asserted that Stalin was a cautious and flexible statesman.  As such, any blame for the 
breakdown of the Anglo-American-Soviet relationship was placed squarely on 
America.
159
  Central to Gabriel Kolko’s argument was that during the pre-war years 
the ‘so-called Allies lived, in various degrees, in mutual distrust and divisive fear of 
one another’.160  Anglo-American hostility towards the USSR continued once 
hostilities erupted, thus ensuring that collaboration was never truly feasible.  Indeed, 
Kolko argued that Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States did not share 
a single set of objectives, nor did they have unified political and economic peace 
aims.  Thus, no real measure of cooperation was ever achieved.
161
  Terry Anderson’s 
analysis of the Anglo-American relationship prior to the Cold War expresses similar 
revisionist sentiments.  Although the British and American governments had a special 
relationship during the crusade against Nazi Germany, both countries shared tactics in 
order to contain Soviet expansion whilst limiting the role of Stalin in the 
relationship.
162
  Critics of Anderson have argued that too much emphasis is placed on 
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Churchill’s anti-Soviet feelings and that Anderson too readily dismissed the Prime 
Minister’s statements of a British desire for cooperation with Moscow.163  Indeed, as 
Arthur Schlesinger Jnr noted in his critique of revisionism, placing the breakdown of 
the Allied wartime relationship on anyone other than Stalin would be futile and 
illogical.
164
 
Writing with the benefit of official British documents, F.S. Northedge and 
Audrey Wells argued in 1982 that ideological bias was prevalent amongst the British 
political elite.  Indeed, both before and during the Second World War, ‘almost 
insurmountable antipathies between the two countries prevented joint action until the 
last possible moment’.165  Gabriel Gorodetsky, a prevalent neo-revisionist historian 
and one of the first scholars to explore wartime diplomacy from a British perspective, 
developed the theme of anti-Communism within the British Government.  In his 
analysis Gorodetsky both distorted and over-emphasised the importance and indeed 
the significance of antipathy to the Soviet regime during the Second World War.  
In his 1988 article exploring the origins of the Cold War Gorodetsky asserts: 
‘Historians, misled by Churchill’s towering oratory in his speech of 22 June 1941, 
have tended to cultivate a myth in which Churchill jettisoned his traditional anti-
Bolshevik sentiments and welcomed Stalin into a genuine alliance’.  This 
interpretation, in Gorodetsky’s opinion, is ‘false’.166  As evidence to support his 
hypothesis, Gorodetsky unconvincingly argues that the Soviet Union was twice 
brought to the threshold of war with Britain when the Allies decided to bomb the 
Soviet oil fields at Baku.  These plans, Gorodetsky asserts, were only dropped 
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because of the German occupation of Norway, Denmark and France.
167
  This is a 
misleading example of British hostility towards the Soviet Union.  As will be shown, 
the Baku plans were in fact abandoned as it was believed by both the Northern 
Department and the Foreign Secretary that the inevitable result of such action would 
be a breach with the Soviet Union.  
In later work, Gorodetsky continued to assert that the ‘traditional Russophobia 
and repugnance towards communism in both the [British] Foreign Office and the 
armed forces’ ensured that British diplomacy ‘failed to grasp and exploit the intricate 
Soviet dual policy, aimed at regaining their manoeuvrability while forestalling the 
crystallisation of a German-British block’.168  His continued belief that the Foreign 
Office was driven by preconceived political concepts that consequently barred the 
way for real collaboration is somewhat baffling in light of clear evidence to the 
contrary.
169
  As Harry Hanak notes in his review of Gorodetsky’s work, the latter 
tends to overlook the very real difficulties facing British diplomats in their dealings 
with the Soviets.  Indeed, neither Foreign Office officials in London nor the men at 
the embassy in Moscow were the ‘ogres’ that Gorodetsky portrayed.  Their attitudes 
and policies towards a notoriously secretive and suspicious Soviet Government were 
formed under difficult circumstances and were not as antipathetic as Gorodetsky 
consistently maintained.
170
  In the period prior to the signature of the Anglo-Soviet 
alliance of 1942, His Majesty’s Government proved on numerous occasions its ability 
to put its distaste for Communism to one side in order to fulfil its primary objective: 
the final defeat of Nazi Germany.    
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There is a further school of thought within the neo-revisionist perspective that 
criticises British policy towards the Soviet Union during the period under 
examination.  Scholars such as Correlli Barnett and Vojtech Mastny argues that the 
decision-making elite in Whitehall were only too aware of Britain’s limited resources, 
yet ‘tried to hang on to great power status by engaging in a kind of diplomacy devoid 
of any real power’.171  As such, the British in fact appeased the Soviets in order to 
achieve rapprochement and thus perpetuate the delusion that they were still a ‘Great 
Power’.  In his study of wartime diplomacy, Mastny emphasises Stalin’s central 
motivation, one of survival.  The willingness of Roosevelt and Churchill to grant 
Stalin territorial concessions merely resulted in a ‘limitless craving for security’ and 
set the tone for further concessions as the war progressed.
172
  It is quite correct to 
assert that the Foreign Office was alive to the limited resources of Great Britain, as 
evident in the refusal during the Winter War to carry out a policy that would likely 
lead to war with the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.  Yet to conclude that the British 
were merely victims of ‘wishful thinking’ is equally unsatisfactory.173  
A final strand of neo-revisionist historiographical thought tends to take a less 
critical approach in its analysis of Anglo-Soviet relations during the Second World 
War.  It is to that school of thought that this thesis belongs.  It does not seek to discuss 
the origins of the Cold War nor does it ascribe blame for the failure of the Grand 
Alliance to survive after 1945.   As Steven Merritt Miner notes, ‘looking backward in 
history to find the causes of later conflicts can distort the relative importance of 
events and issues’.174  Although the following analysis explores the underlying 
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assumptions within Whitehall about Britain’s wartime relationship with the Soviet 
Union, much like the work of Martin Folly, the focus of this analysis focuses only on 
the earlier stages of the war when British policy was in a far more fluid state due to 
the pervading uncertainty of the Nazi-Soviet relationship.  Whilst Folly argues that 
during the period of the Churchill Coalition, ‘there developed a coherent thesis that 
the Soviet Union follow a policy of cooperation with Great Britain after the war’,175 it 
will be argued here that during the period under examination there was far less 
certainty in London about the motives and intentions of Soviet policy; indeed it was 
generally believed that the Soviet Union was merely a non-belligerent ally of Nazi 
Germany. 
The number of studies focussing on the topic of Anglo-Soviet relations during 
the period from September 1939 to May 1942 is surprisingly small, in spite of its 
obvious significance.  The ever-changing war situation greatly impacted upon British 
diplomacy, thus ensuring that a fluid approach based upon a ‘policy of reserve’ was 
maintained by the British Government towards the USSR.  Miner’s examination of 
the Anglo-Soviet relationship covers the same early-war period as this thesis and 
much like the following analysis, it seeks to correct the assertions put forward by 
Gorodetsky, particularly in his 1984 book Stafford Cripps’ Mission to Moscow, 1940-
42.
176
  In his analysis of British foreign policy towards the USSR Miner clearly argues 
that Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Beaverbrook and Anthony Eden were all too willing to 
appease the Soviets in order to bring about an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement.  Miner is 
critical of the British decision to grant concessions over the Baltic States, yet fails to 
acknowledge the fact that there was no real alternative for Great Britain at that time.  
Realpolitik dictated the necessity for rapprochement and Miner’s work fails to 
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appreciate that His Majesty’s Government was, at that juncture in the war, at a 
distinct disadvantage.  Following the fall of France the British were left to fight the 
war alone.  Should Germany turn on and defeat the USSR it seemed inevitable that 
Hitler’s full attention and wrath would be directed against Great Britain.177    
Paul Doerr’s analysis of the period is less critical of British policy towards the 
USSR.  Doerr argues that ‘British policy-makers were driven by a profound 
ambivalence’ in their policy towards the USSR in the opening stages of the war.  A 
deep and abiding mistrust of the Soviets was evident, yet the British ‘remained 
acutely aware of the grave situation they faced and of the overriding need to retain a 
connection with Moscow’.178  Although the overall hypothesis of distrust and 
cooperation put forward by Doerr most closely reflects the arguments contained in 
this thesis, his belief that ‘such ambivalence can be found at the heart of British-
Soviet relations during this period’ remains unsatisfactory.179   British policy was not 
ambivalent.  British policy was dictated by a desire to get on better terms with the 
Soviet Government, as British interests dictated that an Anglo-Soviet alliance was 
paramount if victory over the Axis Powers was to be assured.  This desire for 
rapprochement was originally motivated by economic necessity.   However, it is clear 
that the Foreign Office hoped that improved economic relations would engender a 
spirit of collaboration that would extend to the political sphere.  This is true of the 
entire period under examination.  Soviet aggression in Finland led to a lessening of 
this desire, yet the unpredictability of the war ensured that British policy towards the 
USSR was under constant scrutiny and examination.  Until the position of the Soviet 
Union could be ascertained it was impossible for the British to form a definitive 
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policy.  Thus, British policy was fluid, yet underlined by a genuine desire for 
rapprochement with Moscow.  Considerations of realpolitik dictated that ideological 
prejudice was relegated in importance and significance.   
Thus, to argue that throughout this period ideology drove policy is pure 
misleading.  Michael Jabara Carley’s belief that ideological assumptions concerning 
the spread of communism meant that ‘some British officials not want alliance with the 
Soviet Union, even after the German invasion of the USSR’ is equally 
unconvincing.
180
  British policy was pragmatic and unideological, driven purely by 
British interests.  In this life and death struggle for survival, the final defeat of Nazi 
Germany was absolutely paramount.  It was consistently held, following the fall of 
France in June 1940, that the best way to ensure victory was to seek rapprochement 
with the Soviet Government, no matter how distasteful such an alignment was to the 
British political elite. 
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Chapter One. 
 
‘An act of treachery unparalleled in the history of the modern world.’181 
 
The signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on 23 August 1939 has been described as ‘one 
of the biggest disasters ever to overtake British foreign policy’.182  When the Triple 
alliance negotiations collapsed and the Nazi-Soviet Pact was concluded, the 
reverberations sent shockwaves throughout Europe.  The British Foreign Office was 
in a state of astonishment over this sudden appearance of cooperation between the two 
ideological adversaries who had spent the years since 1933 locked in doctrinal and 
other forms of political combat – most obviously during the Spanish Civil War.  
 In signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact Molotov had ensured that friendly and 
peaceful relations between Moscow and Berlin were established.  Further to the 
improvement of German-Soviet relations, Molotov had created the legal basis for the 
Soviet position in September 1939.  Article II of the Non-Aggression Pact stated: 
‘Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action 
by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support 
to this third power’.183  In accordance with this provision the signatories were bound 
to unconditional neutrality in the case of the other party’s involvement in war which 
negated the Soviet Union’s obligation towards the cause of collective security as 
stipulated in the Covenant of the League of Nations.  This commitment to neutrality 
in the event of a conflict was of central importance for the Soviet Government and 
was one of the key Soviet motivations behind signing the pact with Nazi Germany.
184
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 The impact of the pact must not be underestimated.  It had a profound effect 
upon the perceptions of, and attitudes towards, Soviet Russia of the British political 
elite throughout the war.  The distrust of Soviet intentions and actions that had marred 
Anglo-Soviet relations in the interwar years was redoubled in the aftermath of the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.  Furthermore, it led figures such as Laurence Collier to 
rethink his opinions of the Soviet Government.  Throughout the 1930s Collier had 
preached the necessity and indeed the desirability of reaching an understanding with 
the USSR; these opinions were shared by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir 
Robert Vansittart.  The first instance of Vansittart’s advocacy of closer Anglo-Soviet 
relations arose in a memorandum composed in February 1935 in which he stated that 
the Soviet Union was sincerely desirous for peace due to its deep-rooted fear of 
German expansionism.
185
  The importance of improved relations between His 
Majesty’s Government and the Soviet Government increasingly became a priority in 
the eyes of Vansittart following the Italian invasion of Abyssinia on 3 October 1935.  
Anglo-Italian relations had previously been the lynchpin of Vansittart’s security 
policy, yet following Mussolini’s flagrant disregard for the League of Nations and the 
preservation of peace, the Permanent Under-Secretary began to view Anglo-Soviet 
rapprochement as crucial as a bulwark to German aggression.
186
  Collier also argued 
that the Soviet Union could act as a bulwark against German expansion which, he felt, 
was more of an immediate threat to British interests.  Alongside his contention that 
Britain ought to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Collier repeatedly 
warned throughout the interwar years of the possibility of Nazi-Soviet cooperation.  
Three questions thus arise: why, then, did the Nazi-Soviet Pact take Collier, as much 
as his colleagues and superiors within the Foreign Office, by surprise?  Did the failure 
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of Collier and his colleagues within the Northern Department to anticipate the Nazi-
Soviet Pact affect his reputation within the Foreign Office?  Finally, how did the Pact 
influence the attitudes of Collier and his colleagues in the Northern Department 
towards the Soviet Union? 
 In signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact, ‘the USSR had executed the most stunning 
volte-face in diplomatic history’.187  The British Government, and more specifically, 
the British Foreign Office, felt the weight of the Soviet decision to ally with Nazi 
Germany.  Throughout the interwar years a division of opinion was evident with 
regard to British policy towards Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia; this was both inter-
departmental within the Foreign Office and within the Northern Department itself.  
While members of the Central Department felt that improved relations between the 
British and German Government was the most advantageous policy to pursue, Collier 
consistently argued that an alliance with the Soviet Government would best serve 
British interests and would constitute a bulwark against Nazi aggression and 
expansion.   
It was generally agreed within the Foreign Office that Soviet Russia and Nazi 
Germany were equally villainous and that British policy should be cautious when 
dealing, or attempting to deal, with either Power.  The effect of the Ribbentrop-
Molotov Pact on Collier was considerable.  As a consequence the Head of the 
Northern Department aligned his attitudes with those of his colleagues in the Foreign 
Office, an occurrence that in the mid 1930s seemed as unlikely as the signing of the 
Pact itself.  No longer preaching the desirability of coming to terms with the Soviet 
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Union, Collier believed that the Soviets had performed ‘an act of treachery 
unparalleled in the history of the modern world’.188 
Once Britain declared war on Germany in September, ten days after the 
signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the lessons of 1939 played a significant part in the 
debate surrounding the formulation of British policy towards Soviet Russia.  In the 
opening months of the war, no fighting took place between the allied Powers and the 
Germans.
189
  This period of ‘suspended animation’,190 otherwise known as the 
‘Phoney War’ lasted from the British and French declaration of war to the German 
invasion of France on 10 May 1940.  During this period there were two key dilemmas 
that British policy-makers faced in the immediate aftermath of the British declaration 
of war: 1) how Anglo-Soviet relations would develop – politically and economically – 
and 2) whether the Soviet Government would be willing to deal with the British 
Government in view of the recent Russo-German alignment.  The signing of the Pact 
conditioned both considerations and shaped the opinions of, and the advice tendered 
by, members of the Northern Department.  A clear example of the ‘lessons of 1939’ 
can be found in the negotiations surrounding the Anglo-Soviet economic agreement, 
negotiations that were initiated by Great Britain in October 1939 and were ongoing 
once Britain and the USSR finally reached a political understanding in 1942.  The 
initial stages of this study, therefore, explore the aftermath of the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
and will continue to examine the two dilemmas that British policy-makers faced once 
Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. 
Upon Collier’s appointment as Head of the Northern Department in 1933, 
correlating with Hitler’s accession to power in Germany, there was a constant flow of 
correspondence within the Northern Department and the Foreign Office generally 
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relating to the state of Nazi-Soviet relations, to which Collier was often a key 
contributor.  An important memorandum penned by Robert Vansittart, then the 
Permanent Under-Secretary, in February 1935 drew attention to two schools of 
thought within the Soviet Union.  The ‘Litvinov School’ favoured improved relations 
with Great Britain whilst the ‘Voroshilov School’ wanted the Soviet Government to 
adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Nazi Germany. Vansittart feared that the 
Voroshilov school would prevail.  Should such predictions prove to be accurate, this 
would be a ‘disaster to our present world’.191 
 Reactions to Vansittart’s memorandum varied within the Northern 
Department.  Collier was in full agreement with Vansittart’s conclusions.  However, 
the Acting Counsellor in the Moscow Embassy, Noel Charles, argued against the 
possibility of a Nazi-Soviet rapprochement as the predominantly Jewish composition 
of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs would oppose any such 
rapprochement.
192
  Collier conceded that the Voroshilov School appeared unlikely to 
impact to any great degree upon Soviet foreign policy due to the diverging ideologies 
of Germany and the Soviet Union.  Nevertheless, he maintained that it remained a 
‘possibility with which we must reckon in the present fluid state of European 
politics’.193 
 What is interesting, and somewhat baffling, is the clear shift in Collier’s 
attitude towards the possibility of an understanding between Germany and the Soviet 
Union. In the first three years of his tenure as Head of the Northern Department, 
Collier repeatedly argued that relations between Germany and the Soviet Union 
showed signs of improvement, even in the face of both opposition from the 
ambassador in Moscow and members of his own department.  Collier was very much 
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guilty of casting aspersions during this period.  Yet, between 1936-1939 Collier 
reversed his position and argued the opposite even in the face of mounting evidence, 
to the contrary.
194
  Whilst one cannot state definitively why Collier changed his 
position in the latter half of the 1930s, it is possible to make an educated guess as to 
the probable cause.
195
  For Collier, the relationship between France and the Soviet 
Union was of central importance.  Following the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact 
in May 1935, Collier had stated that this example of ‘collective security’ would serve 
as a crucial bulwark against improvement of Nazi-Soviet relations.  Whilst his 
colleagues in the Foreign Office – Orme Sargent, for example – warned that British 
support of the Franco-Soviet Pact would initiate German cries of ‘encirclement’, 
Collier not only disregarded such arguments as inconsequential but further argued that 
he had found no evidence to support such a claim.  Rather, the Franco-Soviet Pact 
was essential for His Majesty’s Government as ‘both the French and Germans think 
that the Franco-Soviet Pact does help to prevent a German-Soviet rapprochement’, a 
sentiment that Collier wholly agreed with.
196
 
In a letter to Osborne at the Holy See in July 1939, one can appreciate a 
secondary reason for Collier’s reluctance to believe in the possibility of improved 
Nazi-Soviet relations.  Collier wholly refused to believe in the danger of a German-
Soviet understanding as the diametrically opposing doctrines of what were termed 
Fascism and Communism would not allow for such an eventuality.
197
  Certainly, he 
believed that no such understanding would be possible as long as Hitler and Stalin 
remained in power.  Nevertheless, although he dismissed the possibility of a political 
agreement, Collier did not discount the prospect of an economic understanding.  
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Indeed, he acknowledged that the Soviet Union would likely adopt a ‘policy of 
complete isolation’ in the political sphere that would ‘serve German interests in 
practice’.198  In essence, Collier could envisage a ‘temporary détente’ only.199   
How, then, did Collier justify his failure to anticipate the signature of the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact, not least as in previous years he had argued that the ‘fluid’ state of 
European politics allowed for the improbable to become possible?  Three days 
following the signature of that agreement Collier composed a memorandum detailing 
the reasons why he had failed to foresee the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement.  Central to 
his argument was his belief that the reliability of the sources of information received 
by the Foreign Office was exceedingly difficult to assess.  Indeed, as F.H. Hinsley 
stated with regards to the USSR: ‘intelligence was … impeded by difficulties arising 
from the nature and the state of its sources of information, and these difficulties were 
not only more technical than the administrative obstacles but also more intractable’.200  
The availability and indeed the reliability of the intelligence varied depending upon 
the state of His Majesty’s Government’s relations with the country in question.  It was 
extremely difficult for His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow to obtain any 
information from Soviet sources, a point raised by the ambassador himself in 1938.  
Chilston reported in October that ‘it is impossible to obtain even an inkling of what is 
discussed within [the Kremlin’s] walls’.201  In early 1939, when Sir William Seeds 
replaced Chilston, the change in ambassadors coincided with a change in the Soviet 
Government’s outlook, and, as the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations continued, a 
wealth of intelligence was being passed on to Seeds that related to the possibility of a 
Nazi-Soviet agreement, yet much of this was conflicting and difficult to assess. 
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Alongside the masses of information that Collier and his colleagues received, 
the Northern Department had to assess the varying sources of Foreign Office 
intelligence, and in so doing, divided the intelligence into categories – intelligence 
coming from direct German and Soviet sources; information received from third 
parties in touch with German sources; and finally, information from third parties in 
touch with Soviet sources.  Many of the reports that had crossed his desk, he noted, 
had told against the probability of a German-Soviet rapprochement.  On the contrary, 
it seemed that isolation, rather than a rapprochement with Germany was the likely 
alternative policy to one of agreement with the Allies.
202
 
Indeed, Collier stated that it was believed that very few Soviet personalities 
were aware of any approaches made by Berlin.  The available archival evidence 
contradicts Collier’s belief.  Indeed, there is a wealth of evidence of the consistent 
circulation of rumours within the Central Department of a possible Nazi-Soviet 
rapprochement.  The question thus presents itself of whether Collier was not informed 
of such rumours, or, as is more likely, he simply chose to ignore them as they were an 
inconvenient truth.  Whilst Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, was 
‘reliably reported’ to know nothing of German overtures, it is highly likely that he 
was preaching ignorance yet was fully aware of the German overtures.   
How, then, could Collier justify his lack of foresight when his colleagues in 
the Central Department predicted an improvement in Soviet-German relations?  
Collier asserted that a key reason for this lack of foresight was mainly due to the 
‘contradictory’ nature of the intelligence from direct German sources.  Some of the 
reports reaching the Foreign Office showed that certain factions of German opinion 
favoured some form of understanding with the Soviet Government, but Hitler himself 
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as well as the members of the upper echelons of the Nazi party ‘favoured the policy of 
disrupting the Soviet regime’.203  Hitler’s long-standing antipathy towards the Soviet 
regime was well known and had been articulated on many occasions.  In Mein Kampf 
he referred to the leaders of Soviet Russia as ‘blood-stained criminals’ and, 
interestingly, stated that ‘you do not make pacts with anyone whose sole interest is the 
destruction of his partner’.204  Ironically, in signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Molotov had 
done just that.     
 Given Hitler’s obvious and frequently advertised hatred for Communism and 
the Soviet regime, can one blame Collier and his colleagues in the Foreign Office for 
doubting the validity of sources indicating an improvement in Russo-German 
relations?  Rex Leeper of the Political Intelligence Department exonerated Collier for 
his lack of insight with regard to the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  ‘For the six years that Hitler 
has ruled Germany he has proclaimed to the world that he is the bulwark against 
Bolshevism’, he noted, and, as a consequence of Hitler’s anti-Bolshevik utterances, 
many people in Western Europe were inclined to condone much of what he did in 
Germany and in Central Europe.
205
  By signing the non-aggression pact with the 
Soviet Union Hitler had allowed Stalin to get into a stronger position for introducing 
the ‘Bolshevik virus’ into Europe and, for Stalin’s part, he chose an alliance with Nazi 
Germany over one with Britain and France as ‘war between Germany and Western 
Europe suited Stalin best’.206  As the Nazi-Soviet negotiations took place in secret, 
and reports from the third parties ‘usually came from persons of questionable 
reliability’, Collier gave proportionally less credence to the alleged evidence of 
rapprochement as it was ‘in the interests of both the Russians and the Germans – 
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particularly the latter – to spread rumours of a Russo-German rapprochement for 
purposes of blackmail in their dealings with us’.207   
 One can understand Collier’s ambivalence towards reports of a possible 
Soviet-German understanding.  He could not trust the reliability of his sources nor the 
intelligence received.  Any intelligence indicating a desire from Germany for 
rapprochement was ‘reliably reported to be completely at variance with Hitler’s own 
views and intentions’ and the Foreign Office had no evidence of a corresponding 
desire on the Soviet side.  Consequently, when the pact was signed and the Soviets 
allied herself with Germany, Collier could not explain the Soviet volte-face.  He 
stated that ‘We did not – and could not – know what inducements could be offered to 
them to make them reverse their previously avowed hostility to German expansion in 
Eastern Europe and increase the chances of their seeing a German army stand on the 
Soviet frontier’.  The Foreign Office was wholly justified, due to past experience in 
Nazi-Soviet relations, ‘in proceeding on the assumption that, whatever they did, they, 
[the Soviets] would do nothing contrary to their own vital interests; and it seems to us 
that, while isolation might be compatible with those interests, any positive 
encouragement of German ambitions would not be compatible with them’.208   
Writing in May 1940 Collier continued to justify his confusion over the Soviet 
decision to ally with Nazi Germany. It was contrary to Stalin’s interests to ally with 
Hitler as it allowed Germany to dominate Europe and stand on the Soviet frontier 
with an army capable of knocking out the Soviet Army ‘several times over’.  Had 
Stalin been a ‘longer sighted despot’ he would not have done anything to bring that 
danger nearer.
209
 He merely saw the economic advantages of aligning himself with 
Nazi Germany and in so doing allowed the USSR to remain neutral in the ensuing 
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hostilities.  Fitzroy Maclean viewed Stalin’s policy differently.  Whilst he agreed with 
Collier that neutrality was a motivating factor for Stalin, he disagreed that Stalin 
ought to have been more long-sighted when formulating foreign policy.  What was 
essential for Stalin was securing the immediate concerns of the Soviet Union.  Whilst 
Stalin most certainly did not desire a German-dominated Europe, he was aware that 
the Soviet Union was not in a position in 1939 to oppose Nazi Germany militarily.  
What the Soviet Union needed was time, which is exactly what the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
offered.  In a conversation with M. Fierlinger, the Czech Minister in Moscow until 
December 1939, Maclean found himself agreeing with the openly pro-Soviet 
diplomat.  In signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact the Soviet Government had only acted in 
accordance with its own interests.  Stalin had to secure the immediate future of the 
Soviet Union.  The most effective means of doing so was to remain neutral whilst 
doing everything possible to prolong the so-called capitalist war and thus weaken 
both Great Britain and Nazi Germany.  Allying with Hitler and providing economic 
support for both Germany and Great Britain was the only possible course for Stalin to 
adopt.
210
  Furthermore, as Max Jakobson noted, ‘from his German colleague, Molotov 
had … obtained during the night of August 23-24 everything he had worked for 
during one hundred days of negotiating with Britain and France’.211 
 The confusion surrounding the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact was not 
limited to Collier and his colleagues in the Northern Department.  In January the 
following year, Osborne informed Collier of a conversation between himself and 
Signor Rosso, the Italian Ambassador in Moscow.  Rosso stated that ‘while he had 
never expected the British and French negotiations in Moscow to come to anything, 
he has been surprised by the announcement of the Russo-German Pact’.  On the 
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contrary, according to Rosso, the Germans had hoped merely to stall the Anglo-
French negotiations in Moscow.
212
  Rosso was convinced that the initiative towards a 
political understanding with Germany had in fact come from the Soviet side and 
believed that Schulenburg [the German Ambassador in Moscow] ‘had been as much 
taken by surprise as he himself by this development’.213 
Both Collier and Fitzroy Maclean disagreed with the Italian Ambassador on 
his final statement.  Maclean argued that there could be ‘no doubt that ever since 
1933, when he first made advances to Herr Hitler, M. Stalin had been ready for a 
political agreement with Germany’.214  Although for publicity reasons the Soviet 
propaganda machine had always kept up a howl against Fascism and Nazism, 
Maclean argued that ‘there is no reason to think that anyone as open-minded as Stalin 
ever had any fundamental prejudice against a system of government so much after his 
own heart’.215  In signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact, it was the Germans who had made the 
‘abrupt volte-face’.  The obstacle to an understanding was Hitler’s ‘personal prejudice 
against what he genuinely imagined to be international Marxism’ and it was only due 
to the German General Staff’s fear of a war on all fronts that the German Chancellor 
was able to overcome his dislike.  The initiative, Maclean believed, came from the 
German rather than the Soviet side.  ‘M. Stalin, always an opportunist, simply made 
the best use of circumstances which had altered to his advantage’.216  For Maclean, 
Stalin had ensured that should a European war break out, the Soviet Union would not 
need be involved.  In Maclean’s opinion, ‘this in itself would have been a sufficient 
motive’.217  As Soviet policy was fundamentally opportunistic – a point Maclean 
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consistently raised and reiterated the following year when discussing the possibility of 
entering into trade negotiations with the Soviet Government – Germany simply 
offered Stalin a better deal.  Germany offered territorial advantages in return for a 
passive attitude on the part of the Soviet Union, which echoed the sentiment 
expressed by Collier in his letter to Osborne in July.  The Western Powers, on the 
other hand, required the Soviet Union to engage in a war with Germany, ‘which it was 
neither capable nor desirous of doing’.  This was the crux of the issue.  For, in 
Maclean’s opinion, ‘until the spring of 1939 the dominating factor in Soviet policy 
has been the fear of Germany and anxiety to enlist the support of the Western 
Democracies against Germany’.218 The signature of the German-Soviet agreement on 
23 August 1939 effectively put an abrupt end to the Moscow negotiations between 
Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, and had a profound impact on the 
international political scene.  There is great diversity within the historiography of 
Nazi-Soviet relations during the 1930s which culminated in the signature of the pact.  
As Geoffrey Roberts has noted, the historiography of the agreement bears ‘eloquent 
testimony to the fact that it was possible to draw radically different inferences about 
Soviet policies and motivations from exactly the same set of events’.219  Several 
historians have argued that Moscow was highly duplicitous in its relations with the 
Western democracies and Nazi Germany.  Arguing that Moscow had moved against 
collaboration with the West at the time of the negotiations and was in fact in favour of 
concluding a pact with Nazi Germany, they point to Stalin’s speech to the Eighteenth 
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Party Congress in March 1939 and the Merekalov-Weizsäcker meeting in April 1939 
as instances of the Kremlin’s insincerity.220   
 Gerhard Weinberg offers a less extreme interpretation of the real focus of 
Stalin’s alliance strategy.  Concentrating on the contacts between David Kandelaki, 
the head of the Soviet trade mission in Berlin, and Hjalmar Schacht, the German 
Minister of Economics, Weinberg argues that, whilst the discussions did not lead to a 
Soviet-German rapprochement, they were evidence of the fact that Stalin merely 
tolerated the idea of collective security as preached by Litvinov until an 
understanding with Nazi Germany could be achieved.
221
  Roberts rejects such a 
hypothesis, arguing that until mid-August 1939 Moscow believed that the security of 
the Soviet Union would best be served by a combined front against Germany rather 
than through an accommodation with Hitler.  It was only when the Triple alliance 
negotiations finally collapsed that Stalin favoured the idea of a rapprochement with 
Nazi Germany.  Rapprochement with Germany would allow Soviet Russia to remain 
neutral in the ensuing conflict and would give the Soviets time to prepare for her 
eventual entry into the war.
222
  The Anglo-French guarantee to Poland and Roumania 
of March-April 1939 had fundamentally changed the situation.  As a consequence of 
these guarantees the Soviets could be comforted by the fact that before the Germans 
could reach the Soviet frontier, they would automatically be at war with Britain and 
France.  Consequently, ‘it only remained for him [Stalin] to extort from the Germans 
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the highest possible price for the neutrality from which it had never been his intention 
to depart’.223  
Collier was in agreement with Maclean that all ‘the available evidence goes to 
show that it was a change of policy on Hitler’s [emphasis in original] part which 
brought about the Soviet-German pact’.224  As Collier believed that it was German 
rather than Soviet duplicity that led to the Nazi-Soviet pact, one could conclude that 
he was continuing his relatively forgiving attitude towards the Soviet Union.  This 
was not the case.  On the contrary, in the aftermath of the pact, Collier’s attitude vis-
à-vis the USSR radically changed.  Whilst he agreed with Maclean that it was 
Germany that made overtures to the Soviet Union and that Stalin ‘simply made the 
best use of circumstances which had altered to his advantage’,225 Collier no longer 
placed any trust in Soviet goodwill.  For Collier, the Soviets always found ‘fresh 
excuse for refusing to be forthcoming with us – the history of the 1939 negotiations… 
provide[s] plenty evidence of this’.226 
 In the months following the outbreak of war, Collier developed a hard-line 
attitude towards the Soviet Union, expressing sentiments wholly different from those 
uttered in the 1930s.  ‘For all practical purposes, we must treat Russia as an enemy, 
even if we do not actually declare war on her’, he wrote in March 1940.227  For 
Collier, the Soviet Union was motivated solely by self-interest and would only enter 
the war if it suited her.  Here one can appreciate a distinct change in Collier’s views 
on the Soviet Union following the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  Throughout the 1930s Collier 
had argued that His Majesty’s Government ought to treat Nazi Germany as the enemy 
of Great Britain.  In a letter to Professor Postan of the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
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in August 1940, he succinctly and clearly illustrated his radical change of opinion 
with regard to the Soviet Union.  In his fifteen years of dealing with the Soviet 
Government, Collier had learned that Stalin was motivated by self-interest only and 
no amount of concessions would sway Stalin in favour of rapprochement with 
Britain.  If anything, Stalin would regard this as a weakness on the part of His 
Majesty’s Government.228 
 Collier’s attitude towards the Soviet Union had changed completely as a result 
of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  He was ‘convinced from long and usually painful experience 
that the only profitable policy to employ with the Soviet Government is to set on the 
Scotchman’s motto: ‘Nothing for nothing, and precious little for half-a-crown’’.  
Indeed, it seemed ‘odd’ to him that the ‘same people in this country, who blamed the 
late government for not adopting that policy towards Hitler and Mussolini, should 
urge us to adopt the opposite policy towards Stalin’.229  For Collier, it was ‘deeds 
alone that count’230 and the USSR’s rapprochement with Nazi Germany was a ‘very 
black deed of treachery’.231  Such treachery left a permanent imprint on Collier’s 
perception of Soviet sincerity and goodwill, a transformation that was evident 
throughout the rest of his tenure in the Northern Department. 
Once the shock of the Nazi-Soviet Pact had subsided and the war had broken 
out, the role of the British Foreign Office had altered.  The aim of British diplomacy 
shifted from attempting to avert war, to shoring up Britain’s political relations with 
allies and neutrals in order to gain the most favourable conditions for waging war.
232
   
The key consideration for British policy-makers was how to treat the USSR, and 
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indeed, how Soviet policy was likely to develop in the opening months of the war.  
Britain’s political and economic relations with the USSR were central to that debate.  
In the month following the outbreak of the war Collier was asked by Major Conwell-
Jones of the Committee of Imperial Defence to prepare a confidential note exploring 
what he believed the Soviet attitude to be in the aftermath of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and 
the German invasion of Poland.  The nature and extent of Russo-German 
collaboration was a central consideration for Collier.  It was difficult to assess the 
quality of the intelligence received by the Northern Department, as the ‘evidence of 
German-Soviet collaboration, actual or potential, is so conflicting that it is difficult to 
strike a balance of probabilities’.233  In spite of such difficulties, Collier was able to 
ascertain that the Soviet Government were offering a good deal of economic 
assistance to Germany, thus rendering the British blockade of Germany less effective.  
The USSR had sent large consignments of gold to Germany through the Baltic States; 
Collier stated that ‘it has been suggested that this gold is the Nazis’ price for the 
abandonment of German interests and influence in the North-East corner of the 
Baltic’.  To be sure, there had been large consignments of gold shipped from the 
Soviet Union to Germany.  However, Collier noted that ‘there is as yet no evidence 
that supplies of raw materials on any considerable scale have been sent to Germany’.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the German Government had sent experts to the Soviet 
Union to reorganise Soviet heavy industry and communications indicated a worrying 
level of collaboration between the two countries.  
 As for Soviet motives behind this cooperation with the German Government, 
Collier believed that the Soviet’s motives ‘are as obscure as her actions’, but, since 
she could not reasonably desire the emergence of a strong and victorious Germany, ‘it 
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has generally been assumed that her object is to hold the balance between the 
belligerents with a view to bolshevising Europe at little cost to herself when both 
sides become exhausted’.  Soviet help would stop short of actual entry into the war on 
the German side, although such an eventuality could not be discounted.  However, ‘it 
seems hardly conceivable that any rational Soviet statesman could desire a peace 
which would leave the Soviet Union to face a victorious and unexhausted Germany, 
ruled by leaders obsessed with the idea of indefinite expansion, particularly in Eastern 
Europe, anxious to recover her lost position in the Baltic and possessing armed forces 
far more efficient than those of his own country’.  To conclude, Collier stated that 
there was as yet no clear evidence of the USSR’s motives or intentions, and ‘in 
certain respects she has already revealed herself as an active helper of Germany; but 
her policy as a whole is, so far at least, susceptible of an interpretation very 
unfavourable to German interests in the long run’.234  
Therefore, Paul Doerr’s assertion that in the period immediately following the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact, ‘British policy-makers [within the Foreign Office] were driven by a 
profound ambivalence’ towards the USSR, an ambivalence that continued throughout 
the Winter War period, is somewhat misleading.
235
  To be sure, it was a difficult task 
to develop a coherent and firm policy towards such a duplicitous country, yet the 
archival evidence available illustrates that there was no ambivalence amongst the 
advisers within the Foreign Office.  D.W. Lascelles, the First Secretary at the British 
Embassy in Moscow, summed up the prevalent attitude within the Northern 
Department in a minute of 8 December 1939: ‘[We ought] not to go out of our way to 
provoke the Soviet Government into active measures against us, but to show them 
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clearly that we are not frightened of their bank’.236  Should it be in their best interest, 
the British Government would not be afraid to antagonise Moscow, and would voice 
opposition to any unsatisfactory action carried out by the Soviets.  Such sentiments 
were also expressed by Maclean when discussing British policy towards Soviet 
Russia.  To be deterred from taking action against the Soviet Union for fear of the 
Soviet response would be a mistake.
237
  British policy was cautious, yet it was 
apparent that, should definite action be needed against the Soviet Union, His 
Majesty’s Government would stand up for British interests.   
 British policy towards the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the 
Anglo-French declaration of war against Nazi Germany was concerned with the likely 
course of Soviet foreign policy itself.  In signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact the Soviet 
Government had ensured itself a neutral position once war broke out, yet the British 
Foreign Office had to consider whether that neutrality was likely to continue in the 
long term.   Molotov would often declare that ‘the non-aggression pact concluded 
between the Soviet Union and Germany bound us to maintain neutrality in the case of 
Germany being involved in war.’238  The foreign policy of Soviet Russia was dictated 
not only by an intense desire to remain neutral, but by a very real fear of Germany.  
Maclean believed that it was not at all surprising that Stalin had decided to continue 
his cooperation with Germany.  Cooperation with Germany provided the added 
benefit of strengthening the Soviet position, which, ironically, worked against 
Germany should Hitler decide to attack the USSR.
239
  The Secret Additional Protocol 
of the Nazi-Soviet Pact allowed the USSR to pursue an aggressive and expansionist 
foreign policy and strengthen her position within Europe.  Article II of the Secret 
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Additional Protocol to the treaty envisaged that a new partition of Poland with the 
rivers Narew, Vistula and San as the approximate boundaries between the German 
and Soviet spheres.  Any future questions on the maintenance and running of an 
independent Polish state would be decided by means of a friendly agreement between 
Germany and the Soviet Union.
240
     
On 17 September the Polish Ambassador to Moscow received a note 
informing him that the Soviet Government had ordered the Red Army to march into 
Eastern Poland.  The British response to the Soviet move is unsurprising.  The 
British government made no move, as David Dilks noted, ‘judging wisely that the 
defeat of Nazi Germany would provide a more sufficient task’.241  As Lancelot 
Oliphant
242
 told the Cabinet, a Soviet invasion of Poland was not an eventuality 
covered by the Anglo-Polish agreement of August 1939.   Oliphant had claimed 
that it was understood by both parties that the ‘European Power’ referred to in the 
terms of the Treaty was Germany,
243
 thus allowing Britain to avoid intervening on 
behalf of Poland.  Oliphant recognised that the Soviets had ‘committed, if possible, 
a more flagrant act of aggression against Poland than the Germans’,244 yet it was 
politically inexpedient to challenge the Soviet action.  As a consequence, Soviet 
neutrality was confirmed as Britain and France thought it wise not to question it.  
Lascelles summed up the situation facing the British Government in a response to a 
letter of complaint from a private citizen: ‘It is quite true that our attitude towards 
the Soviet Government is dictated by funk-fear of their combining with Germany if 
we annoy them … Our policy towards the Soviet Union being in fact an immoral 
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one thrust upon us by necessity’.245 Sir William Seeds agreed with Lascelles’ 
response, noting that it would be unwise to break off diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Government.  Once again the British position was very much dependent 
upon considerations of Nazi-Soviet relations.  The presence of a British 
Ambassador in Moscow would be essential once the Soviet-German friendship 
began to wear thin, and, for Seeds, the closer the Soviet-German contact became, 
the more likely a ‘desirable friction’ would occur.246  Following the announcement 
of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty on 28 September, the War 
Cabinet fully agreed with Seeds.  Close cooperation over any period of time would 
be hindered by the well-known antagonism between the two countries. 
247
 
Seeds dealt with this issue in some detail in the month following the German 
invasion of Poland.  The ambassador highlighted the difficulties in reaching a 
conclusion as to whether the USSR was likely to enter the war against Great Britain 
as ‘evidence is not obtainable under Moscow conditions either one way or the 
other’.248  Indeed, for that reason it was largely acknowledged that in the opening 
months of the war the value of the British Embassy in Moscow as a listening-post was 
very slight.
249
  When composing a reply for the Foreign Secretary for the upcoming 
House of Lords debate, in which Halifax had expected the subject of Anglo-Soviet 
relations to be raised, Collier reinforced the sentiments of his ambassador.  Collier 
highlighted the ‘obscurity of present Soviet policy’ and emphasised the importance of 
‘proceeding with caution’ when approaching the uncertain topic of Anglo-Soviet 
relations.
250
  In spite of the obscurity of their policy, Collier believed that Soviet 
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Government had made it clear that they wished for no change in their political 
position of strict neutrality that would be satisfactory for His Majesty’s Government.  
Halifax was in full agreement on this point, and repeated Collier’s statement verbatim 
in the debate in the House of Lords.  This not only illustrated that the advice tendered 
by the Head of the Northern Department was deemed credible by his superiors, but 
showed that a policy of caution was considered the best course for His Majesty’s 
Government, as it was not wise to antagonise the Soviet Government and risk gaining 
another adversary.
251
  This policy was drawn up in the Northern Department and 
adopted within the upper echelons of the Foreign Office.   
Alongside the key consideration of the likely course of Soviet policy, the 
Foreign Office also debated the state of Russo-German relations in the aftermath of 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  What level of cooperation could one expect from the newly-
aligned aggressors?  F.S. Northedge and A. Wells noted that in the months following 
the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and Russo-German aggression against Poland, 
‘Stalin and Hitler were depicted by British cartoonists as virtually the same person’.252  
For Seeds, each visit by Ribbentrop to Moscow had led to ‘greater extravagance’ and 
the meetings between Ribbentrop and Stalin had ‘the general atmosphere of gangsters 
talking to gangsters and must tend to mutual incitement to move to dictatorial 
action’.253  Whilst Ribbentrop had hinted that the consultation between Germany and 
the USSR was likely to lead to something more than merely an improvement of 
commercial relations, Seeds noted that the Soviet Union could get all she wanted 
without going to war and that the threat of German-Soviet consultation may be 
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‘purely bluff and merely a delusion of Ribbentrop’s’.254  Lascelles was in agreement.  
Not only had Stalin obtained a great deal from the Nazi-Soviet Pact, but he had done 
so at Germany’s expense: ‘Apart from paper declarations he has paid nothing so far, 
and if Germany collapses he never will have to pay’.255  However, Lascelles was fully 
aware that it was impossible to gauge the intentions of the Kremlin and believed that 
the best course for His Majesty’s Government was to ‘sit tight and avoid friction as 
far as possible’.256 
 It was during this period of uncertainty that the question first arose of sending 
Sir Stafford Cripps to Moscow. On 18 September Cripps wrote to Halifax stating that 
there were members of the Labour Party who felt that the Soviets had been treated in 
a ‘somewhat cavalier way’.257  In the current circumstances Cripps felt that it was 
necessary that something most urgent should be done as regards the problem of the 
USSR. Due to his understanding of - and sympathy towards - Soviet politics, he 
believed himself to be an ideal candidate to be sent to Moscow in order to investigate 
the situation.  Indeed, Cripps had received many invitations from the Soviets in the 
past to go to the Soviet Union and meet the rulers, yet he had never visited the 
country.
258
  Acknowledging that he would be making the trip as a private individual, 
he was hopeful that he could ‘do something which would eventually be of some 
assistance to this country’, and that he might possibly ‘get information which would 
help in the solution of the problem’.259  Lascelles minuted that ‘Our relations with the 
Soviet Union are now so bad that I doubt whether Sir Stafford Cripps could make 
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them much worse if he tried’.260  Whilst it was generally accepted that a visit by 
Cripps would not harm the present situation, there were great protestations within the 
Foreign Office to Cripps’ suggestion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet 
Government.  This was first taken up by Ivone Kirkpatrick, the former First Secretary 
at the British Embassy in Berlin, who reiterated similar points to those put by Cripps 
to the effect that it would be an ideal way of appeasing those within the Labour Party 
who felt that the Soviets had been treated unfairly in the months preceding the war.
261
  
Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, was in favour of 
creating alarm in Germany, but felt that ‘the words “non-aggression pact” stink 
somewhat since August 23’.262  For Lancelot Oliphant any attempt to woo the Soviets 
would be misguided, as ‘the Soviet is in no way pro-British and anything they do 
which embarrasses the Germans will not be for our beux yeux [sic]’, a point which 
met with the full agreement of Sargent.  Any British approach of that kind would be 
regarded by Stalin as ‘very naïve’.263  Sargent then questioned whether His Majesty’s 
Government needed to make an approach to the Soviet Government when Halifax had 
already seen Maisky to whom he had put certain definite questions.  At the heart of 
Sargent’s protest lay his opposition to Soviet aggression in Poland.  He believed it 
would be a mistake to send Cripps to Moscow and to raise the possibility of a non-
aggression pact with the Soviet Government at a time when the Soviets had 
committed a ‘more flagrant act of aggression against Poland than the Germans, and 
have seized as a result a larger portion of Poland than have the Germans’.264   
As September drew to a close the debate surrounding both Cripps’s visit to 
Moscow and the possibility of a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia continued 
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within the Foreign Office, the Soviets were preparing for another act of aggression, 
with Finland the intended victim.  The Soviet Government had turned its attention to 
Finland following the successful absorption of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, 
which was made possible as a consequence of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.  Indeed, on 25 
September Stalin told the German Ambassador that he intended to take up the 
‘solution of the problem of the Baltic States in accordance with the Secret Protocol 
and expected the unstinting support of the German Government’.265  The absorption 
of the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – was a smooth and speedy 
process.  On 27 September the Soviet Union had concluded a pact with Estonia for 
the lease to the USSR of naval bases on the islands of Osel and Dago, whilst on the 5 
October, the day that the Soviet authorities had sent the invitation to the Finnish 
Government in order to discuss ‘concrete political questions’, the Soviet Government 
concluded a similar pact with Latvia, again securing naval bases on Latvian territory.  
By 10 October the process was complete, with the Lithuanian Government granting 
permission for the maintenance of Soviet land and air forces at agreed points on 
Lithuanian territory.
266
  Once Baltic acquiescence to Soviet control was secured, the 
Soviet Government could set its sights on Finland.   
Arguably, Finland was the strongest and most influential Power in the region.  
Soviet aggression in Finland had a significant impact on Anglo-Soviet relations.  As 
W. N. Medlicott stated, the Soviet attack on Finland had marked Stalin’s real breach 
with British opinion.
267
  The Foreign Office was aware of the impending Soviet 
invasion of Finland.  This topic raised important questions for those in the Foreign 
Office.  Firstly, what did the Soviet Government want from Finland?  Secondly, how 
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would Soviet aggression against Finland impact upon Anglo-Soviet economic 
relations? The Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland and the ensuing Soviet-Finnish 
War ensured that poor political relations continued between Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union.  Whilst the Prime Minister was principally concerned with Nazi 
Germany, the Foreign Office was very much preoccupied with Anglo-Soviet relations 
during the opening months of the war.  Anglo-Soviet political relations were at a 
standstill as a result of Soviet aggression against Poland, yet in the economic sphere 
there was hope of an improvement and indeed it was possible that an understanding 
could be reached between London and Moscow.  An understanding with the Soviet 
Union would only be possible should they help the Western Powers in the successful 
application of their economic blockade of Germany.  As neither Great Britain nor 
France was in a position to wage war in September 1939, their chief weapon was the 
economic blockade of Germany.
268
  The British Government very much wished for 
the Soviets to play a key role in this strategy.  It was hoped that by signing a trade 
agreement with Britain the Soviets would no longer act as a source of contraband 
goods for the German Government.  This was a matter of great concern within the 
Foreign Office.  Any goods sent to the Soviet Union by Great Britain could be passed 
on to the Germans and would thus render the Allied economic blockade ineffective.  
As Steven Merrit Miner has acknowledged during the period between the outbreak of 
the war and the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, British 
analysis of the European situation maintained that Soviet Russia must either be 
divided from the Germans by means of a comprehensive Anglo-Soviet agreement or 
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through successfully closing off the Soviets as a conduit for contraband supplies to 
Germany.
269
 
 Following the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland on 17 September 1939, a 
fresh Anglo-Soviet trade treaty was signed on 11 October. The reason for the 
continuation of economic relations was due to necessity.  Britain badly needed Soviet 
timber for war production, particularly for the construction of aircraft.  It was only the 
Soviets who could provide the necessary levels of timber, as Commonwealth 
countries such as Canada did not have the capabilities to do so.  The Cabinet had 
insisted that so acute was the British need for Soviet timber everything must be done 
to ensure that the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Soviet trade agreement were carried out in 
full.
270
  Though the agreement was signed on 11 October, it was not without its 
hardships for the British negotiators.  The negotiation process was tedious and drawn-
out, with the Soviets proving their insolence through petty actions. During the course 
of the discussions the Soviets had decided to hold up all British shipments as a 
demonstration, one would assume, of how crucially important the shipments were for 
Great Britain.  The final agreement was ad hoc and limited, yet was evidence that 
although Anglo-Soviet political relations were strained, there was scope for an 
improvement of economic relations.   
Following a number of conversations with Ivan Maisky, Halifax was 
convinced that the Soviets were genuinely anxious to conclude a satisfactory trade 
agreement, as he told his Cabinet colleagues on 28 September, the very day in which 
the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty was signed.
271
  Halifax was not 
the only Cabinet member who believed Maisky’s utterances, and further believed in 
the sincerity of his declarations were condoned by his Government.  Hugh Dalton 
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noted in his diary following the Soviet march into Poland that there was a number of 
prominent politicians – including Anthony Eden272 and R.A. Butler273 - who had 
hoped that trade negotiations could be used as a platform to improve Anglo-Soviet 
relations in both the economic and political sphere.
274
   However, it was clear any 
Soviet aggression against Finland would negatively impact upon Anglo-Soviet 
economic relations.   
Reliable information regarding Soviet demands on Finland was exceedingly 
hard to acquire, ensuring that the task facing those in the Foreign Office was even 
more difficult.  The rumour mill was busy circulating a vast array of information that 
was supposition at best. Should the Soviet Union invade Finland, how was London to 
react?  Was it possible that the British Government could rouse public opinion to such 
an extent as to justify involving the country in yet another international quarrel, 
especially when the Finnish Government refused to say what it was up against?  As 
Lascelles noted, mere sympathy with Finland’s desire for independence was academic 
if that independence was not threatened.
275
  A further question that arose at that time 
was how far the German Government supported the Soviet Government in its quest to 
acquire Finnish territory.  Once again German-Soviet relations were at the forefront of 
British political thought.  From the start of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in October 
to the Soviet declaration of war on 30 November, these questions were frequently 
debated within the Foreign and War Office and continued to be discussed once the 
Finns capitulated to Soviet demands.   
Finland had gained independence in 1917 after holding the status of an 
autonomous grand duchy within the Russian Empire.  Relations between the newly 
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independent Finland and Soviet Russia in the interwar years were marred by mutual 
distrust, and both political and economic relations were strained.
276
  The Soviet 
Government had been attempting to conclude an economic agreement with Finland 
since the beginning of 1939, with Soviet-Finnish trade talks commencing in March 
1939.  The Soviet Government had wished to lease Högland as well as four smaller 
islands off the Gulf of Finland for thirty years.  Högland was regarded as crucial for 
naval observation posts along the approaches to Leningrad.  The Finnish Foreign 
Minister refused to lease the islands off the Gulf of Finland as he believed that action 
would negatively impact upon Finnish neutrality.
277
  
The conclusion of a second agreement between Molotov and Ribbentrop, 
which was signed on 29 September, was not only evidence of further Soviet-German 
cooperation, but indicated that the Soviets were plotting action that would preoccupy 
the minds of the British and French Governments.  The British Chiefs of Staff 
believed that any such action was likely to take place in the Baltic region, Finland or 
the Balkans.  Thus, when the Finnish Government received an invitation on 5 October 
to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss the ‘concrete political questions’ that had 
been brought about by the war in Western Europe, it did not come as a surprise to 
Britain or France.
278
  Stalin’s motivation for discussions with the Finnish Government 
lay in his desire to improve the defences of Leningrad and Murmansk through the 
acquisition of Finnish territories.  On the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish frontier at its 
closest point was thirty-two kilometres from Leningrad.  This was regarded as a major 
strategic disadvantage for the Soviet Union, as Leningrad was vulnerable from heavy 
artillery attack from Finland and other potential Soviet enemies.  As a consequence 
Stalin wanted the Finnish border to be moved further north away from the city.  
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Furthermore, on the western coast of Finland, the Aaland Islands gave Finland a 
dominant position in the Gulf of Bothnia and dominated the sea approaches to 
Stockholm.
279
  Consequently, Finnish territories impacted upon Sweden and the 
USSR and, crucially for Britain, the ability of Germany to wage war.  Finland was in 
a position to control the route along which Swedish iron-ore was shipped to Germany, 
a point which was taken up by Winston Churchill in the British War Cabinet.  In the 
far north of Finland, the province of Petsamo was of crucial strategic significance for 
the Soviet Union.  Petsamo divided the Soviet Union from Norway and had direct 
access to the Arctic Ocean.  Thus, any Soviet-Finnish conflict had the potential to 
impact upon British, German, Swedish and Norwegian interests, illustrating why this 
conflict had dominated the minds of Foreign Office and War Office officials for the 
first six months of the Second World War. 
The first official Foreign Office paper relating to the Soviet threat to Finland 
was written by Collier at the request of Lancelot Oliphant on 21 September, and 
following a re-draft – containing no substantial or significant changes – the paper was 
widely circulated within His Majesty’s Government on 25 September.  Copies were 
sent to the Foreign Secretary, the Permanent Under-Secretary and Deputy Permanent 
Under-Secretary, the Air Ministry, Admiralty, Board of Trade and the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare.  Writing on behalf of Lord Halifax, Collier provided an overview 
of both the current international situation following the outbreak of war and the views 
of his superiors in the Foreign Office.  Collier believed that the Soviet Government 
had been encouraged by its success in Poland and was intending to put pressure on 
Finland in order to secure the cession of the islands in the Gulf of Finland.  
Furthermore, as a consequence of recent Soviet policy in the Baltic, including the 
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Soviet Government’s attempts to secure the possession of Högland and other islands 
off the Gulf of Finland, Collier noted that public opinion in Finland and the Baltic 
States had been seriously alarmed by recent Soviet manoeuvres as well as the 
implications arising from the Nazi-Soviet Pact, notably the German-Soviet partition 
of Poland.
280
  In the wake of the apparent strengthening of Nazi-Soviet relations and 
recognising the growing Soviet threat to Finnish independence, Collier believed that 
the Finnish Government was not disposed to yield to threats and was seeking means 
for self-defence.  This was the crux of the issue for Collier and was a key debating 
point within the Foreign Office in the coming months – whether His Majesty’s 
Government ought to encourage Finnish resistance and whether Britain could afford 
to offer any real assistance to the Finns.  Collier forcibly argued a case for 
encouraging Finland and the Baltic States to draw together ‘in order to avoid the 
necessity of complete subservience to either German or Soviet aims’.281  His reasons 
for suggesting such a course of action included the desirability of distracting German 
attention and German forces from the main theatre of war in Western Europe.  It was 
hoped that German resources would be exhausted as a result, and should Stalin be 
willing to sign an economic agreement with Britain, the economic blockade would 
cripple the German war economy.  Additionally, there would be the inevitable 
outcome of increasing the self-imposed ‘neutral’ Soviet Government’s preoccupation 
through prolonged action in Finland.  His Majesty’s Government would derive 
economic advantages as a result of British encouragement of Finnish resistance to 
Soviet and German pressure.  They could ensure the maintenance of supplies of 
foodstuffs and timber from Finland and the Baltic States that would otherwise be cut 
off if they submitted entirely to German pressure. 
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Adopting the advice tendered by Collier, Halifax believed that the Finnish 
Government and people were ‘genuinely determined … to defend their independence 
and neutrality’, which would be possible due to Finland’s comparatively large army 
of good fighting quality and its frontier which was well adapted for defence.
282
  
British assistance to Finland would come in the form of providing modern equipment 
– such as war material and tanks – and discreetly aiding the Finnish Government in 
the construction of a railway to the ice-free port of Petsamo.  The question of the 
supply of tanks to Finland was particularly important for Collier, as the British 
military authorities had retained six tanks from the Finnish order of thirty-two, which 
had been placed in 1936.  The War Office’s determination to withhold the tanks was 
baffling for Collier.  The War Office’s justification that the tanks would be used for 
training purposes was quite rightly questioned by Collier as the British Army did not 
use, and had never used, the same type of tank as the Finns.  It was simply a case of 
the War Office playing games, the consequences of which would have a detrimental 
effect on Anglo-Finnish relations.  Unfortunately for both Collier and the Finns, the 
issue of the incomplete order was to be drawn out for a number of weeks. 
At the end of September Collier received a telegram from the British 
Ambassador at Helsingfors, Robert Snow, supporting the points Collier had made in 
his paper.  Following a conversation that had taken place in Washington between the 
Finnish Foreign Minister and the American Ambassador, Mr. Schoenfeld, Snow 
informed Halifax that Schoenfeld considered that there was a great risk to Finland due 
to its position of isolation at the end of the Baltic.  Their ‘defenceless exposure to the 
Russian menace’ could tempt the Finns to ‘place its sole hopes in Germany’.283  
Collier disagreed.  He noted in a minute on 7 October that the recent developments 
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would have convinced the Finnish authorities that they could not rely on Germany for 
any kind of support, be it moral or material, against the Soviet Government.
284
  
Central to his reasoning was the visit of Ribbentrop to Moscow on 27 September 
which resulted in the conclusion of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship 
Treaty, demarcating the line between the USSR and Germany.  The Treaty promised 
an improvement in relations and an increasing level of cooperation between the two 
countries.
285
  Additionally, whilst Soviet claims on Finland had disturbed Hitler, due 
mainly to the fact that they undermined German prestige and represented a potential 
threat to Germany’s strategic interests in the Baltic region, Stalin’s actions towards 
Finland remained in the spirit of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
286
  The question of German 
support for Soviet claims against Finland was consistently raised, and once again, as 
had been the case during the period leading to the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 
the intelligence received was of questionable reliability.  The British Ambassador in 
Tallinn informed the Foreign Secretary that he learned from a conversation with 
Andreas Pitka, son of Admiral Pitka, the Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Navy 
in the Great War, that Germany had promised to give unofficial support to the Finnish 
Army to resist Soviet aggression.  Gallienne had used the recent visit of Admiral Pitka 
and his son as evidence to support his claims.
287
  During the course of their visit to 
Finland they had attempted to arrange cooperation for the defence of Estonia and 
Finland. Collier disagreed.  The Pitka family belonged to the formally pro-German 
‘Ex-Soldiers’ Party’ in Estonia and their views were likely to be coloured by their 
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politics.  The belief that the Germans would send ships which would attempt to sink 
Soviet vessels was, in Collier’s eyes, ‘an example of wilfully wishful thinking’.288  
However, Collier was of the opinion that there was one point raised in the 
ambassador’s communication that was worth investigating, namely the possibility of 
the Germans surreptitiously helping the Finns against the Soviets.  Recent information 
received from Rome indicated that the Germans were to some extent prepared to 
double-cross Stalin.  Collier was verifying the reliability of the information through 
examining the source of Gallienne’s information and determining whether it could be 
trusted.  Should the source prove reliable, Collier would consider the desirability of 
making indirect use of the Pitka’s ‘Ex-Soldier’s Party’ to drive a wedge between the 
Germans and the Soviets – an idea supported by Halifax.289  How Collier would 
verify the information is unclear.  For Collier, ‘it seems to me that the rift that this 
would tend to cause in Soviet-German relations would be well worth the small 
concomitant gain to German prestige in the Baltic States, which is at present very 
low’.290  This was the first time that Collier raised the possibility of driving a wedge 
between the Germans and the Soviets, and it was an idea pursued by the Head of the 
Northern Department throughout the crisis. It was crucial for His Majesty’s 
Government to attempt to drive a wedge between the Soviet and German 
Governments as reports were reaching Collier that Germany had given the Soviets a 
free hand in Finland.
291
  In order to stop Soviet dominance of the region, the British 
Government had to do all it could to disrupt Soviet-German relations.  Once again 
Collier did not have the support of his colleagues in the Northern Department.  
Lascelles argued that one should dismiss the notion that Germany was affording, or 
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was prepared to afford, any tangible help to Finland or Estonia against the Soviet 
Union.  Not only did Lascelles dismiss the possibility of Germany aiding Finland or 
Estonia, he believed that ‘nothing could be better calculated to provoke the Soviet 
Government to a thoroughly ruthless policy both in Finland and Estonia than a 
conspiratorial organisation of this sort’.  Such a policy may not necessarily be to 
Britain’s advantage, and one ought not to encourage such action whilst the Soviet 
Union remained on the fence, not least as it could force them to re-evaluate their 
neutral status.
292
   
For his part, Major Kirkman at the War Office agreed with Collier.  Any 
action that could create a rift between Germany and the Soviet Union would be 
invaluable for Britain, yet the possibility of successfully convincing the Soviets that 
Finland was receiving German support was slim.  Stalin was likely to find out the 
truth of any rumour that the Pitka organisation had German backing, and may well 
discover the British deception.  Kirkman informed Collier that ‘such a discovery 
might provide considerable scope for propaganda, both in Soviet and Nazi circles in 
Germany, to show that perfidious Albion was up to her old machinations again.’293  
Rather than attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the Germans, 
Kirkman believed the more favourable approach would be to wait for the inevitable 
crack between the two countries to develop, at which point His Majesty’s 
Government ought to do all they could to widen it. As Soviet-Finnish tensions 
intensified in October, the Ministry of Economic Warfare communicated a 
memorandum to the Foreign Office that related to the possibilities of coming to an 
understanding with Moscow.  Both Collier in the Northern Department and the 
Foreign Secretary had stated that should Soviet aggression against Finland intensify it 
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would consequently put an end to any chance of concluding a more comprehensive 
Anglo-Soviet trade agreement.
294
 However, the Cabinet maintained that the British 
need for Soviet timber was so great that any reaction to Soviet aggression by the 
British Government had to be carefully considered.
295
  Should the British protest be 
too strong the Soviets would likely stop supplying Britain with any materials that 
were regarded as essential to its war effort.  Hugh Dalton wrote in his diary on 18 
September following the Red Army’s invasion of Eastern Poland that the Soviets 
ought not be ‘publicly slanged’, as the likely outcome would be a widening of the 
Anglo-Soviet rift.
296
   
Such incredible patience was evident in a memorandum by the Head of the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare, Ronald Cross.  He conveyed to the Foreign Office 
that from an economic perspective it was crucial for His Majesty’s Government to 
keep calm in the face of Soviet aggression.  In spite of the political conditions 
prevailing, Cross argued that London had to reach an agreement with Moscow in the 
face of mounting evidence that Soviet-German relations, both politically and 
economically, continued to improve and strengthen.  In a recent communication, 
Ribbentrop and Molotov had agreed that the Soviet Union was to supply Germany 
with materials essential to her war effort.
297
  Cross argued that whilst it was unlikely 
that the Soviets would deprive themselves of products in order to supply Germany, 
there was no reason to suppose that they would refuse to order raw materials on 
behalf of the German Government.  If they received payment in the form of 
manufactured goods, it would be advantageous for the Soviet Government to act as a 
conduit for German war materials.  Should the Soviet Union order goods on behalf of 
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Germany, the Anglo-French blockade would be rendered defunct.  In order to for the 
British blockade to be effective, therefore, it was essential that the issue of contraband 
reaching Germany through the USSR had to be seriously considered, and ways to 
strike a blow to Nazi-Soviet cooperation be discussed.  Problems arising were 
twofold.  Firstly, the British Government could not interfere with Soviet imports on 
the ground that they were suspicious of the consignees, as it would inevitably produce 
the greatest protest from the Soviet Government.  Secondly, Great Britain relied on 
certain commodities from the USSR.  The agreement of 11 October was vital for the 
British war effort and it was crucial that any serious dispute with the Soviet 
Government should be avoided until the majority of the timber had reached Britain.  
As that could take some time due to the inefficiency of the Soviet transport system, it 
was essential that Britain tread carefully.
298
  A.G. Marshall, the chair of the 
Consultative Committee on Anglo-Russian Trade, agreed with Cross.  The British 
Government must not run after the Soviets, but to unnecessarily antagonise them 
would be unwise.  Hence, British contraband control had to be delicately handled.
299
   
In spite of the somewhat precarious position in which the British authorities 
were placed, Cross acknowledged that ‘it is difficult to believe that we shall gain 
anything by letting the Soviet Government think we are afraid of them’.300  Collier 
agreed with Cross’s conclusions.  His Majesty’s Government ought not to treat the 
Soviets with more leniency than other neutrals when it came to contraband control, 
and advocated that Britain adopt a firm approach to the Soviets. Indeed, it was 
imperative that Britain should not display any signs of weakness.  In Collier’s opinion 
the Soviet Government had made it clear that they fully intended to act as a source of 
supply to Germany, and any leniency from Great Britain would most certainly be 
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viewed as a sign of weakness.  The Soviet Government was fully aware of the 
importance of its actions in the successful application of the blockade.  The Soviet 
intention to re-export goods to Germany clearly illustrated a lack of goodwill.  
Therefore, as Britain could not count on Stalin’s goodwill, ‘we ought to give them 
nothing for nothing’.301 
Hence, the issue of the possibility of sending aid to Finland, alongside the 
desirability of improving Anglo-Soviet trade relations were the key points debated by 
members of the Foreign Office and the War Office during the Phoney War period.  
There was a fervour of activity within the Foreign Office once they heard of the 
Soviet invitation to Finland to discuss the European situation.  Previous attempts at 
diplomacy in the past had often been swiftly replaced by manipulation and threats of 
action.  This knowledge had dictated the response of the Foreign Office.  In a 
telegram by the British Ambassador in Stockholm, Monson, he told the Foreign 
Office that ‘[the] Scandinavians as a whole are looking to His Majesty’s Government 
to support the Finnish Government in their resistance to expected Soviet demands’.302 
Lascelles questioned how the Swedes imagined that the British could support Finland.  
It may have been possible to send help via Petsamo, but only at the expense of 
declaring war on the Soviet Union.
303
 There was a consensus within the Foreign 
Office that to gain another adversary would be highly damaging to the chances of an 
Allied victory.   
As a result, there were officials within the Foreign Office who were becoming 
increasingly belligerent in their attitudes towards the Soviet Union.  Collier was the 
most outspoken.  He continually aired his opinions on the necessity of adopting a 
hard-line approach to the Soviets.  Cadogan agreed with Collier in this matter – a rare 
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occurrence during his tenure as Head of the Northern Department.  Cadogan shared 
with Collier the belief that Britain need not be deterred from taking any advantageous 
action due to a fear that the USSR would declare war on her.  Soviet aggression in 
Finland and Molotov’s approach to the British proposals for a trade agreement 
illustrated that no amount of British overtures would induce the Soviet Government to 
cooperate with London.
304
  
Lascelles and Collier agreed with Cross’s analysis on the merits of obtaining a 
trade agreement with the Soviets.  Lascelles believed that the British Government 
must not be paralysed by a fear that any firm approach taken in this matter would lead 
to a deterioration in Anglo-Soviet relations.  As Lascelles had remarked in September 
when Cripps had first proposed to visit Moscow, Anglo-Soviet relations were in such 
a terrible state that no action on the part of the British Government could make them 
any worse.  To favour the Soviet Government above ‘genuine neutrals’ would be 
unwise.
305
  Collier reiterated that the Soviet Union did not want to be involved in a 
war with Britain.  In economic matters, however, the Soviets would do all that they 
could to help Germany short of going to war with Britain.  As a result, Collier saw no 
reason for treating the Soviets with special leniency due to a fear of driving them 
further into the arms of Germany.  Should the Soviets commit another act of 
unprovoked aggression, this time against Finland, Collier had stated that London 
ought to look elsewhere for timber.
306
 
Halifax dealt with the issues arising from Cross’s memorandum in a War 
Cabinet meeting on 25 October.  As a result of Britain’s recent dealings with the 
Soviet Government – in which the Kremlin had ignored Halifax’s proposal to start 
negotiations over trade matters – he believed that Britain ought to be cautious in 
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approaching them again. If Molotov was to agree to his proposal, Halifax’s believed 
that there were only two ways in which to obtain a trade agreement with Moscow.  
The safest and preferred option was to conduct negotiations in London.  The second 
course suggested that the first part of the negotiations should take place in London, 
and for the agreement to be signed in Moscow.  Should the second course be adopted, 
it was suggested that the British delegation should be headed by a Minister of the 
Crown so that the Soviets would not question British sincerity of, and the importance 
attached to, reaching a satisfactory trade agreement.
307
  The advantages of the second 
course were clear.  It offered the best chance of obtaining an agreement that would 
produce both political and economic benefits for London, thus allowing for a ‘big 
deal’ to be made.  It was evident that Halifax had hoped that through adopting the 
second approach there was scope to improve Anglo-Soviet relations generally. 
However, he did express his belief that a British Delegation would only proceed if 
political conditions permitted, a comment that was readily understood as a warning 
that the issue would be halted should the Soviets commit an act of aggression against 
Finland.   
The day after Halifax had proposed to start negotiations with the Soviet 
Government, an alternative course of action was raised by the Minister of Supply.
308
  
Through bombing the Soviet oil installations at Baku it would be possible to stop the 
flow of supplies to Germany.  This idea was supported by prominent figures within 
the French military, namely General Gamelin.  It was believed that the oil fields in the 
region were vulnerable to attack, and should Great Britain and France decide to take a 
more forceful approach, it would have the advantage of cutting off supplies to 
Germany by naval action in the Black Sea, as well as producing a positive effect on 
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the neutral Balkan states.
309
  In this way one need not enter into frustrating 
negotiations with the Soviets.  There would be the added benefit of illustrating British 
strength and willingness to take drastic measures in order to render the blockade of 
Germany effective.  The Prime Minister was wary of such an aggressive approach 
whilst Halifax declared that the Chiefs of Staff were far more desirous of the plan 
than he was.  Sargent asked the pertinent question whether the plan was viable, as it 
was far from sure that Germany in fact needed the Soviet oil.
310
  This being so, the 
only result of bombing the oil installations would be to rattle the Soviets.  Cadogan 
interjected and stated his opinion that force was ‘the only language the Kremlin 
understands’.  As such, bombing the oil fields would be evidence of British strength, 
and would show the Soviets the consequences of displeasing the British Government. 
The impact upon Germany would be slight.  For it was Germany, not the Soviet 
Union, who was Britain’s enemy. 311  
The idea of bombing Baku would impact upon the events in Finland.  Though 
the Soviet Government had not yet declared war on Finland, it was clear that should 
the Finns not acquiesce to Soviet demands, a declaration of war would soon follow.  
A Soviet-Finnish war could possibly lead to British involvement on behalf the Finns, 
and thus the theatre of war would be extended to Eastern Europe, stretching British 
resources still further.  If the British decided to bomb Baku as a means of protestation 
to Soviet aggression, the inevitable result would be a breach with the Soviet Union.   
Indeed, Collier and his colleagues in the Northern Department would not contemplate 
a complete breach of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government.  Relations 
were most certainly strained, yet a rupture with the Soviet Union would not command 
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nationwide support, nor would it command the support of the British Cabinet.
312
  If 
Britain were to break with the Soviet Government, the most probable consequence 
would be a Nazi-Soviet alliance, which would be disastrous for the British 
Government.
313
 
Rather than openly antagonising the Soviet Government in this way, Collier 
recommended that the Army release the remaining six tanks as requested by the 
Finns.
314
 Collier, who was supported by the Foreign Secretary, urged the Army 
Council to release the whole order as a sign of goodwill that would inevitably serve to 
strengthen Anglo-Finnish relations.  Not only would the release of the six tanks 
illustrate a degree of goodwill, but it would prevent the Finns from turning to the 
Germans for the tanks.  Collier called upon Halifax on 25 October and relayed the 
details of his conversation with Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Minister.  Erkko had 
warned Collier that his Government were considering obtaining arms from Germany 
as a consequence of the Finnish Government not receiving the entire order of tanks.
315
  
This possibility had led both the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Foreign 
Secretary to respond.  Cadogan wrote to Arthur Street in the Air Ministry and stated 
that for political reasons it was important for His Majesty’s Government to provide 
arms and to encourage the Finns to stand up to the Soviets.
316
  For his part, Halifax 
had questioned the War Office’s assertion that they would be making a great sacrifice 
in allowing six tanks of a type not suitable for use in the British Army to be exported 
to a country who was in urgent need of them.  Halifax agreed with Collier’s belief that 
supplying the tanks would very much be in the interests of His Majesty’s 
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Government.
317
 After weeks of negotiating with the War Office, Collier had ensured 
that the entire order was completed.
318
  The issue of British tanks for Finland 
illustrated not only Collier’s belief that the British Government had to prove to the 
Finns of their desire to assist them, but also the fact that the Head of the Northern 
Department had the support of the Foreign Secretary and was in a position to affect 
the actions of the War Office.  In doing so, His Majesty’s Government were not 
involving itself in the conflict.  They were simply completing a long-standing order, 
whilst at the same time allowing the Finns to defend themselves.  Collier was aware 
that neither His Majesty’s Government nor the United States’ Government would be 
in a position to afford much assistance to Finland once hostilities broke out.  All 
Britain could do was to maintain trade exchanges ‘within the narrow limits imposed 
by war-time conditions’.  More overt assistance could lead to war with the Soviet 
Union.
319
   
Snow disagreed.  He believed that ‘a complete breach with the Soviet 
Government would command nationwide support’, and continued to assert that Stalin 
had posed a greater threat to British interests than Hitler.
320
  Both Maclean and 
Lascelles disagreed.  Maclean agreed with Collier that a breach with the Soviet 
Government over Finland would prove unpopular within Britain, and Lascelles 
reiterated that the British Cabinet had believed that the only result of a breach would 
be a full-blown alliance between Germany and the USSR.  This was regarded as the 
most satisfactory course of action, as the Finns themselves did not ‘propose the 
hopeless task of resisting Russia by force’.321   Crucially, at that time His Majesty’s 
Government were still unaware of the exact nature of the Soviet demands on Finland.  
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As Lascelles noted, His Majesty’s Government was under no obligation to defend 
Scandinavian independence against any Power, and the Scandinavian states had 
always fought shy of the slightest suggestion of a guarantee from Britain.  As such, to 
risk war with the Soviet Union for Finnish independence was a gamble not worth 
taking.
322
 
Thus, as the situation in Finland was escalating, British policy towards the 
Soviet Union was far from certain.  It proved to be a highly divisive topic within the 
Cabinet as well as the Foreign Office. On 24 October Halifax read a letter written by 
Sir Stafford Cripps to his War Cabinet colleagues.  Cripps did not mention the 
problems in Finland, nor whether London should come to Finland’s aid in the event of 
a Soviet declaration of war.  Instead he once again argued that Anglo-Soviet 
economic relations were of paramount importance and that an agreement was urgently 
needed.  Cripps advised Halifax that His Majesty’s Government ought to negotiate an 
agreement in Moscow, as the Soviets would take no interest in trade negotiations that 
were conducted entirely in London.
323
  Recent indications of a German desire to 
improve its economic relations with the Soviet Union had influenced Halifax decision 
to conduct part of the negotiations in London, with the final stages occurring in 
Moscow.  However, to publicly announce such a plan would be unwise as it was 
likely to antagonise Hitler and accelerate any German plans to consolidate its 
relations with the Soviet Union.  The War Cabinet, however, concluded that ‘nothing 
would be gained by half measure[s]’ and that any risk associated with the second 
course was worth taking, a conclusion wholly different to those reached by members 
of the Northern Department.  Collier and Maclean agreed that a breach with the USSR 
would be disastrous, yet Halifax’s preferred course would give the appearance of 
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British desperation and a British anxiety to appease Stalin in order to gain an 
economic understanding. 
Consequently, Halifax decided to inform the Soviet Ambassador that his 
Government would be willing to contemplate a much larger trade deal following the 
conclusion of the recent barter deal.  There were numerous obstacles facing the 
British Government, the most important of which was the uncertainty surrounding 
Finland as well as the extent of Soviet-German economic collaboration.  As Gabriel 
Gorodetsky has noted, the British had to be wary of conducting talks with the Soviets 
following the triple alliance negotiations, in which the Soviets had used the 
negotiations as ‘bait to extract better terms from the Germans’.324  ‘Caution’ was an 
oft-quoted word when discussing any approach – be it in the economic or political 
realm – to the Soviet Government.  There was a widespread fear within both the 
Foreign Office and His Majesty’s Government of Soviet game-playing and time-
wasting, as was evident during the triple alliance negotiations.  It was clear from the 
War Cabinet discussions and the memorandum composed by Halifax that an 
overriding consideration was a fear that the Soviets would prolong any negotiations 
with the British Government in order to extract the ultimate advantages from London.  
In this way, the Soviets would use negotiations with Great Britain to improve its 
relations with Germany, as was the case during the 1939 negotiations.  Halifax 
succinctly summed up this predicament: ‘…it is obvious that any trade negotiations 
with the Soviet Government would need to be conducted with great caution, both to 
avoid risk of commodities of value to Germany being sent on from the USSR to that 
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country, and to ensure that any visit to Moscow arising out of negotiations would not 
merely result in the public humiliation of the visitors’.325 
With the obvious limitations in the British position, coupled with their clear 
desire to reach an economic understanding with the Soviets, it was necessary for the 
Finns to make preparations and anticipate the demands placed upon them by Moscow.  
The Finns offered a group of Eastern islands, which they had previously refused to 
concede, in return for economic concessions.  Lascelles admitted that whilst any other 
line taken by the Finns would have been sheer folly, ‘such folly might have benefited 
us!’326  When the Soviet-Finnish negotiations commenced on 12 October and were 
concluded on 14 October, very little information was disclosed as to the nature of the 
negotiations or what the Soviet demands included.  Such secrecy only served to 
solidify the British belief that aiding Finland would be foolhardy and that Britain 
should instead attempt to improve her economic relations with the USSR.  It was not 
until the end of October that details of the Soviet demands were made known to His 
Majesty’s Government.  The demands included the cession of the islands in the Gulf 
of Finland and the cession of the Finnish half of the Ribachi peninsula which would 
allow the Soviets to dominate the Finnish arctic post at Petsamo.  The Soviets also 
wanted a base at Hangӧ as whoever controlled that part of the coast could block the 
Gulf of Finland and all sea access to Leningrad.
327
  Snow had informed Collier that 
the previous demand for a military alliance between the Soviet Union and Finland had 
been dropped and that no demands had been made in connection with the Aaland 
Islands.  Collier believed that the prospect of a peaceful settlement did not look 
promising.  Should the Finns approve the cession of the Ribachi peninsula and to 
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allow a Soviet base at Hӓngo, Finnish independence would be seriously 
undermined.
328
 
When Halifax met with Maisky on 16 November, rather than ascertaining 
whether the Soviets were likely to remain on peaceful terms with the Finns, he asked 
the ambassador whether the Soviet Government was ready to start negotiations for a 
trade agreement.  Predictably, Maisky was noncommittal and informed the Foreign 
Secretary that he had hoped to make a communication within the course of the next 
few days.  Many within the British Government feared that once again the Soviets 
were drawing out the issue in order to place themselves in a better strategic position.  
However, Cripps believed that the Soviet Government would carefully consider 
Halifax’s proposal.  Unfortunately, Cripps had also believed that Moscow would not 
proceed with their negotiations with London until a settlement had been reached over 
their difficulties with Finland.  It was those ‘difficulties’ that were being represented 
to the Soviet public as largely due to the support given by Britain to the Finns in their 
opposition to the Soviet proposals.
329
  Cripps was convinced that the Soviet 
Government did not wish the delay to affect the prospect of securing a trade 
agreement with Britain.  Although he appreciated that Halifax’s patience was being 
tested, he believed that it was in Britain’s interest to continue the policy of tolerance 
towards the USSR.
330
 
Unsurprisingly, Collier was less tolerant of Soviet game playing than Cripps, 
and did not believe that one could trust the Soviets.  He accepted that Britain must 
remain tolerant of the Soviets, yet was growing tired of the increasingly virulent anti-
British tone in the Soviet press and was frustrated that Moscow continued to delay its 
response to the British proposals of 21 October.  Following a meeting attended by 
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Collier, Halifax and the President of the Board of Trade on 24 November, the way in 
which Halifax was to approach Maisky was discussed.  It was no longer debated as to 
whether negotiations with the Soviets were desirable, as the British need for Soviet 
timber was a matter of urgency.  The question was once again how to approach the 
Soviets.  It was agreed that when the Soviet Ambassador next called upon the Foreign 
Secretary, Halifax should not give him the impression that he was sent for because 
His Majesty’s Government was in a rush to start trade negotiations, nor that they were 
chasing the Soviet Government over this matter.
331
 
It was at this time that the details of the most recent Soviet demands on 
Finland reached the Foreign Office.  On 6 November, Snow was once again 
championing the Finnish cause, much to the annoyance of his colleagues in the 
Foreign Office.  In communication with Halifax, Snow repeated statements 
previously made by Collier regarding the relative threat of Nazi and Soviet 
aggression.  Snow stated that he fully agreed with Collier’s belief that the democratic 
neutrals hated the Bolshevik form of totalitarianism far more than the Nazi variety.  
Indeed, British propaganda should emphasise that British war aims were directed 
towards the ‘preservation of all nations from the perpetual threat of unprovoked 
attack’.  This included an unprovoked attack by the USSR.332  Snow had entirely 
agreed with Collier’s statement made on the 20 October, yet was at a loss to 
understand why Collier had altered his opinions by the end of the month.  By that 
time, Collier argued that Britain was fighting the Germans and not the Soviets, and 
whatever he and his colleagues in the Foreign Office felt about the latter, His 
Majesty’s Government could not afford to antagonise the Soviets directly so long as 
there was any risk of them joining up with the Germans.  Snow seemed to attach no 
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importance to that fact, and argued that ‘as regards the risks of bringing Russia and 
Germany into closer contact, I venture to suggest that we are in the presence of two 
poisonous but mutually destructive elements’.  British policy ought to recognise that 
fact.
333
  In response to Snow’s confusion as to the change in his position regarding the 
Soviet and German threat, Collier asserted that he was simply being realistic.  The 
British Government could not antagonise both totalitarian powers, as its resources 
were not equal to it.  Nothing would have pleased Collier more than to ‘take on’ both 
Germany and the Soviet Union.
334
  However, once the Soviet demands were 
circulated and war between the USSR and Finland was imminent, Britain needed to 
be realistic and aware of its limitations.  To declare war on the Soviet Union would 
only strengthen her relationship with Germany.  Collier had consistently argued that it 
was necessary to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and Germany and, not, on 
the contrary, to provide them with a common enemy in Great Britain.  Barclay of the 
Central Department agreed fully with Collier.  The Chiefs of Staff had decided that on 
the whole Britain ‘should not be justified in adding to our present burden by declaring 
war on the USSR unless and until the USA has definitely ranged herself on our 
side’.335  Challenging Snow’s notion that His Majesty’s Government had simply 
washed its hands of Finland, Barclay pointed out that Great Britain had already 
supplied a great deal of the Finnish armament requirements and that Maisky had been 
informed that any Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations would have to be suspended should 
the Soviet Union make an unprovoked attack on Finland.  Lascelles succinctly 
summed up the British situation: ‘… through attempting to protect a certain small 
Power [Poland] whom we were bound by treaty to assist, we have become engaged in 
a life-and-death struggle ourselves’.  If the British Government were to adopt Snow’s 
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line they would be guilty of biting off more than they could chew.  Consequently, 
there would be no hope for any small state should its independence be threatened by 
either Stalin or Hitler.  The only way in which Great Britain would be victorious in 
this life-and-death struggle would be through restricting her field of operations to 
manageable proportions.
336
  In his response to Snow, Halifax reiterated the points 
made by Collier, stating that ‘if our resources were adequate we should not hesitate to 
take on both Germany and Russia in the last resort’.337  It was now Snow’s turn to be 
the odd man out in the Foreign Office rather than Collier, who was now part of the 
Foreign Office consensus. 
Following the transmission of the Finnish counter-proposals, the Soviet Union 
declared war on Finland.  The Finnish terms had stipulated that they were prepared to 
move the frontier of the Karelian Isthmus twelve kilometres further from Leningrad, 
yet were not prepared to agree to the cession of the Ribachi peninsula or for the 
Soviets to control the naval base at Hangö.
338
  In Molotov’s speech to the Supreme 
Council of the USSR, he reviewed Soviet foreign policy and placed the responsibility 
for the breakdown of the negotiations solely on the shoulders of the Finns.  Finland 
had refused a mutual assistance pact and would not grant any concessions.  Finnish 
rejection of the Soviet proposals would merely ‘do harm to the cause of peace and to 
themselves’.339  Unsurprisingly, those in the British Foreign Office did not accept 
Molotov’s justification and saw his speech for what it was – propaganda covering a 
barely veiled threat, intended to scare the Finns into capitulating to the very demands 
that would compromise their independence.  As Seeds noted, the only reasonable 
explanation for the Soviet invasion of Finland was that the failure of the Soviet 
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campaign of threats and intimidation was greatly damaging to the prestige of the 
Soviet Union and of Stalin himself.
340
  Maclean believed that Stalin had not expected 
the Finns to fight for their independence and predicted that the Finnish war could 
mark a turning point in the history of the Soviet Union and quite possibly of Stalin’s 
regime.
341
  
Leo Amery, an MP in the House of Commons, communicated to Halifax that 
with regard to the Finnish question, if the Soviet Union was seriously held up over the 
Finnish war she would not be able to make much trouble in Roumania or against 
Turkey, who were two countries with whom His Majesty’s Government had hoped to 
come to terms with.  However, much depended on the actual state of Nazi-Soviet 
relations.  For Amery, ‘my own view is that the two gangsters will continue to 
cooperate so long as there is loot to be got’ and that ‘there is no doubt an element of 
gamble in whatever decision we take, but as between the risks of the bolder and more 
moral policy, and that of the policy of waiting, I believe we should be wise to lean in 
the former’.342 
Maclean once again took up the issue of Britain’s policy towards the Soviet 
Union following the outbreak of the Winter War on 30 November.  Reiterating points 
made by Collier in previous minutes, Maclean noted that the principal reason for 
British reluctance to become involved in hostilities with the Soviet Union was due to 
a desire not to take on another adversary.  It was not due to a belief that the Soviet 
Union did not constitute a real threat to British interests.
343
  As for the problem of 
German-Soviet cooperation, it was clear that their economic relations were improving 
as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and, whilst German and Soviet conduct had been 
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equally reprehensible, it did not follow that cooperation between the two governments 
would become closer simply because they were both following an aggressive and 
expansionist foreign policy.  Creating a rift between Germany and Soviet Russia, as 
suggested by Collier on 15 November, would be difficult.  Hence, the only option for 
His Majesty’s Government would be to damage Soviet interests by indirect means.  It 
was improbable that a blockade or economic sanctions would greatly prejudice the 
position of the Soviet Union as it was largely self-supporting and had a comparatively 
small foreign trade.  The best way to damage Soviet interests would be to send 
armaments to the Finns and to any other victims of Soviet aggression.
344
  His 
Majesty’s Government should not refrain from adopting such an approach out of fear 
of Soviet retribution.  If Stalin decided to pick a quarrel with the British Government 
as a consequence of the shipment of arms to the Finns, Maclean believed that it would 
show conclusively that he was deliberately seeking a pretext for declaring war on 
Britain.  There was, however, no reason to believe that Stalin had any intention of 
breaking from the neutral status of the Soviet Union.  Therefore, any suggestions of 
breaking off relations with the Soviet Union, as suggested by both Snow in 
Helsingfors and Seeds in Moscow, would be a rather meaningless measure with no 
positive benefit for the British Government.  
During a War Cabinet meeting on 12 December, Halifax argued that it was in 
the interest of Great Britain to send armaments to the Finns even in the face of reports 
stating that Germany was ‘hand in glove’ with the USSR.345  Consequently, it was 
decided that the Secretary of State for War should arrange for the despatch of 
munitions to Finland, including the despatch of one hundred high calibre guns.
346
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While Britain was readying herself to send aid to Finland, a previously ignored 
problem was discussed.  It was noted that any British aid to Finland would be 
redundant unless the Swedish and Norwegian Government agreed to do the same.  
Unfortunately for both Finland and Britain, the Swedes were paralysed by fear of 
Soviet-German collaboration and of German retribution should Sweden intervene in 
the Finnish conflict.  This was a problem of great significance for it was only from 
Sweden that the Finns could receive immediate help.  The Germans would not 
forcibly aid the Soviets should Sweden come to the aid of the Finns.
347
  The role of 
the Swedish and Norwegian Governments was one of the key considerations within 
the Foreign Office when discussing the extent of possible British aid to Finland.  
Great Britain could only reach the main area of operations in Finland by passing 
through Norway and northern Sweden, and without the active help of these two 
Powers it would be almost impossible for British munitions to reach Finland.
348
  From 
the outset the Swedish authorities were hesitant to lend any support to Finland.  
Whilst Sweden dreaded a German descent on Scandinavia, Sargent welcomed the 
prospect of a German invasion as it would give the British an absolutely caste-iron 
case for sending an expeditionary force to Norway and Sweden.
349
  He further 
believed that it was in the interests of Great Britain that Finland should be saved, ‘if 
only because she constitutes a barrier between Russia and her control over the 
Swedish iron-ore and her ambitions to reach the Atlantic’.350  Before Britain could 
attempt to save Finland, the Chiefs of Staff had to consider what assistance could be 
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provided to Sweden and Norway should their direct or indirect assistance to Finland 
antagonise the Soviets.   
The Chiefs of Staff were fully aware that they ought to consider Soviet action 
in Finland as a possible prelude to the spreading of operations to Scandinavia.  Should 
operations spread to Scandinavia, His Majesty’s Government could not directly 
protect southern Scandinavian cities against air attack, nor could they protect a land 
invasion of southern Norway or Sweden.
351
  Whilst the Chiefs of Staff doubted 
Britain’s ability to prevent Scandinavia should the Soviet Union attack, they still 
recommended the despatch of arms to Finland and encouraged the Swedish and 
Norwegian Governments to do the same.  In spite of the possible problems associated 
with such a course of action, it was deemed important to intervene.  The Finnish need 
was urgent.  Should they allow the opportunity to assist slip by, the British 
Government may well lose Norwegian and Swedish confidence in its ability and 
determination to help them should their independence be threatened.  Such a loss of 
prestige was deemed an unacceptable risk.
352
  Collier agreed with the conclusions 
reached by the Chiefs of Staff.  In a paper entitled ‘Consequences of the Soviet-
Finnish War’, Collier related a conversation with Chabonnier in the French Embassy 
in which they were in agreement that the success of the Soviet attack on Finland 
would, in the eyes of the world, be a serious blow to the British cause.  Collier 
recommended that Britain should go ‘all out’ to help Finland regardless of Stalin’s 
reaction and regardless also of the timidity of the Swedish and Norwegian 
Governments.
353
 Here one can appreciate Collier’s desperation in his desire for action.  
Indeed, Collier believed that it was in the interests of His Majesty’s Government to 
prolong the Finnish conflict as it would make it difficult for the Soviets to either 
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afford help to Germany in her war with the West or to embark on any further military 
adventures elsewhere.
354
   
When Collier was informed on 17 January 1940 that a further strengthening of 
Soviet-German trade relations had occurred, he became more adamant that Great 
Britain should come to the aid of the Finns.  Maclean noted that the news was not at 
all surprising as a number of sources had circulated rumours of an impending 
agreement.  However, the Nazi-Soviet agreement of 11 December 1939 had ensured 
the continued delivery of cotton from the USSR to Germany, leading members of the 
Northern Department to express its dissatisfaction with British policy towards the 
USSR.  Not only was His Majesty’s Government still waiting for a Soviet response to 
the proposals put forward on 21 October 1939, but the Soviets continued to trade with 
the Germans.  Thus, the British blockade was weakened further.
355
   
A glimpse of hope was evident when the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
informed the Foreign Office that the wintery conditions had meant that large 
quantities of goods would not be shipped to Germany from the USSR.   The 
memorandum stated that ‘the agreement may … be described as little more than an 
expression of pious hope’, but warned that in six or eight months’ time the general 
situation may be very different.
356
  Timing was everything, and His Majesty’s 
Government could not let the opportunity pass by.  Hence, it was believed that they 
must act while the weather was in their favour.
357
  Unfortunately, the fact remained 
that the Soviets continued to consolidate her economic relations with the German 
Government.  A commercial agreement was reached during Ribbentrop’s visit to 
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Moscow in August 1939, yet the British proposals continued to be ignored by 
Moscow. 
At the start of 1940 Maclean argued strongly that by standing up to the Soviets 
the British were just as likely to frighten Stalin out of close cooperation with 
Germany as to drive him into it.  Furthermore, Soviet-German cooperation was 
probably as close as circumstances and the mutual interests of the two countries 
would permit.
358
  Furthermore, Maclean argued that through helping Finland in their 
resistance to Soviet Russia, His Majesty’s Government would in turn be acting in 
their own best interest.
359
  Prolonging the war in Finland would damage Soviet 
interests and would take an economic toll on the Soviet Union.  More crucially, 
however, her relationship with Germany would be negatively affected.  Preoccupation 
with Finland would ensure that Soviet imports and exports to Germany would be 
reduced, as all essential war materials would be used to ensure Soviet victory.  Any 
reduction of Soviet economic assistance to Germany was vitally important for His 
Majesty’s Government.360  A memorandum composed by Sargent explored this in 
greater detail.  He agreed with Maclean that close cooperation was not the most likely 
outcome of the Finnish conflict.  Should the deadlock continue, the Soviet 
Government might be forced to accept German help in order to reorganise and 
strengthen the Soviet economic and military machine, and thus hasten the overthrow 
of Finnish resistance.  Consequently, Germany would obtain a foothold in the USSR 
that it had hitherto failed to secure.
361
 Furthermore, it would not be to the German 
good for the Winter War to be decided without the intervention of the German 
Government.  Consequently, it was probable that Germany would find adequate 
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reasons for helping to destroy Finland for the benefit of the Soviet Union, even 
though it would mean the ‘establishment of the Soviet Government as the ultimate 
rival of Germany in the Baltic’.  Sargent concluded that it was clearly in the interests 
of Great Britain and France to prevent German mediation from materialising.  
Possibly the most crucial point made by Sargent in this memorandum was that the 
only way in which Great Britain and France could realistically prevent such German 
involvement was to encourage the Finns to make a formal appeal to the British and 
French governments for help.
362
 
Collier expanded upon the points made by Sargent in a memorandum that was 
circulated to Oliphant, Cadogan and Halifax.  Collier dealt with the effect of the Great 
Britain involving itself in a war with the Soviet Union.  Once again, central to the 
issue was the state of Nazi-Soviet relations.  German statements had reached the 
Foreign Office that had indicated that the German Government would welcome a 
state of war between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in the hope that it 
would lead to a stronger Soviet-German alliance.  This would give Germany, as the 
predominant partner, greater influence over of Soviet policy and Soviet resources. 
Collier believed that an actual breach between the German and Soviet Government 
was unlikely as it was simply not worthwhile for the Germans to quarrel with the 
Soviets.  As a result, ‘the two robbers will probably continue to hang together until 
they both hang separately’.363  If Great Britain and France found themselves at war 
with the Soviet Union it would be due to closer German-Soviet collaboration and not 
the result of any British aid to Finland. 
As the debate continued within the Foreign Office as to the nature and extent 
of German-Soviet collaboration and how it would impact upon British aid to Finland, 
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the war was taking its toll on the Scandinavian country.  Although Finland had 
withstood the initial Soviet onslaught remarkably well, a fact that had surprised the 
Western Powers and Soviet Union alike, it was clear that without reinforcements 
Finland would not be able to withstand the Soviet advances indefinitely.  Le Rougetel 
in the Moscow Embassy informed the Foreign Office that the main Soviet offensive 
against Finland was due to start on 28 February.
364
  As Seeds had asserted, the Soviet 
invasion of Finland, though planned on the German model, had not been executed 
with totalitarian efficiency.  The invasion had been improvised once it had become 
clear that the Finnish Government was not prepared to yield to bluster and 
intimidation, unlike Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
365
   
News of the impending Soviet offensive spurred the failing League of Nations 
into action.  At the beginning of February, the Assembly urged every member of the 
League to provide Finland with as much humanitarian assistance as was in its power 
and to refrain from any action which could weaken Finland’s power of resistance.366  
It was at this time that the British Cabinet authorised the Chiefs of Staff to work out a 
detailed plan in which an Allied expeditionary force would land in Scandinavia.  This 
scheme was met with emphatic support in the Northern Department.  Lacy Baggallay 
urged his superiors in the Foreign Office to do all they could to avoid a Finnish 
collapse,
367
 a sentiment to which Collier fully concurred.  Many within the Northern 
Department were far from convinced that the Finnish forces could withstand another 
Soviet offensive.  Consequently, Swedish and Norwegian assistance was of the 
greatest importance.  Their aid would make a Soviet victory far less likely, as the 
combined force of Finland, Sweden and Norway would overwhelm them.   
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The British Ambassador in Stockholm, Mallet, informed Collier of his 
conversation with the Head of the Swedish armed forces.  The Swedish Secretary-
General had stated that the Germans had made it clear that they would regard any 
official Swedish participation in the war in Finland as an act of aggression and the 
German Government would implement immediate counter-measures.  However, 
should Swedish help to Finland continue to be unofficial, then the German 
Government would not raise any serious objections.
368
  Collier was scathing of the 
Swedish mentality.  He did not know of any German démarche to which the Swedish 
Government could identify that would support the assumption that the Germans 
would attack them if they sent units of the Swedish army to Finland, even if they were 
in the guise of volunteers.  Rather, Collier suspected that they were making that 
assumption ‘merely to excuse their own timidity’.  On the other hand, he was satisfied 
that the Swedish Government would not dare to refuse passage to volunteers, however 
numerous.  Collier then suggested the rather radical idea that His Majesty’s 
Government ought to send as many volunteers as possible through Sweden in order to 
force their hand.
369
 
 Collier regarded such drastic action to be necessary.  Following a meeting 
between August Zaleski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs,
370
 and Halifax, there 
was a general consensus that something must been done to stop Finland from meeting 
the same fate as Poland.  During the course of the meeting, during which the Polish 
Ambassador, Cadogan and Strang were present, a variety of topics were discussed.  
The first of these was the nature of Nazi-Soviet collaboration.  Zaleski had previously 
believed Germany to be ‘enemy number one’.  However, following the Soviet 
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advance into Poland and her invasion of Finland, Zaleski believed that both Powers 
were equally dangerous.  The ambassador was thus determined to find means of 
halting the possible improvement of Soviet-German relations.
371
  Both British and 
Polish intervention in the Finnish conflict could provide an opportunity for action that 
would have the desired effect.  As Poland was already in a state of war with the 
USSR, there would be no question of any possible effect on Soviet-Polish relations.  
Whilst that action may damage Anglo-Soviet relations, Zaleski believed that the 
advantages of intervention outweighed the disadvantages.  Halifax agreed that it was 
desirable to disrupt Nazi-Soviet relations, yet was hesitant about irreparably damaging 
Anglo-Soviet relations and risking the possibility of adding the Soviet Union as an 
adversary.  One must remember that Halifax still sought an Anglo-Soviet economic 
agreement in spite of Molotov’s refusal to respond to British overtures.  Indeed, 
Halifax was convinced of the necessity of keeping the Soviets occupied with Finland 
for as long as possible, as they would consume the resources and supplies that might 
otherwise be directed to Germany.  War with the USSR, however, would involve 
Britain in new commitments and would dissipate its resources.  Collier had made that 
point on 15 November 1939.  Halifax stated that fear of Soviet displeasure should not 
dictate British policy, a point that had first been raised by Collier.   One can 
appreciate that a consensus of opinion within the Foreign Office was slowly 
developing as a result of the Winter War.  As Lascelles had stated in December 1939 
in defence of British policy towards the Soviet Union, it was prudent for Great Britain 
to avoid provoking the Soviet Government into active measures against them.  What 
the British Government could not afford to do, however, was to display any signs of 
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weakness or fear when dealing with the USSR.
372
  On the issue of British aid for 
Finland, Halifax informed Zaleski that the British had sent much more material to 
Finland than had been made public, but was equally aware that should British aid 
prove insufficient and Finnish resistance collapsed, British prestige would be severely 
damaged.
373
  It was the intention of the British authorities to continue to send as much 
material as possible.  What was crucially important, however, was manpower.   
To this end, His Majesty’s Government had been unofficially preparing and 
organising the despatch of volunteers.  Once again, the anxiety of the Scandinavian 
governments was a barrier to the successful despatch of British volunteers.  Halifax 
hoped that as the danger of German encroachment into Scandinavia increased, the 
governments of Sweden and Norway would be more willing to assist Britain in their 
attempt to aid Finland.  The Polish Government in exile was facing similar 
difficulties.  General Sikorski was willing to send some 4,000 men to Finland by 
April, yet it was difficult to ensure their arrival.  Halifax had hoped that public 
opinion in Sweden and Norway would become outraged by the situation in Finland as 
this public outrage could induce the Swedish and Norwegian Governments to send a 
large measure of assistance and allow the safe passage of troops through their 
territory.  The Polish Ambassador in Washington, Ciechanowski, interposed that the 
Swedish Minister had recently told him that their chief anxiety was not simply that 
they might be dragged into war, but that Great Britain and France would not be able 
to protect them should the German or Soviet Government declare war on them.  
Halifax’s response was curiously evasive, which was no doubt due to his previous 
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admissions that British resources would be stretched too thin should such an 
eventuality occur.
374
   
 Swedish determination to avoid aiding Finland was confirmed at the end of 
February.  Following a meeting with the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mallet 
gained the impression that the Swedish Government had decided that any help that 
they could give to Finland would only serve to delay their inevitable defeat.
375
  
Maclean and Collier could not hide their disgust.  Maclean minuted that ‘the Swedes 
are in a deplorable state of mind’ whilst Collier reiterated his belief that Britain ought 
to present a fait accompli to the Swedes.  An Anglo-French landing of volunteers at 
Narvik was believed to be the best course of action.  Collier was convinced that 
should His Majesty’s Government ask Sweden and Norway for permission to send a 
force through to Finland they would get ‘nowhere’.376 
 On the day of the rumoured Soviet offensive against Finland, Collier prepared 
a memorandum outlining his key arguments regarding Swedish and Norwegian aid, 
and how their support would impact upon the aid that Great Britain could provide for 
Finland.  Once again Collier’s memorandum was widely distributed, with copies sent 
to R.A. Butler, Vansittart, Cadogan and Halifax.  Vansittart praised the conclusions 
reached by Collier, believing that there was a good deal of force in what he had 
written, and that his suggestions ought to be carefully considered.
377
  In his 
memorandum Collier asserted that should His Majesty’s Government wish to incite 
the Swedish and Norwegian peoples against their governments, then the proposed 
Finnish appeal for aid should be publicly made by 5 March.  It was hoped that this 
would spur the Swedish and Norwegian Governments into action.  Unfortunately, 
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there was an obvious downside.  The appeal could give the German Government the 
opportunity to publicly threaten Norway and Sweden with dire penalties if they were 
to allow British or French troops across their territory.
378
  If the German Government 
was foolish enough to use British support for Finland as reason to escalate from 
threats to action, it was likely that it would have a positive effect on the relations 
between Great Britain and Sweden and Norway.  As a consequence of German 
bullying the Scandinavian governments might decide to appeal to Great Britain for 
help, which would be favourable for His Majesty’s Government.  Collier noted that 
such an appeal was possible, but not at all likely.  Rather, His Majesty’s Government 
ought to expect ‘an intensive campaign of intimidation from both Berlin and 
Moscow’ and as a consequence the Norwegian and Swedish Governments would be 
too ‘terror-stricken’ to allow Anglo-French troops to pass through their territory.379  
Only decisive action by the British could redeem the situation.  In Collier’s opinion, if 
the Swedish and Norwegian Governments knew at once that Britain would be 
prepared to protect them from a German attack, it was just as likely that they may in 
fact yield to British requests for free passage for their ‘volunteers’.  Acquiescence 
would most likely occur under duress, yet assent would allow the passage of troops 
across their territory without experiencing either passive resistance or sabotage.  In 
order to bring them to that frame of mind quickly, it was essential that the Swedish 
and Norwegian authorities should, when called upon to make their decision, be 
already in possession of all the facts regarding the help which Great Britain was 
prepared to give them.  Collier stated that General Lewin should be ‘on the spot’ by 5 
March and ready to give complete explanations of British plans to the Swedish and 
Norwegian soldiers.   
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Whilst this suggestion held the best chance of a successful outcome, Collier 
was not optimistic.  Rather, he believed that the most likely outcome of an appeal 
would be the categorical refusal of the Swedish and Norwegian Governments.  Hence 
Collier boldly asserted that London had to decide whether they were to ‘take this 
lying down on the ground’.  Collier clearly believed that they should not.  Although 
the conclusions of a joint Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff paper of 18 February 
stated that Great Britain was not in a position to risk issuing an ultimatum and seeing 
it through, Collier believed that Britain would have to risk an ultimatum and trust that 
Anglo-French troops would be able to land and use the Narvik-Lulea railway without 
any active resistance or sabotage by the Norwegian and Swedish authorities.  Collier 
was once again guilty of letting his emotions dictate his opinions and the advice he 
tendered.  He was desperately anxious to avoid a Finnish defeat.  Collier continued to 
advise that it was prudent to make immediate provisions to send out the relevant men 
who would be needed to work the railway in the event of the Norwegian and Swedish 
Governments withdrawing their railway staff.  Collier stressed the importance of 
immediate and decisive action in the face of such a possibility.
380
 
 As Halifax was considering the advice put forward in Collier’s memorandum, 
Collier penned yet another paper on the subject of Swedish and Norwegian assistance.  
This time the Permanent Under-Secretary was the recipient.  The tone of Collier’s 
memorandum was frantic and desperate.  Collier apologised to Cadogan for troubling 
him with yet another communication regarding the proposed expedition to Finland.  
His concern over the discouraging answers given to the Finnish Government by His 
Majesty’s Government had motivated him to seek Cadogan’s support.  Maclean 
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shared Collier’s concerns.381  For his part, Collier accepted that Britain could not 
follow the French example and promise things which they were incapable of fulfilling 
– Daladier had sent a message to the Finnish Government without consulting his 
British ally, in which he promised 50,000 men and 100 bombers to be in Finland by 
the end of March, yet urged that action was necessary.   
Collier feared that there was a real danger that the Finns would submit to 
Soviet demands and argued that it would not be in the interest of His Majesty’s 
Government for the Finns to capitulate.  Collier proceeded to advise Cadogan to 
encourage Halifax to override the objections of the Chiefs of Staff and to inform 
Marshal Mannerheim that he could be in command of the British expedition to 
Finland.  Collier then proposed that Cadogan should convey to Mannerheim the 
‘most, rather than the least encouraging account of the numbers of that force which 
might be available for Finland’.382  Collier’s behaviour was unacceptable.  To advise 
his superior to ignore expert advice was wholly inappropriate and no doubt made 
Collier look erratic in the eyes of Cadogan.  Collier informed Cadogan that the French 
had misled the Finns with the projected numbers of men who could be sent to Finland 
in the immediate future, and believed that they could very well send 50,000 men in 
total.  Furthermore, it was conceivable that more than 12,000 of these could proceed 
from Sweden to Finland.  Collier feared that the British Government was positively 
going out of its way to paint the gloomiest picture possible of the expedition’s 
prospects.
383
  Cadogan’s reply to Collier was short and succinct and was limited to the 
practicalities of the difficulties facing potential forces in Finland.  Any force that was 
sent to Finland had to be supplied over a single-track railway.  That was the key factor 
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that had limited British aid to Finland rather than any hesitation or pessimism from 
the War Office.
384
 
 As the Soviet attack on the Mannerheim Line continued, time was most 
certainly of the essence.  The intelligence that had reached the Foreign Office 
suggested that a new Soviet offensive was imminent.  When the Finns failed to make 
an official appeal to Great Britain, Sargent asked Collier to compose a memorandum 
relating to the implications of British policy towards Finland.  In spite of Collier’s 
inappropriate behaviour throughout the crisis, his overall argument in the 1 March 
paper had appeared to hold sway amongst his superiors.  Collier relayed the details of 
the original plan of action, whereby Great Britain and France were to ask the 
permission of the Norwegian and Swedish Governments to send forces across their 
territory.   However, they could not do so without the consent of Sweden or Norway.  
Collier criticised the original plan as he believed that no consideration had been given 
to the effect on public opinion in France and Britain.  The most likely result of such a 
policy would be a desperate appeal by Finland to the Western Powers as well as to 
Norway and Sweden.  Any appeal would inevitably be made public.  Britain and 
France would announce that they had prepared an expedition and had asked the 
permission of the Swedish and Norwegian Governments to send the volunteers across 
their territory to Finland.  Collier predicted that the Swedish and Norwegian 
Governments would refuse.  In that case, all that the Allied Powers could say was that 
the blood of Finland was on the hands of Sweden and Norway.  For Collier, that was 
unacceptable.
385
  Meanwhile, the Germans would publicly state that they would not 
tolerate the passage of the expedition and it would appear that the Swedish and 
Norwegian Governments refusal for passage was the result of German opposition to 
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the plan.  Collier feared that the world would believe that Britain had abandoned not 
only Finland, but Scandinavia as well, to Russo-German domination.  According to 
Collier, this was the opinion held by the French Government.  Should such this occur 
as a consequence of any action or inaction by His Majesty’s Government, a very 
severe strain would be placed on Anglo-French relations.  The reputation of His 
Majesty’s Government in France and in the world at large would be damaged, which 
was why Collier had argued that the original plan should be abandoned.   
Instead, His Majesty’s Government should face the Scandinavian 
Governments with a fait accompli in the form of landing the first contingent of troops 
quietly at Narvik in the guise of further volunteers, without waiting for the consent of 
the Norwegian Government.  Gladwyn Jebb, previously Cadogan’s private secretary 
prior to his appointment as to the Special Operations Executive, had first suggested 
such a plan; Collier fully approved of it.  If the contingent of ‘volunteers’ were sent to 
Narvik, Collier did not believe that the authorities at Narvik or the Swedish frontier 
guards would oppose their landing.  The Germans would most certainly object to an 
Anglo-French force moving towards the source of their supplies of iron-ore and 
would take counter measures.  Scandinavian public opinion would hardly permit the 
Norwegian and Swedish Governments to become active allies of Germany in turning 
out the Anglo-French forces on their territory.  If the Germans persisted in adopting 
forcible measures, they would have to fight the Swedes and Norwegians as well, 
which would be advantageous for the British Government.  Collier was aware that the 
military authorities had stipulated that Scandinavian cooperation and not merely 
acquiescence was essential, as anything short of that would make it almost impossible 
for the expedition to arrive in Finland at the time planned, yet he did not feel that an 
adequate reason to oppose his proposed fait accompli.  If the Finns maintained their 
 120 
current position, Collier argued that the delay in the expedition’s arrival would not 
necessarily be fatal.  A delay was far more desirable than a failure to send any aid 
whatsoever.   The consequences of the latter would be extremely grave, and could 
very well mark a turning point in the war.  In conclusion, Collier wrote: ‘in such 
circumstances I hope I may be forgiven if I have in any way trespassed beyond my 
province or spoken my mind more frankly than is proper’.  Collier further hoped that 
his paper had illustrated to his superiors in the Foreign Office that a decision of some 
sort was urgently required.
386
  Collier believed that the British Government was guilty 
of moving in a vicious circle, refusing to tell the Finns what action Great Britain 
would take unless they first make their formal appeal, whilst the Finns refuse to make 
their appeal until they know what His Majesty’s Government would do once it had 
been made.
387
 
 Collier’s appeal for speedy and decisive action proved to be unnecessary.  On 
8 March news reached the Foreign Office that negotiations had begun.  There was a 
general consensus that His Majesty’s Government ought to keep out of the 
negotiations as they had no business interfering.  It was decided that the only peace 
terms which the Soviets were likely to accept would gravely discredit the reputation 
of any foreign government that had helped to bring about their acceptance.
388
  Should 
the Finnish Government reach a settlement with the Soviets, His Majesty’s 
Government would have nothing more to say on the matter.   
If, on the other hand, they failed, the Finnish Government would have to 
decide whether they would make the suggested appeal for the help of the military 
forces of Great Britain and France.  Should such an appeal be made, the Finnish 
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Government would have to do so by 12 March, the date of the alleged new Soviet 
offensive.  Halifax made it clear that in the event of a Finnish appeal, His Majesty’s 
Government could afford to send fifty Blenheim Bombers.
389
  Collier maintained that 
‘the Swedes are the chief villains of this piece’, whilst Sargent doubted that the 
British could have altered the decision of the Finnish Government even had His 
Majesty’s Government made the offer as regards the immediate despatch of 
bombers.
390
   
 The peace treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union was signed on 13 
March 1940.  The terms were transmitted to the Foreign Office and contained nine 
articles.  The most pertinent terms in the Treaty included the amassing of Finnish 
territory in the Karelian Isthmus, the fifty-year lease of Hangö to the Soviet Union 
and the understanding that neither party would attack the other. Nor would they 
conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition against the other Power.
391
  
Barclay was scathing about the peace treaty, and stated that the terms were 
‘appallingly severe’,392 whilst Collier was scathing about the Swedish response 
following the signature of the treaty.  During a speech by the Swedish Minister for 
Foreign Affairs on 13 March, Gunther, had stated that the Swedish Government had 
attempted to assist the Finnish Government to find a basis for fresh negotiations with 
the Soviet Government.  In their position as intermediary, the Swedish Government 
had attempted to utilise every opportunity to promote Finland’s interests and had 
never exercised any pressure on the Finnish Government.
393
  Again, Collier was 
guilty of letting his emotions run wild.  Writing that ‘this is one of the most dishonest 
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speeches ever made outside a totalitarian country’, Collier proceed to examine the 
‘more flagrantly disingenuous passages’.394   
The first of these related to the fact that the Swedish Government, especially 
the Foreign Minister, had exercised the strongest pressure on the Finnish Government 
to accept peace on any terms.  Collier further asserted that he had reason to believe 
that the German Legation in Stockholm had urged the Swedish Government to 
proceed with their pro-German mediation.  Finally, and most crucially, Collier 
asserted that the Swedish Government knew that they could intervene in Finland by 
themselves without provoking any German action.  They chose to believe that their 
intervention would not be decisive without Anglo-French aid.  Furthermore, the 
Swedes had clearly feared that any intervention would involve them in the main war.  
In spite of his outrage, Collier did not suggest that the British Government expose 
Gunther in its propaganda, but he did believe it essential to prevent public opinion 
abroad from believing that the Swedish Government was blameless in the matter.  For 
Collier, the fundamental fallacy underlying the policy adopted by the Swedish 
Government was the assumption that a neutral state ought never to run the slightest 
risk of being involved in war by helping the victim of aggression, even if the 
aggressive party threatens its own interests.
395
  Sargent agreed generally with Collier, 
yet wanted to make it clear that it should be the object of His Majesty’s Government 
to show that the Germans were the ultimate villains of the piece, rather than the 
Swedes.
396
   
Following the conclusion of the Winter War, there was a swell of ill-feeling 
towards the Soviet Government within British public and official opinion.  Those in 
the War Office, much like those in the Northern Department, were increasingly 
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belligerent in their attitudes towards the Soviet Union.  The War Office’s opinions 
were similar to those held by Collier.  They had dismissed the arguments of those 
sympathetic to the Soviets.  A rapprochement with the Soviet Union was neither 
possible nor desirable.
397
  Once again the idea of bombing the oil fields in Baku was 
raised.  Maclean had no doubt that the recent conciliatory and friendly attitude 
adopted by the Soviet Government towards Britain was due to the Soviet victory over 
Finland.  Now that the Soviets were no longer preoccupied with the war with Finland, 
they could turn their attention to their economic relations with Great Britain after 
months of ignoring the issue.  More crucially, Maclean attributed this more 
conciliatory attitude to the ‘fear of the Soviet Government that we were preparing to 
bomb the oilfields’.398 Once again it was Collier and Maclean who were in favour of 
maintaining a hard-line policy towards Moscow.  It was in the economic sphere that 
the British could effectively show their displeasure of recent Soviet conduct.  Aside 
from any action at Baku, the best way to strike a blow at the Soviets was through the 
detention of Soviet ships carrying contraband to Vladivostok.  As Maclean noted, 
Vladivostok had ‘constituted a bad gap in our blockade of Germany’.  In view of the 
apparent close collaboration between the Soviet Union and Germany, and alongside 
the present unsatisfactory state of Anglo-Soviet relations, it was in the British interest 
to prevent war material from reaching the Soviet Union itself.  Maclean had held this 
view prior to the Winter War.  The loss of British prestige that resulted from the 
conflict had made the success of the British blockade infinitely more crucial.  
Maclean had doubted Soviet sincerity in their renewed desire for an Anglo-Soviet 
economic arrangement.  If Britain was to agree to commence negotiations, ‘after their 
experience of last summer, the Russians doubtless hope to be able to keep us in play 
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for a considerable period’.399  In a review of the current state of Anglo-Soviet 
relations and Soviet policy towards Britain and Germany, Collier believed that there 
was no reason to suppose that the Soviet Government would be willing to purchase a 
political détente with France and Britain by abandoning their economic collaboration 
with Germany.  At the heart of the Nazi-Soviet economic cooperation was the desire 
to render the Anglo-French blockade ineffective.
400
  Thus, the only real means of 
disrupting the trade levels between the USSR and Germany was through the detention 
of the ships. 
Maclean expanded upon this point a fortnight later following a discussion with 
Sir William Seeds.  Seeds had told Maclean that the Soviet Government’s present 
policy of cooperation was based solely on Soviet interests.  Consequently, there was 
no hope improvement in that respect.  However, Seeds had felt that the British 
Government would be well advised in entering into trade negotiations with Moscow, 
but warned that they ought to ‘adopt a firmer attitude than would have been called for 
last autumn’.401 Seeds’ statement is somewhat surprising.  As the former British 
Ambassador in Moscow, one would expect that his experience in dealing with the 
Soviet Government, not to mention the fact that he was withdrawn from his post due 
to Soviet aggression in Finland, would result in a far less accommodating attitude 
towards the Soviets. Indeed, during his final meeting with Molotov in January 1940, 
Seeds had complained of the way in which the Foreign Minister spoke to him, and 
expressed his disbelief in Molotov’s assertion that ‘Finland would never have been so 
openly hostile to the Soviet Union even during the negotiations [prior to the war] had 
she not been instigated by us [Great Britain].’402   
                                                 
399
 NA, FO371/ 24846/ N3485/ 40/ 38, minute by Maclean, 21 March 1940. 
400
 Ibid., minute by Collier, 25 March 1940. 
401
 NA, FO371/ 24846/ N3794/ 40/ 38, minute by Maclean, 3 April 1940. 
402
 NA, FO371/ N40/ 40/ 38, Seeds to Foreign Office, 1 January 1940. 
 125 
Maclean promptly aired his objections to Seeds’ suggestion.  Maclean doubted 
whether any useful purpose would be served by such negotiations if there was no 
prospect of preventing the Soviet Government from continuing their support of 
Germany and thus prolonging the war indefinitely.  Aside from that, what could Great 
Britain obtain from the Soviets that would be of any use?  It was Maclean’s belief that 
the Soviet Union would not declare war on Britain, as it was to the interest of neither 
Germany nor the Soviet Union that the latter should be involved in hostilities with 
Britain.  But that was all that Britain could hope for from the Soviets.
403
  Maclean 
acknowledged that should His Majesty’s Government move forward with the 
negotiations, a possible outcome would be the restriction of Soviet exports to 
Germany, as Britain would offer to take the greater part of Soviet export surplus 
themselves.  Restriction, not prevention, of Soviet exports was the pertinent point.  
Whilst that constituted the only possible approach for the British at that time, Maclean 
fully believed that it would only constitute a temporary solution to the problem.  
Maclean argued that the Soviets were once again raising the possibility of a trade 
agreement in order to manipulate the British Government into refraining from any 
drastic action against the Soviet Union.  Should an Anglo-Soviet economic agreement 
be reached, the Soviets would simply keep the British in play for as long as was 
convenient.  Once inconvenient the Soviets would then cease to fulfil their obligations 
under the agreement and the bulk of Soviet exports would once again be sent to 
Germany.  Maclean concluded by stating that there was little probability that the 
benefits of any agreement for Great Britain would bear any relation to the ‘very 
considerable advantages’ which the Soviets and Germans would gain by keeping the 
British in play.  In addition, it would prevent the British from taking any initiative 
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against the Soviet Union until it was too late.  That was the real object of direct and 
indirect approaches by the Kremlin to His Majesty’s Government at that time.404  
Collier very much doubted the worth attached to any economic agreement 
with the Soviets, unless it specifically stated that the Soviet Union would stop 
supplying Germany.  All that would be achieved was a prolonged negotiation process 
that would ultimately result in British disappointment, as was the case in the summer 
of 1939.
405
 
On 27 March Maisky had called on Halifax and informed him that the Soviet 
Government would be prepared to enter into negotiations ‘without delay’, yet only 
along the lines suggested by the Foreign Secretary in October 1939.
406
  Evidently, 
once Stalin was no longer preoccupied with the Finnish crisis, he was ready to 
conclude a general trade agreement.  No mention of a war trade agreement was 
mentioned, merely a desire to improve Anglo-Soviet trade relations.  Maclean was 
dissatisfied with the Maisky’s communication, as it failed to include any concrete 
information as to what the Soviet Government wanted to achieve from the agreement.  
Whilst considering the motives behind the Soviet offer, Maclean recalled the 
‘unsatisfactory character of Anglo-Soviet trade relations in the past’, in which the 
failed triple alliance negotiations of 1939 were once again referred to.
407
  When the 
political and military negotiations broke down prior to the signature of the Nazi-
Soviet Pact, the Soviet Government had failed to respond to the British offer of 
sending a trade delegation under Mr Hudson to Moscow, an offer that had been made 
at the beginning of 1939.  There were clear parallels between Soviet game playing 
that had shrouded the trade negotiations of 1939 and the tactics being used during 
                                                 
404
 Ibid. 
405
 Ibid., minute by Collier, 4 April 1940. 
406
 NA, FO371/ 24840/ N5246/ 5/ 38, Telegram: Le Rougetel, 29 April 1940. 
407
 NA, FO371/ 24840/ N4155/ 5/ 38, minute by Maclean, 4 April 1940. 
 127 
Britain’s second attempt at opening trade negotiations with Moscow.  As the Soviet 
Government had failed to respond to the British trade proposals of October 1939, 
Maclean asserted that the Soviet Government did not attach any real importance to 
their trade relations with Britain.  The sudden appearance of a war trade agreement 
proposal at the end of March 1940, therefore, was seen by Maclean as dictated by 
purely political considerations.  It was clear to Maclean that rumours had reached 
Moscow of the possibility of British action against the oilfields at Baku.  One could 
assume that the new course of Soviet policy was met with the full approval of the 
German Government, as it was a well-established belief within the Foreign Office and 
His Majesty’s Government generally that the Soviet Union would not take any action 
that would antagonise the Germans.
408
   
Should the British Government decide to proceed with economic negotiations 
with the Soviets, in spite of the dubious motivations on behalf of Moscow, what 
benefits could Britain derive from a trade agreement with the Soviet Government?  
The only understanding of any value would be a war trade agreement, which would 
require the Soviet Government to cease their economic support of and cooperation 
with Germany for the duration of the war.
409
  Collier qualified Maclean’s statement 
by commenting in the margin that the most that the British Government could expect 
was a reduction of Soviet supplies of certain raw materials to Germany, such as oil 
and non-precious metals.
410
  It was noted by Maclean that Germany was the natural 
market for the Soviet Union, and both Powers would benefit from continued 
economic cooperation.  Soviet raw materials could be exchanged for German arms 
and machinery.  German technical assistance would prove particularly valuable in the 
reorganising of Soviet industry; assistance that would be even more crucial following 
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the departure of foreign experts from the Soviet Union.  It was questionable what His 
Majesty’s Government could offer the Soviets in order for them to renounce such a 
beneficial economic agreement, a policy that also boasted the added benefit of 
prolonging the war and thus weakening both Britain and Germany.  The arguments 
put forth by Maclean his memorandum were consistently held and did not waver as 
events unfolded.  His distrust of Soviet intentions and his belief that the British 
Government would not be able to induce the Soviets to renounce their economic 
cooperation with the Germans did not change throughout his tenure at the Northern 
Department.
411
 
In spite of the advice tendered by Maclean and Collier, it was apparent that 
their superiors in the Foreign Office felt it prudent to move forward with plans to 
improve Anglo-Soviet economic relations.  Although aware of the Soviet 
Government’s tendency to draw out negotiations and use negotiations with London as 
a means of getting the most out of the Germans, Halifax decided to weigh up the 
advantages and disadvantages of the recent Soviet proposals for an economic 
agreement.  Phillip Kerr, the British Ambassador in Washington, took up the question 
of the proposals made by Moscow in a telegram to Halifax on 8 April following a 
discussion with Cripps.  During their conversation, Cripps relayed the details of his 
tour to India and China that had taken place at the end of November 1939.  Whilst in 
Chungking, Cripps had a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador.  During the 
course of the conversation between Kerr and Cripps it was suggested that the latter 
visit Moscow in order to discuss the issue of Anglo-Soviet relations with Molotov.
412
   
Cripps arrived in Moscow on 15 February.  Cripps recorded in his diary the 
details of his meeting with Molotov that had taken place on the day of his arrival to 
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Moscow.  During the course of their conversation, Cripps had informed the Foreign 
Minister that he had hoped that their two Governments would be able to come to 
some agreement following the conclusion of the ‘Finnish incident’.  The issue of the 
nature and extent of Nazi-Soviet relations was discussed in conjunction with possible 
future Anglo-Soviet cooperation.  For his part, Molotov insisted that ‘the German 
association was only looked upon as a temporary expedient’.  Molotov’s reassurances 
were readily accepted by Cripps.  He was convinced that the Soviets were ‘anxious 
for a rapprochement with Great Britain and indeed that they were anxious for it at as 
early a moment as possible’.  Why, then, had the Soviet Government ignored the 
British proposals for a trade agreement, proposals that could have served as a 
platform for future discussions?  Molotov had complained about the generally 
unfriendly attitudes of the British and French Governments, and of their equally 
unfriendly actions towards the Soviet Union.  In spite of such grievances, Cripps left 
Moscow with the belief that once the political situation stabilised, the Soviet 
Government were sincerely desirous for an Anglo-Soviet agreement to be reached at 
the earliest opportunity.
413
  Kerr was also convinced of Molotov’s keen desire of the 
Soviet Government to make a trade agreement with Britain.
414
   
Cripps’ account was discussed at length during a Cabinet meeting on 6 May, 
in which the principle problems arising from Cripps’ communication were discussed.  
In the first instance, Molotov had not suggested that by concluding an Anglo-Soviet 
trade agreement there would be a modification in Soviet policy towards Germany.  
Rather he wished to trade with both sides to the advantage of the Soviet Union.  
Molotov had insisted that such a policy would prevent a monopolisation of Soviet 
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imports and exports by Germany.
415
  In a barely veiled threat, Molotov had warned 
Cripps that should the United Kingdom not be prepared to negotiate by the end of 
April, the Soviet Government would be likely to make a decision that would be 
‘highly unfavourable to us [Great Britain]’.416  Rather than expressing displeasure at 
the Soviet strategy of threats and manipulation, Cripps drew three conclusions: 1) that 
the Soviet and German Governments were fundamentally antagonistic; 2) a belief that 
the Soviet Government would prefer to see peace rather than risk being drawn into the 
conflict; and finally, that apart from foodstuffs, the Soviets were not likely to provide 
Germany with any pertinent materials necessary to wage war against Great Britain.  
Thus, any attempts to blockade Vladivostok would not derive any real benefit for 
Britain and France, as the present imports via Vladivostok were merely replacing 
those goods normally imported through European ports.  Any such blockade would 
merely risk war with the USSR.  Cripps was able to convince the Cabinet that his 
arguments held considerable force and it was recommended that the Foreign Secretary 
talk to Cripps upon his return to London.
417
  Halifax supported Cripps’ initiative and 
was in favour of sending him on an official mission to Moscow to explore the 
possibilities of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Government. 
The same day, Ingram from the Ministry of Economic Warfare communicated 
to Sargent his views as to the desirability of negotiating once again with the Soviets.  
Ingram enclosed a memorandum detailing the kind of agreement that would be 
satisfactory for the Ministry.
418
  This memorandum served as the British counter-
proposal to the Soviet overtures of 27 March.  In a minute attached to the 
memorandum Ingram drew attention to the administrative inefficiency of the Soviet 
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Union and the fact that one could not place any reliance on assurances from Moscow, 
making one take pause before recommending the commencement of negotiations.  
The memorandum itself laid out the terms that the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
believed to fulfil British requirements.  Ingram clearly stated in the opening paragraph 
that the writers were told that they need not explore the question of whether a policy 
of concluding a war trade agreement with the Soviets would be desirable or 
undesirable.  Questions of policy were to be decided by higher authorities.
419
   
The paper was to concentrate solely on the outline of a possible war trade 
agreement with Soviet Russia with the object of furthering Anglo-French measures of 
economic warfare against Nazi Germany.  Any such trade agreement must restrict 
goods passing to Germany across the USSR – a point held by Collier and his 
colleagues in the Foreign Office, one of the few instances of agreement over policy – 
and the restriction of the export of Soviet domestic produce to Germany. It was noted 
that protracted and indecisive negotiations with the Soviet Government would be 
undesirable for London, who would not want a repeat of the humiliating triple 
alliance negotiations.  Rather, the best course would be for the immediate agreement 
upon the principles of a war trade agreement, with the details to be worked out at a 
later date.  For the Ministry of Economic Warfare, ‘the obstacles to a war trade 
agreement with Russia are mainly political and sentimental; the purely economic ones 
are comparatively simple’.420  Two days later it was decided to accept the Soviet offer 
of commencing trade negotiations and that Halifax would indeed discuss this with 
Cripps when the latter returned from Washington.
421
   
During a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on 19 April, Halifax 
attempted to explain the British predicament with regards to the possibility of 
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reaching an understanding with the Soviet Government.  Noting that Britain had 
throughout the opening months of the war attempted to recognise the position of the 
Soviet Union as a ‘limitrophe’ neutral of Germany, but that the most significant point 
that the British Government had to consider was the effectiveness of the British 
blockade.  With this in mind, Halifax had hoped that exploratory talks could be held 
and way in which to overcome difficulties could be discussed.
422
  He then gave 
Maisky the memorandum that had been prepared by the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare that had laid out the British proposals for a war trade agreement in full.  
Maisky was once again noncommittal in his response, stating that whilst he would 
give the proposals to his Government, but did not know what their reaction would be.  
The ambassador believed that his Government would take issue to the fact that His 
Majesty’s Government wanted assurances of Soviet internal products.  As Maisky had 
stated, the Soviet Union intended to maintain its position as a neutral.  As such, the 
Soviet Government was at liberty to send supplies to Germany if she wished to.  The 
British demands were likely to be problematic and would thus reduce the chance of 
reaching an understanding.  Maisky then asked the Foreign Secretary why the British 
proposals for trade talks were different from those made in October.  Rather than 
emphasising a desire to build upon existing barter agreements, the most recent 
proposals spoke of a war trade agreement.  It was the latter that his political masters in 
Moscow would have an issue with.  The exchange of timber against rubber, copper or 
machinery would not raise any problems with Moscow.  In justification for the 
change in scope, Halifax informed Maisky that the reports reaching London of the 
economic aims of Germany in regard to the USSR, and the general policy of the 
British blockade of Germany, had made it necessary to introduce of the war trade 
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aspect to the question.  Halifax did not shy away from the fact that he wanted to see 
talks start for trade as well as for political reasons, but he ‘had little doubt that the 
Soviet leaders would make criticisms of any formula’ since he had ‘already found 
them adept at this art’.423 
Although Maisky had insisted on 27 March that the Soviet Government would 
be prepared to enter into negotiations with Britain ‘without delay’, it was not until 29 
April that the Soviet Ambassador handed Halifax a communication from Moscow.  
John Hellier Le Rougetel, who had been the Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow between 
1930 and 1939, transmitted Maisky’s recent communication to the Foreign Office.  
As scathing as ever – Le Rougetel’s dislike of the Soviets was well known – he wrote 
that the Soviet Government maintained that as a neutral power they were within their 
rights to trade with both belligerent and neutral countries according to its own 
requirements in imports and exports.
424
  Furthermore, the Soviet Government 
intended to carry out its trade agreement with Germany.  The Soviets were, however, 
prepared to re-establish trade relations with Great Britain in commodities of interest 
to both sides on the basis of reciprocity, providing that any agreement concluded 
would not demand from either side the violation of its trading obligations vis-à-vis 
other countries.
425
  The Soviet reply was far from satisfactory.  Moscow had not put 
forward any concrete proposals covering the desiderata of His Majesty’s Government 
as set out in their memorandum of 19 April.  It was clear that Nazi-Soviet trade 
relations would continue, ensuring that British remained fearful that Germany would 
receive the goods imported under a general agreement.  Collier correctly identified 
that the Soviet Government had not changed their policy of supporting Germany 
against Great Britain by every means short of going to war with them.  The only 
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apparent change that the Soviets had made was that they were putting slightly less 
public emphasis on it.
426
  Indeed, it was hopeless to expect the Soviet Union to act as 
a counter-weight to Germany, or to convince them of the prudency of reaching an 
understanding with London under the terms desired by the British Government.
427
 
As was the case throughout the Finnish crisis, Collier and Maclean were in 
agreement with one another.  There was no advantage in concluding an agreement 
expressly designed to safeguard German interests, which was evidently what the 
Soviet Government were offering London in their memorandum of 29 April.  
Consequently, in Maclean’s opinion, ‘the Soviet note cannot be said to furnish a basis 
for discussions’.428  Should the British Government settle for a simple barter 
agreement it would produce a disastrous effect on Allied and neutral opinion.  To 
acquiesce to this would be regarded as a display of weakness – something that they 
were desperate to avoid during the Soviet-Finnish conflict.  It was essential that 
Britain avoid giving the impression that in return for timber the British Government 
was prepared to overlook Soviet aggression against Poland, the Baltic States and 
Finland, as well as Soviet cooperation with Germany.  As such, Maclean reiterated his 
oft-stated belief that Soviet neutrality was advantageous for both the USSR and 
Germany, and that the Soviet Government would not jeopardise her relationship with 
Germany.
429
  Sargent concurred with Maclean’s analysis.  Only a war trade agreement 
would suffice, as ‘anything short of this would not merely be of no use to us but 
might do us positive harm’.  The Ministry of Economic Warfare had made that much 
clear, and if the British entered into negotiations with Moscow, it was highly likely 
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that they would be ‘dragged into doomed negotiations’, the breakdown of which 
would inevitably be blamed on the British, as was the case in August 1939.
430
 
Following a discussion with Sargent and Collier, Halifax agreed that the 
Soviet reply was unsatisfactory and seemingly barred the way to further negotiations.  
However, he was anxious to find out whether it also barred the possibility of an 
agreement with London.  It was Halifax’s hope that any such agreement would 
replace the Soviet agreement with Germany when the latter expired.
431
  Somewhat 
tentatively, Halifax questioned whether one could discover Soviet opinion on this 
point by simply asking the Soviet Government for the particulars of their agreement 
with Germany.  It was agreed by Halifax, Sargent and Collier that the Soviets would 
not disclose the particulars of their arrangement with the Germans.  Thus, any further 
Anglo-Soviet discussions would inexorably reach a deadlock, unless the British 
Government was prepared to limit the scope to a simple barter agreement.  Not 
enthusiastic with such an outcome, Halifax asked the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
and the Board of Trade to weigh in and help the Foreign Secretary draw up a reply to 
the Soviet memorandum.
432
   
The European situation alongside Britain’s war strategy had dictated British 
policy.  As Germany was preparing to send troops into France, the Foreign Secretary 
believed that the need to reach a satisfactory agreement with the USSR had become 
far more urgent.  As such, it was necessary to have a British Ambassador in Moscow 
once again.  It was at this juncture that the question of sending Sir Stafford Cripps 
arose once again, who was regarded by Halifax as a better candidate than Sir William 
Seeds, the previous ambassador in Moscow.  Cripps’ successful visit to Moscow and 
the cordial manner in which he was received by Molotov had made him the obvious 
                                                 
430
 Ibid., minute by Sargent, 1 May 1940. 
431
 Ibid., minute by Collier, 1 May 1940. 
432
 Ibid. 
 136 
candidate.  At the time of Cripps’ personal visit to Moscow, Maclean was far from 
impressed that he had taken it upon himself to discuss policy with Molotov, without 
the consent of His Majesty’s Government.433 In spite of the objections of the Northern 
Department, it was decided in the Cabinet on 6 May that Cripps would go to Moscow, 
accompanied by Professor Postan of the Ministry of Economic Warfare and Lascelles 
of the Northern Department.  Whilst there were doubts as to whether the mission 
would be successful, Halifax had hoped that the negotiations would at least create a 
rift in Soviet-German relations.  He assured the War Cabinet that as the mission was 
exploratory only, it would not involve the British Government in any commitment 
towards the Soviet Government.
434
  
For Ingram, any war trade agreement that could be negotiated with the Soviets 
was unlikely to meet the British requirements, and was sceptical that they would in 
fact fulfil its obligations should they succeed in signing an agreement.
435
  In spite of 
the advice tendered by Ingram, Sargent and Collier, Halifax was determined to 
explore every possibility of concluding a war trade agreement with the Soviet Union.  
As May drew to a close, Sargent informed Le Rougetel in Moscow of the decision 
reached in London.  Justifying the decision to send Cripps, Sargent informed Le 
Rougetel that Maisky recently had indicated that the current deadlock could be broken 
if the exchange of notes between Government’s was abandoned in favour of personal 
contact.  He further hinted that a change in procedure such as this could very well 
induce the Soviet Government to discuss political issues alongside economic ones.  
One ought to question whether Maisky was sincere in his proclamation or merely 
manipulating the Foreign Secretary.
436
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By the time of Ingram’s telegram to Le Rougetel, the ‘Phoney War’ had come 
to an end, following the German invasion of France.  The fall of France did little to 
improve the likelihood of attaining an economic agreement with the USSR, as it was 
believed that Britain could very easily – and swiftly – follow in France’s footsteps.  
Should Moscow sign an agreement with the United Kingdom only for the British to 
fall at the hands of Germany, the Soviet Government would be left in an extremely 
difficult position.  Consequently, as a German victory on the Western Front became 
more likely, Anglo-Soviet negotiations were yet to start.  Indeed, the Soviet 
Government had not responded to the British counter-proposals delivered to Maisky 
on 8 May.  It is entirely likely that the French capitulation, coupled with the ease and 
speed of the German success, contributed to Stalin’s eagerness to remain on good 
terms with the Germans.
437
  Consequently, as the Phoney War was drawing to a close, 
Europe was in a state of flux and Britain’s desire to simultaneously improve its 
economic relations with the Soviet Union whilst strengthening the Allied blockade 
against Germany was theoretical at best, and no progress to this end had been 
achieved.   
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Chapter Two 
From the fall of France to ‘Operation Barbarossa’ 
‘The question for a British Ambassador here is not how much he can do, but 
merely how much he can stand’.438 
 
As the German Wehrmacht swept through Western Europe in the summer of 1940 the 
Governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union were forced to review their 
respective wartime relationships.  The suitability of the British ‘policy of reserve’ that 
had hitherto been adopted towards the Soviet Government had to be scrutinised as a 
consequence of German successes in Western Europe and the subsequent collapse of 
France.  Britain had lost its main ally, and, with America’s continued adherence to 
non-belligerency, the necessity of improving relations with the USSR had to be 
considered once again by those within the British Foreign Office.   Furthermore, the 
pertinent question of Soviet policy towards Germany and its impact upon Anglo-
Soviet relations was again raised within the Foreign Office.  Many officials believed 
that the German Government would inevitably turn its attention to the USSR 
following the German successes in the Netherlands, Belgium and France.
439
  Should 
such predictions prove to be accurate, how would Stalin react?  Would the Soviet 
leader consider the implications of Hitler’s successes in Europe and deem a 
continuation of the policy of neutrality to be in the best interest of the USSR?  The 
key question for Stalin was whether the German Führer was now likely to turn the 
tables on the Soviet Union, or would he instead seek to dominate Western Europe in 
its entirety before contemplating an attack in the East?  Should Stalin fear such an 
eventuality, would an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement be viewed as the most 
advantageous course, or would he continue to adhere to the policy of benevolent 
neutrality whilst consolidating the position of the Soviet Union in anticipation of a 
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German attack?  Consequently, one can appreciate the sense of urgency that had 
gripped British policy-makers as they began to reconsider the wartime relationships of 
both the belligerents and non-belligerents.   
 In the months following the fall of France the possibility of obtaining a war 
trade agreement with the Soviet Government continued to be pursued within the 
Foreign Office.  Intrinsically linked to Anglo-Soviet trade relations was the question 
of the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States that had taken place over the summer of 
1940.  The question of whether His Majesty’s Government was to grant de facto or de 
jure recognition of the most recent act of Soviet aggression dominated discussion 
within the Foreign Office at that time.  British policy-makers were faced with an 
inherently irksome dilemma – a refusal to appease Stalin over the Baltic States would 
undoubtedly put an end to any chances of obtaining a war trade agreement with the 
Soviet Union which would serve to strengthen the British blockade of Germany.  Yet 
to grant de jure recognition of this latest act of aggression would be viewed 
worldwide as buying off the Soviet Union at the expense of three independent 
nations.
440
  Could His Majesty’s Government appease one dictator in an attempt to 
defeat another?   
A review of British policy was undertaken in the immediate aftermath of both 
Germany’s subjugation of France and the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States.  This 
had culminated in a lengthy document with contributions from the Permanent Under-
Secretary of State and his Deputy, as well as members of the Northern Department.   
In a minute penned on 18 June 1940, only days prior to the signing of the armistice 
between France and Germany, Sargent had expressed his conviction that the Soviet 
Government would not abandon its present policy towards Germany.  Stalin would 
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adhere to the policy of neutrality whilst fulfilling the terms of the various Nazi-Soviet 
economic agreements.
441
  The rapid increase in deliveries of Soviet raw materials to 
the Reich following the fall of France had clearly illustrated the importance that Stalin 
placed on economic support to Germany.
442
   
Sargent’s minute rebuffed the arguments put forth by Sir Stafford Cripps in 
his most recent communication to the Foreign Office.  Following a meeting with the 
Soviet Foreign Minister on 13 June, at which the French Ambassador, Erik Labonne, 
was also present, Cripps stated that he had been surprised by the readiness of Molotov 
to consider the points put to him and was struck by the apparently genuine interest 
and appreciation of the British and French point of view.  Cripps believed that the 
German fait accompli in France was likely to force the Soviet Government into 
adopting a more conciliatory and friendly attitude towards Britain, as Stalin would 
need British assistance to prevent German hegemony over the continent.  As a 
consequence of this meeting, Cripps believed that a significant shift in Stalin’s 
thinking had occurred, and that an improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations would be 
possible.
443
    
Whilst Cripps had erred on the side of optimism in the aftermath of his 
meeting with Molotov – which was unsurprising as his sympathy towards the Soviet 
Union was well-known – Sargent took the opposing line, one of caution and doubt. 
He argued that although Stalin had undoubtedly been caught unawares by the rapidity 
of the German successes in Western Europe, the only viable option was for the 
Soviets to keep on friendly terms with Germany, however much they may have feared 
her.  Indeed, Stalin would no doubt hope for the Reich’s future discomfiture, yet 
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Sargent believed that he would do nothing to encourage any such development 
himself.
444
  He also believed that Stalin feared the consequences that might ensue 
from anything other than Soviet acquiescence in German demands, both economic 
and political.  Stalin had certainly intensified his economic appeasement of Germany 
and to that extent Cripps’ optimism was unfounded.  Sargent contended that in the 
months prior to the fall of France the Soviets could have quarrelled with the Germans 
without any severe repercussions, due mainly to German preoccupations with the 
campaign in Western Europe.  Under present circumstances, however, the situation 
was radically different.  As a consequence of the successful absorption of the 
Netherlands, Belgium and, imminently, of France, the resources of the Reich had 
multiplied and freed up the Wehrmacht for campaigns elsewhere.  Indeed, as Hitler 
informed Molotov when the latter visited Berlin in November, following the 
conclusion of the French campaign, Germany was ‘extraordinarily strong’.445  There 
was little doubt in Sargent’s mind that Hitler would now turn his attentions to the 
Soviet Union.  The Führer’s anti-Soviet utterances throughout the 1930s had made his 
ultimate intentions clear enough.  Should the Soviets do anything to upset the 
Germans, Hitler could send anything up to forty divisions to the Soviet frontier within 
a fortnight.  Rather than quarrelling with Germany, in Sargent’s opinion, Stalin had 
‘wisely chosen to mop up the Baltic States’ in the hope of creating a strong strategic 
frontier, both on land and sea, against the day when he may be forced to defend 
himself against Hitlerite aggression.
446
  Although Sargent questioned why Hitler had 
allowed Stalin to strengthen his position in the Baltic, he believed that it was no doubt 
‘part of some comprehensive bargain, the object of which is to enable Russo-German 
collaboration to continue unimpaired for the time being’.  Alternately, Hitler may 
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have assessed the Soviet army and navy as being so inefficient that the strengthening 
of the Soviet strategic position in the Baltic would make no practical difference when 
it came to a Nazi-Soviet show down.
447
   
The conclusions drawn by Sargent mirrored those formed within the Northern 
Department.  Maclean argued that both Cripps and Labonne were showing ‘undue 
optimism’ at the attitude adopted by Molotov.  All that could be gleaned from Cripps’ 
communication was that the Soviet Foreign Minister had listened politely to 
Labonne’s lamentations of the French desire to maintain resistance in the face of the 
German attack.  Molotov would not commit himself or reveal the Soviet position 
without first consulting Stalin.  Undoubtedly, the Soviet Government would be glad 
to find a means of prolonging French resistance, yet their fear of Germany was likely 
to prevent them from taking any positive action in the matter.  Thus, Stalin’s 
appeasement of Germany would continue.
448
  Indeed, Maclean declared that he would 
be surprised if Stalin decided to engage in conversations with Britain on the delicate 
subject of preserving the European equilibrium.  It was in the Soviet Union’s best 
interest to consolidate its position in Bessarabia and the Baltic States, an eventuality 
which would render an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement unlikely, as turning a blind eye 
to further Soviet aggression would be unpopular with domestic and foreign – 
particularly American – opinion.449  Collier’s contribution to the debate was brief.  He 
agreed with Maclean regarding the Soviet Union and the Baltic States, whilst 
reiterating his long-standing belief that the key obstacle to a rapprochement with the 
Soviet Government was its continued supply of materials to Germany, as a result of 
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which the British blockade had been rendered useless.  Until Moscow agreed to halt 
its economic aid to Germany there could be no economic agreement with the Soviets, 
and certainly no political understanding could be reached.  The Head of the Northern 
Department intended to instruct Cripps to put that point straight to Molotov at the 
earliest possible opportunity.
450
   
It is not surprising that Collier held this position regarding the Soviet Union 
and the economic blockade of Germany, nor is it surprising that the issue of Soviet 
action against the Baltic States had sparked his interest.  As John Hiden has noted, 
throughout the 1930s Collier had consistently argued – alongside Frank Ashton-
Gwatkin of the Economic Relations Department of the Foreign Office – that the 
Baltic States were vitally important to British commercial interests, and that economic 
stability in those countries was paramount.  Collier had believed throughout the inter-
war years that the main threat to the status quo came from Germany, and had argued 
that if the Germans succeeded in establishing an effective grip on Scandinavian and 
Baltic trade it would be to the detriment of British economic interests in those regions.  
He was equally adamant in 1940 that the Soviets should be prevented from 
establishing either political or economic control in the Baltic States.
451
  However, 
during the inter-war years, in spite of the warnings of Collier and Ashton-Gwatkin, 
there was no formal British commitment to defend the border states in the event of 
aggression.
452
  Although it was in Britain’s best interest to maintain the independence 
of the Baltic States, Collier’s superiors did not deem it a cause worth fighting for. 
 The question of Soviet intentions towards the Baltic States and Britain’s 
economic blockade of Germany were intrinsically linked in the period between the 
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fall of France and Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.  
Germany’s successes in Western Europe had forced the Kremlin to consolidate its 
strategic position in the Baltic, as control of the Baltic States would greatly improve 
the defences of Leningrad in the event of German aggression against the USSR.  This 
had prompted the British Government to consider whether to recognise the Soviet 
Union as the ruling Government of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in return for a 
considerable diminution of Soviet economic aid to Germany.
453
  Britain would only 
grant such recognition if there was adequate motivation to do so.  In Collier’s opinion, 
a promise from Stalin to halt supplying Germany was the only reason for such an 
inducement on the part of His Majesty’s Government.  
 In an article written in 1943 by Henrikas Rabinavicius, a Lithuanian diplomat, 
the ‘first note of suspicion that Soviet Russia had other than strategic intentions in the 
Baltic States was aroused in the summer of 1939’, during the tripartite negotiations in 
Moscow.
454
  In a communication to Sir William Seeds in June 1939, the British 
Foreign Secretary had professed an appreciation of the Soviet desire to consolidate its 
position in the Baltic States.  Initially, it was unclear as to whether consolidation, 
rather than conquest, dictated Soviet motivations.  Indeed, in a conversation with the 
Estonian Ambassador in June 1939, Halifax had remarked that the USSR may have 
merely desired protection against the possibility of German action in the Baltic, and 
would not necessarily resort to aggressive measures to ensure such protection.
455
  In 
any case, Halifax was adamant that Britain could not allow Moscow to thrust upon the 
Governments of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania a guarantee which would be ‘highly 
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distasteful to them’, nor one that would threaten their sovereignty.456  However, he 
did not qualify what action – if any – the British Government was likely to take to 
prevent any such guarantee.  As the tripartite discussions progressed, it was evident 
that Halifax had displayed unfounded optimism and that Stalin had indeed 
deliberately intended to ask too much of the Governments of the Baltic States.  Stalin 
had demanded that the Baltic States ought to be explicitly guaranteed by the USSR, 
even without their consent.
457
  Whilst Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
believed that any strengthening of the position of the USSR in the Baltic ought to be 
welcomed, as the alternative would mean a German domination of the region, the 
issue of the Baltic States proved to be a stumbling block during the Anglo-Soviet-
French negotiations.
458
  As Hiden has noted, the tripartite negotiations of 1939 
illustrated the fact that ‘the British Government chose not to defy one dictator by 
appeasing a second’.459  When it became clear that an Anglo-Soviet-French 
agreement would not come to pass, Stalin began to consider the merits of coming to 
terms with the German Government.
460
  By signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact Stalin 
ensured that Estonia, Latvia and Finland would fall within the Soviet sphere of 
influence, whilst Vilnius initially fell in the German zone.
461
  Lithuania was later 
assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence as a consequence of the signature of the 
German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty at the end of September 1939.
462
  As 
one historian has remarked, Molotov had ‘swapped ethnic Polish territory for 
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Lithaunia, as easily as American kids swapped baseball cards’.463  Geoffrey Roberts 
has observed that control of the Baltic States would give the USSR a free hand in the 
area without fear of German military intervention.
464
 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Baltic States had been forced to sign 
mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Government, a process that had been swiftly 
concluded by 10 October 1939.  However, as A.N. Tarulis has noted, one ought to be 
careful not to conclude that the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States meant that they 
were now Soviet-occupied countries.  Rather, outwardly they remained 
independent.
465
  As Molotov stated in a report to the Supreme Soviet at the end of 
March 1940, it had suited the Soviet Government to maintain peaceful relations with 
the Baltic countries whilst the Red Army was preoccupied in Finland.
466
  However, it 
was evident that once the Winter War had been concluded with the Soviet Union 
emerging victorious, and in light of Hitler’s triumph in the west, it was necessary for 
the Soviet Government to adapt their attitudes and policies towards the Baltic States.  
Thus, the evolution of Soviet policy in the Baltic, from one of peace to one of 
aggression, was viewed as necessary in the face of a growing German hegemony on 
the continent.  The justification put forward by Soviet historians in the 1970s and 
1980s that Soviet policy had developed as a consequence of the growing anti-Soviet 
actions by the Baltic Governments themselves holds very little sway.  Whilst one can 
most certainly appreciate that the Baltic countries were collaborating in an attempt to 
maintain their independence, as evinced in the Eleventh Baltic Entente Foreign 
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Ministers’ Conference in Riga in March 1940, arguments of a Baltic-German 
alignment against the USSR lack credibility.
467
 
 The Soviet conquest and absorption of the Baltic States began in May 1940 
and was completed by August.  Lithuania was the first country to fall prey to Soviet 
designs, with the Soviet Government justifying its action by arguing that the 
kidnapping of Soviet officers coupled with acts of violence against Soviet soldiers 
had prompted a re-evaluation of Soviet policy.  On 14 June Molotov had read the 
Soviet demands to the Lithuanian Government and stated that they had until the 
following day to respond.  Similar methods were adopted in Latvia and Estonia, with 
the Soviet ultimata being handed to the Latvian and Estonian Governments on 16 
June, the result, according to Stalin, of the violation of their mutual assistance 
agreements.  All three governments accepted the Soviet terms, as none was militarily 
strong enough to mount a successful campaign against the Red Army.
468
 
These developments were discussed in Cripps’ first interview with Molotov 
on 13 June 1940, days before the French collapse.  According to the newly appointed 
ambassador, Molotov had been receptive to the idea of some closer collaboration with 
Great Britain and had urged the necessity for rapid action in the matter of a trade 
agreement with the British Government.  Once France had capitulated, however, the 
views of the Soviet Government underwent a transformation.  Instead of working 
towards a rapprochement, Cripps found himself denied access to Molotov – a 
common occurrence during his time in Moscow – whilst the French Ambassador was 
withdrawn from all active diplomatic contacts by the French Government.
469
  Cripps 
believed that the Soviet response to the fall of France in terms of proceeding to 
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liquidate the Baltic States as a means of reinforcing the USSR against possible attack 
was justified; the ensuing debate about the attitude now to be adopted towards 
Germany and Great Britain was also understandable.  Following the absorption of the 
Baltic States, Cripps communicated to the Foreign Office that the only way in which 
the Soviet Government would abandon their present attitude of ‘reluctant 
acquiescence’ in the German domination of Europe would be through a clear and 
authoritative assurance of American collaboration and support.  The ambassador 
maintained that the recent change in Soviet policy was not incompatible with the 
improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations, and that the desirability of inducing Stalin to 
adopt a policy of cooperation with Great Britain was ‘clearly greater than ever’.470   
Cripps’ evaluation of the situation following the conclusion of the Phoney 
War was somewhat awry and wholly different from those entertained by his 
colleagues and superiors within the Foreign Office.  Cripps’ desperation, indeed his 
folly, is evident in his telegram to the Foreign Office.  Not only did he encourage 
London to court the Soviet Government in order to improve relations, but he also 
stated his desire for the Foreign Secretary to instruct the British Ambassador in 
Washington to persuade President Roosevelt to convey such an assurance of 
collaboration and support to the Soviet Ambassador, Konstantin Umansky.  Cripps 
believed that London could successfully draw the Soviet Union into a common front 
against Germany, a belief that was very much contrary to the consensus within the 
Foreign Office.
471
 
 Sargent was careful not to dismiss outright the conclusions drawn by Cripps.  
Instead of involving the Americans, who were in any case reluctant to involve 
themselves, Sargent suggested that the best way to approach the Soviet Government 
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was for Cripps to deliver a message from the British Prime Minister to Stalin.  As 
Stalin alone dictated policy, the only way in which the British could secure a change 
in Soviet policy would be through a personal approach to him.
472
  Churchill agreed 
and a message was sent out via Cripps.  It was hoped that it would give the Soviet 
Premier the occasion, should he desire it, to ‘enlarge on the views and intentions of 
the Soviet Government in the face of the sudden overthrow of all military and 
political equilibrium in Europe’.473  In his message to Stalin, Churchill acknowledged 
that although the systems of government in Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
represented widely differing systems of political thought, such differences ought not 
to prevent Anglo-Soviet relations from blossoming.  The threat of German 
domination of the continent must unite Britain and the Soviet Union.
474
   Upon 
handing Stalin Churchill’s message, it was proposed that Cripps should take the 
opportunity to raise the issue of Anglo-Soviet trade relations and to convey to Stalin 
that the British realised that the USSR’s ability to grant or refuse vital supplies to 
Germany had placed in their hands a powerful weapon.  Whilst the British 
Government was not in a position to say how Moscow should use that weapon, ‘the 
manner of its use must naturally have an influence in the present crisis upon the 
negotiation of a mutually profitable trade agreement’, an agreement that the British 
Government was anxious to bring about.
475
  Evidently, Sargent was hoping to use the 
opportunity to discover whether the Soviet Government did in fact wish to improve 
Anglo-Soviet economic relations.  The issue of the Baltic States was to be raised 
simultaneously, illustrating that the two questions were inexorably linked.  What is 
interesting, and indeed surprising, was the line that Sargent had proposed Cripps 
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might take in the matter should the issue arise during the conversation.  Should the 
issue of the Baltic States be raised, Cripps was to acknowledge that Soviet action was 
dictated by the German danger and that they had been justified in their actions.
476
  
Before Sargent’s reply reached Cripps the ambassador frantically transmitted another 
dispatch, the tone of which was wholly different to that of his previous 
communication.  Previously, Cripps had illustrated a sense of almost blind optimism, 
yet his tone was now positively pessimistic.  This was the result of Molotov’s refusal 
to receive him following his request to discuss the recent changes with regard to the 
war situation and the apparent shift in Soviet policy, as evident from the increased 
economic support to Germany.  Cripps had sent his request to Molotov on 22 June, 
yet had only received an acknowledgement.  Clearly the Soviet Government had 
resorted to the tactic of time-wasting and game-playing.  Whilst one cannot blame the 
Soviets on this occasion, given the fluidity of the situation, those in the Foreign Office 
were frustrated by the latest display of Soviet manipulation.  Previous ambassadors 
had experienced such treatment at the hands of Molotov and his predecessor, Maxim 
Litvinov.  Indeed, Collier remarked in 1941 that it did not make a great difference as 
to what sort of ambassador was stationed in Moscow, for, as Chilston had once noted, 
‘the question for a British Ambassador here is not how much he can do, but merely 
how much he can stand’.477   
Following a renewed request two days later, Molotov had informed Cripps 
that he would not be able to see him for another two or three days ‘owing to unusual 
pressure from work’.  Cripps consequently believed that the Soviet Government had 
already decided to maintain benevolent neutrality towards Germany.
478
  Thus, Cripps 
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had believed that his presence in Moscow was neither necessary nor beneficial, and 
requested to be withdrawn from his post.  Whilst Cripps’ reaction in no way surprised 
his colleagues in London, it was somewhat worrying that the ambassador had been so 
easily discouraged, in spite of the fact that there had been no material change in 
Soviet foreign policy.
479
  Indeed, the Soviets had made it clear that they would not 
allow relations with Germany to deteriorate, a fact about which Cripps’ colleagues in 
the Foreign Office had never entertained any illusions.  Whilst Molotov’s actions 
brought no surprise to those in London, Collier conceded that ‘to Sir S. Cripps it 
comes as more [of] a surprise, no doubt’.480 
Unlike Collier, whose minute had an air of resignation and annoyance, Sargent 
was more sympathetic to the frustrating situation into which Cripps had been placed.  
Clearly, Molotov had deemed it prudent to avoid any contact with the British 
Ambassador at that time, probably due to a fear of raising German suspicions of 
Anglo-Soviet collusion.  Yet the Soviet Foreign Minister kept Cripps ‘in play’ – a 
phrase used by Michael Jabara Carley – by hinting that a meeting was likely to take 
place in the near future.
481
  Such delaying tactics had been adopted by the Soviets 
during the failed negotiations in the summer of 1939, much to the frustration of the 
British and French.  Sargent was resigned to the fact that Cripps was ‘entering the 
humiliating phase which all British negotiators in Moscow have to go through’, 
whereby Molotov intended on keeping the ambassador ‘on the doormat until such 
time as the Soviet Government consider it desirable’.482  The delaying tactic played a 
dual role for the Soviets.  Keeping the British on the ‘doormat’ illustrated the 
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dominant position held by Moscow in the Anglo-Soviet relationship, whilst allowing 
the Kremlin to play the British and German Governments off against one another.   
Both Collier and Sargent believed His Majesty’s Government had to set a 
definite time limit in which trade negotiations would have to be concluded by.  
Otherwise the issue could be dragged out indefinitely.  Not only would it frustrate His 
Majesty’s Government, it would illustrate to the world the weak position in which 
London was placed at the hands of the Soviets.  Indeed, following the outbreak of 
war, the British Government had become the ‘suitor’ whilst Stalin had stepped back, 
and was ‘relieved to have avoided being drawn into the war’, whilst being ‘anxious to 
take advantage of the destabilization of Europe’.483  Unfortunately, Cripps’ capacity 
as a regular ambassador rather than a Special Envoy could not protect him against the 
Soviet methods of procrastination and boycott.  Thus, Stalin had Cripps exactly where 
he wanted him, ‘as a suppliant on his doormat holding his pathetic little peace 
offerings in a tin in one hand and a rubber in the other.’484  Sargent was certainly 
sympathetic to Cripps’ plight, but had made it clear to the ambassador that admitting 
defeat and withdrawing him was not an option; to withdraw Cripps would only tarnish 
London’s reputation further.  Cripps had been sent to Moscow ‘with such a flourish of 
trumpets’ as the man capable of bridging the divide between Great Britain and the 
USSR; to remove him as a result of the predictable tactics of the Soviets would evoke 
the general conclusion that London had given up all hope of any cooperation with the 
Soviet Government.  It was thus crucial for Cripps to ‘cultivate the virtues of patience 
and long-suffering, as indeed all British Ambassadors in Moscow are bound to do, 
and to stay at his post’.485 
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Following his complaints of a lack of interaction with either Molotov or 
Stalin, Cripps met with Stalin on 1 July.  During the interview, Cripps was able to 
obtain an authoritative statement of Soviet policy whilst transmitting Churchill’s 
message in the hope that his personal communication would serve as a catalyst to the 
improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations.
486
  Through a series of telegrams, Cripps 
relayed the details of his three-hour interview with Stalin.  Whilst Cripps’ principal 
motivation for the meeting was to discuss Anglo-Soviet relations and, if possible, to 
persuade Stalin of the merits of halting Soviet economic aid to Germany, Stalin was 
fixated on the apparent threat from Turkey to the Soviet Union.  Stalin had stated his 
desire to improve relations with Turkey, and claimed that he was nervous of some 
sudden action by Turkey against the Soviet Union.  Furthermore, Stalin declared that 
he was anxious not to provoke Turkey into taking any aggressive action, and hoped 
that His Majesty’s Government would help bring about an improvement in relations.  
More specifically, Stalin hoped to ‘deal’ with the question of who controlled the 
Straits, and informed the ambassador that ‘until this question is settled relations with 
Turkey will not be wholly satisfactory’.487  Cripps was eager to oblige and believed 
that the advantages for Britain deriving from any potential Soviet-Turkish 
collaboration were twofold.  Firstly, should Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union 
come to a reasonable understanding over the Straits it would create the best possible 
guarantee against German aggression in the Balkans.  Secondly, this would greatly 
increase British prestige in the Balkans and the Near East.  Predictably, Cripps readily 
declared the desire of the British Government to do anything to help improve relations 
between Turkey and the USSR.  He agreed with Stalin that the Straits ought not to be 
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under the exclusive control of a single Power who could abuse its position in the 
region.
488
   It would have been prudent for Cripps to be less forthcoming in his 
opinions and promises of British support.  Unfortunately, Cripps eagerly agreed with 
the points raised by Stalin, giving the impression that the British were running after 
the Soviets.   
Though the issue of the Straits was the dominating topic under discussion, 
Cripps was able to introduce the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-Soviet relations as a 
consequence of the USSR’s economic support for Germany.  Stalin was noticeably 
less forthcoming in disclosing the position of his Government on that point.  Stalin 
stated that the general attitude of the Soviet Government towards Great Britain and 
Germany was simple.  The USSR had ‘nothing but a non-aggression pact with 
Germany’ and insisted that the pact was ‘in no way directed against Great Britain’.489  
He informed the ambassador of his belief that Germany could not dominate Europe as 
it lacked the naval strength, and doubted that Hitler had intended upon any such 
domination.  Stalin was not prepared to admit that the danger of Germany domination 
in Europe was real, nor that it would be physically possible for them to do so.
490
  
Furthermore, Stalin had refused outright to accept that Hitler was contemplating any 
action against the Soviet Union.  Cripps perceived Stalin’s acceptance of German 
protestations at their face value as an attempt to ‘excuse himself [from] acting in 
concert with us against Germany’.491  Soviet-German cooperation would continue, 
and, as Fitzroy Maclean noted, any non-ferrous metals supplied by Great Britain to 
the Soviet Union would ‘bring grist to the Soviet-German mill’.492  That was wholly 
unsatisfactory for the British Government.  The economic blockade of Germany was 
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the lynchpin of Great Britain’s war strategy.  Hence, Stalin’s continued economic 
support of Germany was disastrous for Britain and consequently prevented any 
improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations, a point seemingly lost on Cripps.   
Unlike his previous communication to the Foreign Office, which was unduly 
pessimistic, Cripps was optimistic following his interview with Stalin, noting that the 
general tenor of the talk had been frank but friendly.  Cripps took solace in Stalin’s 
assurance that he had no intention of using the trade agreement with Germany against 
Great Britain.  It was clear, however, that Stalin was absolutely resolved to the 
continuation of supplying the Germans throughout the duration of the war.  In spite of 
Stalin’s refusal to change his policy towards Germany, Cripps believed that trade 
negotiations could commence in the near future.  Cripps’ vacillation between undue 
optimism and pessimism frustrated Maclean who maintained that the British had 
nothing to hope for from the Soviet Union.  Thus, they had nothing to gain by 
attempting to bribe the Soviet Government with the rubber and non-ferrous metals.  
With regard to Turkey, Maclean conceded that Stalin would no doubt prefer to 
achieve control of the Straits by peaceful means, but steadfastly believed that the 
Kremlin would attempt to manipulate London into putting pressure on Turkey in 
order to induce her to capitulate to Soviet demands.  The British would not be offered 
anything in return for services rendered.  Furthermore, the apparent two-fold 
advantages for British intervention, as laid out by Cripps, were refuted by Maclean.  
He doubted that British mediation would enhance prestige, nor would it lead to the 
formation of an Anglo-Soviet-Turkish barrier to German aggression in the Balkans.  
There was the additional possibility that any British mediation would drive Turkey 
into the arms of Germany, thus losing another ally.
493
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On 3 July Sargent, Collier, Maclean, Nichols and Bowker met to discuss 
whether it would be to Britain’s advantage to secure the friendship of the Soviet 
Union at the expense of its friendship with Turkey.  Turkey was an important ally for 
His Majesty’s Government as Turkey lay on the direct route between Europe and vital 
spheres of interest in the Middle East, including Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan.  
From a political point of view, Turkey was the leading member of the Balkan Entente 
on the one hand and the Saadabad Pact on the other.
494
  Hence, Turkish influence on 
the policy of the countries in the Near and Middle East was clearly significant.  As a 
result, it was essential to keep Turkey out of the orbit of the Axis Powers, and it was 
agreed that Britain ought to accept the Soviet invitation to serve as an intermediary, 
but to remain cautious and suspicious of Stalin’s motivations.  As Bowker observed, 
‘we have no reason to trust M. Stalin’ and Stalin’s remark that the Soviet Government 
were nervous as to some sudden action by Turkey held an ‘insincere ring’ that did not 
give grounds for confidence.
495
  There was a collective suspicion of Soviet 
motivations and intentions in this matter.  It was believed that Stalin desired to 
monopolise control of the Straits, and that the chances of any satisfactory agreement 
being reached were very small.  Nevertheless, the discussions would either reveal the 
measure of Stalin’s insincerity or would illustrate whether it would be possible for the 
Soviet Union and Turkey to cooperate together against the danger of German 
penetration in the Balkans and the Black Sea.  Such cooperation would be of 
inestimable value to Great Britain.
496
    
The War Cabinet agreed and decided that the British Government ought to test 
the Soviet’s intentions by offering to act as an intermediary between the Soviet and 
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Turkish Governments.  Halifax was ‘not very sanguine that anything would come of 
this move’ but had ‘thought it worth trying’.497  His Majesty’s Government’s policy 
towards the USSR at this juncture was one not of ambivalence, as Paul Doerr has 
argued, but simply one of reserve.  His Majesty’s Government wanted to prevent 
further German military successes, and hoped for Soviet assistance in this endeavour.  
British suspicion of Soviet sincerity was evident, but the recent turn of events in the 
war had forced London to attempt a genuine improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations 
in the face of an increasingly powerful Germany.  The attempts to intervene in Soviet-
Turkish relations and the desire to conclude a war trade agreement with Moscow were 
a direct result of the changing course of the war.  A consensus was steadily growing 
within the Foreign Office that Britain could no longer ignore the strategic importance 
of the USSR.    
There were still two points under discussion: how far would Britain go in 
order to secure Soviet friendship and how should His Majesty’s Government go about 
attaining it?  Whilst the issue fell under the jurisdiction of the Northern Department, 
there was a plethora of contributions from officials from the various departments in 
the Foreign Office.  For example, Owen St. Clare O’Malley of the Southern 
Department, a vocal critic of Soviet Russia throughout the inter-war years, who had 
castigated the Soviet Union as a ‘spiritual gas chamber, a sinister, unnatural and 
unholy place’,498 was one contributor to the debate.  O’Malley had recognised the 
need to put personal prejudices to one side in order to form an Anglo-Soviet bloc 
against Germany, and proposed the rather drastic measure of indicating to the Soviet 
Government that Britain was tempted to listen to Hitler’s recent peace overtures.499   
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Collier was critical of such an approach.  He maintained that as a consequence 
of Stalin’s intense fear of Germany, it was highly unlikely that he would take any 
measures that would involve the Soviet Union in hostilities with Germany.  Stalin was 
far more likely to seek a fresh understanding with Hitler as quickly as possible.  
Rather than driving a wedge between Stalin and Hitler, they would be forced to be 
uncomfortable bedfellows, united in a desire to defeat the Allied Powers.  
Furthermore, there would be disastrous consequences both in Europe and America 
should it be believed that Britain was to acquiesce to Hitler’s terms.500   Collier 
acknowledged that although the idea appeared attractive at first sight, it was too 
dangerous to be pursued.  What he failed to include, however, was a counter-proposal 
to O’Malley’s suggestion.  He was yet to formulate a plan as to how the British 
Government could draw Stalin away from Hitler.  Sargent was equally critical of the 
idea of using such obvious scare tactics in order to bring about an Anglo-Soviet 
rapprochement.  Stalin would certainly be alarmed at the prospect of an early peace 
between Britain and Germany, but it was doubtful whether his reaction would take the 
form of military action in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, thus precipitating 
hostilities with Germany.
501
  Sargent feared that all that would be achieved would be 
the precipitation of a fresh Soviet-German entente, a fear shared by Collier.  Unlike 
Collier, Sargent did in fact suggest a possible course of action.  Sargent thought that it 
would be safe to let Stalin know privately that Hitler had been putting forward peace 
feelers to London through unofficial channels and that such feelers had been ignored.  
Sargent proposed that Hitler wished to free his hands in the West.  He would then be 
able to take military action against Soviet Russia in the not so distant future.  
Consequently, Stalin may have been tempted to make an advance to His Majesty’s 
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Government in order to prevent London from concluding a separate peace with Nazi 
Germany.  Sargent hoped it would have the twofold benefit of increasing tensions 
between Moscow and Berlin whilst prompting Anglo-Soviet consultation.  Sargent 
feared that Stalin may suspect that Britain was in fact on the verge of capitulation.  
However, he believed that so long as they made it clear ‘by speech and act’ that they 
were not prepared to give Hitler the early peace that he wanted, then such a course, 
though risky, would be favourable.
502
  The ideas expressed in Collier’s minute 
combined with the action proposed by Sargent were met with the approval of the 
Permanent Under-Secretary.  Cadogan believed that Sargent’s suggestions ought to be 
adopted and contended that it was surely possible to convince Stalin that they were 
not contemplating accepting Hitler’s peace feelers.503 
At the end of July, although he had already met with Stalin at the beginning of 
the month, Cripps was once again voicing his desire to be withdrawn from his post in 
the face of further refusals by Molotov to receive him.  Evidently, Sargent’s request 
for patience had fallen on deaf ears.  As a consequence, Cripps suggested to Halifax 
that he ought to inform Maisky that he was questioning the utility of keeping an 
ambassador in Moscow.  Despite the cordial tone of Churchill’s message to Stalin – 
as conveyed during Cripps’ recent interview– and Cripps’ own efforts to establish 
friendly contacts, the ambassador had believed that it was ‘clearly useless to maintain 
an ambassador to a government whose Minister for Foreign Affairs declines to 
receive him’.504  So long as the Soviet Government maintained their present attitude it 
would be impossible to achieve any improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations.  Maclean 
once again urged patience.  Should Halifax grant Cripps’ request, the results would be 
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entirely negative.  The Soviet Government would lose no time in advertising the fact 
that Cripps had been forced upon them, and that he had been sent to Moscow merely 
to keep the Soviets in play whilst the British proceeded to ruin Moscow’s relations 
with third powers, notably Germany.  Again, it was feared that British prestige would 
be tarnished and any fears that Hitler may have held of the likelihood of an impending 
Anglo-Soviet rapprochement would disperse.  Maclean was not unsympathetic to 
Cripps’ plight, but felt that Cripps had been too easily discouraged.505  The treatment 
of Cripps was nothing new or unusual.  His predecessors would go for months at a 
time without seeing the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov.  Cripps, however, 
had seen Molotov several times as well as Stalin in the eight weeks he had spent in 
Moscow.  Collier was inclined to agree, and informed Cripps that he would speak to 
Maisky of British displeasure, but categorically refused to withdraw Cripps from his 
post.  Collier agreed that to do so would be regarded as a public admission that His 
Majesty’s Government had failed in their attempt to disrupt Nazi-Soviet relations.506 
One can most certainly sympathise with Cripps at this juncture.  His attempts 
at arranging further meetings with Molotov were frustrated at every turn.  In any case, 
it was a widely held belief within the Foreign Office that Molotov was ‘a person of 
very little importance’.507  One would have to convince Stalin of the merits of 
reversing his policy, yet that was highly unlikely.  In a Foreign Office appraisal of the 
consequences of the French collapse, the general consensus was that Stalin had 
believed that cooperation with Germany would give the Soviet Union greater 
advantages than would any other course.  Stalin’s wish to conclude a barter agreement 
rather than a comprehensive war trade agreement with Great Britain illustrated his 
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desire to avoid antagonizing the Germans.  Any commercial agreement between Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union would be viewed by Hitler as decidedly anti-German.  
Maclean believed it likely that the Germans would approve of an Anglo-Soviet barter 
agreement as the Soviets would receive rubber, tin, nickel and copper, all of which 
Germany was greatly in need of.  The German Government would further hope that as 
a consequence of the barter arrangement the British blockade would be relaxed 
further.  Maclean concluded that it would be both economically and politically 
disadvantageous for Britain to pursue such a course.  The only way in which Stalin 
could afford any effective relief for Britain was by taking immediate action against 
Germany, or at any rate by adopting so threatening an attitude as to cause Germany to 
transfer a proportion of her resources to the east, thus relieving the pressure on the 
Western front.
508
  In order to induce Stalin to make such a radical break from his 
existing approach, Cripps would have to persuade him that his own interests 
demanded it.  Maclean postulated that there was a chance – as slim as it was – that 
Stalin could be convinced of the detrimental effects of a swift German victory over 
Great Britain as Hitler would then turn his attention to the Soviet Union.  If, according 
to Maclean, Britain was able to defeat Germany with the help of the USSR, any such 
German attack could be avoided.  The British Government would in turn take 
legitimate Soviet claims into consideration, a discreet reference to the Soviet 
absorption of the Baltic States.  If, however, the Soviet Government were to persist in 
their present policy of cooperation with Germany, Maclean argued that the British 
would be obliged to take retaliatory action against the Soviet Union.  Thus, it was 
decided that Cripps’ attempts to review Anglo-Soviet policy with Molotov should be 
abandoned.  The best course would be to arrange a meeting between Churchill and 
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Stalin.  As Stalin was an extremely ‘shrewd and … open-minded man’, Maclean 
believed that a meeting between the Prime Minister and Stalin would force the latter 
seriously to consider the British proposal.
509
   Collier and Sargent agreed that a 
meeting between Churchill and Stalin was the best course of action, though it would 
undoubtedly displease Cripps.  Collier, however, believed that rather than expecting 
the Soviets to take immediate military action against Germany, one ought to be 
satisfied with an assurance by Stalin that he would cease supplying Germany.
510
 
Although Cripps had been received by Mikoyan, Molotov and Stalin in the 
first eight weeks of his tenure as ambassador, he had been unable to discuss the 
pertinent issues of Anglo-Soviet trade and the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States.  
All that had been clear from these meetings was Stalin’s desire to fulfil the terms of 
the various Soviet-German economic agreements.  Cripps had not been able fully to 
comprehend Stalin’s position on Anglo-Soviet trade relations and what measures 
would be required to improve those relations.  As for the Baltic States, the 
motivations behind Soviet aggression were unclear.  Was Stalin motivated by fear of 
a German attack or was he simply dissatisfied with the mutual assistance pacts 
imposed on Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in October 1939?  Cripps’ interview with 
Mikoyan, the recently appointed Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on 22 
August helped to clarify the Soviet position. 
In his account of the meeting, Cripps drew attention to the difficulties he faced 
when he was able to meet with any Soviet statesman.  He was not permitted a 
shorthand writer with him, thus the record of his interview was not wholly accurate.
511
  
In one account of a conversation with Molotov, Cripps had complained of the 
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linguistic barrier that he faced in any exchange of views with the Soviet Foreign 
Minister.  Unfortunately for Cripps, Molotov had a tendency to speak both rapidly 
and with little clarity.  His translator spoke very little English, resulting in an 
incomplete translation of their meetings that often did not reflect the length and 
breadth of what was discussed.  Consequently, Cripps was ‘generally only able to get 
the main line of M. Molotov’s argument without any of the finesse of the details or of 
particular phrases he uses’.512    
In the case of Cripps’ interview with Mikoyan on 22 August, he was without a 
shorthand writer, although he was provided with a translator.  During the course of 
the meeting Cripps was able to gain further insight into the position of the Soviet 
Government vis-à-vis the possibility of concluding an Anglo-Soviet trade agreement.  
The news was not promising.  Unfortunately for Cripps, Mikoyan bluntly informed 
him that the Soviet Government did not feel that the present moment was suitable for 
a comprehensive agreement.  The British Government’s retention of the assets of the 
former Baltic States was cited as the main obstacle.  As a consequence the atmosphere 
would not be suitable for general trade discussions until the ‘difficulties arising out of 
the incorporation of the former Baltic States in the Soviet Union have been 
satisfactorily disposed of’.513   
Although Mikoyan had limited his protestations to the economic sphere, 
Maclean believed that the Soviet Government simply did not desire a rapprochement 
with Great Britain, but would not openly declare as much.  The Soviets were thus 
using ‘delaying tactics’ whilst simultaneously blaming the British for the lack of 
progress made.  By making themselves the victims of British cynicism they were 
attempting to render public opinion in Britain critical of the government’s policy 
                                                 
512
 NA, FO371/ 29464/ N829/ 3/ 38, Cripps to Eden, 3 February 1941. 
513
 NA, FO371/ 24841/ N6468/ 5/ 38, telegram: Cripps, 26 August 1940. 
 164 
towards the USSR, whilst at the same time succeeding in extracting concessions from 
Britain in the matter of the Baltic States.  Public perception of British policy towards 
the Soviets had always been important for British policy-makers.  As Robert Manne 
has perhaps controversially argued, London entered into negotiations with the Soviets 
in 1939 ‘not to secure an alliance but to appease and dupe public opinion’.514  Whilst 
Cripps was guardedly optimistic, Maclean argued that London would not be justified 
in making any concessions over the Baltic question ‘in return for illusory political 
advantages’.515  Collier believed that the Soviets were using the British response to 
the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States as an excuse to avoid improving their 
relations with London.  The real obstacle in reaching an understanding was Stalin’s 
intense fear of Germany.  According to Collier, if the Baltic excuse was not available, 
then ‘another [one] will be found’.516 
Professor Postan, the Soviet expert in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, 
contributed to the debate in July 1940.  In a letter to Collier, Postan was openly 
critical of the conclusions drawn by members of the Northern Department, sparking a 
number of minutes by Maclean, Collier and Sargent.  According to Postan, the chief 
concern of the Ministry of Economic Warfare was to prevent the further development 
of economic assistance to Germany.  Although he agreed with Collier and Maclean 
that Soviet policy since 1938 – following the Munich Conference – was guided by an 
innate fear of Germany and German designs on the Soviet Union, he felt that Britain 
ought to grant small concessions to them – notably in the Baltic States – in order to 
buy its friendship and lure the Kremlin away from the Germans.  By granting such 
concessions, the British would help to strengthen the Soviet position.  This would 
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prove to be essential when Germany finally invaded the Soviet Union.  A reversal of 
the current Soviet attitude towards Great Britain would only come about through the 
‘development of our [British] armed power and the German weakness, or a striking 
accretion of Russian armed strength’.  However, although these changes would not 
immediately attain Soviet friendship, Postan believed that the British Government 
ought to ‘keep the road clear’ through offering ‘a series of small concessions to Soviet 
interests and points of view’.  Postan believed that the Soviet occupation of the Baltic 
States had affected the position of the Baltic States very little and the ‘British military 
position not at all’.517  He maintained this position throughout the wartime period, and 
would not be dissuaded of his views.   
In a meeting with Maisky in February 1941, Postan emphasized the 
importance of a war trade agreement and informed the Soviet Ambassador that he 
wished to ‘settle any outstanding problems between His Majesty’s Government and 
the Soviet Government’.  Maisky had repeated the Soviet party-line that they had 
never recognised the British blockade and would stick to their right as a neutral to 
trade freely with all.  Postan, however, was unwavering in his conclusions.
518
  There 
was a great deal of common ground in the attitudes of Postan and Cripps, but Postan’s 
arguments were at odds with those held by both Maclean and Collier.  Maclean stated 
that Postan’s analysis of Britain’s policy towards Soviet Russia was ‘unnecessarily 
complicated and insufficiently unrealistic’ and, in places, was ‘inclined to be wrong-
headed’.519   
Collier’s response was, unsurprisingly, lengthy and emphatic.  He fully agreed 
with Postan that the ‘dominant motive of Soviet foreign policy is fear of Germany’.  
However, until the Soviets had a reason to fear Britain, their attitude would remain 
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unaltered.  Previous plans to bomb Soviet installations at Baku had evoked such fears, 
but had never been adopted by the British Government.  Both Sargent and Collier 
were in favour of taking such action, and believed that a firmer line with the Soviets 
would force Stalin to re-think his policy towards Britain.
520
  Whilst Cripps believed 
that Stalin would look favourably on British resistance to German military advances, 
Maclean argued that the Soviets would continue to support the Germans in order to 
‘prolong the struggle and weaken both sides as much as possible’.521  Collier agreed 
with Maclean.  Stalin had no more desire to see Britain win the war than he wished to 
see Germany winning it, and ‘the chance of anything really useful to us arising from a 
change in Soviet policy is too small to warrant making concessions to the Soviet 
Government in the hope of paving the way for it’.  Moreover, even if the Soviet 
Government changed its attitudes towards the belligerents, Collier believed it would 
be erroneous to grant concessions, even if they paved the way for a war trade 
agreement.  Indeed, Collier had never recommended concessions to Hitler or 
Mussolini in the 1930s, and he would not recommend them to Stalin in 1940.
522
  
Instead, the British Government ought to adopt a hard-line attitude towards the 
Soviets and should drop the policy of concessions altogether.
523
  Sargent agreed with 
Collier regarding any proposed concessions to the Soviet Government, indicating a 
reversal of his position from June 1940 when he had stated that Soviet action in the 
Baltic States could be justified as an act of self-defence in the face of the growing 
German menace.  In any case, the only trade agreement that would constitute a ‘slap 
in the face’ for Germany, as Postan had remarked, would be one which would 
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definitely limit the amount of vital commodities reaching Germany either through or 
from the Soviet Union.
524
 
 As was very often the case, definite evidence illustrating the nature and extent 
of Nazi-Soviet collaboration was exceedingly hard to obtain.  At the end of October, 
Maclean composed a memorandum exploring this issue.  He believed that since the 
start of the conflict the Soviet Union had wanted to prolong the war to the detriment 
of both sides, and that Stalin was willing to bring this about through supplying 
Germany with essential war materials.  As Collier remarked, in the first year of the 
war the German Government had been the dominant partner in the Soviet-German 
relationship, and only had to ‘bang on the table’ in order to induce Stalin to acquiesce 
in Hitler’s demands.525  By October 1940, however, this relationship had altered.  It 
was Hitler who needed the Soviet Government in order successfully to carry out his 
war strategy.  What was unclear, however, was how far Hitler was prepared to go to 
secure the continuation of Soviet aid.  There was a surplus of information flowing into 
the Foreign Office relating to that issue, yet the reliability of such information was 
under constant scrutiny, and much was supposition at best. Maclean asserted that it 
had seemed ‘probable that the Germans have told the Russians that they are at liberty 
to expand in the direction of the Persian Gulf’, yet it was less clear what division of 
spoils Hitler had offered Stalin in the Near East.
526
   
There were varying accounts of questionable reliability.  Such reports 
indicated that Hitler had only offered the Soviets a rectification of the Caucasus 
frontier, whilst others stated that the German offer included Soviet control of the 
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whole of Turkey in Asia.  The secret nature of Nazi-Soviet relations made it 
impossible to determine with any certainty which information – if any – was accurate.  
British officials were continually wary of the reports received as it was believed that a 
great deal of the information had been planted by the Germans and Soviets, with both 
Powers using the press to convey the information that they wished to be made public 
knowledge.  The information received by Collier had hinted that the Germans were 
prepared to make the Soviets an offer regarding the Dardanelles, which were of 
strategic importance to the Soviet Union.  Collier noted that Stalin may well have 
realised that any joint Soviet-German control of the Straits would mean German 
control in practice.  Therefore, the first object of British and Turkish policy should be 
to attempt to convince the Soviet Government that it would be advantageous for them 
to collaborate with Great Britain over the matter.
527
 
Upon receiving a telegram from the British Ambassador in Belgrade, Maclean 
noted that any hope of collaborating with the Soviets was unlikely.  In a recent 
conversation with Vyshinsky, Campbell had gained the impression that the Soviet 
Government was prepared to join Germany in an attack on Turkey with the object of 
safeguarding Soviet interests in the Straits, thus implying that Stalin was prepared to 
share control of the Straits with Germany.  In this way Stalin would be able to avoid 
war with Germany whilst satisfying his ambitions in Turkey.
528
  No doubt Hitler had 
induced Stalin to agree to put pressure on Turkey through a mixture of threats and 
bribes, and in the very near future the Soviets would try to keep the Turks quiet by 
amassing troops on the Caucasus frontier and stationing warships in the Black Sea.
529
  
Collier hoped that London would not be deterred from promising Turkey the fullest 
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support against the USSR.  He further stated that the British Government ought to 
treat the Soviet Union as an enemy and warn Stalin that any threat to Turkey would 
lead to an immediate breach with Great Britain.  Such a threat was likely to be 
effective, as there was ‘little doubt that they dread the prospect of being involved in 
the war and, rather than face it, would be likely to back out of any engagements to 
Germany’.  This would only happen should the Stalin be convinced of a British 
resolve to support its Turkish ally.
530
 
Upon Joachim von Ribbentrop’s invitation, Molotov arrived in Berlin on 10 
November.
531
  Molotov’s trip ignited the belief of further Soviet-German 
collaboration.  As Collier stated, ‘I find it hard to believe that Molotov would have 
agreed to go to Berlin unless the main outlines of the new Russo-German deal had 
already been worked out’.532  The Berlin Conference, although now widely accepted 
as a failure as it produced no new agreement between the two Powers, illustrated inter 
alia the importance that both Germany and the Soviet Union attached to Turkey.
533
  
Indeed, one historian has remarked that Molotov ‘over-played his hand’ with regard 
to Soviet demands over Turkey.
534
  During the talks between Hitler and Molotov both 
statesmen complained of their dissatisfaction with the Straits and the Montreux 
Convention, and ways of revising the situation were discussed in some detail.  It was 
decided that the Montreux Convention was to be ‘scrapped’ and the three Powers 
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would create a new Straits convention that would satisfy the demands of all and give 
the USSR ‘certain privileges’.535   
In his final meeting with Hitler, the Soviet Foreign Minister wanted the 
Germans to grant ‘effective guarantees of her security’ through establishing Soviet 
bases in Turkey.
536
  This would have come as no surprise to Collier.  Stalin had 
expressed his desire for an improvement in relations with Turkey in his first meeting 
with Cripps in July.  This had led to a debate within the Foreign Office as to whether 
Soviets intentions were sincere or whether Stalin hoped that Great Britain would exert 
pressure on Turkey to acquiesce in whatever demands Moscow put to the Turkish 
authorities.  It was decided in July that the British would act as intermediary but that 
they would make it clear to the Turkish Government that they had no intention 
whatsoever of suggesting that they should renounce any of their rights under the 
Montreux Convention, nor would any special rights be given to the Soviet Union.
537
  
Furthermore, London would have to specify that the only acceptable Turko-Soviet 
arrangement regarding the Straits would be one that would deny access to Germany 
and Italy.
538
  However, once details of Molotov’s talks with Hitler reached the 
Foreign Office via Cripps, the idea of London serving as an intermediary between the 
USSR and Turkey was redundant, as the Soviets had clearly illustrated that their 
relationship with Germany would better serve their interests. 
As Collier argued, Stalin’s increasing cooperation with Germany over Turkey 
had severely damaged Anglo-Soviet political and economic relations, and provided 
yet another stumbling block in the conclusion of a war trade agreement with the 
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Soviet Union.  When Cripps transmitted the details of Molotov’s visit to Berlin to 
London, the British Government was still awaiting a reply to the proposals made to 
Moscow on 21 October.  In the proposals delivered to Vyshinsky via Cripps, the 
British had promised that the Soviet Union would play a part in any ultimate peace 
settlement as well as pledging that the government would not join any combination of 
powers hostile to the Soviet Union and, crucially, would grant de facto recognition of 
the incorporation of the Baltic States in the Soviet Union.
539
  It was hoped that this 
would satisfy the Soviets and thus pave the way for a war trade agreement.  
Unfortunately, as had been the case in 1939, when Britain first approached the USSR 
with proposals for an economic agreement, they were kept waiting until Stalin 
deemed it to be the favourable time to discuss the proposals.  As Maclean observed, 
Stalin was playing his cards close to his chest in order to keep both the British and the 
Germans guessing.  He made the interesting remark that Stalin was in fact pursuing a 
policy of appeasement both towards Germany and, to a lesser extent, towards Great 
Britain and her allies.  Maclean noted that ‘when he [Stalin] feels that he has gone too 
far in one direction, he restores the balance by making some gesture to the offended 
party’.540  This was highly advantageous for Stalin, as it served the double purpose of 
keeping both parties in play whilst avoiding a breach with either.  Furthermore, it 
induced both London and Berlin to offer a higher price for Soviet friendship than they 
would otherwise feel disposed to pay.  Unfortunately for His Majesty’s Government, 
‘the Soviet Government are less frightened of us than of Germany and therefore have 
less regard for our feelings’.  This was evident in the Soviet response to the British 
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proposals for an economic agreement.  Indeed, Sargent firmly believed that Molotov’s 
visit to Berlin had amounted to a rejection of Britain’s advances.541   
Collier’s frustration at the fact that Stalin never gave an ‘early or definite 
reply’ to British communiques intensified following Molotov’s visit to Berlin.  He 
was aware that His Majesty’s Government had to carefully consider the British 
attitude towards the various practical questions affected by the most recent Soviet-
German understanding.  With regard to British policy in the Middle East, Collier once 
again suggested that a warning ought to be immediately conveyed to the Soviet 
Government that any threat to Turkey would lead to a breach with Great Britain, and 
that the Ministry of Economic Warfare ought to formally inform the Kremlin that the 
proposed economic agreement would lapse.
542
  As a consequence of recent 
developments, Cripps was convinced that Molotov’s treatment of Great Britain was 
unprecedented and ‘showed unmistakably his [Molotov’s] un-neutral attitude’.   
Consequently, he believed that it would be ‘quite useless to make any further attempt 
to improve relations’ with the Soviet Union.543   
On 19 November Cripps asked the Foreign Secretary for permission officially 
to withdraw the proposals, believing that it would increase the pressure upon the 
Soviet Government.
544
  Cripps’ justification is somewhat difficult to understand.  The 
Soviets had illustrated no desire to come to terms with Great Britain as to do so would 
be to the detriment of their understanding with the German Government.  Stalin’s 
failure to respond to the British proposals of October was evidence of this.  Therefore, 
to withdraw the proposals would merely reinforce in Stalin’s mind the precarious 
position in which His Majesty’s Government was placed.  The British Government 
                                                 
541
 Ibid., minute by Sargent, 10 November 1940. 
542
 NA, FO371/ 24848/ N7165/ 40/ 38, minute by Collier, 18 November 1940. 
543
 Ibid., telegram: Cripps, 11 November 1940. 
544
 NA, FO371/ 24848/ N7233/ 40/ 38, Cripps to FO, 19 November 1940. 
 173 
clearly wanted to obtain an economic agreement with Moscow, yet was anxious to 
avoid any appearance of chasing after the Soviets.  So far they had failed on both 
accounts.   
Inevitably, Cripps’ suggestion of withdrawing the British proposals for an 
economic agreement was criticised by both Maclean and Sargent.  Neither could deny 
that the Soviet’s had been reprehensible in their treatment of both Cripps and the 
proposals that he had presented to Molotov.  However, they felt that Cripps was 
allowing his irritation to get the better of his judgement.  Maclean very much doubted 
that the Soviet Government wanted to conclude a war trade agreement, and noted that 
it was likely that the Soviets had allowed trade negotiations to continue simply to 
keep the British in play.  However, if His Majesty’s Government withdrew the 
proposals, the Soviet Government could have justifiably argued that the British had 
never really wanted to reach an agreement and that Stalin had been on the verge of 
accepting the British proposals at the point of withdrawal.
545
  However, Maclean 
believed that one ought not to be consumed by the political repercussions of any trade 
agreement with Moscow.  As the Ministry of Economic Warfare had consistently 
argued, the agreement could have stood on its own merits; no political advantages 
were required to ‘make up weight’.546  Once again, Sargent urged patience.  Although 
Cripps’ frustration was understandable, Sargent would not authorize the ambassador 
to withdraw the proposals for an economic agreement as it would not exercise 
pressure on the Soviet Government.  Stalin did not appear to want an agreement with 
Great Britain, as evidenced from his refusal to respond to the British overtures.  
Hence, such tactics had very little chance of success.  As Maclean stated, it would be 
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viewed by the world as evidence of Foreign Office insincerity in all their approaches 
to the Soviet Government.
547
   
Rather than withdrawing the economic proposals, Maclean believed that the 
British should find ways in which to inspire the Soviets with a fear of Great Britain 
which was at least as great as their fear of Germany – a point often raised by 
Collier.
548
  The most obvious way to invoke such fear was to renew plans to bomb the 
oilfields at Baku as the Soviet Government had never shown themselves to be more 
forthcoming than when an attack on Baku was being canvassed in Great Britain.  
Maclean firmly believed that it would have ‘a most salutary effect if this fear were to 
be revived’ should the Soviets take any action hostile to British interests.549  
Evidently, both Maclean and Collier were in agreement when it came to the treatment 
of the Soviets.  A hard-line policy was the most advantageous one to adopt.  Both had 
advised that the Soviet Government should be warned that any hostile action – 
whether in the guise of economic aid to the Germans or acts of aggression against 
Turkey – would inevitably lead to a breach with London.  Whilst Sargent was inclined 
to disagree, as he could see no way to make the Soviet Government fear the British 
more than they feared the Germans, the two Northern Department officials had 
enlisted the support of a most surprising figure – Sir Stafford Cripps.  As his tenure as 
ambassador in Moscow was nearing the six month mark, his initial optimism and 
belief in Soviet sincerity had dissolved and had been replaced with an inherent 
suspicion of the Kremlin.  Indeed, Cripps was now advocating the adoption of a hard-
line policy towards the Soviets, which was a marked break from his previously held 
views.
550
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Cripps reiterated that point in a communication to the Foreign Secretary on 9 
December.  He again suggested formally withdrawing the detailed and as yet 
unanswered proposals that he had communicated to Stalin in October.  The issue of 
the Baltic States had escalated to something of an obsession for Cripps, and the 
reversal of his opinions on the issue was perplexing to his colleagues in the Northern 
Department.  In previous months Cripps had been adamant that Britain ought to grant 
concessions regarding the recognition of Soviet control of the region, yet by 
December he was arguing the opposite.  Maclean did not comment on the ever-
changing opinions of the ambassador.  Instead, he noted that if it was the intention of 
His Majesty’s Government to adopt the firm line approach to the Soviets, Cripps’ 
proposal would serve the purpose very well.  If, on the other hand, the British wished 
to continue the policy of ‘uniform amiability’, Cripps’ suggestion should not be 
adopted.
551
    
Unlike in previous months, when Maclean was critical of Cripps, by 
December 1940 he was informing Halifax that Cripps’ opinions ought to be seriously 
considered.  Maclean noted that the fact that Cripps was stationed in Moscow had 
meant that he was in the position to judge what the situation required.  Additionally, 
his well-known sympathy and personal contacts with the Soviet regime ‘should 
enable him to judge how best to approach the Soviet Government in matters of this 
kind’.552  Although Maclean was in favour of formally withdrawing the economic 
proposals, he was fully alive to the possible repercussions.  The Soviet Government 
might put forward counter proposals, or, more importantly, they could take the 
opportunity of making trouble in certain sections of public opinion in Britain, most 
notably with the British Left.  As a consequence of the Soviet production of a 
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‘garbled version of what has happened’, the Foreign Office would predictably be 
criticised for ‘deliberately sabotaging Anglo-Soviet relations’.553   
Dr Dalton and Frederick Leith-Ross at the Ministry of Economic Warfare, 
although wary of definitively stating their opinion as the matter was primarily 
political in nature and therefore outside the scope of their expertise, they were 
inclined to agree with Maclean and Cripps.  Both Dalton and Leith-Ross feared that 
any reluctance to give Cripps a free hand in this matter would lead to his resignation.  
Furthermore, the proposals relayed to the Kremlin in October would be extremely 
inconvenient if not impossible to implement at that time.  Central to their reasoning 
was the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States and Stalin’s insistence to continue 
supplying war materials to Germany.  Thus, Soviet policy had rendered cooperation 
difficult.
554
  Halifax disagreed.  On 2 December he informed Cripps of the 
inadvisability of taking such an action, adding that the British attitude towards 
Moscow ought to be as forthcoming and helpful as possible.  Displays of irritation 
would be counter-productive.
555
  Central to Halifax’s reasoning was a belief that 
Nazi-Soviet relations were not as close at previously believed.  The Berlin Conference 
of November 1940 initially appeared to indicate a strengthening of relations between 
Moscow and Berlin, yet Halifax began to doubt that any such strengthening had in 
fact occurred.  According to Halifax, German designs in the Balkans would 
inexorably cause friction between the two Powers, and it was for His Majesty’s 
Government to wait patiently for the relationship to implode.
556
 
Evidently, as 1940 drew to a close, the British were still unsure as to the best 
ways and means of dealing with the Soviets.  The ‘policy of reserve’ was widely 
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accepted, yet London had faced many obstacles in its attempt to improve Anglo-
Soviet relations.  The key consideration for those in the Foreign Office remained the 
extent and nature of Nazi-Soviet cooperation and whether His Majesty’s Government 
would be capable of rupturing Soviet-German relations.  In a review of his first six 
months as ambassador, Cripps noted that although Anglo-Soviet relations were 
neither better nor worse than they had been before his appointment, the chances of 
improving them remained slim.  The Soviet Government was un-sentimental, realistic 
and nationalistic, and would only alter its policy should it suit its interests to do so.  
With regard to the way in which Soviet diplomacy was conducted, Cripps stated that 
the Soviet Government had utilized Maisky to create an atmosphere of optimism in 
London as a means of counter-balancing the effect of their current close relations with 
Germany.  More specifically, the Kremlin had used such methods to ‘soften [the] 
reaction of His Majesty’s Government to an impending fresh economic agreement’ 
with the Germans.
557
  Stalin had consistently used British approaches to the Soviet 
Government in order to extract more favourable conditions from the Germans, and, 
according to Maclean, it was for the British to bring an end to Soviet duplicity.  
Although the war situation was markedly differently by the end of December in that 
an overwhelming German victory appeared unlikely, Maclean maintained that the 
Soviets would continue to deal with Germany in order to prolong the struggle to the 
detriment of both belligerents.
558
  Soviet policy at the time of the fall of France had 
been motivated by self-interest, and although a German domination of the continent 
no longer seemed inevitable, it was still in Stalin’s best interest to maintain close 
relations with Germany whilst keeping the British in play.  Maclean remarked that 
even when Germany began to get the worst of it, Soviet support would continue.  
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Such support would serve two purposes.  Firstly, it would enable Germany to 
continue the struggle and thus weaken her opponents to a greater extent than would 
otherwise have been the case.  Secondly, it would also make Germany less likely to 
seek a diversion by turning on the Soviet Union.
559
  It was for those reasons that 
Maclean and Collier in London, and Cripps in Moscow, had favoured taking the 
rather dramatic step of withdrawing Britain’s proposals for an economic agreement 
with the USSR.  
 The idea of standing up to the Soviets was not limited to those in the Northern 
Department.  In a paper written at the beginning of 1941 Mr Randall of the News 
Department reviewed the varying strands of opinion within the British press.  It was 
evident that he was in full agreement with the arguments put forward by those within 
the Northern Department.  Randall noted that it was ‘obviously impossible to 
maintain that any sympathy with democracy or antipathy to totalitarianism alone 
predisposes Russian official opinion to wish for our success’.  Indeed, ‘Moscow 
would certainly not welcome Germany’s victory at our expense, but scarcely less 
would it suit her to see our complete victory over Germany’.560  The need for a new 
approach became more crucial once news reached the Foreign Office of a further 
Nazi-Soviet economic agreement in the form of a renewed credit agreement, signed 
on 10 January 1941.
561
  Cripps reported on 12 January that the new agreement had 
made the Germans in Moscow ‘jubilant’ and that they were stressing the political and 
economic importance of the agreements.
562
  Collier’s frustration at his Government’s 
persistent policy of uniform amiability was clear, and once the news of extended 
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cooperation between Moscow and Berlin had reached Collier, he openly criticised his 
political masters.  Stalin continued to insist upon the neutral stance of the Soviet 
Union, yet the ever-expanding economic cooperation with Hitler made it clear that the 
Soviets were not neutral but merely a non-belligerent ally of one of the parties to the 
conflict.  Consequently, they must ‘take all the consequences and expect the other 
party to treat them as such’.  Unfortunately, due to the British Government’s lack of 
resolve to chastise the Soviets, Stalin would be ‘inclined to think that we shall never 
react against their economic help to Germany, however large it becomes’.563  Collier’s 
advice to Anthony Eden, the new Foreign Secretary, was to refuse any future 
advances from the Soviets for a barter agreement and to authorize Cripps to send a 
letter formally withdrawing Britain’s previous barter offer.564  Sargent disagreed.  
With the support of Cadogan, Sargent argued that, rather than taking any specific 
action in reply to the most recent German-Soviet agreement, a ‘general attitude of 
reserve’ alongside the tightening of the British blockade were the only necessary 
actions to take.
565
  Sargent believed that Stalin had ‘been at pains to buy off and 
appease the German ogre’ and that no amount of British protestation would persuade 
him to alter his appeasement policy.
566
 Once again, the notion of Stalin’s appeasement 
of Germany was raised.  It was believed by Sargent, Collier and Maclean that Stalin 
was pursuing a policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany, as it suited Soviet 
interests at that time.   
Eden, for his part, appreciated the frustration felt within the Northern 
Department, but agreed with Sargent and refused to allow Cripps to make any form of 
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protest in Moscow.
567
  To soften the blow of his rejection of Cripps’ proposal, Eden 
communicated a telegram to the ambassador in which he praised the ‘realistic and 
forceful way’ in which he was carrying out his difficult task in Moscow.568  Eden’s 
communication served to pacify the frustrated ambassador whilst simultaneously 
clarifying his own position on the matter of Anglo-Soviet relations. Eden could 
sympathise with Cripps as he had himself experienced the difficulties that arose from 
any attempt to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and explained to the ambassador that 
he had his share of disappointment in those endeavours.
569
  In spite of his praise, Eden 
had made it clear that the policy of ‘reserve’ was one which he approved, and he 
believed that the recent Soviet-German agreement was an additional reason for 
continuing it.  However, should the Soviet Government fail to respond to future 
British approaches, there could be no question of making any further political or 
economic approaches to the Soviet Government.  With regard to the question of 
concessions over the Baltic States, the Foreign Secretary was in agreement with the 
attitudes of the Northern Department.  Nothing would be gained from making fresh 
attempts to reach a settlement of the outstanding Baltic questions.
570
    
The ‘outstanding Baltic questions’ became increasingly important as the war 
progressed.  During Cripps’ interview with Molotov on 1 February 1941, the 
ambassador had attempted to discuss with the Soviet Foreign Minister the 
unsatisfactory state of Anglo-Soviet relations, in particular their economic relations.  
Molotov used the Baltic question as a means of justifying not only his refusal 
formally to acknowledge the British proposals, but to justify the recent consolidation 
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in Soviet-German relations.  When Cripps had communicated the British proposals in 
October 1940, the British Government had clarified its position on the Soviet 
absorption of the Baltic States, and had acknowledged that the Soviet Union was the 
de facto Government in the region.  Unfortunately, Molotov was clearly unimpressed 
by the British position and declared that the proposals could not serve as the basis for 
a settlement of the relations between the two countries.
571
  This would have come as 
no surprise to Cripps, as the Soviet Government’s silence following the presentation 
of the British proposals was evidence of this.   
Indeed, during a conversation between A.V. Alexander of the Admiralty and 
Maisky in September 1940, Maisky had proclaimed to be perplexed as to why the 
Foreign Office were so hostile towards the USSR, adding that he could not 
understand the British stance on the Baltic States.  Towing the party-line, Maisky had 
told Alexander that the territory had been Russian for over two hundred years, and 
had only been constituted as three independent nations in the aftermath of World War 
One.  As a consequence of British hostility, Maisky asserted that his Government and 
people did not believe that the British truly wanted to improve relations.
572
  Though 
the communication was intended to reach Cadogan, the Foreign Secretary was the 
first to read and respond to Alexander’s report of the conversation.  The then Foreign 
Secretary, Halifax, correctly pointed out that the argument that the Baltic States had 
been ‘Russian’ territory for two hundred years was ‘imperialist … if ever there was 
one’, and was in contradiction to the Soviet Government’s earlier policy which had 
led to their recognition of the independence of those states in 1920.   Halifax 
proceeded to question Soviet sincerity.  Maisky had hinted that in order for the British 
to defeat Nazi Germany they must gain the help of the Soviet Union.  The Soviet 
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Ambassador declared that in order to assure assistance the British ‘must do what his 
government wants in questions such as that of the Baltic States because we shall need 
their help against Germany’.  Halifax did not dispute the importance of Soviet aid, but 
noted that in spite of Maisky’s utterances he had avoided producing any evidence to 
suggest that Moscow were prepared to aid Britain in their struggle with Germany.
573
  
Indeed, Maclean had noted that the Soviet Government consistently made a point of 
keeping its representatives abroad in the dark with regard to its real intentions and 
would simply hand out to them whatever they considered a suitable ‘party line’ for 
export purposes.
574
  Collier concurred with the Foreign Secretary and adopted a 
somewhat mocking tone in his response to Maisky’s justifications of the Soviet 
absorption of the Baltic States.  The imperialist argument used by the Soviet 
Ambassador was unconvincing, due mainly to the fact that his Government had 
‘rejected with contumely’ any imperialist arguments when the Kremlin had 
recognised Baltic and Finnish independence in 1920.  The illusory idea of the 
continuation of Soviet neutrality was unconvincing.  Collier was as equally doubtful 
that the Soviets could adopt any policy that would be advantageous for Britain.  
Reiterating an oft-used justification, Collier exclaimed that the only way in which the 
Soviets could be of any use for Britain would be through the diminution of economic 
aid to the Germans.  Soviet economic assistance to Germany was increasing, ensuring 
that any Anglo-Soviet collusion in the political sphere was highly unlikely.  It was 
merely another example of Maisky’s attempted manipulation of the British, and 
Collier firmly believed that one ought to disregard Alexander’s conversation with 
Maisky.
575
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In previous months the Foreign Office had advised Cripps that it would 
‘clearly be a mistake to miss any opportunity of fishing in these troubled waters’.  The 
idea that Soviet-German interests in the Baltic were not easily reconcilable had been 
dismissed, as it was apparent that their relations were steadily improving, both 
economically and politically.
576
  His Majesty’s Government consistently maintained 
that position.  Following Alexander’s meeting with Maisky it was decided that any 
future approach towards the Soviet Government ought to be cautious and based on 
three pertinent points.  The possibility of British mediation in Soviet-Turkish relations 
would be dependent on some practical proof of benevolent neutrality towards Turkey.  
The Soviet Government could not merely be passive spectators but should ‘facilitate 
Turkish defence by all steps consistent with technical neutrality’.  The British 
Government would concede that the Soviet Government was in de facto control of the 
Baltic States, and upon these two points the third was dictated.  Any economic 
agreement between Great Britain and the USSR would hinge upon Soviet assurances 
of assistance to Turkey and satisfaction of the British position vis-à-vis the Baltic 
States.  That position was to be maintained throughout 1940.  
Thus, as 1941 approached, there was a consensus within the Northern 
Department that no further approaches should be made to Moscow.  In December the 
Foreign Secretary had raised the idea of addressing a personal message to Stalin in the 
hope of kick starting an improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations, yet Cripps believed 
such an approach would be fruitless.  The ambassador believed that the Soviet 
Government was perfectly aware of the willingness of Britain to improve relations 
and have had ample evidence of that, through the various proposals put forward by 
Cripps, all of which had been rebuffed.  As a consequence, Cripps was certain that 
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any friendly messages would not make the slightest difference to the Soviet mind-set, 
as their policy was ‘based on the realities of their own situation and not on 
sentiment’.577  Cripps used Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940 as an example 
of an improvement of Nazi-Soviet relations.  As such, any further British expressions 
of friendly intentions would only be interpreted as an indication of some special or 
increased need for Soviet assistance.  Stalin would only seek a rapprochement with 
Great Britain if it suited Soviet interests.  Should a change in the war or a 
deterioration in Soviet-German relations occur, it was conceivable that Stalin would 
adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards His Majesty’s Government.  Consequently, 
Cripps believed that he ought not attempt to change Stalin’s mind.  Maclean agreed, 
noting that Cripps’ comments were both valuable and interesting.  Maclean fully 
endorsed Cripps’ suggestion that rather than chasing after the Soviets, it would be 
wise for the British to adopt a policy of ‘non-helpfulness’ towards the Soviet Union.  
It would serve no purpose for Eden to ask about the outstanding issue of the Baltic 
States and the state of Soviet-Turkish relations, and their impact upon the possibility 
of concluding an economic agreement with Moscow, for they had not undergone any 
significant change.  Indeed, the Berlin Conference had illustrated the Soviet position 
well.  The Soviet Government had favoured a strengthening of its relations with 
Germany rather than with Great Britain; thus, to communicate a further message of 
British goodwill would serve no real purpose.
578
  Cripps rightly concluded that 
Moscow’s trump card was the knowledge that Hitler was obsessed by the danger of a 
war on two fronts, whilst Hitler’s trump card was the presence of German forces on 
the borders of the Soviet Union and the knowledge that Stalin was determined not to 
be drawn into hostilities with an undefeated Germany.  This ensured a ‘delicate 
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balance and completely opportunistic policy on both sides’, and illustrated the fact 
that Great Britain and the persistent assurances of British goodwill were not a 
consideration for Stalin.
579
 
Following an interview with Molotov on 1 February – a meeting that had only 
taken place following Eden’s complaint to Maisky that Cripps had not had any 
contact with Molotov for four months – it was clear that the Soviets were unwavering 
in their attitudes.  Eden had warned Maisky on 29 January that, should Cripps 
continue to receive the cold shoulder, His Majesty’s Government would treat Maisky 
with similar discourtesy.  During the course of the interview the Soviet Foreign 
Minister had used an abundance of flattery in an attempt to persuade Cripps that 
should the outstanding question of the Baltic States be resolved, it would be possible 
for Great Britain to achieve a rapprochement with the Soviets.  Molotov told Cripps 
that the Soviets had adopted a positive attitude towards him personally and that the 
Kremlin had welcomed his appointment.  Furthermore, the Soviet Government had 
committed no unfriendly acts towards Great Britain, whilst the dispute in the Baltic 
had illustrated the negative attitude adopted by the British towards the Kremlin.  
Furthermore, the British retention of Baltic assets had clearly illustrated a lack of 
goodwill.
580
  Although they had outwardly created an illusion of a British desire for 
rapprochement, the political and economic proposals of October 1940 did not and 
could not serve as a basis for a settlement of the relations between Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union.  Molotov had placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of the 
British.  His Majesty’s Government’s methods of coming first to an arrangement on 
general questions and then proceeding to individual outstanding questions would only 
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lead to a delay and a ‘tangling of the solution’.581  Cripps stated his belief that the 
proposals had provided a good basis for improving relations between the two 
countries, and that British recognition of the de facto control of the Baltic States 
would naturally become the basis for regulating the questions at issue between 
London and Moscow.  A general advance in Anglo-Soviet relations would be 
followed by the solution of the outstanding secondary problems, and Cripps had 
hoped in October 1940 that the political proposals would prove acceptable to the 
Kremlin.  Indeed, the proposals should have been acceptable at that time also.   
Unsurprisingly, Molotov was unwavering in his criticism of the British, and 
expressed his disappointment that the details of Anglo-Soviet conversations had been 
leaked in the British press.  The political proposals were to be kept secret, 
predominantly due to a Soviet desire to keep the Germans in the dark.  For the 
Commissar, ‘this reminded him of the position in the summer of 1939’.  At that time 
Molotov had been conducting secret negotiations with the British and French 
Ambassadors, in an attempt to reach an Anglo-Soviet-French understanding.  
However, reports had appeared in the press and had therefore violated the agreement 
about the necessity of keeping the negotiations secret.  Consequently, Molotov had 
believed that there had been an accumulation of unfriendly measures on the part of 
the British Government and that the experience of 1939 had not shown a desire on 
their part to improve relations; the wartime experience had indicated a similar 
attitude.  Cripps was equally critical of his Foreign Office colleagues for not 
preventing the leak, and believed that instances of leaks in the British press would 
only enhance his difficulties in Moscow.  In spite of complaints in his telegram to the 
Foreign Office, Cripps was insistent when he informed Molotov that he was wrong in 
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his analysis of the situation.  He told Molotov that the offers made in October 1940 
had shown quite clearly that London was genuinely anxious for better relations with 
the Soviet Union.
582
   
Maclean and Collier wasted no time in condemning Molotov’s criticisms of 
leakages of information in the British press.  Maclean remarked that one of Maisky’s 
principal functions during the previous eighteen months had been to cast the blame 
for the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-Soviet relations upon the British Government 
and the incompetent officials within the Foreign Office had served as useful 
scapegoats.
583
  Collier addressed Cripps’ complaints of British publicity and its 
effects on Anglo-Soviet relations.  He had doubted that ‘we should ever be able to 
compete with Maisky’s methods of feeding the press’ and that his ‘intrigues in 
journalistic and parliamentary circles’ had become ‘notorious throughout the 
diplomatic corps’.584  Sargent was in full agreement.  Following Molotov’s 
complaints of press leakages, Collier suggested that the Foreign Office should adopt a 
policy of refusing rather than granting Maisky social favours as he had made so 
improper a use of his contacts in London.
585
  Cripps’ meeting with Molotov had 
consolidated in Maclean’s mind that the predominant motivation for the Soviets was 
to secure the recognition of their sovereignty over the Baltic States before the end of 
the war.  That would prove to be impossible, as to do so would mark a departure from 
the principles that had been laid down by Churchill in a speech on 5 September 1940.   
In his speech, Churchill was adamant that he would not recognize any 
territorial changes made during the war, except those brought about by the free 
consent of all concerned.  To do so would lead to the abandonment of the common 
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attitude shared with the Government of the United States who had very clearly taken a 
firm line on the subject of the Baltic States.  Maclean took solace in the belief that for 
the present time Soviet interests would not allow the Soviet Government to either to 
break or strengthen its relations with the British.  In the circumstances, Maclean 
believed that the best chance of improving the position of Britain vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union would be brought about as a result of increasing Soviet respect for Great 
Britain.  That would only be achieved should Britain take a firm line with the Soviets, 
not through granting concessions to appease Stalin.  Since the outbreak of the war it 
was Britain who had made the advances, to very little avail.
586
  Cripps’ interview with 
Molotov had consolidated Maclean’s belief that in present circumstances there was 
little hope of achieving profitable cooperation between Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union, a conclusion that mirrored those drawn by Cripps at that time.  The continued 
hostility against Great Britain was unlikely to dissolve unless some ‘very visible signs 
of accomplished facts convince the Soviet Government of a change of attitude’.587 
In a letter to Eden, Cripps wrote of his belief that the USSR was in a dominant 
position at that juncture of the war.  Not only had London been actively courting the 
Kremlin but the Soviet Government’s relationship with Germany had altered 
somewhat.  Upon the signature of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939, the Soviet 
Government was very much the weaker Power in the relationship.  As a consequence 
of the Soviet conquest and absorption of the Baltic States, alongside its victory in 
Finland, the Soviet Union’s frontiers had been strengthened to the point that Stalin no 
longer had to fear Germany to the extent he had done in previous months.  Indeed, the 
British Ambassador believed that the settlement of the problem of the Baltic States 
had been a ‘major success for Russian diplomacy’.  The Soviet absorption of 
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Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, alongside the most recent Nazi-Soviet economic 
understanding, would make it almost impossible for Hitler to make any trouble for 
Stalin in the region.  Cripps acknowledged that as a by-product of the purely 
economic agreement there was a very clear political repercussion, one that had suited 
Stalin immensely.  The Soviets were able temporarily to appease the German menace 
and comply with German economic requirements, and should Moscow fear too early 
a termination of hostilities before the combatants were sufficiently weakened, Stalin 
could utilize the prospect of Anglo-Soviet discussions to delay the end of the war 
until both sides were adequately enfeebled.
588
  Consequently, the short-term 
improvement in the relations between the USSR and Germany had ensured the 
‘practical elimination of the fear of armed conflict’ on both the Soviet and German 
side.  All that remained for Stalin was to resolve the outstanding question of British 
de jure recognition of the Soviet control of the Baltic States. 
589
  Maclean was critical 
of Cripps’ assessment, and did not believe that Stalin had attached such great 
importance the Baltic question.  He did, however, agree with Cripps that the recent 
economic agreement between Moscow and Berlin was significant, and that there was 
very little chance of immediate political collaboration between London and 
Moscow.
590
 
Just as a consensus of opinion was developing within the Northern 
Department about the unsuitability and futility of attempting to settle the Baltic 
question with the Kremlin, Cripps once again reversed his position on the matter, 
much to the frustration of Collier and Maclean.  Cripps’ reversal of opinion came at a 
time when the Foreign Secretary had finally authorized Cripps officially to withdraw 
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the British proposals of 21 October 1940.  As a consequence of Cripps’ change of 
heart, his colleagues in the Foreign Office were becoming increasingly exacerbated 
by the ambassador.  Cripps’ viewpoint had reversed in the aftermath of Eden’s visit to 
Turkey at the end of February.
591
  Although Cripps had acknowledged the fact that the 
Soviets were ‘masters of delay and sabotage’, and was aware that whenever the 
Soviets adopted a more friendly attitude it often presaged fresh attempts to neutralize 
the German danger by further appeasement, he wanted to inform the Foreign 
Secretary of the advisability of coming to a settlement with the Soviets over the Baltic 
question.
592
  Quite apart from British interests, Cripps had believed that His Majesty’s 
Government were ‘bound as realists’ to accept the fait accompli in the Baltic States 
and grant de facto recognition.
593
   
Once again, Cripps’ position was somewhat confused.  When the matter of the 
Baltic States had been discussed in previous months, there was a general concurrence 
within the Foreign Office – with the exception of Collier – that de facto recognition 
would in fact be acceptable.  It was the Soviets who had deemed de facto unsuitable, 
thus stalling the possibility of reaching a resolution of the issue.  As Collier rightly 
illuminated, Cripps had ignored the fact that the Soviet Government had required 
from London something that would in practice be indistinguishable from de jure 
recognition, and that Cripps had spoken as if he was only asking the British to 
recognize Soviet de facto recognition of the Baltic States.
594
  Collier repeated his 
reasons for opposing the granting of de jure recognition.  To do so would negatively 
affect Britain’s relations with the American and Polish Governments, and would run 
contrary to the position of the Prime Minister.  In spite of these justifiable reasons for 
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opposition, ‘Cripps apparently thinks that these objections would be mitigated, if not 
wholly overcome, by negotiating for de facto recognition only’.  In the same breath 
Cripps had admitted that by adopting that course, Soviet demands on His Majesty’s 
Government would continue.  It is difficult to comprehend the advice tendered by Sir 
Stafford Cripps.  His vacillation was a constant source of frustration for Collier.  
Whenever Collier expressed satisfaction of the work and opinions of the ambassador, 
Cripps communicated confused and contradictory advice to his colleagues in the 
Foreign Office.  One of the greatest difficulties of conducting any discussion with 
Cripps, as Collier wrote the following month, was the ambassador’s habit of ignoring 
of any objections raised by those in the Foreign Office.  Cripps consistently tried the 
patience of Collier throughout his tenure as ambassador.
595
   
Indeed, Collier believed that the ambassador was unsuitable for conducting 
any negotiations involving the question of the Baltic States due to his obsession over 
the issue.  As a result Cripps could not, or would not, appreciate the point of view of 
his colleagues within the Northern Department.
596
 Accordingly, Collier informed the 
Foreign Secretary unequivocally of the prevailing belief within the Northern 
Department, whilst excluding the opinions of, and advice tendered by, Cripps.  Collier 
told Eden that should London commence any negotiations with the Soviet 
Government, the British ought not to be deluded into thinking that they would be 
required to give anything less than de jure recognition in practice.  Collier informed 
the Foreign Secretary that the choice was between granting full de jure recognition 
and leaving matters as they stood.  Collier had previously informed the ambassador 
that so serious a concession, with all its far-reaching consequences, would only be 
contemplated if it could be shown that it would bring some definite and considerable 
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advantage, such as the cessation or considerable diminution of Soviet economic help 
to Germany or Soviet interference with German plans in the Balkans.  Collier had 
never believed that such advantages were obtainable.  The Soviets had consistently 
preached their adherence to the policy of benevolent neutrality, as well as their right 
to trade with Germany as a neutral.  Furthermore, any Soviet interference in German 
plans in the Balkans – namely in Turkey – would only come about should the Soviet 
Government consider it in their interest to take such a step, and not merely because 
the British had offered them concessions in the Baltic States or elsewhere.
597
   
Although Collier conceded that such concession would increase the general 
goodwill of the Soviet Government and so incline them to do more for Turkey, 
Collier’s past experiences had led him to believe that goodwill was a commodity in 
which the Soviets had very little dealing.  Soviet interests dictated action, not 
goodwill.  Thus, he concluded that there was no reason to believe that recognition of 
their sovereignty over the Baltic States would make any difference one way or 
another to their decision to give further help to Turkey.  Nor would it induce the 
Soviet Government to diminish its economic aid to the Germans.  The authorities in 
London had conceded the fact that the Soviet Government controlled the Baltic 
States, yet did not give official recognition of Soviet sovereignty.  Collier believed 
that the position adopted by His Majesty’s Government in this matter was quite 
correct.  Furthermore, he believed that in the face of continued hostility from the 
Soviet Government it was crucial that Cripps, and His Majesty’s Government 
generally, should continue the policy of reserve and aloofness towards the Moscow.
598
  
Evidently, the problems arising from the Soviet absorption of the Baltic States 
continued to prove decisive within British policy-making circles. 
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However, as 1941 progressed, a different topic of debate dominated the 
Northern Department.  Since the outbreak of war in September 1939 the nature Nazi-
Soviet relations had been an issue of special concern to His Majesty’s Government.  
In October 1940, Fitzroy Maclean had been one of the first officials within the 
Foreign Office to broach the question of German intentions towards the USSR.  In an 
analysis of the interconnected issue of Anglo-Soviet and Nazi-Soviet relations, 
Maclean stated his belief that the Germans would not choose to invade both Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union at the same time, as his contact from the Berlin 
Embassy, von Herwath, had informed him.  To decide upon an invasion of the USSR 
in the spring of 1941 would, he believed, be a mistake as the German mechanised 
forces ‘would be at a grave disadvantage owing to the condition of the ground’.599  
Following Molotov’s visit to Berlin Maclean’s conclusions appeared to be accurate.  
As previously mentioned, although Molotov’s visit had failed to produce a new Nazi-
Soviet agreement, in the immediate aftermath of the Conference, members of the 
British Foreign Office were not yet aware of that fact.  Until those in London received 
a summary of the conversations, they were convinced of Stalin’s determination to 
‘keep out of trouble’ and stay in Hitler’s good graces in the hope of avoiding falling 
victim to German aggression.  Indeed, it was believed that Molotov’s visit to Berlin 
had resulted in a general strengthening of Soviet-German relations. 
Although Maclean and Sargent believed that Stalin would continue to appease 
Hitler in economic matters in order to stave off a German attack, they could not 
condone Cripps’ behaviour in the aftermath of Molotov’s conversations in Berlin.  In 
a communication of 13 November, Cripps put forward two suggestions as to how to 
deal with the Soviets in the aftermath of the Commissar’s visit.  His first suggestion 
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was that he could lose his temper with the Soviet Commissar in their next meeting in 
order to illustrate his displeasure over Stalin’s refusal to respond to British overtures.  
Cripps’ alternative suggestion was that he could ‘pretend’ to lose his temper with the 
Soviets.  Sargent was critical of each approach.  The Deputy Permanent Under-
Secretary feared that it would ‘merely give Stalin the impression that His Majesty’s 
Government have been very much frightened’.  Rather, the British Government had to 
accept that although the Soviet Union was formally not allied to Germany, it was 
‘quite natural that they should consult together whenever the occasion requires’.600  
As for the Soviet attitude towards the British, that would remain unaltered as a result 
of Stalin’s innate fear of Germany.601  Indeed, as Maclean pointed out, until Germany 
‘collapsed completely’, there was no possibility of an improvement of Anglo-Soviet 
relations due to Stalin’s innate fear of Hitler.  Indeed, Stalin would merely avoid a 
breach with the British Government, whilst doing all he could to ‘prolong the struggle 
to the detriment of both belligerents’.602 
Thus, as 1940 drew to a close, officials in London were under no illusions as 
to Stalin’s ultimate intentions: the Soviet Premier wished to see Britain and Germany 
exhaust themselves whilst observing from safety of the sidelines.  Hitler’s intentions 
towards the USSR, however, remained something of a mystery.  On 4 December, Sir 
Robert Craigie, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, relayed the opinions of a ‘Czech 
informant’ whom the ambassador believed to be ‘absolutely reliable’.  Following a 
recent conversation with Kaganovitch, the Soviet Commissar for Transport, the 
informant was convinced that Soviet policy was motivated by a desire to maintain 
‘peace at any price’, unless it involved sacrificing important Soviet interests.  Indeed, 
the informant had argued that the Soviet Government was in a position to stop 
                                                 
600
 NA, FO371/ 24848/ N7166/ 40/ 38, minute by Sargent, 13 November 1940. 
601
 NA, FO371/ 24848/ N7232/ 40/ 38, minute by Maclean, 22 November 1940. 
602
 NA, FO371/ 24849/ N7526/ 40/ 38, minute by Maclean, 26 December 1940. 
 195 
German expansion through economic and diplomatic action alone.
603
  Although 
Maclean was sceptical about the reliability of his Craigie’s source, he did not dispute 
the conclusions drawn.  The informant believed that Kaganovitch was very close to 
Stalin, who had married his sister, yet Maclean doubted that Stalin would confide in 
him on issues of Soviet foreign policy.  Maclean acknowledged that there was bound 
to be a certain amount of mutual suspicion between the Soviet Union and Germany, 
but he reiterated that a clash between the two Powers was most unlikely.  It was likely 
that the Soviets would only fight if their territory was invaded.  The Germans would 
no doubt realize that fact and Maclean noted that Kaganovitch’s claim that the USSR 
was in a position to stop German expansion by economic and diplomatic action was 
credible.
604
  For Maclean, the Soviet attitude was highly advantageous for the German 
Government.  Stalin’s desire to maintain peace at any cost – as illustrated in the 
extensive economic aid for Germany – would prove successful as Hitler had received 
vast amounts of supplies that were vital to Germany’s war economy.  Indeed, there 
was a general consensus within the Foreign and War Offices at that time that there 
was ‘no reason to anticipate an early German attack on the Soviet Union’ as any such 
attack would be contrary to the best interests of Germany.
605
 
At the end of January, in a communication to the Foreign Secretary, Cripps 
registered his agreement with the prevailing consensus within Whitehall.  Although 
the ambassador did not believe that any change had occurred in the long-term outlook 
of the Soviet Government with regard to its relations with Germany, he believed that 
there had been a ‘lessening of temporary tensions’ between Moscow and Berlin.  
Stalin remained determined to avoid an armed conflict with Germany ‘at almost any 
cost’.  Furthermore, the extension of Soviet economic aid to Germany had convinced 
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Stalin that German aggression towards the Soviet Union was unlikely.  Indeed, the 
increased economic support had led to the ‘practical elimination of the fear of armed 
conflict on both sides’.606   
Scepticism about possible German aggression against the Soviet Union 
continued well into 1941.  For example, on 24 March 1941 the Military Attaché in 
Switzerland informed the War Office that a confidential source in Berlin believed that 
preparations were being made for an attack on the USSR.
607
  The combination of 
continued large-scale recruitment, reports of increased Nazi-Soviet tension and the 
construction of fortifications on the Soviet-German border had convinced Kelly’s 
source of Hitler’s intention to invade the Soviet Union.  J.K. Roberts of the Central 
Department mused that ‘there must be some fire behind the increasing clouds of 
smoke’.  However, although the Germans appeared to be making preparations, 
Roberts was of the opinion that Hitler would instead hope that blackmail would 
suffice.
608
  Collier agreed.  Following a discussion with Major Tamplin of the War 
Office, it was agreed that Germany would not attack the Soviet Union if it could be 
avoided.  However, it was possible that the Germans could find themselves involved 
in a war with the Soviet Union against their wishes should Stalin call Hitler’s bluff 
and refuse to bow to threats and blackmail.
609
   
Major Tamplin, who was highly knowledgeable in matters relating to the 
Soviet Union, informed Collier that the result of a successful German invasion ‘would 
in practice be complete chaos throughout the whole of the Soviet Union’ and that the 
Germans would have to reorganize everything from the bottom upwards in whatever 
territories they occupied.  As a consequence, far from gaining new resources, the 
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Germans would lose the USSR as a source of supply.  Additionally, they would spend 
a great deal of time and effort in the reorganization of the USSR.  Tamplin noted that 
German resources were not ‘illimitable’.  Hitler could hardly afford to undertake a 
first-class campaign in the Balkans and to simultaneously attempt to deal a knockout 
blow against Great Britain before American help arrived, as well as invading, 
occupying and reorganizing a large part of the Soviet Union.  As a result of Tamplin’s 
advice, Collier was convinced that whatever German plans may have been drawn up 
concerning the destruction of the Soviet Union, these would have to be ‘put into cold 
storage’ pending the result of Germany’s forthcoming campaign in the Balkans.610  
The conclusions drawn by Collier were met with the approval of both Sargent and 
Cadogan.  To precipitate a war with Soviet Russia would cause immeasurable damage 
to the German war machine.  Thus, should Stalin continue to meet Hitler’s demands 
for economic assistance and supply, it was widely believed that the status quo would 
be maintained in the Nazi-Soviet relationship.
611
   
On 28 March, Kelly composed a paper exploring this issue. Kelly relayed 
information obtained from the His Majesty’s Consul in Geneva who was convinced of 
the growing feeling among German officers that a move would be made against the 
Soviet Union that year.  Hitler’s objective was to furnish Germany with supplies from 
the Ukraine for an indefinite amount of time.  It was believed that Hitler hoped to 
neutralize Yugoslavia and Turkey through diplomatic means, whilst simultaneously 
forcing Greece to conclude peace.  In that way, Germany’s flank would be 
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protected.
612
  Whilst Kelly was correct in his belief that Hitler would use diplomacy to 
subdue any opposition from the Governments of the Balkans, it proved to be a timely 
memorandum.  The next day the Yugoslav Government was overthrown by General 
Sushan Simovic, the commander of the Yugoslav air force, in protest to Yugoslavia’s 
accession to the Tripartite Pact.
613
  The coup led the Soviets hurriedly to conclude a 
non-aggression pact with Yugoslavia on the day of the coup.  Upon hearing the news, 
Hitler, who had always suspected an intimate tie between Moscow and Belgrade, 
decided to invade Yugoslavia, a decision that contributed to the delay of his assault on 
the USSR by five weeks.
614
 
Collier criticised the conclusions drawn by Kelly on account of the sources of 
information.  Kelly’s intelligence network was unreliable.  His information had 
derived from a Zurich grain importer who was also a member of the Swiss Trade 
Delegation to the Soviet Union.  Kelly’s informant stated that he had been ‘told by 
high officials in Germany close to General Halder’ that there had been ‘a growing 
feeling among German Army officers that movement must be made against the Soviet 
Union that year in order to obtain grain and other products from the Ukraine’.615  
Collier was critical of both the accuracy and reliability of Kelly’s report as the author 
‘could not vouch for the accuracy’ of the information.  The most serious argument 
against the possibility of a German attack, according to Collier, was the Soviet-
German oil agreement.
616
  A German invasion of the USSR would inevitably put an 
end to Soviet-German economic cooperation.  That would be detrimental to Germany.  
However, Collier was aware that ‘everything … depends on Hitler’s decisions’.  In 
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Collier’s opinion, those decisions were incredibly difficult to predict.  Furthermore, 
he noted that since the Yugoslavian revolution there had been a significant dearth of 
evidence to suggest a German move against the Soviet Union.  To be sure, there had 
been rumours of some three million German troops being stationed in Poland, yet 
Collier argued somewhat curiously in the circumstances, that this was not necessarily 
indicative of Hitler’s intention to invade the Soviet Union.617 
Throughout this period Collier continued to be critical of the intelligence he 
received which pointed to a German invasion the Soviet Union in the coming months.  
On 30 March the British Ambassador in Belgrade reported on a conversation between 
his American counterpart and Prince Paul in the course of which the latter had been 
told by Hitler that he intended to attack the USSR on 30 June.
618
  While 
acknowledging that it was ‘quite probable’ that Hitler had expressed anti-Soviet 
sentiments due to Prince Paul’s well-known dislike of Soviet Communism, Collier 
wholly rejected the idea that a German invasion was imminent.  In spite of this, he 
suggested that the details of the conversation between Hitler and Prince Paul and 
Hitler’s could be relayed to the Kremlin.  In Collier’s opinion, warning the Soviets 
would ‘only have a good effect’ from the British point of view.  It was possible that 
Stalin would conclude that the Soviet Union would be attacked regardless of any 
concessions that he made to Hitler.  Thus, although Collier did not in fact believe that 
Hitler intended to invade the USSR on 30 June, relaying the details of the 
conversation might lead Stalin to rethink his ‘policy of subservience’ to Hitler.619  
The idea of warning Stalin of an impending German invasion on the USSR 
was not, however, limited to Collier.  On 3 April, Cripps had been given a message 
from the Prime Minister for communication to Stalin.  The contents of the message 
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were highly significant, and marked Churchill’s decision to intervene personally in 
Anglo-Soviet relations.  Upon receiving intelligence that had come from the German 
air force Engima intercepts, Churchill had decided to warn the Soviet Premier of 
German troop concentrations in Poland. This, according to the Prime Minister, could 
‘only mean Hitler’s intention to invade Russia in May’.620  
Cripps delivered Churchill’s message on 19 April, a full sixteen days after he 
had been instructed to do so.  More incredibly, days prior to the delivery of 
Churchill’s message, Cripps had handed Vyshinsky a note warning of the impending 
German attack without making any mention of Churchill’s message.  Sargent could 
not disguise his disbelief over the extraordinary behaviour of the ambassador.  On 13 
April, ten days after the Prime Minister had requested Cripps to deliver his message, 
the Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary complained: ‘Sir S. Cripps is incalculable.  
After arguing and refusing to communicate the Prime Minister’s message for ten days 
he now suddenly, off his own bat, addresses a full-dress letter to Vyshinsky in which 
he formally raises the whole political issue’.621  Incredibly, in his ‘reappraisal’ of 
Churchill’s warning to Stalin, Gabriel Gorodetsky has argued that Cripps’ behaviour 
in this matter has been ‘blown up out of all proportion’.622  He further argues that the 
incident figured prominently in Churchill’s war memoirs in an ‘obvious attempt to 
invoke the historical record to discredit his rival’.623  Gorodetsky’s examination of 
Churchill’s warning to Stalin is highly critical of the way in which the Foreign Office 
handled the intelligence reports relating to the impending German attack on the Soviet 
Union, and in particular how the reports were effectively disregarded.  Central to 
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Gorodetsky’s argument is the idea that the evaluation of such intelligence was 
‘severely hampered by the entrenched political concept in the foreign office’.624  
Although the reports of German intentions proved to be accurate, one must consider 
two crucial points before chastising the Foreign Office.  Firstly, one cannot overlook 
the vast array of information that flowed into the Foreign Office on a daily basis, a 
large percentage of which was of doubtful reliability and origin.  Secondly, Stalin’s 
central axiom of pursuing economic appeasement of Germany at all costs in order to 
prevent German aggression was as convincing a reason as any to question the 
reliability of any warnings.  German action against the USSR was rightly viewed as 
nonsensical, not least due to the negative impact any invasion would have on the 
German war economy.  Therefore, until the Enigma intercepts were known to 
Churchill one can hardly criticise the conclusions drawn by Collier, Sargent et al.  As 
Schwendemann has argued, it was the extensive and valuable Soviet economic aid to 
the Reich that led to Stalin’s stubborn refusal to accept the inevitability of a German 
attack.  As such, one should refrain from criticizing those British officials for reaching 
similar conclusions, at least until more definitive and persuasive information was 
available.
625
 
Gorodetsky’s conclusions are difficult to comprehend.  Although one can 
appreciate the fact that Cripps had not been granted further audience with Stalin since 
their first and only meeting in July 1940, there is no excuse for Cripps’ refusal to 
follow orders.  As Miner has argued, the ‘simple request’ by Churchill ‘triggered a 
minor controversy’ both at the time and amongst historians since.626   
Unsurprisingly, Cripps’ actions angered his colleagues in the Foreign Office 
and compelled Sargent to compose a damning memorandum that criticised the 
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ambassador’s behaviour.  In his analysis Sargent confessed his frustration at Cripps’ 
behaviour.  In his analysis Sargent confessed his frustration at Cripps’ vacillation: ‘at 
one moment he advocates and practices a policy of reserve and aloofness while at the 
next moment, although conditions have not materially changed, he is to be found 
addressing appeals and remonstrances to the Soviet Government which, I fear, may 
well produce on Stalin the impression of weakness and even panic which it ought to 
be our object to avoid above all else with the Soviet Government’.627  Cripps’ latest 
display of stubbornness led to the discussion of his recall at the beginning of June.
628
 
On 16 April it was Eden’s turn to warn the Soviets of the looming threat of 
German aggression.  In a conversation with Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador refused 
to discuss the state of Moscow’s relations with Berlin, and merely repeated Stalin’s 
desire to avoid being drawn into hostilities.  In the course of what he described as a 
‘frank discussion on Anglo-Soviet relations’, Eden told Maisky that His Majesty’s 
Government believed Germany’s military ambitions to be ‘boundless’.  Consequently, 
the Soviet Union was not safe from the German military menace that had swept 
across the continent.  In light of the German threat, Eden broached the possibility of a 
rapprochement between Great Britain and the USSR, enquiring of Maisky whether 
the Governments of Britain and the Soviet Union could put aside past differences in 
order to make real progress.
629
 For his part, Maisky responded by expressing his 
belief that his Government had already shown by a number of minor gestures that 
they had wanted an improvement in its relations with Britain.  Maisky did not respond 
to Eden’s warning.  One cannot be overly critical of the Soviet Ambassador during 
this meeting.  Churchill’s warning to Stalin had not yet been delivered.  All Eden had 
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told the Soviet Ambassador was that the doctrine of Nazi Germany had centred 
around expansion.  That would not have come as a surprise to Maisky. 
In spite of the controversy surrounding the delivery of Churchill’s warning to 
Stalin, on 18 April, during a meeting with Vyshinsky, Cripps handed the Deputy 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs a paper in which he explored the interconnected issue 
of Anglo-Soviet relations and the German threat.  Cripps’ memorandum suggested 
that it ‘was not outside the bounds of possibility’ that if the war was protracted, His 
Majesty’s Government might be tempted to come to some arrangement to end it ‘on 
the sort of basis which had already been suggested in certain German quarters’.630  
Once again, Cripps had been ‘ignorant and reckless in his statements and 
proposals’.631  Cripps then immediately proceeded to undermine his barely veiled 
threat by stating that ‘at the moment there is no question whatever of the possibility of 
such a negotiated peace so far as His Majesty’s Government are concerned’.632   
He then explored the two likely possibilities as regards the development of the 
Eastern European situation. Hitler could obtain his supplies in one of two ways: either 
by agreement with the Soviet Union or, by resorting to force and simply taking what 
he wanted.  The British Ambassador noted that in the second eventuality London and 
Moscow would share a common foe and a common goal – the destruction of Nazi 
tyranny.
633
 
Vyshinsky was predictably cool in response to Cripps’ warnings.  Evidently, 
the necessary prerequisites for discussing wider political problems did not exist.   
Cripps gained the ‘strong impression that the Soviet Government have not turned at 
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all in our direction as a result of recent events’.634  An exasperated Collier remarked 
on 21 April that as His Majesty’s Government had realised ‘M. Maisky’s limitations 
as an interpreter of his government’s views’ he in turn could ‘only hope the Soviet 
Government realise the limitations of Sir S. Cripps!’635 
Collier’s frustration with the ambassador’s recent behaviour and tardy delivery 
of Churchill’s warning came at a time when Cripps’ obsession over the Baltic States 
had warped his judgement.  Indeed, as previously mentioned, Collier had already 
noted Cripps’ unsuitability for conducting any negotiations with the Soviet 
Government over the issue of the Baltic States.  As his recent activities had very 
clearly illustrated, Cripps was unwilling to carry out instructions from his political 
masters and was thus a liability for the British Government.  The ambassador had 
been so determined to conclude an agreement with Moscow that he was willing to 
sacrifice the Baltic States in order to do so.  For Collier, this position was 
fundamentally flawed.  Cripps had been prepared to contemplate an agreement by 
which Great Britain would publicly recognise the Soviet Government as the de facto 
Government of the Baltic States, but Britain would not receive anything in return.  
The Soviets would merely continue to support Hitler economically, at least until 
Stalin had made up his mind whether to risk war or not.  In Collier’s opinion, it was 
clear that should Cripps be allowed to negotiate with the Soviet Government, he was 
likely to commit ‘us to some serious concession without any adequate prid pro 
quo’.636  
In spite of such scathing criticism, of which he was fully aware, Cripps’ 
advice remained unaltered. In a memorandum summarizing the state of Nazi-Soviet 
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relations he stated that the basic hostility between the two Powers had not diminished.  
Consequently, the Soviet Government would yield to German pressure so long as it 
did not impinge on Soviet war preparations.  Should Hitler be satisfied with 
assurances and promises, there would be no need to attack the USSR.  The whole 
question rested upon the amount and degree of compliance demanded by Hitler.
637
  
Collier agreed that the Soviet Government would not allow German control over any 
part of their productive or distributive system for in the long run it would be fatal to 
Stalin’s regime.  Rather, Hitler would be satisfied with the present situation as the 
Germans had already obtained large amounts of supplies from the Soviet Union.  
Although the quantities had been liable to fluctuation, Hitler only had to ‘bang the 
table hard enough to ensure that they will continue on at least the same scale as in the 
past’.638  Collier believed that Hitler would be satisfied with the present position for 
the time being, at least until he had tried his hand at an invasion of Great Britain.  
Once he had tried and failed to neutralize Britain, Collier believed that there were 
various motives that would impel the Führer to seriously consider an invasion of the 
Soviet Union.
639
  
The following week, Collier again argued that Stalin would not allow the 
Germans to control anything of importance in the Soviet Union.  Instead, Stalin would 
increase his economic support of Germany at the expense of the British blockade, 
thus making any Anglo-Soviet understanding impossible.
640
  Collier’s conclusions 
were met with the approval of his superiors within the Foreign Office as well as that 
of Brigadier Skaife, who had been the military attaché to the Soviet Union between 
1934 and 1937 and was now the Head of the Research Department in the Foreign 
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Office.
641
  In his own appraisal of the German threat to the USSR, Skaife agreed that 
it was to Germany’s economic disadvantage to engage in a war with the USSR.642 
  Skaife believed it quite impossible to say whether Hitler was planning an 
attack on the Soviet Union.  It was even more difficult to predict when an attack 
would happen should Hitler deem it necessary.  The concentration of German troops 
on the Soviet frontier was ‘sufficient for the task’; lending credence to rumours that 
spoke of the imminence of a German attack, as well as corroborating the information 
obtained from the Enigma intercepts.  In Skaife’s professional opinion it would be to 
Germany’s economic disadvantage to engage in a war with the USSR and, more 
importantly, he believed that ‘M. Stalin can hardly fail to realise what important 
trumps he holds in his hands’.  Thus, Stalin would strive to postpone war for as long 
as possible through granting more and more concessions to Hitler ‘in the hope of 
reaching next winter in peace’.643  
As the debate continued, an unexpected event intervened which served further 
to complicate the issue of both Nazi-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet relations.  On the night 
of 10 May Rudolf Hess arrived in Scotland.  The arrival of the Deputy Führer was the 
cause of great confusion at the time, and there is still speculation as to whether Hitler 
had prior knowledge of Hess’s mission.  Cripps reported to the Foreign Office on 13 
May that the Hess incident had intrigued the Soviet Government and confessed to 
fearing that it had aroused Soviet fears of a ‘peaceable deal at their expense’.644  It is 
interesting to note that a mere ten days previously Cripps had raised the idea of 
threatening Molotov that Great Britain was tempted to conclude a compromise peace 
with Germany to the detriment of the USSR, an idea that had been categorically 
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dismissed by both Sargent and Eden.
645
  Collier believed it to be a good idea for the 
United States to warn Moscow that ‘collaboration with Germany will mean the 
complete cutting off of US supplies’.  However, he could not approve Cripps’ overly 
dramatic and dangerous suggestion of threatening the Soviets with a separate Anglo-
German peace.
646
  In his telegram of 13 May, in light of Hess’s mysterious mission, 
Cripps made yet another wild suggestion as to how the British Government ought to 
deal with this latest development.  Although he was aware that Hess was unlikely to 
reveal anything pertinent, if he revealed anything at all, Cripps hoped that the Foreign 
Secretary would authorize him to use whatever information divulged by Hess in order 
to stiffen Soviet resistance to German pressure.  Cripps proposed two alternative ways 
to achieve this.  His Majesty’s Government could attempt to increase Soviet fears of 
being left to face Germany alone.  Alternatively, the British could encourage Stalin to 
enter into cooperation with the prospect of facing the German menace together.  
Cripps was aware that this may not prevent the Soviet Government from succumbing 
to German pressure.  Indeed, Stalin could instead extend Soviet economic support to 
Germany, rather than taking the initiative by attacking the Reich.  Indeed, Cripps 
believed that the Germans would no longer be satisfied with a mere economic 
agreement with the Soviets, since there could be no guarantee that Moscow would not 
go back on an arrangement as soon as it deemed it safe to do so.  For example, once 
they had achieved aerial supremacy in the war.
647
   
Sargent doubted that the British Government would be able to get any useful 
material out of Hess that could be used by the ambassador.  He was also critical of the 
two possible courses of action suggested by Cripps.  His first idea of arousing Soviet 
fears was dismissed out of hand by Sargent.  It would be altogether too dangerous to 
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excite Stalin’s fears further as in his present state of panic it would most likely 
precipitate and complete his capitulation to Germany. Sargent suspected that Cripps 
wanted to suggest to Stalin that London was using Hess’s presence on British soil in 
order to work for a compromise peace.  Indeed, the idea of His Majesty’s Government 
hinting at the possibility of a compromise peace with Germany was far too dangerous 
to be considered, a point with which Cadogan emphatically agreed.
648
  In addition, 
Cripps had hoped that Hess would supply military information regarding Germany’s 
preparations for an invasion of the Soviet Union.  Again, Sargent doubted whether 
such information would be forthcoming.  He was equally critical of Cripps’ other 
suggestion that His Majesty’s Government should attempt to stiffen Stalin’s 
resistance to Hitler’s demands by convincing him that there were weak points in the 
German war machine.  In Sargent’s opinion, the possibility of persuading Stalin to 
ally with Great Britain against Germany was slim.  Indeed, he fully believed that 
Stalin was so conscious of the weak points in his own military situation that no 
amount of evidence of Germany weakness would reassure him.  The Deputy Under-
Secretary concluded by stating that it was unlikely that Hitler’s policy towards the 
USSR was having a disintegrating effect on German morale.  Consequently, Sargent 
did not deem it necessary to reply to Cripps’ telegram at that time.649  Cadogan was as 
equally critical of the suggestions put forward by Cripps.  He doubted that the British 
Government would be able to ‘turn this escapade to best account’.650  Christopher 
Warner, Collier’s successor as Head of the Northern Department, joined the debate on 
13 May. In response to Cripps’ desire to use the Hess incident to Great Britain’s 
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advantage, Warner merely told the ambassador that if and when Hess provided 
material suitable for his use, he would let him know.
651
  
On 23 May Halifax reported that he had received information indicating that 
German troops were amassed on the Soviet frontier in force and were preparing to 
take action.  Halifax believed this to be unlikely.  During the recent Nazi-Soviet 
economic negotiations Hitler had easily obtained assent for increased supplies of raw 
materials.
652
  The recent rumours stating that Germany was contemplating an attack 
on the USSR – a rumour that Halifax believed to be of German origin – had been 
largely replaced by stories that Moscow was on the eve of signing with Berlin a far-
reaching economic agreement with military implications.  Halifax believed that Stalin 
was gradually preparing to give Germany economic privileges in the Ukraine and in 
the Baku area.  Although Ribbentrop had been in favour of such an arrangement, the 
German military believed that they could not allow the Soviets time to strengthen her 
military position.  Indeed, according to Halifax, German military officials had argued 
that it was to Germany’s advantage to attack the USSR whilst she was unprepared.  
Thus, the conflicting information had made Hitler’s position difficult to assess, 
making it impossible to predict German movements.
653
   
Similar reports from the British Ambassador in Stockholm, Victor Mallet, had 
reached the Foreign Office on the same day as Halifax’s communication.  During the 
course of a meeting with Erik Boheman, the Swedish Secretary-General for Foreign 
Affairs, Mallett had been told that Germany was ‘quite likely to attack Russia in the 
middle of June’. According to his sources in Berlin – which Boheman did not name – 
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the German General Staff imagined that they could successfully occupy Moscow, 
Leningrad, Kiev and Odessa within three weeks.
654
   
Although he dismissed Boheman’s conclusions as mere guesswork, Coote, a 
clerk in the Northern Department, decided to transmit Mallet’s telegram to Cripps.655  
Warner was equally doubtful of the veracity of the information contained in Mallet’s 
communication.  He noted that similar reports had reached his desk,
656
 yet he believed 
that the decision depended not upon the opinions of German Army circles but whether 
the Soviet Government were prepared to accept German demands or not.  One could 
not assess the situation from the Soviet point of view only.
657
   Sargent was more 
inclined to believe the reports of Halifax and Mallet.  He remarked that in the face of 
mounting evidence one could argue that Hitler was preparing for an attack in mid-
June, should Stalin refuse to conclude a treaty with Germany.
658
  Predictably, the 
Soviets dismissed rumours of an impending German attack as British and American 
propaganda and as being entirely without foundation.
659
  
Cavendish-Bentinck, however, had adjusted his position slightly in light of 
fresh evidence of increased concentrations of German troop concentrations.   
According to the most recent intelligence that he had received of German military 
deployment, the Germans now had seventy-five divisions in East Prussia and Poland.  
He did not have precise information as to the number of German divisions on the 
Soviet-Roumanian frontier, but did not believe that they exceeded five divisions.  
Ominously, Cavendish-Bentinck wrote: ‘I cannot remember how many divisions the 
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Soviets have facing Germany, and I do not think it matters much as the Germans 
could cut through them like a hot knife through butter’.660 
Evidently, as May drew to a close, there was still a good deal of uncertainty 
surrounding the question of Germany’s intentions towards the Soviet Union.  On 28 
May, R.A. Butler, Sargent, Horace Seymour, Bowker and Warner met to discuss the 
rumours and their impact upon Anglo-Soviet relations.  The meeting was far from 
satisfactory as it proved difficult to find ways in which a rapprochement with 
Moscow could be reached.  Cripps was becoming increasingly isolated and his most 
recent attempt to meet with Molotov had been refused.  Cripps had to be content with 
a meeting with Vyshinsky who had made it quite obvious that he was not interested in 
any discussion regarding a possible invasion by Germany or his Government’s 
relations with Great Britain.  Warner remarked on 28 May that the prevailing cause of 
Soviet hostility remained a fear of Germany, a fear that paralysed Stalin.  Thus, it was 
‘extremely hard to think of any approach that we could make to the Soviet 
Government’ that might ‘induce them to brave German displeasure and complicate 
the negotiations which are presumably going on, or will shortly begin, and to flirt 
with us’.661   
In spite of the difficulties facing Cripps and his inability to meet with 
Molotov, he composed a lengthy memorandum for his colleagues in London on 27 
May.  The memorandum reached the Northern Department the day after the 
unsuccessful meeting between Butler, Sargent, Seymour et al.  In his opening 
paragraph Cripps stated his opinion that the Soviet Government would not concede 
anything that would vitally affect their war preparations or preparedness, as Stalin had 
been under no illusions as to Hitler’s ultimate intentions and was determined to resist 
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any German pressure that would be contrary to Soviet national interest.  Indeed, Stalin 
was himself preparing for all eventualities.  As H.W. Koch has noted, between the 
start of the war in September 1939 and the end of 1940 the Red Army had doubled its 
forces to four million on the western frontier of the USSR.
662
  Although Soviet 
conscription had dramatically increased, it was not necessarily indicative of Stalin’s 
belief in the inevitability of a German attack. 
The difficulty with Cripps’ argument is clear.  Opinions would inevitably vary 
amongst the Soviet experts as to what would or would not render a given concession 
irretrievably harmful to Soviet vital interests.
663
   However, Cripps was aware that in 
recent weeks there had been numerous, though imprecise, signs that pointed towards a 
weakening of the Soviet Government’s determination to resist German diplomatic 
pressure.  As a consequence, Cripps confessed that his hopes of Soviet resistance had 
been somewhat shaken.   It was possible that Stalin would agree to ‘crippling 
economic concessions’ in order to stave off a German attack, though Cripps could not 
state as much with any real degree of certainty.  The cause of such uncertainty was 
simple.  Not only was Cripps isolated in Moscow, ensuring that obtaining information 
was an extremely difficult task, but the nature and extent of German-Soviet 
collaboration remained highly secretive.  Thus, Cripps’ conclusions were necessarily 
speculative.  The information that Cripps received in Moscow from his colleagues 
was equally speculative, as he illustrated in his memorandum of 27 May.  Although 
he believed that information relating to German-Soviet cooperation in Iran was 
credible, for example, he noted that there was an abundance of ‘less well established 
evidence’ and ‘rumours’ circulating within diplomatic circles in which he placed little 
credence.  How he verified the intelligence – both of reliable and unreliable origin – is 
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unclear.  Such an omission is frustrating.  Cripps merely stated his belief that the 
rumours of German troop movements towards Iran through Soviet Russia were 
credible without any further explanation.   
In a minute penned on 29 May Coote explored afresh the nature of Nazi-
Soviet relations.  Praising Cripps’ reasoning, he believed that the ambassador had 
attempted to persuade the Soviets that they were in a strong enough position at that 
time to ‘stand up to the Germans’, and that any concessions that Stalin was prepared 
to make would be detrimental to the Soviet regime.  Unfortunately, these efforts had 
been unsuccessful.  Coote noted that in its present precarious position the Soviet 
Government had been forced to adopt a ‘hand to mouth policy’; as such, any accurate 
estimation of how that policy might develop was extremely difficult.  In spite of this 
difficulty, Coote predicted that the Germans would attack the Soviet Union as soon as 
possible should Hitler truly desire to do so as any delay would be detrimental to 
Germany.  Moreover, rumours continued to circulate of Hitler’s intention to invade 
the USSR the following year.  Should that be the case, Coote postulated that in twelve 
months’ time the Germans would be in an inherently weaker position.  The Soviets 
would be in a stronger position, as Stalin would use the time to strengthen its frontiers 
and enlist soldiers for the impending conflict.
664
   
The newly appointed head of the Northern Department expanded upon 
Coote’s concluding point.  Following a conversation with Professor Postan, Warner 
believed that the Germans did not intend to start a war with the Soviet Union at that 
time as it would negatively impact upon Germany’s economic strength.  The 
dislocation caused by the invasion would mean considerable delay in Soviet supplies 
to the Reich.  Warner believed that nothing short of German control over the Central 
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Soviet bodies that had dictated Soviet economic policy would provide the Germans 
with a real guarantee that the Soviets would in fact fulfil any undertakings.   Warner 
noted that, in Postan’s opinion, it would be not be advantageous for Hitler to follow 
such a policy.
665
  Hitler could get all the supplies that he desired through the threat of 
force alone.  To wage war would thus be pure folly on Hitler’s part.666  Postan’s 
conclusions were highly regarded within the Foreign Office.  The opinions tendered 
by Postan reinforced Sargent’s belief that the British Government ought to adopt a 
conciliatory policy towards the Soviet Union.  It was vitally important for Stalin to be 
convinced that he need not buy off Germany with a new and unfavourable agreement, 
whether it be economic or political in nature.
667
 
As May drew to a close no firm conclusions had been drawn on the much 
debated issue of Germany’s future policy towards the USSR.  Lord Halifax informed 
his colleagues that according to American sources, a report from Berlin had stated 
that a fresh Nazi-Soviet economic agreement was imminent.
668
 Warner was wary of 
such information, as he believed that the Germans often circulated false information 
in order to mislead Great Britain.
669
  
On 28 May, the Joint Intelligence Committee [hereafter J.I.C.] composed a 
paper that was particularly significant.  The memorandum analysed the vast array of 
information regarding Hitler’s plans for the Soviet Union and came to the conclusion 
that a new agreement between Berlin and Moscow was nearing completion, thus 
dispelling the rumours that the Wehrmacht was preparing for an invasion in the 
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East.
670
  This paper was the first in a three-part examination of Nazi-Soviet relations.  
Cavendish-Bentinck, the main contributor to the paper, noted that although in 
previous weeks rumours had been circulating throughout Europe of an impending 
German attack, the contrary was now the case.  Central to his reasoning was the 
simple fact that Germany could not fight a long war without obtaining greater 
economic help from Soviet Russia.  To draw the Soviet Union into the conflict would 
thus be contrary to German interests.  A war against the USSR would on balance 
result in initial economic losses and the additional strain on the German air force 
would entail the postponement of major operations elsewhere.  Thus, ‘the advantages 
... to Germany of concluding an agreement with the USSR are overwhelming’.671  
In order to achieve an additional agreement, it was predicted that Hitler would 
exert extreme pressure on Stalin, supported by the threat of force, in order to obtain 
by negotiation the concessions that were required.  However, Cavendish-Bentinck 
noted that the Soviet Government would refuse to sign any agreement that would 
endanger their effective control of the economic, strategic or political organization of 
the USSR.  Cavendish-Bentinck concluded that the Soviet Government would 
endeavour to avoid a clash with Germany by yielding to Hitler’s demands, whilst 
making extensive preparations to meet the German threat should the worst happen.
672
   
 Cavendish-Bentinck revisited this issue in a further paper of 2 June. The 
previous J.I.C. memorandum had concluded that as a consequence of a war with the 
USSR, Germany stood to lose far more than she would gain.  Although on purely 
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economic grounds a German invasion would be disadvantageous, Cavendish-
Bentinck now wrote that he had ‘long instinctively felt that such a war was a 
possibility’.  He justified this assertion by stating that the German High Command 
had increased the strength of their armies to 250 divisions, thereby weakening their 
industrial potential and greatly straining the internal economy of Germany.  A smaller 
number of divisions would have been sufficient to maintain the occupation of the 
conquered territories and to carry out offensive operations against Great Britain in the 
Mediterranean.  Whilst he clearly believed that embarking on a war with the Soviet 
Union on purely economic grounds would be contrary to Hitler’s interests, 
Cavendish-Bentinck noted that the Führer’s Soviet policy may have been motivated 
by a more personal reason – revenge.  Moreover, Cavendish-Bentinck mused that 
‘Hitler has a tendency sooner or later to revert to the tenets enunciated in Mein 
Kampf’.673  The motivating factor of ideology, rather than economic or military 
considerations, had not been raised in previous discussions of the possibility of a 
German invasion of the USSR, nor was it raised to any great degree in the weeks prior 
to the German invasion.  Certainly, there were allusions to politico-military motives, 
yet no one had referred to Mein Kampf and its possible influence on Hitler’s foreign 
policy.
674
  Further evidence of German military dispositions at the beginning of June 
suggested that Hitler was about to abandon his pro-Soviet policy in order to fulfil his 
aim of gaining Lebensraum in the East. 
As a result of numerous reports of the imminence of a German invasion, 
including Cavendish-Bentinck’s most recent analysis, on 2 June Eden decided to 
inform Maisky that from the information available to His Majesty’s Government it 
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was clear that a German move was imminent.
675
  Once again, Eden’s warning fell on 
deaf ears.  The Soviet leadership stated that rumours of an invasion were nothing 
more than British propaganda.  However, Cripps’ recall to London at the beginning of 
June had evidently unnerved the Soviet leadership.
676
  On 5 June Maisky asked the 
Foreign Secretary why Cripps was returning to London, to which Eden replied that it 
was for consultation with his Government.  In an attempt to assure Maisky that 
nothing untoward was going on, Eden confirmed that Cripps would be returning to his 
post.
677
 
Behind the scenes Eden’s colleagues continued to debate whether Germany 
would invade Soviet Russia and on what grounds.  By 5 June a consensus had finally 
been reached within the J.I.C. on this issue.  They had reviewed their previously 
drawn conclusions in light of persistent reports of increased German military activity 
on the Soviet frontier.  Cavendish-Bentinck now reversed his earlier position and 
began to argue that a German invasion of the USSR was in fact looming.  On 5 June, 
in the final paper of a three-part exploration of the issue, Cavendish-Bentinck 
concluded that although the economic picture presented in the previous memoranda 
remained unaltered, the scale of German military preparations in Eastern Europe 
suggested Hitler’s decision to invade the USSR in the near future.678  The previously 
held belief that should Stalin continue to grant greater and greater economic 
concessions in order to prevent German aggression against the USSR had been 
replaced by a belief that Hitler had decided upon the removal of a perceived Soviet 
threat on Germany’s frontiers.  Military and ideological considerations now 
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dominated German policy; no amount of Soviet economic appeasement would 
prevent the inevitable.
679
  
As a consequence of the final paper composed by the J.I.C., Coote composed a 
memorandum entitled ‘Basis for rapprochement with the Soviet Union’680  which 
outlined how any deterioration in Nazi-Soviet relations would impact upon His 
Majesty’s Government’s relations with Moscow.  There were, he considered, only 
two possible outcomes.  Firstly, the German Government would present the Kremlin 
with economic terms which, although severe, would be accepted by Stalin in an 
attempt to avoid war.  In that case, there would be no possibility of Anglo-Soviet 
rapprochement.  The second possibility was that Germany would force a war by 
demanding unacceptable economic or political concessions from the Soviets. If the 
Soviet Union was thus forced into war, Anglo-Soviet cooperation would be of 
paramount importance. 
In Coote’s opinion, Anglo-Soviet collaboration in the aftermath of a German 
invasion would hinge upon effective military and economic cooperation.  He noted 
that it was highly unlikely that His Majesty’s Government would be able to offer 
military assistance due to geographical limitations.  However, economic cooperation 
would commence, with Great Britain relaxing the blockade measures that had been 
put in place, thus allowing ‘everything possible pass into the Soviet Union via 
Vladivostok and any other practical route’.681  
On the other hand, should the Soviet Premier decide to make further 
concessions to Hitler, whether economic or political, Anglo-Soviet relations would 
continue to deteriorate.  Coote’s pessimism was shared by Warner who commented 
that should the Soviet Union be dragged into the war, all that Britain could offer the 
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Soviets was an exchange of technical information and the prospect of a coordination 
of the general strategy of Britain and America with the USSR.
682
  Coote and Warner 
were evidently still wary of Soviet Russia and did not place much confidence in the 
possibility of reaching an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement, as Stalin steadfastly refused 
to accept the imminence of a German attack, even in the face of mounting evidence to 
the contrary.
683
   
On 10 June Sargent shifted the focus of discussion and explored the 
motivations that had impelled Hitler along the course that he was now following.  He 
now fully ascribed to the belief that economic considerations did not dictate Hitler’s 
policy.  The chief political motive, according to Sargent, was Hitler’s desire to 
capitalise on his victories without further delay, bringing about the Gleichschaltung of 
the whole of Europe.  This would inevitably require the transformation of the Soviet 
system into something that would be the Soviet equivalent of the Nazi system in 
Germany.  Indeed, Sargent believed that Hitler had undoubtedly calculated that the 
destruction of Soviet communism would not only rally the Nazi Party, but would be 
welcomed by large sections of populations throughout Europe.  In this way, Hitler 
hoped that his ‘crusade against communism would turn public opinion in the USA 
and even in this country in his favour’.684  Should those political motivations prove 
valid, the Germans would have to act quickly ‘if they are to produce their full effect 
on the progress of the war’.685 
Sargent proceeded to examine the military motivations behind a possible 
German attack on the Soviet Union.  Whilst he admitted that he was not competent to 
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speak with any real authority, he attempted to ‘hazard a guess as to Hitler’s military 
reasons for an attack on the Soviet Union’.  Sargent mused that Hitler might feel 
compelled to ‘settle his Russian problem’ during the summer months.  Should Hitler 
decide to delay an invasion, he would have to wait until the spring of 1942 to launch 
an offensive.  A successful invasion of the Soviet Union, in Sargent’s opinion, would 
ensure that Hitler would in one stroke ‘achieve all his political objectives’ and would 
be in a position to exploit the military advantages which free access to the Caucasus 
would give him.  If, on the other hand, the Soviets put up an effective fight, Sargent 
was aware that Germany would be able to make a compromise settlement with Stalin 
in order to ‘pull out [of the conflict] without having worsened his general strategic 
position either in the Atlantic or in the eastern Mediterranean’.686  
 Although the Soviets continued to dismiss British warnings, Coote noted that 
the authorities in Moscow were becoming ‘uneasy’ in light of the persistent rumours 
of an impending German attack.
687
  However, when Cripps met with Maisky on 18 
June the Soviet Ambassador did not betray a hint of apprehension.  When discussing 
the present situation, Maisky simply informed Cripps that he ‘saw no reason for a 
break in Soviet-German relations’.  In response, Cripps told Maisky of his belief that 
either Stalin would capitulate completely to Hitler or be dragged into the war against 
Germany.  Upon hearing this Maisky ‘seemed much less positive’ that war might be 
avoided.
688
   
As Geoffrey Roberts has noted, ‘despite all the intelligence, when the 
Germans attacked on 22 June 1941 they achieved complete surprise’.  This surprise 
gave the Germans a distinct advantage that contributed to the success of the 
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Wehrmacht in the first weeks of the war.
689
  From the British point of view, the 
German invasion of the USSR, although finally removing the ‘problem of Germany’ 
from Anglo-Soviet relations, it sharpened the focus on another troublesome issue: the 
attainment of an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement.
690
  Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
were now fighting a common enemy, yet the long-standing mutual distrust clearly 
remained in the wake of the German invasion of the Soviet Union.  Additionally, a 
further problem was evident in the immediate aftermath of the invasion: would the 
Soviets be able to withstand the German onslaught?  The onset of Operation 
Barbarossa thus posed many problems for the British Government and forced yet 
another examination of Anglo-Soviet relations in light of the Soviet Union’s new 
status as co-belligerent in the war against Germany. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
689
 Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War, p. 137. 
690
 Lothar Kettenacker, ‘The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany, 1941-1945’, Journal 
of Contemporary History, 17, 3 (Jul., 1982), pp. 435-458. 
 222 
Chapter three 
‘It is essential to treat the Russians as though we thought that they were 
reasonable human beings’.691 
 
The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, whilst seemingly taking 
the Soviets by surprise, had a significant impact upon the state of Anglo-Soviet 
relations as it had forced both the Kremlin and His Majesty’s Government once again 
to re-examine the current state of relations between the two Powers.  London and 
Moscow were united by a common enemy, thus elevating the need for a 
rapprochement between the two Powers.  It was at this time that the Foreign Secretary 
and the Prime Minister took a more active role in Britain’s relationship with Moscow.  
The wealth of knowledge and experience within the Northern Department was 
essential for Eden and Churchill during the period between Operation Barbarossa and 
the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 26 May 1942.  It was in the months following Barbarossa 
that the advice tendered by Northern Department officials arguably held the most 
significance.  With Christopher Warner at the helm one can appreciate a more level-
headed and pragmatic approach to the issue of Britain’s relationship with the USSR, 
in contrast to the emphatic advice tendered by Laurence Collier.  Anglo-Soviet 
relations had entered a new phase, and the new personnel within the Northern 
Department were more suitable for the task than their predecessors.  The overhaul of 
personnel, with the arrival of figures such as Warner and Armine Dew, alongside the 
appointment of Archibald Clark Kerr as Cripps’ successor as ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, had occurred at a most opportune time.  In January 1944, Warner wrote 
to Balfour and stated his belief that his superiors – Eden and Churchill in particular – 
were too prone to going to extremes in their treatment of, and responses to, Stalin and 
                                                 
691
 FO371/ 32876/ N927/ 5/ 38, minute by Strang, 20 February 1942. 
 223 
Molotov.  He believed that they ought to ‘take things in their stride’ and that ‘the 
attitude of mind which throws the hat high in the air when Molotov and Joe turn on 
their kindly and responsive mood for the benefit of the Prime Minister and Secretary 
of State, and get in a flap whenever the Soviet Press is a bit naughty, is most 
prejudicial to a sound conduct of policy’.692  After all, Soviet manipulation and 
duplicity was neither new nor unusual.  As for Archibald Clark Kerr, who was 
Ambassador in China from 1938 to 1942, he was very much a welcome successor to 
Cripps.  One historian has noted that the new appointee appeared to have ‘brought 
with him few if any of the anti-Soviet prejudices characteristic of many British 
diplomats at this time’.693 
  Much like in previous years, the centrality of economic relations between 
Britain and the Soviet Union was evident following the German invasion of the 
USSR.  The issue of economic cooperation gained greater significance as the 
coordination of supplies between Great Britain and the USSR, and of course the 
United States of America, now lay at the heart of British diplomatic activity in the 
aftermath of Hitler’s unprovoked aggression against the Soviet Union.  Prior to 
Barbarossa, when Soviet Russia was a ‘neutral’ Power in the war, the Foreign Office 
had believed in the importance of Anglo-Soviet economic collaboration to the 
improvement of Anglo-Soviet political relations specifically.
694
  Following 
Barbarossa a great deal of discussion was generated by members of the Northern 
Department and the resulting advice tendered was often passed to the Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State to the Foreign Secretary himself.  This chapter will explore 
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the progression of the economic and political relations between London and Moscow, 
leading to the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet alliance of 26 May 1942.  The 
significance of the Northern Department will be demonstrated throughout, with the 
role of the department in the process being illustrated as vitally important, particularly 
in the preparations of Eden’s visit to the USSR in December 1941.   
 At midday on 22 June it was Molotov rather than Stalin who addressed the 
Soviet people via a radio broadcast.  Molotov emphasised the fact that Stalin had not 
received any demands or ultimata from Hitler and that the invasion was very much 
unprovoked.
695
  The Germans, on the other hand, had emphasised the fact that the 
invasion was a direct consequence of Soviet hostility towards Germany.  During a 
conversation at 4am on 22 June, the Reich Foreign Minister told the Soviet 
Ambassador Dekanosov that previously he had hoped that ‘the two countries would 
contrive a sensible relationship with each other’.  Unfortunately, the recent agreement 
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had illustrated ‘the hostile policy of the 
Soviet Government toward Germany’. Ribbentrop had stated that the Soviet-
Yugoslavian Pact, coupled with increased concentrations of Soviet forces on their 
borders, had constituted a serious threat to the existence of the German Reich.  Due to 
the ‘serious threat of a political and military nature’, Hitler had been forced to act.696    
Evidently, the Soviet belief they could stave off a German attack through 
granting greater economic concessions had been misguided.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, by the time of the German invasion there was no one in Whitehall 
who was in any doubt as to Hitler’s ultimate intentions with the USSR; Barbarossa 
was inevitable.  As Gorodetsky has argued, there was no lack of information reaching 
Stalin in Moscow of German intentions.  As such, the sheer amount of information 
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being transmitted had made it incredibly difficult for the Soviet intelligence collators 
in Berlin to ignore the evidence of Hitler’s intentions.697  Coote wrote on 22 June that 
‘the complacency of the Soviet Government’ had been ‘one of the most extraordinary 
things throughout’.698   Warner expressed a similar sentiment the following week, 
noting that it was ‘really quite amazing that in spite of our warnings the Russians 
were taken by surprise’.699   
In the months following the German invasion, Cripps undertook an 
examination of the events that had led to the outbreak of war between the USSR and 
Germany.  The ambassador conceded that it was difficult under the existing 
circumstances accurately to analyse the course of events ‘since the relationship 
between the two countries during the preceding two years remain for present wrapped 
in mystery’.700  In spite of such difficulty, Cripps started his review at the date of the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact.  The ambassador stated his belief that Stalin’s adherence to the pact 
had been motivated by a desire to keep the USSR out of the war, whilst enabling him 
to acquire territory on the frontiers of the Soviet Union.  According to the 
ambassador, the Soviets had ‘never considered the Soviet-German Pact as anything 
more than a temporary expedient’.  In typical fashion, Cripps’ analysis of Soviet 
policy following the outbreak of war in September 1939 was wholly uncritical and at 
times apologetic for Soviet policy.  In relation to Soviet policy from the signing of the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact to the German invasion in June 1941, the ambassador argued that 
‘stark nationalism’ had been Stalin’s primary motivation.  As such, Stalin had pursued 
a policy that had made the USSR ‘friends of the Fascists and hostile neutrals to the 
Allied democratic Powers.’  Cripps’ account of Soviet policy continued to make 
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questionable conclusions, particularly in the matter of Soviet-Turkish relations and 
Britain’s attempt to serve as a mediator to a possible understanding between the two 
countries.  According to Cripps, Stalin had sincerely attempted to bring about a 
rapprochement with the Turkish Government, and the failure to do so was due more 
to the attitude and suspicion of the Turkish Foreign Minister than anything else.
701
  
Cripps’ uncritical examination of the period, although not at all surprising, was 
somewhat alarming.  Whilst Armine Dew, Fitzroy Maclean’s successor as Warner’s 
second-in-command, praised Cripps’ communication as an ‘admirable account of the 
causes and events leading up to the German invasion of the Soviet Union’, 
Christopher Warner asserted that ‘there is a good deal in the despatch which is not 
entirely objective’.702  Cavendish-Bentinck, the chairman of the J.I.C., was equally 
critical of Cripps’ memorandum.  He wished to place on record the incorrect 
statements made by Cripps, as Cripps’ account contained many contradictions and 
thus should be treated with caution.
703
  Cripps’ most questionable conclusions can be 
found in the final paragraphs of his paper.  Following a brief analysis of the Soviet-
German-Yugoslav relationship, Cripps concluded that the Soviet alliance of 
friendship with the new Government of Yugoslavia – which had replaced the pro-
German Government of Prince Paul – was the deciding factor that had precipitated the 
German attack on the Soviet Union, a conclusion that was categorically condemned 
by Cavendish-Bentinck.
704
  As for Stalin and Molotov’s surprise over the German 
invasion, Cripps was once again sympathetic to the Soviet leadership.  Cripps 
believed, much like Stalin, that Soviet economic appeasement would prevent any 
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German assault.  Unfortunately for the Soviets, Hitler’s ultimate objective was to 
‘crush the Russian forces’ before they could strike first.705  Cripps’ analysis of Nazi-
Soviet relations is intriguing, not least as it was another example of his sympathy 
towards the Soviet leadership, but because it so clearly illustrated the different 
opinions held by key figures such as Cavendish-Bentinck and the Head of the 
Northern Department.    
On the morning of the German invasion of the USSR Lacy Baggallay, who 
was in charge of the Moscow Embassy whilst Cripps had been recalled to London for 
consultation with the British Government, met with the Soviet deputy Foreign 
Minister to discuss the implications of Barbarossa on Anglo-Soviet relations.  
Although Baggallay had not yet received official instructions from London, he 
believed it to be axiomatic that the relationship between Moscow and London had 
altered.  Baggallay told Vyshinsky that ‘whether we like it or not we now have a 
common interest of defeating Germany’, to which Vyshinsky gave ‘cautious 
assent’.706  Maisky reiterated the same point in a conversation with Eden on 26 June.  
For Maisky, a larger measure of cooperation between the two governments was 
essential.
707
   
Although Eden adopted a cautious approach to Maisky’s suggestions, his 
actions following the interview told a different story.  Eden deemed it necessary for 
Cripps to return to Moscow with both a Military and Economic Mission in order to 
facilitate cooperation between the two Governments.  On 27 June Cripps arrived back 
in Moscow with the Missions.  After formally introducing the leading members to 
Molotov, Cripps spoke of the determination of His Majesty’s Government to 
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cooperate fully with their Soviet counterparts.
708
  Cripps informed the Foreign Office 
that Molotov had cordially welcomed the Mission and had once again stressed that the 
war had been forced upon the Soviet Union ‘through no fault of their own’.709  This 
latter point was raised by Churchill in his speech on 22 June, during which the Prime 
Minister had also declared that ‘the Russian danger is our danger’, thus illustrating a 
British desire to aid the latest victim of German aggression.
710
 
That evening, Molotov sent for Cripps in order to ascertain the British 
perspective on the future course of the Anglo-Soviet relationship.  Three questions 
were put to the British Ambassador: what was the degree of cooperation that the 
British proposed; did it include political cooperation and were His Majesty’s 
Government prepared to conclude a political agreement to define the basis of 
cooperation?
711
  Cripps adopted an unusually firm approach in his response, and 
informed Molotov that the maximum possible economic assistance would be rendered 
by Great Britain, although the amount of support was limited due to problems with 
transport.  As for military aid, Britain had no men or materials to spare.  However, 
Cripps conceded that they could offer advice and technical support to the Soviets.  As 
for a political agreement, the ambassador stated that it was not contemplated at that 
time, and explained that the common enmity against Hitler was a basis for military 
and economic cooperation only.  Cripps correctly noted that the new state of relations 
between London and Moscow was in its infancy and that it was necessary to build 
trust in the economic field before attempting to reach a political understanding.  To 
his colleagues in the Foreign Office, Cripps proposed that the British authorities ought 
to remain ‘completely firm on this subject’ and should ‘insist upon cooperation 
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without any political agreement’.712  Cripps’ first meeting with Molotov following the 
German invasion illuminates the dramatic change in the Anglo-Soviet relationship.  In 
the weeks prior to Barbarossa it was the British who were anxiously trying to bring 
about a rapprochement, and were desperately trying to persuade the Soviets of the 
urgency of an Anglo-Soviet understanding in light of the mounting evidence of some 
German move against the Soviet Union.  Following Cripps’ interview it is clear that it 
was the Soviets who were the ‘suitors’, and that they were desperately scrambling to 
comprehend the British position and were seeking to strengthen Anglo-Soviet ties in 
the form of a political agreement.    
Soviet dissatisfaction was again evident following a conversation between 
Eden and Maisky on 30 June.  Maisky, whilst encouraged by the speed with which the 
missions were dispatched to Moscow, he had nonetheless complained that they held 
too little authority.  Repeating the questions that Molotov put to Cripps on 27 June, 
Maisky told Eden that Stalin wanted to secure a definition of the type and extent of 
collaboration that the authorities in London had envisaged.  Was it military only, 
military and economic or a combination of military, economic and political?  For his 
part, Maisky stated his impression that his government was ready for all three, yet the 
British position remained somewhat ambiguous and that had caused concern in 
Moscow.  Eden refuted Maisky’s accusation and specified the type of cooperation 
London had wished to achieve with Moscow.  The British Government was prepared 
to give all the military and economic help in its power in order to defeat Hitlerite 
Germany, but political collaboration was a more difficult issue due to British 
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uncertainty as to what type of agreement the Kremlin sought.  Did it want an alliance 
or some less far-reaching agreement?  That was the crux of the issue for Eden.
713
 
 The issue of what type of agreement Moscow had hoped to obtain was at the 
heart of Cripps’ meeting with Stalin on 8 July, the first such meeting since the 
German invasion.  It was during this meeting that Cripps delivered Churchill’s 
message to Stalin.  Churchill promised Stalin that the British would ‘do everything to 
help that time, geography and our growing resources allow’, and noted that the longer 
that the war lasted the more help the British could afford.
714
  Clearly, Churchill had 
feared either an early Soviet collapse or the possibility that Stalin would seek a 
separate peace with Germany.  Either option would create an intolerable situation for 
Great Britain, who would thus once more bear the brunt of the conflict alone.  Once 
Cripps had delivered Churchill’s message, Stalin broached the question of reaching 
some kind of agreement between the two countries, ‘without which in his opinion 
cooperation was not possible’.715  Stalin had wanted to come to an agreement of a 
purely general nature that would entail mutual help without any precision as to 
quantity or quality whilst stipulating that neither country would conclude a separate 
peace.  Stalin had thus clarified the Soviet position fully.
716
  Stalin informed Cripps 
that an understanding would be invaluable for the morale of the USSR and Great 
Britain.  In his response, Cripps told Stalin that he had misunderstood Molotov’s 
request during his meeting of 28 June, as he believed that Stalin had intended 
something much more specific as regards to a political agreement.  Cripps pointed out 
that whilst the British Government was in agreement with the two points raised by 
Stalin, he felt that it was ‘not necessarily easy or advisable to reduce them to a formal 
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agreement at this early stage’.  The predominant reason for British hesitancy to 
conclude a formal agreement with Soviet Russia was a fear that public opinion would 
not approve of such a union, as it was widely believed within the Foreign Office that 
the British people were still firmly against a rapprochement with the USSR.   
Thus, following his meeting with Stalin, rather than wanting to conclude a 
formal agreement, Cripps was instead in favour of an exchange of notes on military 
matters.  Cripps recommended that the Foreign Office should ‘seize this opportunity 
without delay in order to bind the Russians to continuing their resistance’ and stated 
that he could ‘see no possible drawback to our stating our determination to do so’.717  
Cripps informed the Foreign Office that his discussion with Stalin was both ‘frank 
and easy’.  And, more importantly, Stalin had attempted to justify his reluctance to 
improve relations with the British in the months prior to the German invasion.  Stalin 
told Cripps that to do so ‘would have been tantamount to attacking Germany’.  Any 
improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations, even if limited to the economic sphere, would 
have been viewed as directed solely against Germany.
718
 
 Predictably, Cripps’ interview with Stalin generated a great deal of interest in 
London.  The widespread interest within the Foreign Office clearly illustrates the 
importance attached to the issue of Anglo-Soviet cooperation in the aftermath of the 
German invasion of the USSR, whilst simultaneously highlighting the various strands 
of opinion within Whitehall.  The day following Cripps’ communication, Sargent 
composed a lengthy memorandum outlining the possible courses of action in light of 
Cripps’ conversation with Stalin.  In Sargent’s opinion, there were five courses open 
to the authorities in London in this matter.  Firstly, there was the view adopted by 
Cripps in his meeting with Molotov on 28 June, namely that a political agreement 
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could not be contemplated until there was a greater measure of trust cultivated 
between London and Moscow.  According to Cripps, in order to overcome the mutual 
distrust there would have to be a period of military and economic cooperation.  Until 
then, an Anglo-Soviet political agreement could not be reached.  At the time of the 
circulation of Sargent’s memorandum, however, Cripps had altered his stance on the 
most favourable course of action – a not uncommon occurrence.  Cripps now believed 
that an exchange of notes was preferable.  Sargent discounted that option as it was 
‘hardly a suitable method of placing on record a political agreement of this 
importance’.  Furthermore, Sargent believed that it would fail to produce an impact on 
world opinion.  The third possibility, according to the Deputy Permanent Under-
Secretary, was the conclusion of a joint declaration by the two governments that 
would mirror the Anglo-French agreement of March 1940, when Britain and France 
undertook not to make a separate peace with Germany.  The fourth option would be 
the conclusion of a formal treaty of mutual assistance that would include a no separate 
peace provision.  The final option was for the British to ask the Soviet Government to 
suggest the text of either a draft declaration or agreement so as to give His Majesty’s 
Government more time to consult the Dominions and the United States.
719
  Eden was 
clearly anxious to reach an agreement with the Soviets and wanted to seize the 
opportunity without delay.  He dismissed Cripps’ suggestion of an exchange of notes 
as an ‘inappropriate and inadequate’ method of recording what the Foreign Secretary 
deemed to be a decision of high policy.  Rather, Eden favoured a joint and formal 
declaration of the two governments.
720
  Thus, as a result of Cripps’ interview with 
Stalin, one can already see the foundations of the forthcoming ‘July Agreement’.   
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The two terms that Stalin had deemed central to any Anglo-Soviet agreement 
were debated within the Foreign Office immediately upon receiving Cripps’ 
communication.  For Britain, as Cripps had informed Stalin on 7 July, it was 
necessary for the government to keep both the United States and the Dominions 
informed as to the nature of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations and the progress made.  On 
9 July, Eden informed Halifax in Washington of Cripps’ conversations with Stalin.  
Although Eden professed not to attach any undue importance to any assurance by 
Stalin, the Foreign Secretary informed the ambassador that ‘it was clearly a good sign 
that he should ask us to join him in a statement that neither country would make a 
separate peace’.  Consequently Eden felt that ‘we should be right to clinch this offer 
as soon as possible’.721   Eden evidently wished to conclude an understanding with 
Moscow without delay, but was aware that no such move could be made without the 
approval of America.  In an attempt to persuade the Americans, Eden met with 
Winant, the American Ambassador in London.  Eden stated that he was fully alive to 
the American opposition to a formal treaty being concluded between London and 
Moscow, as ‘a treaty had an especially serious sound in the United States’.722  To that 
end, the Foreign Secretary sought the opinion of the American Ambassador in order 
to reach a compromise that would suit both British and American opinion. Winant 
replied that should Eden deem an exchange of notes inadequate, the authorities in 
Washington would agree to a joint declaration between London and Moscow.
723
 
The debate surrounding Stalin’s proposal to Cripps on 8 July quickly 
progressed through the political echelons to the War Cabinet.  The following day, the 
War Cabinet convened to discuss Stalin’s terms where general consensus of opinion 
was reached.  It was believed that an Anglo-Soviet joint agreement would be the most 
                                                 
721
 NA, FO371/ 29467/ N3603/ 3/ 38, Eden to Halifax, 9 July 1941. 
722
 Ibid. 
723
 Ibid. 
 234 
favourable course to pursue.  However, with regard to Stalin’s persistent demands for 
the recognition of Soviet territorial gains that had resulted from the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 
it was clear that such demands could not be met. The British Government had insisted 
that territorial frontier questions would have to be settled in accordance with the 
wishes of the indigenous people and on general ethnographical lines.  In addition, 
those people must be free to choose their own form of government and system of life, 
something that was undoubtedly stipulated in order to avoid the possible spread of 
Communism in those states.
724
  It was generally agreed that it was most important that 
the Soviet advance should be met with ‘an immediate and generous response’.725   
The conclusions drawn by the War Cabinet formed the basis of Churchill’s 
message to Stalin, and were communicated to Cripps on 10 July.  It was decided that 
the terms of the proposed Anglo-Soviet declaration should fall under two headings.  
The first term related to the delivery of mutual help without any precision as to 
quantity or quality, and the second stipulated that neither country would conclude a 
separate peace.
726
  Whilst the British authorities had agreed to Stalin’s terms 
verbatim, Sargent then proceeded to raise an issue that had not yet been discussed.  
He noted that in any agreement with the Soviet Government the British should 
presumably not want to pledge themselves, either explicitly or implicitly, to go to war 
with Finland, Roumania and Hungary, merely because they happened to be 
cooperating with Germany in the attack on the USSR.
727
  It was for that reason that 
the draft declaration enclosed in the communication to Cripps was confined to 
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Germany.
728
  Cadogan was in agreement with his deputy on the issue and refused to 
contemplate declaring war on Finland, Roumania and Hungary.   
Cripps delivered Churchill’s message to Stalin on 10 July.  Stalin insisted 
upon stating the fact that Great Britain and the Soviet Union were supporting one 
another in the war against Hitlerite Germany, as he believed that by specifically 
referencing the German Führer it would ‘split the German people’.  Stalin was clearly 
eager to reach an agreement as soon as possible in order to silence the pro-German 
Communist speakers within the USSR.
729
  It is interesting to note that Cripps did not 
question this statement, in spite of the fact that it was utterly preposterous.  Following 
Germany’s unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union it seems wholly unlikely that there 
would be many pro-German Communists in the USSR, and, had they existed, one 
would imagine that they would not dare proclaim their pro-German stance in public.  
In spite of such a glaring act of manipulation, Eden was determined to conclude an 
agreement with Moscow without delay, and asked Halifax to inform Cordell Hull, the 
American Secretary of State, of Britain’s intention to sign a declaration with the 
USSR.  In an attempt to ease the concerns of the Americans, Eden wanted Halifax to 
assure those in Washington that the British Government did not wish to extend the 
theatre of war and that the proposed agreement related only to a war with Germany.
730
  
On 12 July the Foreign Office informed Cripps that he was authorized to sign 
the agreement as soon as possible, but that he ought categorically to state the British 
position with regard to Poland.  Warner told the ambassador that should the Soviets 
raise the question of the British obligation to the Polish Government, Cripps ought to 
refer to Article 7 of the Anglo-Polish Treaty of 25 August 1939 in which it was 
agreed that they would not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual 
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agreement.  The British position in that respect in regard to the Soviet Union and 
Poland would thus be identical.
731
  Consequently, the Anglo-Soviet ‘Joint 
Declaration’ was signed by Cripps and Molotov at 5.15pm on 12 July 1941 and 
marked the first official Anglo-Soviet agreement of the war.  The agreement was to 
come into force immediately and was not subject to ratification.  Pravda praised the 
Agreement as a ‘document of greatest historical and political significance’732 whilst 
Cripps expressed his delight with the Agreement in a diary entry of 12 July, writing: 
‘I feel at last that I have accomplished something worthwhile’.  The ambassador, who 
believed that a ‘far more hopeful chapter’ in Anglo-Soviet relations had opened, 
emphatically spoke of the significance of the July Agreement.
733
   
Although the ‘July Agreement’ had marked the first step towards Anglo-
Soviet wartime collaboration, in the week following its signature Maisky had told the 
Foreign Secretary that ‘he was apprehensive of a situation in which, though we [the 
British] gave Russia generous assurances of help, we could not find it possible to give 
effect to them’.734  Dew noted that it was of the utmost importance from a 
psychological point of view that the British authorities do all they could to give 
tangible evidence of assistance in order to bolster Soviet resistance.  To that end, he 
had hoped that fighters would be made available in the near future in order to appease 
Soviet protestations of being left to fight the German menace alone.
735
   
Maisky’s complaints mirrored those raised by the British Military Mission in 
Moscow.  At the end of July Cripps transmitted a telegram to the Foreign Office and 
relayed the numerous problems that the Mission faced on a daily basis.  General 
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Mason MacFarlane, the Head of the British Military Mission to Moscow, had 
complained of the continual delays when arranging meetings with the Soviet High 
Command.  In addition, liaison between the air staff was non-existent.  Consequently, 
the only real usefulness in liaison had been in naval affairs.  Cripps proposed to raise 
the matter with Molotov that day, and asked Eden to see Maisky in order to express 
his disappointment at how inaccessible the Soviet High Command was proving to be 
for the British Mission.  Cripps highlighted the fact that no Soviet officer had ever 
visited the British Mission in order to explain the delays, whilst Colonel Firebrace in 
London was ‘more or less at the permanent disposal of the Soviet Mission in any way 
he can’.736  That afternoon Cripps informed his colleagues at the Foreign Office that 
General MacFarlane had had a satisfactory interview with General Panfilov, who was 
appointed commander of the 316
th
 Rifle Division following the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union.  As a result Cripps had asked Eden not to talk with Maisky.
737
   
Unfortunately for the British Mission, MacFarlane’s interview with Panfilov 
did not mark the start of an illustrious and cooperative relationship.  On 5 August, 
Cripps was once again complaining to the Foreign Office about the refusal of the 
Soviets to allow General MacFarlane to visit the front, in spite of the fact that the visit 
had previously been approved in principle.  Cripps’ disillusionment was very much 
shared by MacFarlane.  The British Mission had been in Moscow for five weeks and 
in spite of frequent requests the General had not yet visited the front.
738
   Warner 
replied to Cripps’ most recent complaints the following day.  Warner was wary about 
voicing complaints to Stalin.  Instead, he preferred that the ambassador attempt to 
gently persuade Stalin to reconsider his position regarding Anglo-Soviet cooperation.  
                                                 
736
 NA, FO371/ 29526/ N4070/ 3014/ 38, Cripps to FO, 26 July 1941. 
737
 Ibid., Cripps to FO, 26 July 1941. 
738
 NA, FO371/ 29562/ N4289/ 3014/ 38, Cripps to FO, 5 August 1941.  One can most certainly 
understand why the Russians would refuse MacFarlane’s requests to visit the front line due to the 
heavy losses of the Red Army. 
 238 
Warner noted that such visits should have been among the chief duties of the British 
Mission and the Soviet refusal to cooperate fully made any assistance difficult.
739
  
This difficulty was exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Mission in London showed 
a similar reluctance to cooperate with the British.  Brigadier Stowell complained to 
Dew that the Soviet Mission had asked for visits to naval bases and establishments 
but had not seemed at all interested in army visits at that time.
740
  Dew believed that 
the Soviet refusal to cooperate was because ‘the Russians are quite clever enough to 
see that our attempts to force them to visit Army units are intended to extract from 
them a quid pro quo’.  Until the Soviet authorities in Moscow saw fit to extend 
facilities to the British Mission, and particularly to the Army branch of the Mission, 
Dew feared that little progress would be made.  Promises of collaboration as evinced 
in the Joint Agreement of July remained unfulfilled.
741
  There are two possible 
explanations for the Soviet attitude.  In the first instance it is quite possible that the 
Soviets were merely distrustful of British intentions, a distrust that was magnified as a 
result of the distinct lack of assistance from the British.  The Soviets had often stated 
their belief that Britain was content to allow the Nazi-Soviet war to continue to the 
‘last drop of Russian blood’.742  British inaction was regarded as further evidence of 
this.  Secondly, this fear would have no doubt been compounded once Moscow heard 
of Churchill’s trip to Placentia Bay on 14 August 1941.  It was during that visit that 
the Atlantic Charter was drawn up by Churchill and Roosevelt. 
The key motivation behind the meeting at Newfoundland was for the Prime 
Minister and President to lay down the principles of Great Britain and the United 
States.  The Charter stated that neither country sought any kind of aggrandizement, 
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and that no territorial changes would occur if they did not accord with the ‘freely 
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’.   Churchill and Roosevelt had wished to 
see the sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly 
deprived of their rights.  It is interesting to note that Stalin had not been invited to 
Newfoundland, though it is not at all surprising.
743
  The Winter War between the 
Soviet Union and Finland was very much motivated by a Soviet desire for territorial 
aggrandizement, as was the Soviet action in Poland and Roumania and the absorption 
of the Baltic States in 1940.  Indeed, the Soviets had stated that their absorption of 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia was legal, as the general elections held in the immediate 
aftermath had illustrated the desire of the Baltic peoples for Soviet rule.  Whether the 
peoples of the Baltic States were able to ‘choose the form of government under which 
they will live’ is highly doubtful, due to Soviet tactics of voter intimidation.  Had 
Stalin been invited to Placentia Bay, it is doubtful that he would have readily agreed 
to such terms.  He would have no doubt been in favour of the desire of Britain and 
America to see the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, as stated in the sixth term of the 
Charter, yet the desire to ‘see an established peace that would afford to all nations the 
means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries’ would not have been keenly 
ascribed to by Stalin.
744
   Thus, it is conceivable that Soviet policy at that juncture was 
dictated by an immense mistrust of the British Government.  British aid to the Soviet 
Union had yet to materialize,
745
 whilst the news of the Atlantic Charter may have led 
Stalin to believe that London and Washington were colluding to create an Anglo-
American peace in which Moscow would be largely excluded.   
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Indeed, on the day of the historic Churchill-Roosevelt meeting at Placentia 
Bay, Mason MacFarlane was once again complaining to the Foreign Office that the 
level of cooperation with the Soviet Military Mission remained unsatisfactory, whilst 
the Soviets had informed MacFarlane that he ‘cannot expect improvement as long as 
the British Army are doing nothing on land to help us in our struggle’.746  Both Dew 
and Cripps were in agreement that the only way to dissipate Soviet suspicions was to 
provide active assistance to the USSR.
747
  Cripps wished to make Stalin aware that 
Great Britain was fully alive to how vitally important the steadfast resistance of the 
Soviet Union was to the final defeat of Hitlerism.  Therefore, Cripps stated to his 
colleagues and superiors in London that they ought to be alive to the consequences 
that would undoubtedly arise should Britain fail to act quickly in the planning of the 
future allocation of Anglo-American resources.
748
   
The Anglo-Soviet financial and commercial agreement signed by Mikoyan 
and Cripps on 16 August 1941 was a promising step on the long road towards Anglo-
Soviet cooperation.  The agreement provided for the supply of considerable quantities 
of British goods to the USSR as well as the supply of Soviet goods to the United 
Kingdom.
749
   However, it was clear that for the Soviets a mere financial agreement 
would not be sufficient.  Thus, on 29 August the Cabinet decided to send a British 
delegation to Moscow led by Lord Beaverbrook in order to expand upon the recently 
signed financial agreement.  Beaverbrook appeared to be a fitting appointment, as he 
had suggested to Maisky in the immediate aftermath of the German invasion of the 
USSR that Great Britain and the Soviet Union should combine naval, air and land 
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operations.
750
  Beaverbrook has been described by Steven Merritt Miner as a man 
who ‘loved power for its own sake and courted powerful people, regardless of their 
political convictions’.751  As Minister of Supply he was the obvious choice to head the 
British delegation, and it was hoped that his pro-Soviet sympathies would help ease 
Soviet suspicions of British insincerity.  Averell Harriman, Beaverbrook’s American 
counterpart, was the United States’ Lend-Lease representative in London.  Harriman 
was thought to be the logical successor to Harry Hopkins who had visited Moscow in 
July but had been unable to take part in the Mission in September due to poor 
health.
752
  Hopkins, Roosevelt’s friend and advisor, had flown to Moscow in July in 
order to express the President’s wish to coordinate Anglo-American supplies to the 
USSR.
753
  During his meeting with Stalin, Hopkins had informed his host of his desire 
to see a three-cornered meeting between Great Britain, the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  The proposed meeting was to deal with the strategic interests of the 
three Powers and it was hoped that a greater degree of reciprocity of information 
would be obtained and that a timetable for the delivery of Anglo-American supplies to 
the Soviet Union would be worked out.  Thus, the arrival of the Harriman-
Beaverbrook Mission was to build upon the work of Hopkins and help put relations 
between the three Governments on an even footing.  The timing of the Cabinet 
approval was crucial.  By the beginning of September 1941 the Soviets were 
becoming increasingly disheartened by British inaction, whilst the British were 
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becoming increasingly frustrated over the Soviet refusals to cooperate with the British 
Military Missions and divulge military information.     
On 4 September Maisky met with Eden and Churchill in order to deliver a 
message from Stalin.  During the course of the meeting Maisky ‘emphasised with 
great earnestness the seriousness of the present situation’ following German successes 
on the Eastern Front.  He asked the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister whether, if 
the proposal to establish a second front had been ruled out, fresh efforts could now be 
made to meet Soviet requirements in respect of munitions and supplies as set out by 
Stalin.  As Tuvia Ben-Moshe has noted, it was the German invasion of the USSR that 
had given birth to the Soviet demand for a second front,
754
 and from the Soviet point 
of view the British response was far from satisfactory.  Churchill informed the Soviet 
Ambassador on 4 September that prior to the German invasion the Chiefs of Staff had 
been considering the possibility of an invasion of the French coast or off the coast of 
Norway.  However, plans were dismissed as ‘military opinion was unanimously 
against such a course’ due to the limited resources of Great Britain.755   
That day, Vyshinsky handed Cripps a personal message from Stalin that was 
to be delivered to Churchill.  In the communication, Stalin stated his belief that the 
only remedy for the situation was for the British to establish a second front in the 
Balkans or in France in order to divert some thirty to forty German divisions from the 
Eastern Front.  For Stalin, without such assistance the Soviet Union would either be 
defeated or at least weakened in their fight against Hitlerism.
756
  Cripps agreed fully 
with Stalin’s message and emphatically stated that ‘unless we can now at the last 
moment make a super-human effort we shall lose the whole value of any Russian 
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front … possibly for good’.  The Ambassador had feared that it was ‘almost too late’ 
to save the front, unless Great Britain was prepared to commit fully to the Soviet 
Union.
757
  Churchill outlined such practicalities in his reply to Stalin on 5 September.  
He informed Stalin that there was no possibility of any British action in the West – 
except air action – that would draw the German forces from the East before winter.  
Furthermore, there could be no second front in the Balkans without the help of 
Turkey, but Churchill did concede to previous Soviet demands relating to Finland.  
Churchill told Stalin that Britain was willing to put pressure on the Finns, including 
immediate notification that Britain would declare war upon them should they continue 
beyond the old frontiers, and that he had asked Roosevelt to take all possible steps to 
influence Finland in that regard.
758
 
Churchill’s point-blank refusal to open a second front in the Balkans was 
criticised by Cripps in a communication to the Foreign Secretary on 15 September.  
The Prime Minister’s statement that it would be impossible to give any actual military 
help on any other front at that time had only served to increase Stalin’s distrust of 
Great Britain.  The British position, combined with the ambassador’s isolation in 
Moscow, had made Cripps’ job of promoting greater Anglo-Soviet cooperation 
difficult.  Alongside his complaints about Churchill’s most recent message to Stalin, 
Cripps informed Eden of the varying obstacles that he faced.  He and his staff were 
‘almost entirely confined to the embassy’ which made it impossible to have any 
contact with the Soviets.  Any reliable information as to what was going on in the 
country was thus difficult to obtain.  Consequently, Cripps complained that he was 
‘living in a vacuum’ so far as information was concerned.   Cripps’ successor, 
Archibald Clark Kerr, made similar complaints.  In April 1942 Clark Kerr spoke of 
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the ‘isolation’ that was imposed upon him by the Soviets.759  A lack of interaction 
with their hosts had made the jobs of both Cripps and Clark Kerr difficult.  The only 
positive and arguably insignificant point that could be gleaned from the situation, 
according to Cripps, was that the Soviets had been kind in social settings.  However, 
although his personal relationships with the Soviets had been fair, ‘the hopes of close 
collaboration which were entertained at the beginning have not been realised’.  In 
order for him to bring about a strengthening of Anglo-Soviet ties, Cripps believed that 
London ought to abandon the idea of bargaining with the Soviets.
760
  Sargent 
disagreed with the ambassador.  Bargaining for information, he noted, even amongst 
co-belligerents, was a necessary tactic.
761
  Parallels can most certainly be drawn 
between the advice tendered by Cripps over the opening of a second front in 1941 and 
the matter of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in 1940.  What Cripps failed to 
grasp, however, was that to grant concessions in order to gain Soviet friendship would 
amount to little more than appeasement.   
In his message to Churchill on 16 September Stalin informed the Prime 
Minister of his belief that the absence of a second front ‘favours the designs of our 
common enemy’, and stated his belief that Great Britain should be able to land 
twenty-five to thirty divisions at Archangel ‘without any risk’ in order to relieve the 
strain on the Eastern front.
762
  This extraordinary request was ignored by Churchill in 
his reply which merely stated that he had hoped that the forthcoming arrival of the 
Harriman-Beaverbrook mission in Moscow would help alleviate Soviet suspicions 
and cultivate better relations between London and Moscow.  The mission was to work 
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out with Stalin a definite programme of monthly delivery of resources.
763
   This 
avoidance of Stalin’s request served to exacerbate the difficulties faced by Cripps and 
the British Military Mission in Moscow.   
Four days later the Soviet General Staff were complaining that the British 
were not doing enough to help the Soviets, an accusation examined by Dew.  He 
believed that the Prime Minister’s avoidance of Stalin’s request would halt any 
progress in collaboration.  In order to improve Britain’s relations with the USSR it 
would be wise to send a large force to the Caucasus, as one or two divisions would 
not be sufficient.  For Dew, the repeated references by Stalin and Maisky to the need 
for assistance by Britain on land in order to relieve the strain on the Soviet forces may 
have reflected the serious danger in which the Soviet Union was now placed, or it 
could have been indicative of a more sinister problem.  He mused that Soviet 
complaints may have been raised merely in order to prepare the ground prior to 
putting the blame on London should things deteriorate on the Eastern Front, or, more 
crucially, if Stalin was contemplating seeking a separate peace with Germany.
764
  
Thus, two months following the Joint Declaration, Anglo-Soviet relations were far 
from satisfactory, with members of the Foreign Office fearing that the Kremlin would 
renege on the agreement due to continued German successes in the USSR.  As Dew 
noted, the recent German successes would induce Hitler to press forward 
energetically with the Soviet campaign; the next few weeks would thus be a crucial 
point in the war.
765
  The possibility of either a Soviet collapse or a Nazi-Soviet peace 
at that juncture would have had catastrophic consequences for Great Britain.   
The need for a British gesture of solidarity was more crucial than ever, a point 
not missed by Cripps in Moscow or Coote in London.   Coote had hoped that the 
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efforts of MacFarlane and Cripps of disproving Stalin’s allegations would prove 
successful and that a measure of Anglo-Soviet cooperation would be possible.
766
  For 
Cripps, the problems facing the British Military Mission and thus the possibility of 
fruitful Anglo-Soviet cooperation were political in origin, due to an inherent Soviet 
distrust of British intentions.  It was Cripps’ belief that Molotov was acting as the 
main channel of supply through which all political information reached Stalin, and the 
Commissar’s long-standing anti-British attitude was beginning to have the desired 
effect on Stalin.
767
   
At the end of September the Harriman-Beaverbrook Mission arrived in 
Moscow to outline a comprehensive long-term aid programme.  With the conclusion 
of the ‘First Soviet Supply Protocol’ between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, in 
which ‘uniquely generous’ and unilateral British aid to the Soviet Union was 
established, economic relations between the two Powers were strengthened.  Dew, 
Warner and Cripps hoped that Anglo-American promises of economic aid would 
reduce the mistrust emanating from the Kremlin.  Thus, the spirit of collaboration that 
was evident during the Harriman-Beaverbrook conversations could help to 
consolidate and strengthen Anglo-Soviet cooperation in both the economic and 
political realm.  Whilst the details of the Mission will not be explored here, as a 
wealth of excellent works have comprehensibly examined the topic,
768
 it is important 
to note that Sir Stafford Cripps had not been invited to attend the conference, a fact 
that had severely disgruntled the ambassador. 
Despite the cordial nature of the Beaverbrook-Harriman conversations in 
Moscow, the onset of German successes on the Eastern Front in the aftermath of the 
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Anglo-American-Soviet talks ensured that any optimism was short lived.  On 26 
September Mallett informed the Foreign Office that, according to a telegram received 
from the Swedish Ambassador in Berlin, ‘a wave of optimism’ had ‘spread both in 
German official circles and amongst the German people as a result of the fall of Kiev 
and of recent military operations in the direction of the Crimea’.  Consequently, he 
warned that should the Red Army experience further material losses on the Eastern 
Front there could be a Soviet collapse before winter.
769
  Cavendish-Bentinck believed 
that Soviet resistance would be more resolute in the face of German pressure.  
Furthermore, as a consequence of the Anglo-Soviet action in Iran,
770
 the Soviets were 
able to receive supplies at all times of the year via Iran as well as over the Trans-
Siberian Railway.  Consequently, the Wehrmacht would have to maintain several 
million men in the East should Hitler decide to try and stabilise the front there.
771
  
Cavendish-Bentinck’s optimism as to the viability of Soviet resistance was, however, 
not shared by members of the Northern Department.  The recent German successes 
would inevitably induce the Germans to press energetically forward.  As Dew 
reiterated, the coming weeks would be crucial.
772
   
Rather than improving the relations between the co-belligerents, the 
Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission widened the rift between the three Powers.  Promises 
of aid had failed to materialize, leading the Soviets to once again raise the issue of a 
second front.  In a minute on 18 October, Dew illustrated the fundamental problem 
facing the British Government with regard to this issue.  He noted that, although 
Stalin had on several occasions accepted the explanation proffered to him about the 
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ability of the British military to create a second front, it was clear that this was not 
accepted by Molotov.
773
  Both he and Maisky continued to complain about British 
inaction in the East, with the Soviet Ambassador urging Eden to take action in the 
majority of their interviews.  In Maisky’s meeting with the Foreign Secretary on 18 
October he had proclaimed that a ‘token force’ would be insufficient.  For Dew, there 
was no doubt that should Britain send a force to the Caucasus it would go a long way 
to both inspire Soviet confidence and help to dispel Soviet suspicion of Britain.  Dew 
agreed with Cripps’ previous statements that to increase British support to the Soviets 
would also greatly aid the all-important goal of denying Caucasian oil to the 
Germans.
774
  Thus, there was a belief shared by the ambassador in Moscow and Dew 
in London that British action was essential, and that time was of the essence.   
As October progressed, Cripps’ pleas were becoming increasingly emphatic.  
Following a meeting with Molotov on 22 October, in which the Commissar had 
shown quite clearly that he was against any British troops coming into the USSR 
‘unless they were going to proceed direct to some active front’, Cripps re-registered 
the Molotov’s displeasure with the British position.775  Three days later, Cripps was 
once again pleading with Eden.  Relations between Great Britain and the USSR were 
‘getting worse and not better’, and, should Britain fail to relieve pressure on the 
Soviets by action elsewhere, ‘the only way in which we can improve matters is to 
send some troops to this country’.776  Cripps feared that the Soviet obsession about 
British inactivity would result in a crack in Soviet morale during the winter months 
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thus creating further obstacles to fruitful Anglo-Soviet cooperation.  Such fears 
continued to be expressed by Cripps throughout this period.
777
   
Unfortunately for Cripps, Churchill did not share his sympathy with the plight 
of the USSR.  He told the ambassador that the Soviets had brought their fate upon 
themselves.  The Nazi-Soviet Pact had let Hitler loose on Poland and had thereby 
started the conflict in which both Britain and the Soviet Union were now embroiled.  
As for Soviet complaints about the lack of a second front, Churchill quite rightly 
believed that the Soviets had cut themselves off from an effective front when they 
allowed the French Army to be destroyed.  Indeed, Churchill declared, ‘if they [the 
Soviets] harbour suspicions of us it is only because of the guilt and self-reproach in 
their own hearts’.778 
Christopher Warner entered the debate at the beginning of November.  Warner 
had not yet vocalised his opinions on the issue of Anglo-American aid to the USSR 
and the need for a second front.  The continued complaints of the British Military 
Mission in Moscow forced his interjection.  Unlike Collier, who regularly expressed 
his opinions on each and every issue relating to Anglo-Soviet relations, Warner would 
only intervene in discussions should he deem it useful and necessary.  In response to 
Mason-MacFarlane’s communication to the War Office in which he spoke of the need 
to adopt a ‘very firm line’ with the Soviets, Warner expressed his opposition to such 
an approach.
779
  Although he sympathised with Mason-MacFarlane and recommended 
that the matter be raised with Maisky by either himself or Eden, Warner noted that he 
was ‘always a little nervous when the General starts talking about “taking a very firm 
line”’.  MacFarlane was too quick to think in terms of threats.  Rather than threatening 
the Soviets, Warner instead suggested that MacFarlane should state that it would be 
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mutually beneficial for the British Mission to know where the British tanks and 
instructional personnel were to be situated in order for them to be used to the best 
advantage.  For Warner, ‘the case ought to be put reasonably to the Russians’ as ‘the 
General and Ambassador won’t take them by storm’.780 
It was at this time that Cripps received a telegram from the Foreign Office 
divulging the nature of the Beaverbrook-Harriman conversations.  On 5 November an 
outraged Cripps registered his disbelief that ‘these most important conversations 
should now be reported to me for the first time and that apparently little notice has 
been taken of them by anyone at all’.781  One can sympathise with Cripps over his 
treatment in this matter.  Although issues of supply were at the heart of the 
conversations in September, Cripps was not unjustified in stating that his absence had 
placed him ‘in an entirely false position as regards Molotov’ as the Commissar could 
easily have concluded that Cripps possessed very little authority to discuss vital 
matters that had affected Anglo-Soviet relations.  Cripps complained that he had since 
discussed many of the issues raised in the Beaverbrook-Harriman conversations with 
the Soviet Commissar, and presumed that as a result the Soviets would think him 
‘most disingenuous for not disclosing any knowledge of them’.  More pointedly, he 
feared that he would be viewed as ‘so little trusted by His Majesty’s Government’ that 
he was ‘not given any information about them’.  Cripps’ complaint encapsulated both 
his outrage over his absence during the discussions and the fact that British inaction 
had continued once the talks had concluded.  Beaverbrook had expressed his belief 
that an Anglo-Soviet treaty would be advantageous, yet the matter had not been taken 
up by London.  It was conceivable that, as a result, Stalin would conclude that the 
British Government was not truly desirous of reaching an agreement with the Soviets.   
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Cripps’ frustration is most certainly understandable.  However, his statement that ‘in 
these circumstances I can see no use in my remaining here to act as an occasional 
post-box’, was somewhat childish and petulant.782   
In his response to Cripps, Eden sought to appease the disheartened 
ambassador.  Eden regretted that he had felt that he was in a ‘false position’ with 
Molotov, but drew the ambassador’s attention to the fact that the communication of 5 
November had ‘extracted every item of diplomatic consequence out of a conversation 
of fifteen hours on supply’.  Furthermore, Beaverbrook had assured Eden that Stalin 
had not attached undue importance to the exchanges as there were ‘no serious 
diplomatic talks at all’.783  Indeed, had the Soviets attached any importance to 
Beaverbrook’s suggestion of an Anglo-Soviet treaty, Stalin would have raised the 
matter at every available opportunity.  Warner was in agreement with Eden and 
disagreed with Cripps’ complaint that Beaverbrook’s conversations with Stalin were 
‘essential to the picture’ and that the ambassador should have been present at the 
meetings.
784
 
The Harriman-Beaverbrook conversations in Moscow clearly illustrated that 
the issues of Anglo-American supply to the USSR and the creation of a second front 
in Europe were of paramount importance in the period following the German invasion 
of the Soviet Union.  As was evident throughout the whole of this period, discussions 
that centred around economic cooperation had wide-ranging political implications.  
Stalin’s speech on 6 November illustrated his frustration over the British refusal to 
open a second front that would force Hitler to fight a war on two fronts.  However, in 
an attempt to inject a sense of optimism, Stalin spoke of the fact that Great Britain, 
the USSR and the United States were ‘united in a single camp which has for its object 
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the disruption of [the] Hitlerite imperialists and their usurping armies’.785  In spite of 
Stalin’s cutting remarks over the second front issue, Dew praised this ‘excellent 
speech’ that had frankly expressed the difficulties with which the Soviet Union was 
contending; yet it was ‘at the same time full of confidence’. Dew agreed with Stalin’s 
statement that a second front in Europe must be realized in the near future as it would 
ease the position of the Red Army, and would thus be damaging for Germany.
 786
   
On 12 November Eden met with Maisky and told the ambassador that the 
Cabinet was considering Stalin’s most recent message to Churchill.787  Whilst Eden 
could neither comment nor reply to the message, he remarked that ‘the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet were surprised and pained at the tone and contents of the message’.788  
Maisky’s reply was predictable.  Noting the reasons for the suspicions that had arisen 
during recent years between Moscow and London, Maisky continued to state that 
Stalin’s requests were not unreasonable.  Stalin had been far from satisfied to discover 
that the British Generals in Moscow could not discuss post-war policies.  The Soviet 
Ambassador thus suggested a further visit of personnel who would be authorized to 
discuss such matters.  The meeting concluded with Maisky informing Eden that 
should Britain fail to open a second front, ‘Soviet suspicions of Britain allowing 
Germany a free hand in the East would be elevated’.  Hence, ‘the presence of British 
soldiers in Russia was of such great political importance quite apart from their 
military value’.789  Dew was sympathetic to the Soviet point of view.  It seemed 
obvious that while they were fighting the same enemy the British and Soviet 
Governments ought to reach an understanding on both war and peace aims, as well as 
an agreement on mutual military assistance against Hitlerite aggression in Europe.  As 
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for Maisky’s statement that His Majesty’s Government had not definitely answered 
the Soviet request that Britain should send troops to the USSR, Dew noted that Great 
Britain simply did not have the forces, and especially not the thirty divisions that 
Stalin had requested.  However, the fact that no reply had been sent to Stalin would 
only serve to increase his suspicions, a point which Warner seconded.
790
   
It was at this juncture that the Warner penned a memorandum that explored 
the state of Anglo-Soviet relations and concluded with a series of recommendations 
on how best to proceed.  Notwithstanding the critical nature of Stalin’s speech of 6 
November, it was Stalin’s communication to the Prime Minister that had sparked 
Warner’s paper.  As Hanak has noted, ‘the decision to send Eden to Moscow was the 
direct consequence of Stalin’s outburst’.791  Upon Sargent’s instruction, Warner 
composed a lengthy memorandum examining not simply what Stalin had 
communicated to Churchill, but the implications of his accusations.   This particular 
message to the Prime Minister from Stalin has been identified by numerous historians 
as the catalyst that prompted Eden’s visit to Moscow in December 1941, and whilst 
the trip to the Soviet Union was his first as Foreign Secretary, it was his second visit 
as an official of His Majesty’s Government.  On 27 March 1935, Eden became the 
first British minister to visit the Soviet Union since the revolution.  In an account 
upon his return to London, Eden noted that the discussions had been a positive step 
towards improved Anglo-Soviet relations.
792
  What historians have thus far neglected 
to illuminate, however, is the highly important role of the Northern Department in the 
preparations of the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Moscow.  That much was evident from 
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the Deputy Under-Secretary’s request that Warner himself should deal with the issues 
raised from Stalin’s message.   
Firstly, in relation to the sharp tone adopted by Stalin, Warner mused that, 
although it was difficult to account for, it may have been a tactic used by Stalin, or it 
may have merely been a consequence of the ‘strain of the immense burden Stalin bore 
while the fate of Moscow hung in the balance’.793  Warner advised that certain 
paragraphs in the message ought not to be assumed to be provocative, as it was 
possible that the tone in which it was transmitted was the result of imperfect 
translation.  As for the contents of the message itself, Warner noted that Stalin was 
clearly still intensely suspicious of the sincerity of the British desire to cooperate to 
the full and, indeed, that he ‘suspects that we want the Soviet Union to be crippled in 
crippling the Germans and to be of no account in the peace settlement’.  With regard 
to Stalin’s speech of 6 November, Warner was less flattering than Dew.  For his part, 
Warner surmised that Stalin had not only cited the lack of a second front as ‘one of 
the major reasons for the Russian setbacks’ but he also ‘appeared to hold out to his 
people the hope that a second front in Europe would materialise shortly’.794  It was 
clear to Warner that Stalin had not appreciated the severe limitations on the amount of 
direct military help that Great Britain could give him, ‘thus he suspects that we are 
evading him out of a lack of goodwill’. 
After dealing with the contents of the message, Warner proceeded to identify 
possible lines of reply.  In the first instance, the British had to decide whether or not 
to make an effort to conciliate Stalin.  A key point to consider was the fact that if 
London wished to satisfy the Soviets, His Majesty’s Government would ‘find this 
impossible and we may be forced from one gesture of conciliation to another’.  
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Warner held no illusions as to the difficulties facing the British attempts to bring 
about a rapprochement, as the Soviets were in the habit of hoarding up every 
complaint against London.   Those complaints could then be used to convince the 
Soviet people and world opinion generally of the weaknesses and failures of the 
British Government.  However, the possibility of Stalin seeking a separate peace with 
Germany did not worry Warner, due in large part to the many German successes on 
the Eastern Front.  What did trouble him were the consequences attached to sending a 
negative reply to Stalin.  Soviet morale would suffer further and this could very well 
result in capitulation to Germany, thus allowing the Germans to turn their attentions 
to Great Britain once again.  It appeared necessary, therefore, for the British reply to 
allay the suspicions of the Soviets, even if they could not meet their wishes.   
Warner predicted that the issue of post-war aims would prove to be the biggest 
stumbling block to closer Anglo-Soviet cooperation as Soviet ideas in the post-war 
era would inevitably run counter to those held by both London and Washington.  
Finland and the Baltic States in particular appeared to be key obstacles to fruitful 
collaboration.  In order to avoid a clash with the Soviets in the post-war era, the 
British authorities would have to illustrate that they were ‘anxious to reach a close 
understanding with the Soviet Government with regard to war and peace aims’, a task 
that was rendered much more difficult due to the fact that ‘we ourselves have not 
found it possible to define our war and peace aims in any detail’.795  British aims 
during the war were confined to the defeat of Hitler and his satellites as soon as 
possible in combination with all those who would join in the struggle.  The position of 
Britain and America were not definite beyond the Atlantic Charter, yet Maisky’s 
declaration endorsing the Charter at the Inter-Allied Conference was encouraging.  
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Stalin’s fundamental aim was the liberation of Soviet territories and people ‘from the 
German Fascist yoke’.  As such, the Soviet Government would assist any country in 
its ‘struggle for liberation against Hitlerite tyranny’ whilst later ‘permitting them 
freely to settle their own destiny in their own land’.  The Soviet endorsement of the 
fundamental principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter was a positive step in the 
Anglo-Soviet relationship, yet Warner counselled that it would be idle at that time to 
think in terms of a political post-war settlement as no one knew how and in what 
conditions Hitlerism would be defeated.
796
   
Evidently Warner believed that, although His Majesty’s Government could 
not yet discuss political post-war issues with the Soviets, a gesture was necessary to 
illustrate the British desire for cooperation.  It was due to his wish to allay Soviet 
suspicions that Warner suggested that a ‘suitable representative’, such as the 
Secretary of State, should discuss these matters with Stalin in person, alongside a 
highly qualified representative of President Roosevelt.
797
  Should Eden journey to the 
USSR, Warner believed that he ought to stipulate that the talks should be held in 
Moscow and that they should involve discussions with Stalin himself, as had been the 
case with Beaverbrook and Harriman.  
Warner then dealt with the accusations contained in Stalin’s message to 
Churchill.  He was clearly of the opinion that Stalin should be told unequivocally that 
Great Britain would give the Soviet Union large-scale military assistance if it were at 
all possible.  The British refusal to send thirty divisions to the Eastern Front was not 
due to a desire to see the USSR and Germany mutually exhausted.  It simply was not 
possible.  Responding to the criticism over British hesitancy to disclose detailed 
information about its armed forces, Warner stated that should the British divulge in-
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depth information about their military forces and capabilities to the Soviets and the 
Eastern Front then fall, British military secrets could fall into the hands of the 
Germans.  In order to assuage Stalin of his suspicions, Warner believed that if Eden 
could provide him with sufficient information and convince him of its accuracy, 
Stalin would ‘see the problem of its true proportions’ and would ‘draw the logical 
conclusions’.  Warner believed that Stalin was a ‘realist’ who was capable of reason.  
In order to achieve fruitful cooperation with the Soviet’s it was essential that such a 
reasonable approach be adopted.  In this sense Warner seemed to be the ideal man to 
aid the improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations.  Warner believed that ideological 
prejudices, whether justified or not, had to be put to one side in order to defeat the 
German menace.  Should his advice be adopted, Warner considered it advisable to 
renew the offer to send Generals Wavell and Paget to Moscow in order to discuss 
specific military information with Stalin. 
Warner suggested that if Stalin was told of the limited resources of Great 
Britain he would not expect the impossible.  Warner believed that it would remove 
suspicion and induce Stalin to receive the Generals, even in the midst of his present 
overwhelming preoccupations.  Although Warner was prepared to disclose military 
information in order to convince Stalin of British sincerity, he was firmly against 
combining military and political discussions as the issue of war and peace aims could 
not be resolved while the military and political situation was so fluid.
798
  Furthermore, 
Warner was anxious not to lose the opportunity to appease Stalin over the issue of 
declaring war on Finland, Roumania and Hungary as the declaration of war on the 
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three states would have rather insignificant consequences for Britain whilst gaining 
the crucial advantage of easing Stalin’s distrust.799   
In spite of the fact that Warner’s memorandum advised a large measure of 
accommodation of Stalin’s requests, Cripps expressed his dismay to the Foreign 
Office the following day.
800
  He deplored the decision not to discuss the post-war 
organization of peace and did not accept the argument put forward by Warner that it 
would be unwise to do so when British peace aims had not yet been formulated.  
Cripps was doubtful that any negotiations would be successful due to the 
Government’s refusal to discuss details of peace objectives outside of those expressed 
in the Atlantic Charter.  Consequently, the ambassador told the Foreign Office that he 
found it ‘difficult to know how I am to prepare the ground in a hard frost without any 
implements’.801  Adopting a good deal of hyperbole, Cripps informed his colleagues 
in London that he had gone to Moscow ‘to do a special job and not as a professional 
diplomatist’ and that once his job was done he would return to London.  As he was 
not able to discuss peace aims with the Soviets, Cripps believed that he could no 
longer be of any use.  Once again he asked to be removed from his post.
802
   Two days 
later, Cripps attempted to qualify his position in response to Warner’s memorandum, 
urging the Foreign Office to act promptly as ‘temporisation and delay will not in my 
view improve matters nor will soft words of praise’.803   
Cripps’ inability to sympathise with the difficult position in which his 
government was placed undoubtedly frustrated his colleagues and superiors, yet his 
request to return to London was rejected.  Churchill, who composed a patient reply to 
Cripps, informed him that it would be a mistake to leave his post and abandon the 
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Soviets, not least as his friends in Great Britain would not understand it.
804
  Eden, for 
his part, reinforced the conclusions drawn in Warner’s memorandum.  He did not 
intend to convey that all fruitful discussion with the Soviet Government on peace 
objectives and Anglo-Soviet post-war collaboration would be excluded at that time.  
Collaboration with the Soviets in such matters would be attempted.  However, as 
Warner argued, it would be difficult for the British Government precisely to define 
the lines of such collaboration.  The manoeuvrability of His Majesty’s Government 
was limited due to its adherence of the Atlantic Charter.  To go beyond the terms of 
the Charter would inevitably result in the introduction of the Americans into the 
discussions.  Washington had repeatedly asked London not to undertake during the 
war commitments that would bind them once the war was over.  Thus, the hands of 
the British Government were tied.
805
  
Upon Warner’s suggestion, then, it was decided that Anthony Eden should 
visit Moscow for a second time in order to convince Stalin of the British desire to 
collaborate with the Soviets.  On 19 November Cripps wrote to Eden to advise him as 
to how best to deal with the Soviet leaders, and with Stalin in particular.  Mere 
expressions of goodwill and cordiality meant very little to Stalin, and, as the 
Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission had illustrated, the Soviet leader was capable of 
‘playing up and reciprocating’ utterances of goodwill when there was ‘a basis of solid 
fact and solid advantage’.  In order to dispel Stalin’s fears that Britain had intended to 
‘leave Germany with enough strength to serve as a barrier against the Soviet Union in 
time of peace’, a gesture of goodwill was crucial.  Consequently, His Majesty’s 
Government had to formulate concrete plans on post-war reconstruction and the 
safeguarding of Soviet frontiers in the Baltic.  If they failed to do so, ‘the only 
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outcome of the discussions will be an increased distrust of our ultimate motives’.806  
Evidently, Warner’s memorandum and the subsequent statements by Eden that 
London had not formulated concrete plans with regard to the post-war organization of 
peace continued to fall on deaf ears, with the ambassador towing the Soviet party line 
rather than that of his own government. 
The significance of the Northern Department in the weeks prior to Eden’s visit 
to Moscow was again evident at the end of November when Dew composed a 
memorandum exploring Stalin’s complaint in his message to Churchill on 8 
November.  Stalin had declared that a ‘lack of clarity’ existed and that this was an 
obstacle to improved relations between the USSR and Great Britain.  The purpose of 
Dew’s paper was to discuss what progress could be made with regard to Stalin’s 
particular grievance that there was no definite understanding on war aims and the 
post-war organization of peace.  His paper embodied the results of a meeting that had 
been held in Cadogan’s room on 18 November at which Law, Sargent, Strang, Harvey 
and Ronald were present.  It was generally agreed that Stalin suspected that the 
British wished to see the Soviet Union so weakened in the struggle with Germany that 
they would be excluded from the peace discussions.
807
  Evidently, it was essential to 
make every effort to dispel both British and Soviet suspicions of one another’s 
intentions if a rapprochement were to be reached.  Yet it was not merely the mutual 
distrust that would make any such understanding impossible.  The Foreign Office was 
unsure as to what Stalin had in mind with regard to his war aims and the post-war 
settlement as the Soviet authorities had been ‘extremely reticent in defining their 
ideas’ on these issues.  What was certain, in Dew’s opinion, was that Stalin would 
seek a treaty, as he had mentioned that desire in his conversation with Beaverbrook in 
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September.
808
  Thus, whilst the authorities in London were aware of some of the 
basics of what the Soviets envisioned, and were alive to the fact Soviet Government 
had stated its adherence to the fundamental principles of the Atlantic Charter during 
the Inter-Allied Conference at St. James’s Palace in September, the specific Soviet 
aims were far from clear. Ambiguities such as these had made the preparation for 
Eden’s impending trip problematic.  According to Dew, the fact that His Majesty’s 
Government had not made up its mind as to the questions of an economic and 
political settlement would leave Eden at a ‘serious disadvantage’.  The desire of both 
Dew in London and Cripps in Moscow for Britain clearly to define its aims put them 
at odds with their colleagues and superiors in the Foreign Office.  The conclusions 
drawn at the meeting on 18 November were no doubt unsatisfactory for Dew and 
Cripps.  It was decided that Eden ought to confine any agreement with the Soviet 
Union to a declaration reaffirming the intention of Great Britain and the USSR to 
continue the war until the defeat of Germany.  Both countries would declare a 
willingness to cooperate in making the peace settlement and cooperation thereafter in 
maintaining that settlement, and it was essential for Eden to convince Stalin of 
Britain’s desire to treat the USSR on the basis of equality in such matters.809    
An interview between Eden and Maisky on 1 December resulted in a 
clarification of the Soviet position.  Stalin wanted the agreement to be in two parts.  
The first would cover the period of the war in which neither Power would sign a 
separate peace and would offer one another military assistance for the duration of the 
fighting.  The second related to the post-war period, including the organization of 
peace.
810
  Unsurprisingly, Dew praised the Soviet Government’s clarification of its 
position and stated that Stalin was taking a very reasonable line, not least as and the 
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points covered were not at odds with the terms envisaged by the British 
Government.
811
    
In order to convince the Soviets of its solidarity and support on 6 December 
1941 Great Britain declared war on Finland, Roumania and Hungary.  By doing so, 
and in spite of previous hesitancy by Churchill, the British succeeded in removing an 
oft-raised Soviet grievance.  In a message to Stalin in November, Churchill had 
expressed his doubts as to whether it was good business for Great Britain to declare 
war on the three states.  No doubt Stalin’s message to the Prime Minister of 8 
November served not only to illustrate the need for Britain to send a high-ranking 
official to Moscow in order to discuss both military and political issues but also the 
pressing need to make a gesture of good faith.  The timing of the British declaration 
of war on Finland, Roumania and Hungary coincided within twenty-four hours on the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.  Upon hearing the news, Churchill decided to visit 
Washington immediately, a decision that most certainly threatened to impact upon 
Eden’s forthcoming trip to Moscow.  As Oliver Harvey recalled in his diary, Eden 
feared that Churchill would ‘take all the limelight off the Moscow visit’.812   
In spite of the chaotic atmosphere that preceded Eden’s visit, and the fact that 
Eden could offer nothing more than ‘promises for the future’,813 Foreign Office 
officials were very much convinced of the importance of a successful outcome in 
Moscow.  Sargent recognized the problematic situation that had arisen as a result of 
the Japanese attack, and feared that recent events had rendered obsolete the papers on 
the general strategy of the war that Eden was to take with him.  In spite of such 
difficulties, Sargent believed that Eden needed to emphasise the British resolve to 
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provide the Soviets with all the political and military assistance possible in their fight 
against Germany.
814
   
Eden arrived in Moscow on 16 December.  In his meetings with Stalin, at 
which Molotov and Maisky were also present, the Foreign Secretary was joined by 
Alexander Cadogan, Oliver Harvey and Sir Stafford Cripps.  Although Eden was 
inclined to exclude Cripps from the conversations, as Beaverbrook had done in 
September, Cadogan intervened and persuaded him that a repeat of September would 
be unfortunate.
815
  The first meeting took place on 17 December and lasted for 
approximately four hours.  It was Eden’s intention to achieve a ‘full survey of the 
political situation’ and he was pleasantly surprised to discover that the two draft 
treaties composed by the Soviets did not differ greatly from the papers composed by 
Cadogan and Cripps the previous day.
816
  Until Stalin suggested a secret protocol that 
would embody the joint views of London and Moscow for a settlement of post-war 
frontiers, Eden had not foreseen ‘any insuperable difficulty’ in coming to an agreed 
text with the Soviet leader.  Eden admitted to Stalin that although he agreed with 
much of the latter’s proposal, he could not enter into a secret agreement.817  Not only 
would Eden’s acceptance of a secret protocol put him at odds with the government of 
the United States, but Britain’s own discussion of a peace settlement had not 
advanced to a point whereby definite aims had been identified.  Thus, the Foreign 
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Secretary informed Stalin that he would have to consult his colleagues on the 
proposal.  Stalin was satisfied with this reply.  He expressed his desire to obtain 
American support, yet made it clear that he deemed Anglo-Soviet agreement on 
‘essential war aims’ to be of paramount importance.  Without an agreement on war 
aims, Stalin declared, ‘there was no true alliance’.818  Eden concluded that his first 
meeting with Stalin had been most cordial and informed his colleagues in the Foreign 
Office that ‘[the] treaties in their final form will not be more formidable than 
proposed [the] declarations’.  Nevertheless, he warned that the ‘Russians attach 
importance to [the] term “treaty”’.  In order to ease any worries from Cabinet 
colleagues, Eden stated that one ought not to have any anxiety about the contents of 
the proposals contained in Stalin’s draft as they would ‘generally accord with [the] 
memorandum which the Cabinet have already approved’.819  His concluding sentence 
clearly illustrated his desire to come to an understanding with the Soviets, primarily 
due to his sincere desire to improve Anglo-Soviet relations.  It was moreover highly 
likely that Eden did not want his visit to be overshadowed by Churchill’s trip to 
Washington: ‘It is clearly essential that my visit here should be marked by some 
agreement which will convince the Russians of the sincerity of our collaboration both 
now and in the future’.820 
The question of a second front was predictably raised by Stalin in his 
conversations with the British Foreign Secretary.  When Eden pointed out that Britain 
had opened a second front through her operations in North Africa, Stalin stated that he 
had ‘fully agreed with our [British] military policy’ yet he also asked whether Great 
Britain would now be able to open up a second front in Europe by a landing in the 
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Balkans.
821
  In an attempt to appease Stalin, Eden stated that a landing on the 
continent in the immediate future was not possible but that one of the objectives of the 
British campaign in Libya was to secure a base from which attacks could be made on 
Italy.  Whilst Eden’s reply was unsatisfactory, Stalin merely expressed his opinion 
that the morale of the German army in the USSR was low after suffering heavy 
casualties.  Furthermore, the onset of winter would place the Germans at a distinct 
disadvantage as they would not be equipped to face such severe climatic 
conditions.
822
   
During the final meeting on 20 December Stalin told Eden that despite their 
failure to sign a treaty during the visit it should not be regarded in ‘too tragic a 
light’.823  In spite of Stalin’s display of goodwill, Eden was very eager to meet 
Stalin’s request for British military support and informed the Foreign Office on 22 
December that there was a ‘strong political reason why we should put through this 
joint operation if we possibly can’.  Central to his reasoning was a belief that it would 
be a visible sign of Anglo-Soviet solidarity and would have a ‘far-reaching 
psychological effect’ on the Soviets and thus improve Anglo-Soviet relations.824 
On 1 January 1942, Cripps informed his colleagues in London of the positive 
response to Eden’s visit in the Soviet press.825  In a radio broadcast three days later 
Eden expressed his belief that ‘there was no real conflict of interest between the 
Soviet Union and this country’.826  Both the British and Soviet Government used 
flattery and words of praise in lieu of any definitive expression of solidarity.  On 4 
January the Foreign Secretary asked Warner to compose a memorandum for Winant 
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in order to relay the details of Eden’s conversations in Moscow and to illustrate his 
genuine desire to reach an understanding with the Soviets.  In order for the British 
Cabinet to agree to Stalin’s demands it was essential to gain the support – or at least 
the reluctant approval of Washington.  
 In the subsequent memorandum Warner dealt exclusively with Stalin’s 
request for immediate British recognition of the Soviet claims to the 1941 frontiers 
with Finland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.  It was believed 
that the Soviet Government regarded the question as a ‘test of our real intention to 
cooperate as allies’, and, should His Majesty’s Government find it impossible to meet 
Stalin in that regard, Warner noted that intimate consultation and collaboration with 
the Soviets would subsequently be confined to matters relating to Anglo-American 
aid to the USSR; military and political matters would thus be excluded from any 
future discussions.  Should such a situation arise, he predicted that the British 
Government would neither be able to engage in any useful discussions with the 
Soviets nor receive help if it was needed.  In essence, to refuse to recognize the Soviet 
claims would make any real Anglo-Soviet collaboration highly unlikely.  In response 
to critics of Soviet intentions, particularly in relation to their adherence to the Atlantic 
Charter, Warner acknowledged that ‘it is true that the Russian claims in our eyes seem 
difficult to reconcile with the first three clauses of the Atlantic Charter’, yet one could 
credibly argue the Soviet point of view.  Warner noted that the first clause of the 
Charter would create no conflict between the Anglo-American and Soviet standpoints.  
Stalin could argue that the Soviet Union was in possession of the territory in question 
when the Germans launched their attack.  With regard to the second and third clauses, 
the Soviets had already claimed during Eden’s visit that the Baltic States formed part 
of the USSR according to the Soviet constitution on the basis of the elections that had 
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followed the annexation.
827
  Warner admitted that ‘while we find it hard to take this 
statement at face value, one can hardly use this argument with the Russians’.  The 
only way in which Warner could see a solution to the issue was if Stalin would ‘agree 
to the recognition of their claims being subject to an expression of the will of the 
inhabitants of the territories in question’.  Furthermore, he warned that the authorities 
in London would not be able to impose their will once the war had been won.  Should 
the Soviets emerge victorious from the conflict, they would be able to establish the 
frontiers in question and, once the territories were under Soviet control, ‘we shall 
certainly not be able to turn them out’.  The concluding paragraph neatly summed up 
the predicament: ‘On the grounds of security against a revived Germany, the Russians 
undoubtedly have a strong case; and, in so far as their claims in regard to Finland and 
the Baltic States are concerned, it is clearly in the general interest that the Russians 
should be in a stronger position on the Baltic.’828 
Upon reading this memorandum, Churchill reprimanded Eden.  The Prime 
Minister bluntly reminded the Foreign Secretary: ‘We have never recognised the 1941 
frontiers of Russia except de facto.  They were acquired by acts of aggression in 
shameful collusion with Hitler.’829  Furthermore, to transfer the peoples of the Baltic 
States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina against their will to the Soviet Union 
would be contrary to the founding principles of the Atlantic Charter.  Churchill 
proceeded to dismiss the issue off-hand, declaring that ‘there can be no question of 
settling frontiers until the Peace Conference’.  As for Eden’s belief that the question 
of frontiers was regarded by Stalin as the ‘acid test of our sincerity’, Churchill 
declared that British sincerity could be illustrated through the maintenance of the 
                                                 
827
 NA, FO371/ 32874/ N108/ 5/ 38, (Draft) memorandum for the US Ambassador, 4 January 1942. 
828
 Ibid. 
829
 Ibid., Churchill to Eden, 8 January 1942. 
 268 
principles of the Atlantic Charter.
830
  In spite of the uniform agreement of Warner, 
Sargent, Cadogan and Eden, Churchill wholly rejected the advice tendered by the 
Foreign Office. 
In the aftermath of Eden’s visit to Moscow Cripps once again complained 
about the uncooperative behaviour of the Soviet Government.  He believed that this 
was the result of Eden’s refusal to agree immediately to Stalin’s requests for the 
recognition of the USSR’s 1941 frontiers.  Stalin’s behaviour would have come as no 
surprise to those in London, yet his attitude remains somewhat difficult to understand.  
Stalin had agreed that Eden should consult His Majesty’s Government and the 
Dominions, and had suggested that the signature of an Anglo-Soviet agreement ought 
to be postponed with a view to signing a treaty at a later date.  Unfortunately, Eden’s 
initial optimism upon his return to London appeared to have been misplaced.  This 
optimism was the result of Stalin’s statement in their final interview during which he 
had announced that Eden’s visit had helped to dispel the mutual mistrust that had 
plagued the Anglo-Soviet relationship.  Consequently Eden believed that ‘no doubt… 
the conversations were worth the effort and the time taken up by the journey’.831    
In light of Stalin’s refusal to cooperate with the British Missions in Moscow, 
Cripps had suggested that London ought to delay responding to the most recent Soviet 
request for information.  Warner believed that there would be an advantage to such an 
approach, unless his colleagues believed that to do so would directly hamper Soviet 
operations against the Germans.  Rather than informing Stalin that information would 
be exchanged on a quid pro quo basis, Warner suggested that Cripps should seek to 
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trade information with the Soviets.  Should that prove unsuccessful, the delivery of 
British information would be delayed as a consequence.
832
 
Warner’s suggestion generated discussion within both the Foreign Office and 
the J.I.C.  Sargent fully endorsed Warner’s suggestion whilst Cavendish-Bentinck 
suggested an alternative approach.  He agreed with Air Vice Marshal Medhurst who 
had recently declared that he was ‘opposed to a policy of bartering information with 
the Russians’.833  He advised that one must take the Soviets as one found them.  If 
they required information that could help them defeat the ‘Huns’, then Britain must 
oblige.  Air Vice Marshal Collier had thus been instructed to give information to the 
Soviets ‘without any instructions to attempt to barter’.834  Medhurst’s instruction 
confounded Sargent.  He could not believe that Medhurst was ‘in favour of a self-
denying ordinance by which we abstain from asking for information from the 
Russians which we want to obtain’.835  Warner’s minute had sparked a flurry of 
activity, with both Cavendish-Bentinck and Sargent composing two minutes in one 
day.  Following Sargent’s criticism of Medhurt’s instructions, the J.I.C. was informed 
that a further request had been submitted by the Soviets for British intelligence on the 
present order of battle of the German air force on the eastern front.  Consequently, Air 
Vice Marshal Collier had been told not to bargain with the Soviets but that he should 
simply make it clear that it was ‘high time that we received from them some of the 
information for which we have repeatedly asked’.836  Cavendish-Bentinck believed 
that the outlook was more hopeful.  The Soviets had told the British Mission that they 
had recently acted upon information supplied by Great Britain.  The Soviets 
consequently attacked four aerodromes containing concentrations of German aircraft.  
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In both cases the attacks had been successful, and the successful outcome had, in the 
opinion of the J.I.C., illustrated the fact that the Soviets had valued the British 
intelligence.  Moreover, it was felt that the intelligence directly contributed to Soviet 
successes against Germany.
837
  Warner had the final say in the discussion.  The 
following day he reminded Cavendish-Bentinck that his suggestion had been made 
subject to the condition that the British should not withhold information if it would 
hamper Soviet operations against Germany.  Although Air Vice Marshal Medhurst 
had thought that withholding information would further tarnish Anglo-Soviet 
collaboration, Warner urged that the situation should remain under constant review.  
At that time the Soviets were ‘getting everything for nothing’; it was obviously ‘not a 
good thing that even our most active ally treats us with contempt’.838 
It was at this juncture that Cripps left his post and returned to London.  On 14 
January, Lacy Baggallay wrote to Eden and praised the work of Sir Stafford Cripps 
during his time as ambassador in Moscow.  Baggallay wished to express to the 
Foreign Secretary ‘the regret that I and others feel who have served under him 
[Cripps] feel at the departure of one to whom we are indebted for constant kindness 
and consideration’.  Members of the diplomatic corps in Moscow felt as if a ‘bulwark’ 
had been removed.  Cripps was regarded as a man of ‘strong personality’ who had a 
genuine interest in the official and personal affairs of the Soviet officials he came into 
contact with.  Furthermore, Cripps would always do what he could ‘to help in the face 
of the often incalculable moves of the Government to which they were accredited’.  In 
Baggallay’s opinion, although ‘diplomatic worlds may change quickly … I think Sir 
Stafford’s appointment will long be remembered in this post’.839   
                                                 
837
 Ibid. 
838
 Ibid., minute by Warner, 29 January 1942. 
839
 NA, FO371/ 32941/ N1234/ 188/ 38, Baggallay to Eden, 14 January 1942.   
 271 
In his farewell message to the Soviet people on 21 January, Cripps praised the 
Soviet resolve in defeating the Germans.
840
  In spite of Cripps’ words of praise, the 
manner his departure from the Soviet Union was not befitting a man who had worked 
in earnest to improve Anglo-Soviet relations.  There was no fond farewell for the 
ambassador.  A possible explanation for this was Eden’s refusal to acquiesce in the 
Soviet demands over the 1941 frontiers.  Whatever the motivation behind the 
treatment of Cripps upon his departure, it caused a good deal of indignation in 
Whitehall.  Sargent suggested to Cripps that he ought to put on record the details of 
his ‘ungracious treatment by the Soviet authorities’.   
Sargent believed that the behaviour of the Kremlin towards Cripps was 
symptomatic of the present Soviet attitude towards Britain which in turn supported 
the views that he had expressed to Churchill and Eden about the ‘great importance of 
meeting Stalin’s demand for recognition of his present frontier claims in the West’.841  
Geoffrey Wilson, the Third Secretary at the British Embassy in Moscow, noted not 
merely that Stalin’s failure to see Cripps or even to reply to the ambassador’s request 
for a farewell interview was in itself strange, remarking that ‘even in the worst days 
of 1940-41, requests for interviews always elicited replies of some sort’.842  Dew 
remarked that although it was not unusual for the Soviets to be discourteous, one 
would not expect such behaviour amongst allies, whilst Cadogan believed that ‘this is 
so bad … it must have been deliberate’.843 
In spite of these examples of Soviet petulance, Eden was unrelenting in his 
belief that the British Government ought to grant Stalin’s demand over his 1941 
frontiers.  On 28 February he composed a memorandum simply entitled ‘Policy 
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towards Russia’.  Since his conversations with Stalin in Moscow, the Foreign 
Secretary had been contemplating two key problems facing the British Government.  
In the first instance, Eden was concerned about post-war cooperation.  He was also 
concerned with Stalin’s demand for the recognition of the Soviet Union’s 1941 
frontiers.  Taking the assumption that Germany would be defeated and that France 
would be militarily weak at the end of the war, Eden noted that there would be no 
counterweight to the USSR in Europe.  Continued cooperation with the USSR was 
thus necessary.  If the British did not attain an understanding with the Soviets, Stalin 
could be tempted to conclude a separate peace with Germany.
844
   
Eden proceeded to examine further reasons to maintain the Anglo-Soviet 
relationship.  For the Foreign Secretary, an understanding with Soviet Russia would 
secure the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe and the British could hope 
to temporize Soviet behaviour, whilst militarily encircling the Wehrmacht.  In the 
event of the Red Army defeating Germany, Eden predicted that ‘Russian prestige will 
be so great that the establishment of Communist Government’s in the majority of 
European countries will be greatly facilitated’.  He also believed that the Soviet 
Government would undoubtedly work towards such a goal.  In the event of that 
happening, Moscow would not be inclined towards cooperation with London or 
Washington.  If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union emerged from the war 
thoroughly exhausted, Stalin would need Anglo-American assistance in the mammoth 
task of post-war reconstruction.  Thus, the Soviet Government would be compelled to 
follow, albeit temporarily, a more conciliatory policy towards Britain and the United 
States.  In that event, His Majesty’s Government would not need to make concessions 
                                                 
844
 NA, FO371/ 32875/ N563/ 5/ 38, memorandum by Eden, 28 February 1942. 
 273 
to the Soviet Union over the 1941 frontiers, as the Soviets would be dependent on 
Anglo-American aid.
845
   
Eden acknowledged that it would be difficult to harmonise day-to-day Anglo-
Soviet cooperation with Anglo-American cooperation as Soviet policy was ‘amoral’, 
whilst American policy was ‘exaggeratedly moral’.  In order to garner the support of 
both the Government of the United States and the American public, it would be 
necessary to draw people’s attention to the ‘realities of the war’.  German aggression 
had united Britain and the USSR against a common foe.  Eden acknowledged that 
there was a fundamental problem in that the frontier question was wholly in conflict 
with the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter.  In spite of understandable 
misgivings within the United States Government, Eden believed that superficially at 
least the frontiers demand appeared very reasonable.  From a strategic point of view it 
could have been in Britain’s interest for the USSR to be established once again on the 
Baltic in order to rival German naval influence in the region.  On the other hand, he 
noted that ‘the arguments in favour of acceding to M. Stalin’s demand would be 
overwhelming if it were not for the serious difficulty created by the Atlantic Charter 
and opposition in the USA to anything that would appear to sacrifice the freedom of 
independent nations’.  In an attempt to illustrate his ability to examine the problem in 
its entirety and not merely to state the reasons as to why Anglo-Soviet collaboration 
was desirable, Eden asserted that ultimately Anglo-American cooperation was more 
indispensable and more ‘natural’ as it rested on ‘broader and older foundations than 
Anglo-Russian cooperation’.  On the other hand, Eden was eager to avoid adopting a 
policy that would intensify Stalin’s existing suspicion that Britain was ultimately 
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aiming to bring about an Anglo-American peace ‘in which Russian interests would be 
thwarted or ignored’.  Eden thus advocated tripartite discussions.846 
Eden’s thought-provoking memorandum resulted in the composition of a 
lengthy minute by Sargent.  Sargent’s paper explored the impact of the Nazi-Soviet 
war on the Anglo-Soviet relationship.  Sargent noted that the ‘orthodox view’ within 
Great Britain was that the German army would be stabilized on a European line in 
order to rest and regroup and that in the spring there would be a renewed German 
offensive with a view to reaching the Caucasus.  Whilst the outcome of the 
forthcoming offensive could not be predicted, it would gain Britain and America 
valuable time within which they could improve their position and develop plans for an 
eventual re-entry into Europe.  Sargent believed that such an outcome was dependent 
upon the German army being able to stabilize in time whilst still in occupation of 
substantial tracts of Soviet territory.  The picture would be radically changed if the 
Red Army were able to maintain its present pressure until the spring and force the 
Germans out of all the territories that they had conquered since June 1941.  Although 
Sargent doubted whether the Soviets would emerge from the war in such a dominant 
position, he believed that it was necessary to examine the political repercussions that 
could ensue in the event of such wide-ranging Soviet successes.
847
 
Sargent noted that the Germans would be fully alive to the fact that they had 
launched Operation Barbarossa too late in 1941.  As such, Hitler would launch the 
new offensive much earlier.  Soviet pressure could potentially overwhelm the 
Wehrmacht; it was thus possible that the Germans might abandon the planned 
offensive altogether.  Should the Germans retreat, the Soviets would no longer be 
fighting for the survival of the USSR.  Instead they would be fighting to acquire the 
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territory lost since June 1941.  Thus, the Nazi-Soviet relationship would be radically 
altered and the policies of both the German and Soviet Governments might in 
consequence undergo far-reaching changes.  It was not beyond the realms of 
possibility that in that instance the Soviets would combine their military operations 
against German territory with a political offensive and ‘set about to create a series of 
autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics in different parts of Germany’.  In that 
eventuality, the Soviet Government would have fulfilled both its ideological and 
military object against their Nazi invaders.
848
   
If, however, the German offensive resulted in a deadlock, it was possible that 
Stalin would seek a separate peace.  In that case, Sargent believed that ‘both dictators 
would realize that it would only be a truce until one or other was ready to renew the 
struggle’ and it would be Stalin who would benefit from the situation.  This would 
allow the Soviets to watch from the side lines as Germany, Great Britain and the 
United States exhausted themselves.  The termination of the war in such a way would 
be highly detrimental to British interests.  In effect, the Soviets would emerge from 
the conflict in a position whereby the European continent would be dominated by the 
Soviet Union.  The Kremlin would control the peace negotiations as a result.  To 
avoid that rather terrifying possibility, Sargent advised that London ought to improve 
Anglo-Soviet relations while the conditions were still ‘easy’.849 
The central conclusion drawn by Sargent in his paper indicated that he did not 
advocate Great Britain offering Stalin one-sided surrenders and sacrifices.  He 
believed that it was essential that the British Government negotiate a Treaty of 
Alliance to cover not only the war but the peace-making and the post-war 
reconstruction.  To that end, Sargent declared that ‘it is obvious that we shall have to 
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make concessions not only on the Baltic issue but probably in other matters’.850  In 
order to prepare Anglo-Soviet relations for the more difficult period ahead, such 
concessions would be worthwhile, but only if they were balanced by corresponding 
concessions from Stalin.  As such, Anglo-Soviet relations would rest upon strong 
foundations that could be cultivated in the post-war era.  Furthermore, to grant 
concessions in 1941 when Soviet strength was waning was an infinitely more 
desirable option.  Should the British Government wait until the end of the war, it was 
possible that by that time the Soviets could be in a stronger position.  The authorities 
in London were therefore faced with the rather irksome reality: they simply could not 
gamble on the hope that the Soviets would be so weakened by the end of the war that 
the peace would be an Anglo-American affair.  Cadogan entirely agreed that it would 
be wise to grant concessions, no matter how unappealing that prospect might be.
851
  
Eden was unshakeable in his belief that an Anglo-Soviet alliance was the best 
course for His Majesty’s Government.  On 10 February he wrote to Halifax outlining 
his point of view and explaining his reasons for working towards a rapprochement 
between London and Moscow.  Since his return from Moscow in December, one 
overwhelming preoccupation for the Foreign Secretary had been a consideration of 
Stalin’s demands for recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and 
Roumania.  Eden was fully alive as to why Washington would object to this demand 
as it was contrary to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.  In spite of this 
understandable hesitancy, Eden reiterated his familiar statement that, although the 
frontier demand was an ‘awkward one to satisfy’, he believed it to be a test of British 
sincerity in the eyes of the Soviets.  To refuse it would reinforce in Stalin’s mind the 
idea that the British were not sincere in their desire for cooperation with the Soviet 
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Union either during or after the war.  Eden believed that Stalin’s fear was ‘the fruit of 
a long period of suspicion and misunderstanding’. 
 Eden informed Halifax that he had relayed Washington’s standpoint on the 
frontier question to Stalin during his discussions in Moscow in December, with the 
intimation that this should be relayed to the Americans.  However, it does not appear 
that during his visit to Moscow Eden put the American objections across too strongly.  
Indeed, one could argue that Eden was somewhat sympathetic to Stalin’s argument 
that Hitler had ‘forced him into a war by an unjustified aggression’ and that as such 
the Soviet Union was in possession of the disputed territories.  In response to Eden’s 
lacklustre protestations that the proposed annexation would be contrary to the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter, Stalin had pointed out that following the Soviet 
absorption of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the ensuing plebiscites had legalized the 
Soviet move; as such the principles of the Charter had not been contradicted, an 
argument that Eden appeared willing to accept.  Eden agreed with Cripps that to 
protest and haggle with Stalin over the issue would only serve to increase his 
suspicions.  Rather than merely rejecting the demand over the 1941 frontiers, Eden 
suggested telling Stalin that while he could not agree at that time to the restoration of 
the 1941 frontiers, Great Britain and the United States could ‘immediately give 
assurances that on grounds of Soviet security we would support, when the time 
comes, a demand by the Soviet Government to establish Soviet bases in territories 
contiguous to Russia, and especially on the Baltic and Black Sea from which her 
security might be threatened’.   
Eden argued that should the Soviet Government accept such assurances, it 
would not preclude them from putting forward at the peace conference their claim to 
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absorb the Baltic States, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and parts of Finland.
852
 It is 
evident from Eden’s communication to Halifax not only that he completely 
understood the justifications put forward by Stalin but that he was also prepared to 
make questionable concessions in order to bring about an understanding with 
Moscow.  Eden was, however, alive to the fact that Great Britain could not make any 
concessions to Stalin without requiring a suitable quid pro quo.  To that end, Eden 
suggested that His Majesty’s Government make two demands.  Firstly, it should be 
stipulated that the Soviet Union would not interfere in the internal affairs of other 
peoples.  Secondly, post-war collaboration between the British, American and Soviet 
Governments was to be based on the principle that none of the Powers would seek 
territorial aggrandizement or interference in the sovereignty of any nation.  
Eden had believed that there was a ‘powerful reason for establishing close 
relations with Russia’ whilst her policy was ‘still in a fluid state’ as His Majesty’s 
Government would be able to ‘exercise as much influence as possible on her future 
course of action’.  Eden’s central argument was clear.  Much like Sargent, Eden 
believed it unwise to gamble on the USSR emerging from the war in a weakened 
state.  Rather, Eden maintained that Britain would need to act quickly to secure the 
post-war collaboration of the Soviet Government.
853
  Eden reiterated his belief that 
Stalin was suspicious that close Anglo-American collaboration would be pursued at 
the expense of Soviet interests and that during the peace negotiations those interests 
would be largely ignored.  Hence, it was necessary to show Stalin that Great Britain 
desired tripartite consultations with the Soviet Union.
854
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 For Dew the exclusion of the Soviets from newly formed organizations such 
as the Raw Material Board was contributing to Stalin’s distrust of Great Britain.  To 
compound the difficulties in achieving an Anglo-Soviet alliance, following the 
signature in Moscow of the Beaverbrook-Harriman protocol on 2 October, Dew 
believed that relatively ineffective machinery had been set up in Moscow to deal with 
the British military and civil supplies to the Soviet Union.  He was thus inclined to 
think that the combination of the exclusion of the Soviets from the Raw Materials 
Board and the failure of Great Britain to supply the Soviet Union had effectively 
hindered cooperation with the Soviets.  From a purely practical point of view, Dew 
believed it to be wise for the Soviets to be brought into the various controlling 
organizations ‘on terms of equality’.  If they saw themselves excluded from any 
Allied council of common war strategy as well as from the organizations that dealt 
with the pooling of supplies, Dew argued that ‘we shall certainly not be doing the best 
to bring about close cooperation between ourselves, the Russians and the Americans 
during the war and still more during the post-war period’.855  
 The issue of Anglo-Soviet collaboration and how it could be achieved 
continued to be a greatly debated topic within the Northern Department.  Dew 
stressed the importance of convincing Stalin of British sincerity for a more 
collaborative relationship and believed that treating the Soviets on the basis of 
equality was key, even in the face of the mounting difficulties facing the British 
officials in the Soviet Union.  On 15 February Lacy Baggallay complained that there 
was a distinct lack of cooperation with the Soviets in the economic sphere, yet the 
root cause of the problem was undoubtedly political.  He viewed the Soviet 
Government as naturally suspicious of His Majesty’s Government.  As a 
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consequence, the Kremlin was only interested in the British as allies if they could 
assist Soviet victory in the war and ensure that Soviet security interests were 
considered during the peace negotiations.  On both accounts the Soviets were 
suspicious.  The fact that no British forces had been sent to the Eastern Front had 
made the Soviets doubt the British desire to furnish practical assistance.  Material aid 
was important but not decisive.  Baggallay noted that the Soviets had seemingly 
accepted the explanations politely, yet they were ‘not interested in the reasons or 
motives’.  British refusals to bow to Stalin’s demands over his 1941 frontiers 
accentuated Soviet suspicions to ‘an unbelievable degree’.  That fact alone had made 
any measure of cooperation with the Soviets incredibly difficult to achieve, and, 
according to Baggallay, although the Soviets were no different from other people in 
that they would only enter into a reciprocal relationship, the Soviets were ‘more 
thorough and consistent in their egotism and they do not realize that generosity is 
sometimes the best policy’.856 
 Dew believed that Baggallay’s analysis of the Soviet attitude and policy was 
an accurate account of the current state of Anglo-Soviet relations, and was hopeful 
that British attempts to relieve Soviet suspicions would prove to be successful.  He 
acknowledged that the chance of reducing Soviet apprehension was slim and that 
those who worked towards an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement ‘may suffer 
disillusionment and annoyance by so doing’.  However, Dew did not accept 
Baggallay’s belief that Stalin would not necessarily become more difficult to deal 
with should Britain maintain its position with regard to his territorial demands.  That 
would only apply over matters of secondary importance.  Dew believed that the 
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refusal to accept the territorial claims would certainly increase animosity between 
Stalin and members of the British Embassy in Moscow.
857
 
 Indeed, Baggallay’s telegram prompted Warner to compose a detailed and 
incredibly important paper that tackled the question of tactics, whilst simultaneously 
illuminating his position in the matter.
 858
  He believed that a consensus should be 
reached within the British Government with regard to the best tactics for dealing with 
the Soviets.  Once a consensus was reached, according to Warner, all British 
Departments and Missions which had direct contact with the Soviets should uniformly 
adhere to the same tactics.  Warner believed that British tactics thus far had been 
wrong and had ‘given the Russians a completely wrong impression of ourselves’.859   
 In order to place Anglo-Soviet relations on a more equal footing, Warner 
advocated that British officials should moderate their adulation of the Soviet war 
effort and not offer assistance to them when they had not asked for it.  Once the 
Soviets requested British aid, they should receive a straight answer ‘based on 
reasonable and fully explained grounds’.  There was not a hint of emotion or 
exaggeration in Warner’s memorandum.  Indeed, should the British feel that they 
were not getting a satisfactory deal from the Soviets, Warner believed that instead of 
showing displeasure through complaints or threats – an oft-used tactic adopted by Sir 
Stafford Cripps during his tenure as ambassador – the British ought not to respond nor 
make a fuss.  Rather than treating the Soviets as if they were something peculiar, 
Warner advised that they be ‘treated in a normal way and not cajoled nor treated to 
fine complementary phrases’.  To achieve true collaboration with the Soviets, His 
Majesty’s Government had to take the Kremlin into its full confidence.  Stalin must 
be told what Britain could and could not do.  In this way there would be a reasonable 
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and collaborative basis of exploration of issues as and when they arose.  As Martin 
Folly has illustrated: ‘The key to understanding the Foreign Office approach was that 
firmness was always to be associated with frankness, which centred on an open 
exchange of views, stating one’s interest without fear that doing so would stymie 
cooperation.’860    
 Furthermore, Warner was mindful not to treat the Soviets as if they belonged 
to a ‘“peculiar” category of allies’.  Instead, it was necessary for His Majesty’s 
Government to consult the Kremlin ‘on [the] day-to-day matters concerning the wider 
conduct of war and peace’.  Warner was ‘perfectly aware that this would be a counsel 
of perfection’ and consultation on ‘many of these wider matters would be difficult, if 
not impossible’.861  Cadogan noted with some point that it was the Soviets who had 
made such collaboration difficult.
862
  Nevertheless, Warner believed that the British 
ought to do all they could to overcome such difficulties.  At the very least, those who 
had to deal with the Soviet Government ought to try and limit the bad effect of neither 
consulting the Soviets nor keeping them informed of aspects of British policy.  
Should the British Government continue to keep the Soviets in the dark, fruitful 
collaboration would be impossible.   
The setting up of the Anglo-American supply and production machinery was 
an example of London and Washington acting in concert without any consideration of 
the Soviets.  Warner fully believed that Stalin would have been aggrieved as the 
matter had been dealt with as a purely Anglo-American concern, fuelling the belief 
that the war was primarily an Anglo-American concern which would inevitably lead 
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to an Anglo-American peace.
863
  Warner’s concerns were very much in line with 
those raised by Dew two days earlier when he had warned that the exclusion of the 
Soviet Union from the Raw Materials Board would negatively impact upon Anglo-
Soviet relations.  Although there were numerous reasons against bringing the Soviets 
into the fold, Warner believed that it was necessary for His Majesty’s Government to 
do just that.
864
   
 The response within the Foreign Office to Warner’s recommendation that all 
British Departments must adopt an agreed doctrine on how to deal with the Soviets 
was largely positive.  William Strang was in agreement with the conclusions drawn 
by Warner.  For Strang, it was ‘essential to treat the Russians as though we thought 
that they were reasonable human beings’, in spite of the abundant evidence to the 
contrary.  Stalin, Strang continued, was ‘dominated by an almost insane suspicion’ 
and His Majesty’s Government had to respond accordingly.  British officials had to 
treat the Soviets with infinite patience whilst avoiding an indication of distrust.  
Furthermore, it was essential to avoid either threats or demonstrations of undue 
adulation in any dealings with the Soviets.  Experience had shown that either 
approach would produce a negative response.  For Strang, the Soviets had been 
pursuing their own interests and had expected the British to do the same.  It was only 
through British military successes that the Soviet Government would respect Britain.  
In Strang’s eyes, the ‘rather hysterical magnification of their [Soviet] successes by our 
press and public’ had ‘aroused in them something akin to contempt’.865   
At the end of February Sargent noted that Warner’s advice deserved further 
investigation, yet doubted whether the British would be able to reach a final agreed 
doctrine in that way.  What was possible, however, was for His Majesty’s 
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Government to lay down certain rules as to how not to treat the Soviets.  For example, 
Sargent believed that the British Government were ‘too prone to think that as we have 
nothing tangible to offer the Soviet Government’ they could ‘make up for the 
deficiency by frequent administrations of flattery and congratulations in the form of 
messages and telegrams’.866  To be sure, such expressions of praise had their uses, 
but, in Sargent’s opinion, only when applied in addition to definite actions on the part 
of the British authorities.  Taken in isolation, according to Sargent, that treatment was 
‘merely a form of appeasement’ and would be open to the same objections raised in 
response to Britain’s appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s.  The Permanent Under-
Secretary, whilst not objecting to the line adopted by both Warner and Sargent, drew 
attention to a point they had overlooked.  Cadogan noted that Warner and Sargent had 
written as if the British Government ‘had made no attempt to consult with the 
Russians or treat them as normal allies’.  Cadogan was clearly exasperated, and 
argued that ‘we have done so, again and again’.867 
Thus, the discussion within the Foreign Office focused on ways and means of 
bringing about an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement.  In spite of the large measure of 
agreement within Whitehall over this matter, it was essential to gain the approval of 
the American Government, a point not lost on the Foreign Secretary.  On 21 February 
Halifax responded to Eden’s communication of 10 February in which the latter had 
expressed his keen desire to come to terms with Stalin, even over the latter’s frontier 
demands.  Following a conversation with Welles, it was clear to Halifax that 
Roosevelt would not consent to any agreement over frontiers at that time.  During the 
course of his conversation with Welles, Halifax was informed that the President had 
felt that it was premature to attempt a detailed treatment of the problem of frontiers.  
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Rather than leaving the issues in the hands of Great Britain, Roosevelt instead wished 
to negotiate directly with Stalin.  The President would impress upon Stalin the fact 
that whilst he fully appreciated his claim for security he could not take a final decision 
on the matter at that time.  Halifax suspected that Welles had influenced the 
President’s attitude, as Welles had been ‘much impressed with the policy of the 
Atlantic Charter and of the effect on US public opinion’.868   
Dew expressed his disappointment the following day.  He noted that in 
adopting their attitude towards Stalin’s territorial claims, the authorities in London 
had considered what would prove best in the long run, which was most certainly 
attaining an agreement with Moscow.
869
  The attitude of America was creating a large 
barrier towards rapprochement.  Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, 
shared Dew’s disappointment.  In a conversation with the Foreign Secretary on 26 
February, he highlighted the fact that his Government had not asked the Americans to 
sign an agreement with the Kremlin.  Rather, the Soviets were ‘only asking them to 
acquiesce in our [Great Britain’s] signature’.  Eden agreed that that was no doubt true 
in so far as the Soviet Government was concerned, yet the British position was 
equally clear.  Great Britain was committed to the United States Government and had 
agreed not to enter into any engagements that would affect the sovereignty of any 
nation in the post-war organization of Europe.  However, Eden expressed his fear that 
Britain’s relationship with the USSR had stagnated.  The Foreign Secretary feared 
that as it had been eight weeks since he returned from Moscow, ‘the goodwill that had 
been created by my visit was being dissipated’.  A further period of long delay would 
only serve to exacerbate Soviet fears of British insincerity.
870
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Evidently, the long delay had negatively impacted upon Soviet opinions of 
British sincerity.  On 18 December, during the course of his conversation with Eden, 
Litvinov had ‘spoken strongly on the necessity after the war of the United States, 
Russia and Great Britain remaining absolutely together, since it was impossible to 
expect the German mentality to change for at least a generation’.871  By February 
1942 Litvinov was far less sympathetic towards Anglo-American justifications for 
military inaction in the USSR.  On 13 February, during an interview with the 
President, Litvinov had raised the second front issue, much to the dismay of both Dew 
and Warner.  Dew was convinced that Litvinov had acted upon instructions from his 
political masters, whilst Warner believed that the ambassador had not been kept 
completely informed.  Warner had not seen any other signs that Stalin no longer 
accepted the view that a second front against the Germans – other than in Libya – was 
impracticable for the British.
872
  Eden agreed.  Stalin had ‘certainly understood well 
enough when we were in Moscow that a second front was not in our power’.873  Thus, 
despite of the statements made by Litvinov in December 1941 insisting on a 
continuation of the current state of unity between the three Powers, Sargent remained 
critical of the former Commissar for Foreign Affairs.  Sargent noted that although 
Litvinov had been ‘allowed back into favour’, he was ‘only on probation’.  As a 
result, Sargent predicted that Litvinov would ‘feel it necessary to go out of his way to 
demonstrate that he has broken entirely with his pro-British past’ and would find it 
advisable to ‘model himself on Molotov’s earlier style of brutal frankness as regards 
the inefficiency and unreliability of the Soviets’ allies, particularly Great Britain’.  
The only way in which Sargent could foresee a change in Litvinov’s attitude towards 
the allies, and particularly towards Great Britain, would come as a result of a change 
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in Molotov’s attitude in such matters.  Consequently, Sargent declared that Litvinov 
was a ‘somewhat contemptible figure’.874  Thus, at a time when it was hoped that 
Anglo-Soviet relations would blossom, the old antipathy towards the Soviet statesmen 
remained. 
Warner believed that a pertinent issue at that juncture was how Hitler viewed 
the conflict with the USSR and whether a Nazi-Soviet separate peace was likely.  It 
was widely believed in the Foreign Office that the Germans still had the upper hand 
on the Eastern Front.  As such, according to Warner, ‘the point surely has been all 
along whether Hitler is willing and can afford to offer Stalin terms that the latter could 
accept’, a situation not dissimilar to that prior to Barbarossa.875  In any case, 
according to Warner, Stalin could not have accepted anything less than the complete 
evacuation by Germany of all Soviet territory.  Warner asked: ‘Do we think that 
Hitler is yet in a mood to offer this?’876 
He then proceeded to criticize the argument that Stalin had adopted a non-
cooperative attitude.  On the contrary, Stalin had sought from His Majesty’s 
Government a discussion on war and peace aims, and it had been the British who had 
refused to discuss such matters at that stage of the war.  Warner conceded that Stalin’s 
frontier demands and the renewed propaganda about a second front could certainly be 
interpreted as Soviet deviousness, but he felt that it could merely be Stalin ‘turning 
the heat on’ in order to secure the answer that he required to his so-called ‘acid test’ 
of British sincerity.  Warner concluded by declaring that he was not unduly disturbed 
by rumours of a separate peace ‘unless it is thought that on military grounds Hitler 
must offer Stalin the very favourable terms that he alone could accept without 
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endangering his own position and that of the regime’.877  Both the Deputy Under-
Secretary and Permanent Under-Secretary agreed with Warner’s conclusions.878   
In the face of growing concerns over a Nazi-Soviet peace, the Foreign 
Secretary continued to champion the need for Anglo-Soviet rapprochement.  On 2 
March Eden sent yet another frantic telegram to Halifax drawing attention to the 
situation.  Eden opened his communication by expressing the fact that he was 
‘increasingly impressed with [the] great desirability of replying to Stalin’s demands in 
as favourable a manner as possible at [the] earliest moment’.879  The Foreign 
Secretary did not wish to give the impression that Great Britain was ‘unduly alarmed’ 
over the separate peace rumours nor did he deny the likelihood that Stalin would 
accept a peace offer from Hitler should it serve his interests.  Although he was not 
‘unduly alarmed’, Eden expressed his keen desire to ‘have very early discussions on 
[the] whole conduct of [the] war in order, if possible, to find out what is on their 
minds’.  Eden was convinced that discussions would be impossible ‘until Stalin’s 
demands are got out of the way’.  Betraying a hint of desperation, he concluded by 
highlighting a further argument in favour of a ‘speedy settlement’.  Should the British 
Government concede to Stalin’s demand, it would give Sir Archibald Clark Kerr the 
‘maximum chance of good and close relations with the Soviet Government 
immediately upon his arrival’.  It was Eden’s hope that following his arrival in the 
USSR, the new ambassador would ‘proceed without delay’ towards securing an 
understanding with Stalin.
880
  
Halifax’s response to this rather frantic communication dashed the Foreign 
Secretary’s hope of gaining American approval before an agreement was reached with 
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Moscow.  During a meeting with Roosevelt and Hopkins, Halifax discovered that the 
President’s position on the frontier question remained unaltered.  He informed Eden 
that the President had continued to feel the ‘greatest difficulty’ in agreeing to any of 
the courses proposed by His Majesty’s Government, and had ‘professed strong 
conviction that we need not be afraid of Russia quitting the war on this’.  Halifax 
complained that ‘in the course of [a] long discussion I was quite unable to shake his 
main position’.881  Sargent criticised Halifax for not putting across the main point 
from the British standpoint.  It was not that acquiescence in Stalin’s frontier demands 
would keep the Soviet Union in the war.  Rather, it was of ‘the first importance at this 
juncture to get into real contact with the Russians on the conduct of war’.  Sargent’s 
second point was critical of the American President himself.  In his opinion, the 
British Government had made it clear that should the President not consent to any of 
the courses suggested by Britain, ‘he should at least stand aside and allow us to 
exercise our own judgment’.882 
Cadogan, on the other hand, was critical of the accusations contained in 
Sargent’s minute.  To reach an understanding with Moscow without the consent of 
America would inevitably produce ‘dangerous’ results.  Furthermore, Cadogan 
doubted that compliance with Stalin’s demands would make any real difference to his 
conduct during the war; nor would it ‘assure his loyal and intimate consultation and 
cooperation with us’.  Indeed, it was more likely that compliance with Stalin’s 
demands would merely lead to others.  Consequently, it would be a gamble to attempt 
to gain Soviet friendship at the expense of American friendship: ‘Rightly or wrongly 
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we decided to consult the United States … and I should take it as axiomatic that we 
can only go ahead on lines agreed with them’.883 
Predictably, Eden’s response was emphatic: 
You have reported that President holds firm 
conviction that Russia would not quit war on this 
matter.  This leads us to fear that President does 
not grasp the real reason for the importance we 
attach to giving Stalin satisfactory answer.  We 
regard it of the highest importance at this stage 
of this war to leave nothing undone which may 
enable us to get into real contact with Stalin, to 
exchange ideas freely on all subjects connected 
with the conduct of the war and thus give 
ourselves maximum chance of securing that 
Soviet Government should pay some attention to 
our views and those of the United States 
Government.
884
 
 
For Eden, it was ‘deplorable’ that there had been no significant consultation with 
Moscow at that juncture in the war.  He expressed his belief that it was the ‘height of 
unwisdom that we should deprive ourselves of [the] chance of establishing such 
contacts by refusing to admit Stalin’s claim to the Baltic States, implementation of 
which we shall be quite unable to prevent, as President recognises’.  The British 
Foreign Secretary had abandoned the Baltic States in order to achieve an Anglo-
Soviet alliance, branding it as a logical concession for His Majesty’s Government.  
Eden concluded by declaring that should the British Government not grant 
concessions to the Soviets and Anglo-Soviet relations deteriorate further, ‘we shall 
always reproach ourselves for not having done all we could while there was still 
time’.885 
 To that end, Warner wrote a paper on behalf of the Foreign Secretary and 
distributed it throughout the Foreign Office.  In the paper Warner noted that the 
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Cabinet had called for a greater measure of cooperation with Soviet Russia.  The 
Cabinet had decided that ‘in order to meet Soviet suspicions and guard as far as may 
be possible against the risk of Russia following an entirely independent policy, [we] 
wish to work for tripartite consultations with the Soviet Government and to reach 
tripartite solutions’.886  Warner’s memorandum continued to explore the current 
Soviet attitude towards the Anglo-Saxon Powers.  It had long been acknowledged that 
Moscow was suspicious of Britain and America working together in order to bring 
about an Anglo-American peace.  The Soviet Union was only useful in contributing to 
the defeat of a common foe.  Warner neatly summed up the British fear: ‘Unless 
every effort is made to break down this suspicion, the Russians are likely to pursue 
entirely selfish aims, both during and after the war’.887 
 It was hoped that tripartite collaboration would be the decisive factor in the 
war.  Once again it was hoped that increased cooperation in the economic sphere 
would impact upon the political relations between London and Moscow.  In order to 
strengthen Anglo-Soviet economic ties, there needed to be tripartite consultation in 
the sphere of supply and production.  Up to that point, consultation over issues of 
supply and shipping had been confined to Beaverbrook and Harriman’s discussions 
with Stalin in September 1941 which resulted in the Anglo-Soviet Protocol of 2 
October.  As the Protocol was due to expire at the end of June 1942 it was suggested 
that a new agreement be negotiated prior to that date.  Any future conference was to 
replicate the Beaverbrook-Harriman conversations in order to plan the common war 
effort.  The final paragraph of Warner’s memorandum clearly illustrated the eagerness 
of the Cabinet to continue tripartite cooperation in the economic sphere, stating that it 
would ‘be well to make clear to the Russians that similar conferences would meet as 
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often as necessary to allocate supplies in the light of the general strategic situation, in 
order to make it clear to them that we were proposing a regular system of consultation 
to last throughout the war’.888  
 Although Warner’s memorandum had illustrated Eden’s desire for a greater 
measure of Anglo-Soviet consultation, Dew highlighted a considerable obstacle to 
cooperation with Moscow prior to the arrival of the new ambassador to the Soviet 
Union.  Should an interview between Clark Kerr, Molotov and Stalin be arranged 
upon Clark Kerr’s arrival, there was the problem that His Majesty’s Government was 
‘not in a position to report any progress as regards our answer to Stalin’s territorial 
demands’.  Therefore, it was essential for the Foreign Office to advise Clark Kerr as 
to what could be discussed in any interview with the Soviet leaders.
889
   
Using Churchill’s communication to Stalin of 9 March as a framework for his 
paper, Dew examined the three possible topics that the British Government was 
prepared to cover with Stalin.  Firstly, there was the issue of Soviet frontiers at the 
end of the war.  Churchill had informed Roosevelt of the British position and had 
illustrated his desire to conclude an agreement with Stalin.  Consequently, any 
problems arising would be seen as the fault of the Americans.  Dew believed that 
Clark Kerr could make it clear that whilst the British Government was ready to 
conclude an agreement, they were committed not to sign any such agreement without 
consulting Washington and the Dominions, as Eden had stated during his visit to 
Moscow in December.  Dew predicted that Stalin would merely say that Britain need 
only inform the United States and the Dominions of the pending agreement rather 
than gaining their approval prior to its signature.
890
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 The second issue that could be discussed was the question of supplies to the 
USSR.  The Prime Minister stated in his message to Stalin that the supplies promised 
by Great Britain under the Protocol of 2 October 1941 would continue 
uninterrupted.
891
  As previously mentioned, it was hoped that tripartite consultations 
would prove successful and that a new agreement would be negotiated prior to the 
expiration of the existing Protocol.  Should these recommendations be approved, it 
was possible that Clark Kerr would be in a position to suggest a further conference in 
Moscow for the negotiation of a new agreement.   
Finally, Dew predicted that Stalin would wish to discuss war strategy with 
Clark Kerr.   The issue of the second front would undoubtedly be raised.  Churchill 
had promised the resumption of a heavy air offensive against Germany, alongside a 
British commitment to ‘study other measures for taking some of the weight off the 
German attack on Russia’.  Neither Stalin nor Molotov would miss the evasiveness of 
these assurances.  In order to ward off any criticism from the Soviet leadership, which 
would undoubtedly diminish Clark Kerr’s ability to bring about ‘good and close 
relations with the Soviet Government immediately upon his arrival’, Dew urged his 
superiors in Whitehall to provide the ambassador with ‘some concrete information on 
this subject as well as a review of the war situation as we see it today’.892   
 In March, some two months after Sir Stafford Cripps had departed from 
Moscow, Clark Kerr arrived in the USSR and assumed his role as ambassador.  
Dew’s paper of 11 March clearly illustrated the lack of progress with regard to 
Britain’s policy towards the Soviet Union during that time. Indeed, during the interim 
Anglo-Soviet relations had stagnated.  Although the Foreign Secretary and his closest 
advisers agreed about the necessity to acquiesce in Stalin’s demands without bartering 
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or time wasting, no progress had been made.  Thus, when Clark Kerr arrived at 
Kuibyshev on 17 March, the state of Anglo-Soviet relations had not significantly 
altered since the departure of Cripps. 
 The relationship between the British and Soviet Missions, however, had 
deteriorated quite considerably.  Prior to Clark Kerr’s arrival, General Mason 
MacFarlane, who was known to be hot-headed and to have a particular dislike of the 
Soviets, continued to exacerbate the situation through his tempestuous and brusque 
treatment of the Soviets.  On 10 March Dew was informed by MacFarlane of the 
steady deterioration in his relationship with Panifilov.  Dew noted that MacFarlane 
seemed to have ‘enjoyed making the most or the worst of his instructions’ from His 
Majesty’s Government and that he simply did not understand – nor would he ever 
understand – the line that the British Government had wished him to follow with the 
Soviets.
893
   
Warner’s response to MacFarlane’s most recent display of poor behaviour was 
direct.  Warner stated: ‘I am afraid the General is hopeless and my own belief is that 
he has done and is doing incalculable harm’.  As such, Warner wished to see 
MacFarlane removed from his post as soon as possible.
894
  Those who advocated the 
conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet understanding had placed great importance on 
economic and military cooperation as a means of strengthening Anglo-Soviet political 
relations.  In the absence of an ambassador in the USSR, the smooth running of 
relations between the Missions was paramount, particularly in light of the Cabinet’s 
indecision as to the concessions that could properly be made to the Soviets.  This 
indecision had led to a political stagnation, which, combined with the deterioration of 
relations between the various military missions, served to enhance the difficulties 
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facing the incoming ambassador, thus thwarting Eden’s plans for rapprochement 
between London and Moscow. 
 These plans were also thwarted by the attitude of President Roosevelt.  Much 
to Eden’s dismay Roosevelt arranged an interview with Litvinov on 13 March without 
prior consultation.  Evidently, the President had felt that nothing would be gained 
from delay and had not appreciated the fact that his decision ‘was in the highest 
degree embarrassing’ for Great Britain.895   
Halifax’s subsequent report on the Roosevelt-Litvinov conversation would 
have undoubtedly frustrated not merely Dew and Warner in the Northern Department, 
but also Sargent and Eden; all of whom were advocating the speedy conclusion of an 
Anglo-Soviet understanding.  Upon receiving Halifax’s communication, Dew 
composed a detailed minute that clearly illustrated his frustration with President 
Roosevelt, a frustration very much shared by Warner who described Roosevelt’s 
actions as ‘lamentable’.896  During the course of his conversation with Litvinov, 
Roosevelt had intimated that the United States was ready to support Stalin’s claims to 
security after the war but that nothing would be done about it prior to the final defeat 
of Germany.  Dew criticised the stance of the United States Government as ‘pitifully 
inadequate’ and claimed that the President had aggravated the situation.  He clearly 
would not recognise the Soviet frontier demands during the war, yet refused to 
indicate if he would do so after the war.
897
  Furthermore, Dew gleaned from Halifax’s 
summary of the interview that there was little hope that the President would ever 
agree to the incorporation in the Soviet Union of the Baltic States and possibly not 
even of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.
898
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Clearly, the President had not been convinced of the Soviet justification that 
incorporation was essential for the ‘legitimate needs of the Russian people for their 
security’.  Dew correctly stated that the main obstacle to any meaningful cooperation 
between Great Britain, America and the Soviet Union was the continued mistrust 
between all of the Powers.  The President adopted the stance that he was confident 
that the USSR and the United States would ‘cooperate completely and without any 
mistrust in the aim of winning the war’, yet Stalin had made it clear to London that he 
did not feel that there could be any measure of real trust and confidence unless there 
was a common agreement on war aims.  For Stalin, the recognition of its 1941 
frontiers was paramount.  Dew asserted that Roosevelt ought to assure Stalin that 
should Soviet troops occupy the Baltic States neither Great Britain nor the United 
States Government would turn them out.
899
 
 How, then, should His Majesty’s Government proceed?  Dew had clearly 
formulated ideas for his superiors in the Foreign Office.  As the President had made it 
abundantly clear that he would refuse to sign any secret or public treaty defining 
frontiers before the end of the war, Great Britain had been ‘forced into the position 
either of paddling along in the President’s wake or of pursuing an independent policy 
without the support of the United States’.  The British were forced into choosing from 
three possible courses of action.  They could await Stalin’s reaction to the President’s 
message without taking any further action with the Soviets or the Americans; they 
could tell Stalin that they felt ‘compelled to support the line’ that the President took 
but that they were ‘ready to give the fullest assurances about the recognition of 
Russia’s claims to security after the war’.  The third possible course was clearly the 
one advocated by Dew.  Dew believed that while Britain awaited Stalin’s reply to 
                                                 
899
 Ibid. 
 297 
Roosevelt, they could ‘indicate to the Russians that the President has acted on his own 
and that we will be prepared to continue discussions with them when Stalin’s reply is 
received’.  In the likely event of an unsympathetic response from Stalin, the second 
suggestion of supporting the President’s policy had clear drawbacks.  Stalin would 
inevitably believe that he would get no help from his Western allies in his attempt to 
recover his frontiers as Great Britain ‘clearly do not dare to take an independent line 
and are shackled to the Americans’.  Dew begrudgingly accepted that it was advisable 
at that time to adopt alternative one and let the matter rest for the time being.  Dew 
was scathing of Roosevelt and the ‘fearful mess’ that he had created.900  The Foreign 
Secretary agreed with Dew’s conclusions and was equally critical of Roosevelt, 
noting that his interview with Litvinov was an example of ‘a dismal tale of clumsy 
diplomacy’.  The President had shown no consideration for the British point of view 
and, as such, had increased the difficulties facing His Majesty’s Government.901  As 
Eden exclaimed to Clark Kerr, all that was required from Roosevelt was that he 
should approve, or at least acquiesce, in the proposed Anglo-Soviet Treaty.  The 
President’s interview with Litvinov undermined the position of Great Britain and 
illustrated the distinct lack of unity of opinion between the two Western Powers. 
 Eden’s difficulties were exacerbated following a memorandum composed on 
14 March by Mr Donaldson, the Secretary of the Allied Supplies Executive [hereafter 
A.S.E.], the thrust of which ran contrary to conclusions previously drawn within the 
Foreign Office.  Donaldson’s paper was written in response to the memorandum of 11 
March in which the Warner had advised that in order to stave off the possibility of 
Moscow following an entirely independent policy, Stalin must be made aware of 
Britain’s desire to ‘work for tripartite consultations with the Soviet Government and 
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to reach tripartite solutions’.902  Donaldson criticised this suggestion, which had been 
approved by the Cabinet.  In light of the impending expiration of the 2 October 1941 
supply Protocol, Donaldson explored the three courses open to His Majesty’s 
Government.  A new conference, as suggested by Warner, could be arranged in which 
a new Protocol would be agreed.  Alternative courses to pursue would be to invite the 
USSR to participate as a full partner in the Anglo-American machinery for munitions 
assignment and raw materials allocation, or to invite the USSR to appoint 
representatives to discuss future Soviet requirements with the Anglo-American 
Boards.  Donaldson argued that the introduction of a new partner would complicate 
the development of the Anglo-American machinery as it was still in its infancy.  To 
pursue the second course would cause confusion and delay.  The choice was thus 
between tripartite consultations or the appointment of Soviet representatives to the 
Anglo-American Boards.   
 For Donaldson, the pertinent consideration was how the British Government 
viewed the nature of the Soviet association with the Anglo-American war effort.  If 
the Anglo-American-Soviet association was regarded as a full and permanent one, he 
agreed that Britain ought to aim at reaching agreed decisions based on full 
consideration and discussion of mutual resources and requirements, alongside full 
discussion on the strategic issues involved in such collaboration.  If, on the other 
hand, Great Britain accepted the position that any tripartite cooperation was a ‘purely 
temporary association’, that would, in Donaldson’s opinion, inevitably afford greater 
benefits for the Soviets.  The best course to follow was to ‘treat supplies to Russia as 
a self-contained question’ that would ‘inevitably bring it into the sphere of political 
bargaining’.  The prevalent opinion within the A.S.E. was that Britain should aim at 
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adopting the third course with the intention of going forward to the second if it 
became advisable and practicable.  The A.S.E. believed that the third option would 
give the Soviets ‘a far better impression of our good faith and seriousness of purpose’ 
than the first course.
903
 
 Once Donaldson’s memorandum reached the Foreign Office, Dew was the 
most vocal critic of the conclusions drawn.  Donaldson’s scheme had the advantage of 
introducing Soviet representatives onto the Anglo-American boards, yet it suffered 
from the disadvantage that the Soviet representatives would not be able to take 
decisions on their own.  Dew believed that the ‘whole virtue of the proposal put in the 
Foreign Office paper was that at the proposed conference in Moscow we and the 
Americans would be prepared to talk strategy as well as [the issue of] supplies’.  
Furthermore, the appointment of Soviet representatives would merely be an exercise 
in futility.  Very few people were in a position to talk strategy and supplies in the 
Soviet Union.  In order to make any real progress in the matter of military supplies for 
the USSR, only direct discussions with Stalin would bear any fruit.
904
 
 As a result of the War Cabinet’s approval of Warner’s conference proposal, on 
18 March the Chairman of the London Munitions Assignment Board composed a 
paper supporting the suggestions put forward by Donaldson.  Although Lyttleton, the 
author of the paper, was undoubtedly in a position to discuss issues surrounding 
supply to the Soviet Union, his analysis did not consider the political implications of 
economic and military aid, an issue that was very much a predominant consideration 
for Warner et al in the Foreign Office.  Lyttleton criticised the suggestion put forward 
by the Foreign Office that tripartite consultations should take place in Moscow.  The 
idea of achieving any real measure of cooperation was nothing short of delusional, 
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due in large part to the secretive nature of the Soviet Government.  In any case, 
should British and American personnel arrive in Moscow with the avowed intention 
of nurturing a spirit of collaboration between the three Powers in the economic and 
military sphere, Stalin would ‘know only too well that our delegation cannot afford to 
leave Moscow without an agreement’.905  There is a fundamental flaw in Lyttleton’s 
reasoning.  Whilst one cannot dispute the importance of Great Britain reaching an 
understanding with Moscow, Stalin likewise needed to secure an agreement securing 
Anglo-American aid.  The war was taking place on Soviet soil; Stalin desperately 
needed war supplies in order to continue to fight the German aggressor.  A greater 
degree of support from the Western Powers was crucial for the USSR at that juncture 
of the war.  Lyttleton predicted that the conference proposed by Warner would merely 
result in His Majesty’s Government making a commitment that was ‘probably in 
excess of the existing one’ and that the Soviets would ‘squeeze’ the British ‘while 
despising us as the offerers at bribes’.   Evidently, Lyttleton’s perspective was skewed 
by a suspicion of the Soviet Government.  Lyttleton noted that since the introduction 
of the October Protocol, Great Britain had ‘scrupulously’ fulfilled its obligations ‘at 
great cost to ourselves’, yet the Soviets had not imparted ‘the slightest information on 
military or supply matters’.  Soviet suspicion was due in large part to the fact that they 
had been ‘doing all the fighting’ whilst Great Britain had been observing from the 
sidelines.  Lyttleton accepted the argument that continued Soviet resistance was 
essential for Great Britain, ‘as incalculable damage would be done to our cause if the 
Russians were defeated’.  However, it was also possible that Great Britain and 
America could very well lose the war if they continued to supply the Soviet Union in 
excess of what was truly needed.  To do so could be to the detriment of British forces 
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in the vital Middle Eastern and Indian Ocean theatres.  Consequently, Lyttleton 
agreed with Donaldson.  The most favourable course for His Majesty’s Government 
to adopt was the third option proposed in Donaldson’s paper.  The third option would 
allow Soviet representatives on the Anglo-American Board, giving them the 
opportunity to raise issues pertinent to the Soviet Government.
906
  
 Predictably, Dew defended the recommendations put forward by Warner.  
Dew contested Lyttleton’s assertion that during any tripartite conference the Soviets 
would blackmail the British delegation into ‘giving everything without our receiving 
any information in return’.  In order to combat that possibility, Dew suggested that 
when His Majesty’s Government proposed the idea of a conference to the Soviets, 
they ought to make them aware from outset that information had to be imparted by 
both sides and that the preparatory work had to be done well in advance.  Dew 
continued to point out the obvious criticism that arose from Donaldson and 
Lyttleton’s conclusions: it was not merely the Western Powers who needed an 
agreement.  Should the conference fail, all three Powers would be in a 
disadvantageous position.  Indeed, one could argue that the Soviets would get the 
worst of it, as their need for armaments was acute.
907
   
Warner was equally critical of the alternative course suggested by Donaldson 
whose proposal he considered ‘psychologically wrong’.  More to the point, 
Donaldson had failed to comprehend the motivation behind Warner’s proposal.  It 
was intended that tripartite consultations would ‘put the Russians on a basis of 
equality’ in the negotiations for the renewal of the Protocol.  Any negotiations would 
need to take place in Moscow as Stalin would not delegate responsibilities to 
representatives abroad.  Such minor concessions could potentially reap bountiful 
                                                 
906
 Ibid. 
907
 Ibid., minute by Dew, 19 March 1942. 
 302 
rewards, not merely in relation to Anglo-American supply to the USSR.  Tripartite 
discussions were considered by Warner to be ‘highly desirable on general grounds’.908  
Questions of supply did not exist in a vacuum; they contributed to the general spirit of 
collaboration between the USSR and the Western Powers.  Much like in the early 
stages of the war when London had attempted to negotiate a war trade agreement, it 
was hoped that a general atmosphere of cooperation would extend to the political 
realm.  Lyttleton’s minute clearly illustrated his belief that the Foreign Office’s 
attempt to reduce the innate Soviet suspicion of the capitalist Powers had failed; 
Warner argued the opposite.  As Graham Ross has noted, the British policy of 
‘cautious reasonableness’ following Barbarossa was adopted in an attempt to give the 
Soviets as little cause for complaint as possible.  One could not expect immediate 
results; such a policy would take time to blossom, ‘but the hope was that it would 
have a cumulative effect which would make post-war collaboration possible if not 
easy’.909  As Warner argued, the Moscow Conference had resulted in ‘good results 
psychologically’ and the proposals put forward by the Foreign Office were 
‘psychologically better calculated than his own’.910 
 On 27 March the A.S.E. informed the War Cabinet of its final decision over 
the matter of supply for the Soviet Union.  The A.S.E. admitted that the course 
favoured by Donaldson and Lyttleton might have enabled Great Britain to acquire full 
information from the Soviets whilst leading them into strategical discussions.  
Ultimately, however, the A.S.E. drew similar conclusions to Warner.  The Executive 
agreed that the Soviet Government would not delegate authority on a matter of such 
importance.  Instead, the A.S.E. favoured the first proposal and expressed its 
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agreement with Warner’s suggestion that tripartite discussions should be held in 
Moscow.  It would be stipulated that a ‘full discussion and disclosure of information 
concerning all matters affecting the allocation of supplies’ would be at the heart of the 
conference.  The A.S.E., much like Warner and Dew in the Northern Department, had 
hoped that the tripartite conference would ‘become the beginning of a regular system 
of consultation between the three Governments, to continue throughout the war’.911 
 The A.S.E. paper not merely adopted all of Warner’s suggestions, but 
illustrated a keenness for genuine Anglo-Soviet collaboration.  Upon his arrival to the 
USSR, Clark Kerr believed that such keenness was reciprocated by the Soviets.  Clark 
Kerr wrote of ‘friendly welcome’ that he had received from Molotov, whose ‘manner 
was pleasant and easy’.  During the course of the conversation, Molotov had spoken 
with obvious concern about the war situation and expressed his belief that the year 
1942 would be ‘critical if not decisive’.  Consequently, the Commissar told the 
ambassador that the situation called for ‘supreme effort on the part of each one of the 
allies’, particularly should the anticipated German spring offensive materialise.  
Molotov believed that it would take a ‘stupendous effort’ on the part of the allies in 
order to deal blows at the enemy, a point to which Clark Kerr readily agreed.  In an 
unusual display of affability, Molotov informed the ambassador that Great Britain 
could count upon the fullest cooperation from both himself and his Government.
912
 
 Clark Kerr’s report would have been welcomed in Whitehall, yet there were 
also troubling reports flowing into the Foreign Office that once again raised the 
spectre of a Nazi-Soviet peace.  On 22 March a telegram off Halifax was received by 
Geoffrey Wilson at the Moscow Embassy.  Halifax provided an overview of a 
conversation which had taken place between Sir R. Campbell, the British Ambassador 
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in Lisbon, and Hubert D. Henderson.
913
  Campbell and Henderson expressed their 
fears of the possibility of a Nazi-Soviet peace following Stalin’s Order of the Day 
speech.  In Henderson’s opinion, Stalin had attempted to make British flesh creep 
with the thoughts of a separate peace in order to force the latter to re-double their 
efforts to supply the USSR.  Halifax, however, stated firmly that ‘if Stalin decided to 
make peace no amount of flattery or promise on our part would prevent him’.  The 
only way in which to prevent such an eventuality was either to continue to send 
supplies to the Soviet Union or to open a western front.
914
  Wilson stated that 
although no one had taken the possibility of a separate peace seriously, he believed 
that the pressure for a second front was a more pressing consideration.  Indeed, ‘the 
pressure for a second front is becoming much stronger and may indicate a very real 
apprehension among the Russians about the German spring offensive’.915  Thus, at 
that juncture of the war, with the spring offensive looming, the issue of collaboration 
between London, Washington and Moscow had gained a greater significance.  
Although the predominant consideration centred on supplies to the Soviet Union, the 
importance was not limited to the economic sphere.  The issue of Anglo-American 
supply impacted upon the political relations of the three Powers – the two spheres 
were intrinsically linked.  Should economic and military relations deteriorate, that 
deterioration would inevitably transfer to the political sphere. 
 On 27 March Dew penned a minute that was circulated throughout the Foreign 
Office – recipients included the Southern, Central, Eastern and Far Eastern 
Departments.  Although relatively short in comparison to the majority of Dew’s 
minutes, it was highly significant as it reiterated the wish of His Majesty’s 
Government to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Government, barring any strong 
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views that may have been expressed by President Roosevelt.  The principal point in 
the British proposal for an alliance with Soviet Russia was the recognition of Stalin’s 
claims to his 1941 frontiers with Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania with the 
agreement to support his claim to the restoration of those frontiers after the war.
916
  
Dew’s minute marked a culmination of the widely discussed and divisive issue of 
concessions to Stalin and of how far His Majesty’s Government were prepared to go 
in order to secure an understanding with Moscow.  
 At the beginning of April logistical discussions were underway in Whitehall.  
Sargent requested that it should be considered whether negotiations should be carried 
out in London with Maisky or through Clark Kerr with Molotov.  Dew was confident 
that there would be little difficulty in concluding two public treaties; one outlining the 
nature and scope of an Anglo-Soviet military alliance and the second detailing post-
war cooperation that would largely be along the lines of the text prepared by Cadogan 
and Cripps prior to Eden’s visit to Moscow in December 1941.  Dew believed that it 
would be better for the Treaty negotiations to take place in London through Maisky.  
After all, Eden had travelled to Moscow for Treaty discussions so to send another 
British delegation to the Soviet Union might be viewed as overly zealous.  Thus, from 
the point of view of propaganda within Great Britain, Dew believed that by holding 
the Treaty negotiations in London and the supply Protocol negotiations in Moscow, 
public opinion would view the discussions in a more favourable light.
 917
  Warner 
confirmed on 3 April that the Treaty negotiations would take place in London; the 
stage was now set, all that remained was for members of the British Foreign Office to 
advise the Secretary of State on the desired terms for any Anglo-Soviet Treaty. 
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 To that end, Dew composed another lengthy minute on 2 April in which he 
provided a detailed overview of Anglo-Soviet relations following Eden’s trip to 
Moscow in December 1941.  Attached to this minute was a draft of the proposed 
terms for the Treaty.  The first article stated that the two Allied Powers would afford 
one another military assistance and support of all kinds during the war against 
Hitlerite Germany; the second related to the issue of a negotiated peace with their 
common enemy.  It was stipulated that no armistice or peace treaty with Germany 
would be concluded except by mutual consent.  The third article included the promise 
that neither His Majesty’s Government nor the Kremlin would take part in any 
coalition directed against the other Contracting Party.
918
 
 As there have been a plethora of works that have provided excellent and 
thorough examinations of the discussions in the weeks prior to the signature of the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty, it is not intended to delve into an already well-explored aspect 
of British diplomacy at that juncture.  Rather, the discussion surrounding the publicity 
of the Anglo-Soviet alliance will be explored here.  The question of publicity for the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty received a great deal of attention within the Foreign Office, 
provoking three minutes from Cadogan alone.  In addition, the Foreign Secretary had 
called a meeting in his room on 10 April due to the interest that was being generated 
by the issue.  The question of publicity for the forthcoming alliance arose following a 
meeting at the Ministry of Information on 9 April at which Sargent, Bruce Lockhart, 
Ridsdale and Nevile Butler were present.  The meeting took place in the room of 
Peter Smollett who was the Head of the Soviet section at the Ministry of 
Information.
919
  During the course of the discussions of 9 April it was agreed that 
although the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet agreement would cause ‘grave concern’ 
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in both Europe and the Middle East ‘where fear of Communism as an international 
force is still maintained’, it was held that ‘the considerations in favour of the 
agreement … are so powerful as to outweigh the anticipated effect on certain sections 
of world opinion’.  The central focus of the meeting was British acquiescence to the 
USSR’s frontiers demand and the anticipated backlash from the British public and 
press.  It needed to be emphasised that should Britain refuse Stalin’s request it would 
undoubtedly compound his suspicions and possibly weaken Soviet resistance.  It was 
further supposed that should the USSR attain her ‘essential’ security by agreement, 
there was good reason to believe that the Soviet Union would ‘join the ranks of the 
satisfied powers’ and was less likely to make further demands on Great Britain.  
There is some merit to that idea.  As Sargent had argued on 5 February, it was far 
better to agree to Soviet demands whilst Soviet power was compromised.  The 
meeting concluded by dramatically declaring: ‘It is only by Anglo-Soviet 
collaboration in this spirit that a recurrence of the German menace can be avoided’.920  
Evidently, it was proposed for the publicity surrounding the Treaty to emphasise the 
need for Anglo-Soviet solidarity against the German menace that was threatening the 
very existence of both Great Britain and the Soviet Union.   
 On 19 April, in a telegram to Halifax, Eden clearly laid out the way in which 
the upcoming Anglo-Soviet Treaty was to be publicised in Great Britain and abroad.  
The draft telegram had been prepared by Warner in accordance with the main points 
discussed during the meeting of 10 April.  Although Warner had originally intended 
for a speedy dispatch of the telegram to Washington, due to the interest generated by 
the issue, the final version was not transmitted until 19 April.
921
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 It was regarded as essential to ‘prepare and educate’ public opinion in both 
Great Britain and America as to the reasons for an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement prior 
to the conclusion of the Treaty.  His Majesty’s Government should adopt the line of 
‘positive justification’ for its actions rather than making ‘apologetic excuse’.  There 
would be no pro-Soviet propaganda.  Instead, London would leave any ‘pro-Soviet 
points’ to the Soviet authorities.  Nor would Great Britain attempt to justify the Soviet 
occupation of the Baltic States.
922
  Rather than apologizing for the concessions made 
in order to secure an alliance with the Soviet Union, the British would emphasize the 
predominant motivation for pursuing rapprochement with the Soviets: through 
collaboration and agreement with Moscow, the recurrence of German domination and 
aggression would be prevented.  Thus, the German menace was used as a propaganda 
tool and was considered to be sufficient justification for the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.  
Indeed, it was to be argued that having USSR as the strongest naval power in the 
Baltic was ‘infinitely better for the Western Powers than the domination of the region 
by the Germans.
923
 
 Finally, the telegram addressed the fundamental problem of the ingrained 
distrust of Soviet Communism within Great Britain.  For the critics of any Anglo-
Soviet agreement, it was essential to deny any claims that the British had been guilty 
of ‘selling Eastern Europe to Russia’.  The terms of the forthcoming treaty would only 
refer to the safeguarding of Soviet frontiers; Stalin had not sought territorial 
aggrandizement and as such his terms did not conflict with the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter.  Stalin’s territorial policy was ‘strictly defensive’ and the terms of 
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the treaty would ensure ‘against [Soviet] interference in the internal affairs of other 
states’ whilst guaranteeing tripartite collaboration in the post-war period.924   
 Halifax’s response to Eden’s telegram was largely negative.  The ambassador 
expressed his misgivings about the effect of the publication of the impending Anglo-
Soviet Treaty in the United States and predicted that the agreement was likely to be 
very unpopular.  In spite of British arguments to the contrary, Stalin’s territorial 
claims would be viewed as a violation of the Atlantic Charter and a ‘negation of the 
ideals for which the UN [United Nations] are fighting’.925   Sympathy would not be 
limited to the Baltic States.  There remained a strong pro-Finnish attitude within the 
United States as a result of the Winter War.  Therefore, any attempts to condemn 
Finland as a result of its cooperation with Germany would prove unsuccessful.
926
  
Halifax believed that Washington was ‘still predominantly Russo-phobe’ and the very 
fact that Britain sought an agreement that would be highly advantageous to the 
Soviets would ‘only aggravate the matter’.927  Regretfully, Halifax could not make 
any useful suggestions on the matter of British publicity for the Treaty.  No amount of 
justification or propaganda would prevent the inevitable American backlash.  Thus, in 
Halifax’s opinion, ‘the longer the news of the agreement could be withheld, the 
better’.928  Halifax’s predictions proved to be accurate.  However, in an interview 
between Roosevelt and Litvinov, the President informed the ambassador that although 
he did not approve of the British line, ‘he did not wish to oppose the negotiations’.929  
                                                 
924
 Ibid. 
925
 NA, FO371/ 32879/ N1921/ 5/ 38, Halifax to FO, 12 April 1942. 
926
 NA, FO371/ 32879/ N2056/ 5/ 38, Eden to Halifax, 19 April 1942. 
927
 NA, FO371/ 32879/ N1921/ 5/ 38, Halifax to FO, 12 April 1942. 
928
 Ibid. 
929
 NA, FO371/ 32879/ N1968/ 5/ 38, Halifax to FO, 15 April 1942. 
 310 
Upon receiving this tacit American approval, instructions were sent to the Dominions 
Office to relay the contents of the draft treaties of the Anglo-Soviet agreement.
930
 
 The Anglo-Soviet Treaty was signed on 26 May 1942.  As F.S. Northedge and 
Audrey Wells have argued, from the Soviet point of view, the Anglo-Soviet alliance 
was a ‘makeshift arrangement reached with deadly foes and likely to last only so long 
as Hitler lived’.931  However, there was an air of optimism upon Molotov’s departure 
from London on 13 June.  Irrespective of whether British and Soviet statesmen 
believed at the time of its signature that the agreement was merely a temporary 
expedient, they had negotiated a treaty that was absolutely essential and which had 
linked the fates of Great Britain and the USSR for the duration of the war against 
Hitlerite Germany.  In his farewell message following the conclusion of the Treaty, 
Molotov had stated that he had ‘no doubt’ that it would form a ‘solid basis for the 
further development of friendly relations between our countries as Allies, and will 
contribute to the general cause of all freedom-loving peoples in time of war against 
Hitlerite Germany as well as in the post-war period’.932  Clark Kerr expressed his 
amazement over the evident change in Molotov’s attitude once the Commissar had 
returned home.  The ambassador informed Eden on 18 June that Molotov was ‘a 
much changed man’, and was ‘extremely friendly and almost sprightly’.933   
Unfortunately, much like in the immediate aftermath of the July Agreement in 
1941, this optimism was short-lived.  In a meeting with Clark Kerr on 25 July, 
Molotov raised the issue of a second front as ‘a matter of greater importance’ for his 
country.  The issue of the second front continued to dominate London’s relations with 
Moscow following the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, with the Soviets 
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repeatedly accusing the British that ‘mass protestations of friendship and admiration 
for Soviet resistance from official and unofficial comrades were no substitute for 
action’.934   
In spite of the difficulties that faced fruitful Anglo-Soviet rapprochement, one 
must not underestimate the significance and importance of the conclusion of the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty.  The alliance had been a necessary expedient ever since the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.  Its signature had marked the 
culmination of years of effort on the part of the Northern Department.  The long-
standing mutual distrust between Great Britain and the USSR had evidently been put 
to one side in order to defeat the common foe.  Although the alliance did not survive 
during the post-war period, Stalin’s cooperation was absolutely essential during the 
war and had marked for the first time ‘genuine peaceful coexistence’ in Anglo-Soviet 
relations.
935
  As Martin Kitchen has noted, the Soviet Union had become ‘a great ally 
without whose help the war in Europe could never have been won’.936 
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Conclusion. 
On 26 May 1942 Eden and Molotov signed the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, an 
instrument which, as Steven Merritt Miner has noted, ‘marked the culmination of a 
two-year quest by the British Government to build a closer relationship with the 
Soviet Union’.937  Although one cannot question this assertion, Miner omits the fact 
that the treaty also marked the culmination of two years of hard work on the part of 
the members of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, a body of men who 
were deeply involved on a daily basis in all significant aspects of Britain’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union and who thus had the often unfortunate and 
unenviable task of dealing with the difficult and mercurial Soviets. Their 
recommendations on policy were informed and at times contrary to the prevailing 
Foreign Office consensus on issues pertaining to the Soviet Union.  However, in and 
after 1941, with Christopher Warner at the helm, one can appreciate that a greater 
degree of weight was attached to the advice tendered by Northern Department 
officials.  A statement in February 1943 by Anthony Eden hinted at the influence that 
Warner in particular exerted on the Foreign Secretary.  In a communication to Clark 
Kerr, Eden expressed his belief that in order to secure Soviet cooperation in the post-
war settlement, it was ‘essential that His Majesty’s Government should on all possible 
occasions treat the Soviet Government as partners, and make a habit of discussing 
plans and views with them as a matter of course’, very much in keeping with 
Warner’s advice the year previously.938  Frank Roberts, the chargé d’affaires at the 
Moscow Embassy also adopted Warner’s suggestion in 1946.  Roberts believed that a 
policy of ‘reciprocity, of patience with firmness’ was crucial when dealing with the 
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Soviets.  This scramble to identify a coherent policy towards the USSR, raised first by 
Warner in 1942, served as the foundation for the sub-committee of the Cabinet Office 
that collated information and advised on matters relating to the Soviet Union.
939
  
Hence, the notion that the Northern Department constituted a ‘backwater’ in the 
Foreign Office is clearly erroneous.  The expert advice tendered by the men of the 
Northern Department during such an uneasy period was both well respected by the 
Foreign Secretary and formed the basis of future policy towards the USSR. Indeed, as 
Martin Folly notes, ‘the theme of Warner and others was calm, unexcited consistency, 
with patience and firmness’940 and it was readily agreed to be the best approach in any 
dealings with the Soviets. 
The response to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty within the Northern Department was 
rather detached and nonchalant, not least as it was widely believed that the hard work 
was just beginning for Great Britain.  Although now officially allied with the Soviet 
Union, the task of genuine cooperation and collaboration would not be an easy one.  
As Derek Watson argues, the exclusion of Stalin’s 1941 frontier claims from the 
terms of the treaty would continue to be a particular and persistent problem in Anglo-
Soviet relations.
941
  It was during Molotov’s visit to Washington that he finally 
secured American assurances over the opening of a second front in Europe.  Indeed, 
in a Soviet-American communiqué published on 12 June 1942 it had stated that ‘full 
agreement was reached on the issues of urgent tasks connected with the establishment 
of the Second Front in Europe in 1942’.942  Although this caused a good deal of 
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annoyance in Whitehall due to the lack of prior consultation, the British communiqué 
of 11 July contained identical wording to its Soviet-American predecessor.  It was 
regarded as essential to maintain a display of Anglo-American unity at that time.
943
  
However, it was not until 1944 that the Allies opened a second front in Europe.  This 
hesitancy and delay understandably caused a good deal of friction between Great 
Britain, America and the USSR.  
Sir Stafford Cripps’ response to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty was predictably 
emphatic and did not match the nonchalance displayed within the Northern 
Department.  In his letter to Archibald Clark Kerr on 12 June 1942 Cripps stated: 
 I believe now we are just reaping the results of a  
long and patient endeavour to get back the 
confidence of the Russians, a confidence which  
I think was encouraged by the complete 
frankness with which we dealt with them while I 
was in Moscow, and which, though they may 
appear to resent it at the moment, they do really 
appreciate.
944
   
 
Cripps continued to express his optimism by declaring that in the aftermath of the 
treaty Clark Kerr’s personal relationship with Stalin would be strengthened and that in 
turn would facilitate and promote continued cooperation between Great Britain and 
the USSR.
945
  For the most part, Clark Kerr agreed with the sentiments expressed by 
his predecessor.  In the weeks following the conclusion of the treaty, he wrote to 
Warner and spoke highly of Vyshinsky who had ‘done his best to be agreeable and 
friendly, both officially and unofficially’.946  Unfortunately for Clark Kerr, however, 
Vyshinsky was ‘a person of no great importance’.  In order to strengthen Anglo-
Soviet cooperation during the war, and in preparation for the post-war period, it 
would be necessary to cultivate the ‘football faced Molotov’ and his master. Clark 
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Kerr predicted that to be a mighty task, as he ‘doubted if Molotov could ever be at 
ease with any foreigner’, and considered it ‘impossible’ to get close to Stalin.947 
 In spite of the inevitable difficulties associated with the successful 
implementation of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, this does not diminish the 
immense achievement of attaining an agreement with the Soviet Government, a goal 
that had actively been pursued by the authorities in London since the outbreak of war 
in September 1939 and which had gained greater significance following the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.  Indeed, following the German invasion of 
the USSR, the debate within Whitehall over the desirability of rapprochement was 
null and void.  Hitler’s most recent act of aggression removed any doubt in the minds 
of policy-makers.  An Anglo-Soviet understanding was absolutely essential for both 
the London and Moscow.  At every level of the Foreign Office one can appreciate that 
rapprochement was actively and sincerely sought – from the clerks in the Northern 
Department to their Head, the Permanent Under-Secretary and his Deputy, and most 
importantly, the Foreign Secretary.  Following Operation Barbarossa there was a 
Foreign Office consensus on the future course of British foreign policy, one that was 
difficult to discern prior to June 1941 due to the sheer unpredictability of the 
international climate.    
In response to the arguments put forward by neo-revisionist historians, this 
thesis has consistently illustrated that British policy during the opening stages of the 
war was dictated purely by realpolitik and not by ideological antipathy towards the 
Soviets.  Although one certainly cannot argue against the existence of prejudice, to 
state that this barred the way to real collaboration between the two powers is to ignore 
the many examples to the contrary.   As Cadogan himself expressed, he loathed both 
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Communism and Nazism in equal measure and believed that both ideological 
doctrines were abhorrent.
948
  However much Cadogan and his colleagues disliked the 
Soviets at times, necessity dictated action.  As such, during the years 1939-1941, 
when Laurence Collier was head of department, there was most certainly a degree of 
disgust within the Northern Department at the recent actions of the USSR, which 
escalated to even higher degrees during the Winter War.  In spite of this, there was 
always the realisation that a breach with the USSR was simply not an option.   
That is not to say that the men of Whitehall advised any undue leniency in 
Britain’s dealings with the Soviet Union, and one most certainly cannot accuse British 
policy to be one of appeasement as any agreement was to be based on a quid pro quo, 
yet there was always an understanding that relations between London and Moscow 
had to be maintained.  To be sure, the alliance was a temporary expedient, but it was 
the only option open to His Majesty’s Government, unless they were prepared to 
sanction a German domination of the continent.  It was thus the immensity of the 
German threat that brought these two uncomfortable bedfellows together.  There was 
a vast ideological gulf between Great Britain and the USSR, and Nazi Germany was 
the bridge that temporarily brought the two unlikely partners together. 
On the day of the treaty’s signature the Prime Minister spoke jubilantly of 
Eden’s achievement in a War Cabinet meeting, praising the Foreign Secretary’s 
‘skilful handling of the negotiations and … the satisfactory result which has been 
achieved’.949  Although one cannot deny the centrality of Eden to the eventual 
successful outcome, the activities and advice of Northern Department officials 
throughout the entire process must not be overlooked.  The men of the Northern 
Department were highly intelligent and experienced members of the diplomatic 
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establishment whose advice and recommendations came as the result of years of 
experience within both the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service.  To reduce 
their significance in the policy-making process overlooks not merely the centrality of 
their contributions throughout this period but ignores the very fact that the structure of 
the Foreign Office was such that men of fairly junior rank could – and did – exert 
influence on the formulation of British policy towards the USSR.    
 Throughout this crucial period when British foreign policy was forced to 
remain fluid and evolve as the military and political situation altered with each fresh 
act of both German and Soviet aggression, the Northern Department had been at the 
heart of the debate surrounding Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union.  The 
advice tendered by the Northern Department illustrated the wisdom of its advice as 
well as its rational approach to diplomacy.  Should Britain fail to conclude an 
agreement with the Soviet Union and thereby earn Stalin’s respect, it was plausible 
that a Nazi-Soviet separate peace might be concluded.  That would have disastrous 
consequences for Great Britain as once again, much like in the period between the fall 
of France and Operation Barbarossa, Great Britain would be fighting alone.  Time 
was most certainly running out for His Majesty’s Government.  The contributions of 
the Northern Department men, particularly the contributions of Warner and Dew, 
represented a rational response to the situation at hand.  It was crucial that the war 
was won as quickly and comprehensively as possible, especially in lieu of American 
support. 
Hence, the input of figures such as Collier and Maclean, Warner and Dew, 
was essential to the formulation of Britain’s policy towards the Soviet Union.  
Although Anthony Eden undoubtedly deserved all the congratulations and praise 
heaped upon him following the signature of the Anglo-Soviet treaty, without the 
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valuable and, in turn, much valued advice tendered by the experienced and 
knowledgeable experts in Soviet affairs, British diplomacy during the opening stages 
of the war could have emerged with a wholly different turn.  An examination of the 
activities of the Northern Department provides a unique and insightful account of a 
vitally important period of the Second World War when the fate of Europe was 
precariously balanced on a knife-edge with National Socialism threatening the 
existence of all peace-loving countries.  In the endeavour to combat this threat the 
beleaguered officials of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office played 
their own hitherto somewhat neglected but undeniably significant part patiently and 
assiduously in circumstances that were frequently frustrating and difficult. In so doing 
they made a considerable contribution to the cause of Anglo-Soviet understanding 
which was itself an important factor in the final defeat of Hitlerism. 
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